Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The map of the international system is changing faster than its institutions can keep up. On September 16, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed that Canada become the European Union’s first “associate member,” an unprecedented status that does not currently exist in the EU treaties. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who was present in Strasbourg for von der Leyen’s State of the Union address, has been arguing for a deeper European-Canadian relationship as part of what he describes as a new strategic reality. The proposal does not amount to Canadian EU membership, nor does it create a new European state across the Atlantic. But its political significance is larger than the legal formula suggests. It represents an attempt by two traditional American allies to construct greater strategic room for maneuver at a moment when the assumptions underpinning the post-Cold War order are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Carney's earlier warning that the international system was experiencing a “rupture” rather than a normal transition is therefore becoming increasingly relevant. The question is not whether Canada is geographically European. It obviously is not. The question is whether geography remains as decisive in defining strategic communities as it once was. The European Union itself has always combined geography with institutions, law, economic integration and political identity. Yet the contemporary security environment is forcing Europe to think beyond the geographical boundaries that historically defined its political imagination. Canada, meanwhile, is confronting the strategic consequences of its extraordinary economic dependence on the United States and is seeking alternatives without abandoning its North American identity. The result is something more interesting than a prospective “28th EU member”: it is an experiment in whether political geography can be partially overcome by strategic necessity.

The proposal is particularly significant because Canada is not simply another distant trading partner. Canada is a G7 economy, a NATO member, a major energy and natural-resources producer, an Arctic power and a long-standing partner of European democracies. The EU and Canada already possess extensive institutional links, including the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, while security cooperation has been expanding. In June 2026, the EU Council formally concluded an agreement allowing Canadian companies and Canadian-origin products to participate in procurement under the EU's Security Action for Europe instrument, making Canada the first non-European country to participate in SAFE. The EU and Canada had already signed a Security and Defence Partnership in 2025.

In a development that adds a new layer to the emerging Canada–Europe realignment, U.S. President Donald Trump warned that Washington could impose “very serious tariffs” or restrict trade with the European Union if Brussels proceeds with its proposal to give Canada associate-member status, calling the initiative potentially “hostile” while leaving open the possibility that tariffs would follow if he judged its intentions negatively. Yahoo Finance report on Trump’s tariff warning Reuters likewise reported that Trump described the proposal as “laughable” and threatened “very heavy tariffs” if he considered it a hostile act, underscoring how the initiative could further complicate already strained transatlantic economic relations

This means the latest proposal did not emerge from nowhere. It is better understood as the political expression of a relationship that has been gradually becoming more strategic. The European Union is looking for partners capable of contributing to defense, energy, critical minerals, technology and economic resilience. Canada possesses many of those assets. Canada, meanwhile, is looking for ways to reduce the risks associated with excessive dependence on the United States. The emerging relationship is therefore based not simply on shared democratic values but on increasingly concrete strategic complementarities.

That distinction matters because the international system is moving away from an era in which formal alliances alone determined strategic alignment. The new system increasingly consists of overlapping networks. Countries cooperate on defense without becoming formal allies in every theater. They join economic institutions without accepting complete political integration. They coordinate on critical minerals while competing in other sectors. They participate in security initiatives while maintaining relationships with countries on opposing sides of geopolitical disputes. The result is neither a return to the rigid blocs of the Cold War nor a continuation of the relatively comfortable globalization of the 1990s and early 2000s. It is something more fluid. Canada is becoming an unusually important test case for this emerging system.

The Geography Problem

The most obvious objection to a European-Canadian partnership is geographical. Canada is separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean and is physically integrated into North America. Its economy has been deeply intertwined with the United States for generations. Its supply chains, transportation networks, energy infrastructure and consumer markets have developed overwhelmingly in a North American framework.

This geography explains why the European idea is so unusual. But geography has never been static in international politics. Railways, maritime trade, aviation, telecommunications, digital infrastructure and financial networks have repeatedly transformed the strategic meaning of distance. The Atlantic Ocean once separated political communities that now regard themselves as part of a shared transatlantic security system. Australia and New Zealand are geographically distant from Europe but remain deeply embedded in Western security networks. Japan and South Korea are geographically Asian but participate in extensive political and security arrangements with European states.

The question is therefore not whether Canada is physically European. It is whether Europe and Canada can construct a sufficiently dense institutional relationship that geography becomes less important than strategic interdependence. The answer remains uncertain.

The proposed “associate member” status is precisely where the difficulty begins. Reuters reported that the term has no existing basis in EU treaties and that its practical meaning remains undefined. A closer relationship could involve defense, energy, technology, research, critical minerals, trade or regulatory alignment, but each of these areas raises separate institutional questions. The EU has spent decades constructing a legal architecture in which membership, candidacy, association and participation in the Single Market carry specific meanings. Creating a new category for Canada would therefore require political and legal innovation.

There is also a question of precedent. If Canada receives a new category of privileged relationship, other European partners may ask why they should accept more demanding arrangements. Candidate countries in the Western Balkans have spent years undertaking reforms to move toward EU membership. Norway and other non-EU European states have developed their own deep relationships with the Union. The creation of a privileged transatlantic category could therefore complicate the EU's existing architecture rather than simply expanding it.

This is why the Canadian proposal should not be interpreted as an imminent expansion of the European Union across the Atlantic. It is better understood as an experiment in institutional flexibility. The EU is attempting to answer a strategic question: can it build a deeper political and security community without formally expanding its territorial membership?

Europe Without the United States?

The most important actor in this story is not Canada or even the European Union. It is the United States. The emerging Canada-EU relationship is not officially designed as an anti-American alliance. Von der Leyen explicitly framed the partnership as a means of strengthening common capabilities rather than targeting another country. Yet the context is unmistakable. The United States has become a less predictable partner for both Canada and Europe under President Donald Trump, while trade disputes and disagreements over security commitments have encouraged both sides to consider how much strategic dependence they are prepared to tolerate. Reuters reported on September 17 that Trump had already threatened severe tariffs or restrictions on European trade if the Canadian initiative were perceived as hostile to American interests. This reaction itself demonstrates the geopolitical importance of the proposal.

If the initiative were merely symbolic, Washington would have little reason to treat it as strategically consequential. The fact that the White House has reacted so sharply indicates that the structure of transatlantic economic and political relationships is being renegotiated in real time. Yet Europe is not necessarily trying to replace the United States.

The more important possibility is that Europe is attempting to reduce the extent to which its security depends upon American willingness to provide leadership. The European Commission's State of the Union address also proposed a European Security Council involving EU states and partners including Britain, Norway, Ukraine and Canada. That proposal fits into a wider European effort to develop greater capacity in defense and crisis management while retaining NATO as a central component of European security. Canada is responding in parallel.

On September 16, Canada's government announced its application to join the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force, a European military coalition of ten NATO countries. The move illustrates that Canada's European pivot is not confined to trade or political symbolism. It is increasingly connected to defense relationships, military cooperation and strategic diversification. This produces a paradox.

The more Europe seeks strategic autonomy, the more it needs capable partners. The more Canada seeks to diversify away from excessive dependence on the United States, the more it needs alternative markets, security networks and political relationships. The interests of the two sides are therefore converging precisely because the old structure is becoming less reliable.

From Alliances to Networks

The emerging Canada-Europe relationship illustrates a broader transformation in international politics. During the Cold War, geopolitical alignment was relatively easy to understand. States belonged to identifiable blocs, and military alliances reflected broader ideological divisions. After the Cold War, the United States became the dominant global power and international institutions expanded within an environment of American primacy and economic globalization. Neither model adequately describes the emerging system.

Today's international politics increasingly resembles a network of overlapping partnerships. Countries can cooperate with Washington and Beijing simultaneously. They can maintain NATO membership while developing autonomous European defense initiatives. They can trade heavily with China while attempting to reduce strategic dependence on Chinese technology. They can cooperate with Iran while maintaining security partnerships with the United States.

The recent KPA analysis, Kurdistan in the Emerging World Order: From Autonomy to Strategic Agency, examined precisely this transformation. The central argument was that the international system is not simply moving from one hegemon to another. Instead, states and political entities are increasingly attempting to construct strategic agency within a more fragmented distribution of power. The Canada-EU initiative provides another illustration of the same phenomenon.

The important question is therefore no longer simply: Who is your ally? It is increasingly: How many strategic options do you possess? That is the logic of strategic diversification.

Canada's dependence on the United States created extraordinary economic advantages for decades. But dependence also creates vulnerability when political relations deteriorate. Europe has experienced a parallel problem in security. Its dependence on American military capabilities was efficient when transatlantic political assumptions were stable. It becomes more problematic when Washington's long-term commitments are questioned. Both Canada and Europe are therefore searching for alternatives. This is not necessarily the abandonment of old alliances. It is the construction of additional options.

The Resource Dimension

Economics makes the relationship even more significant. Canada possesses energy resources, critical minerals, agricultural capacity, technological expertise and vast territory. Europe possesses a massive consumer market, sophisticated industrial capabilities, advanced research institutions and regulatory power. Both are attempting to strengthen resilience in sectors increasingly defined as strategic rather than merely commercial. Critical minerals are particularly important.

The transition toward electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy, advanced electronics, artificial intelligence infrastructure and defense technology is increasing the importance of secure access to minerals and industrial inputs. The EU has already adjusted its strategic approach to critical raw materials because demand for base metals, battery materials and rare earths is expected to increase across energy, defense, technology and manufacturing sectors. Canada's resource base therefore has geopolitical significance beyond traditional energy exports. The same logic applies to energy.

Europe's experience with dependence on Russian energy demonstrated that commercial interdependence can become a strategic vulnerability. A more diversified energy relationship with Canada could help Europe broaden its supplier base, while European capital and technology could support Canadian energy and infrastructure projects. The relationship could consequently become an economic-security partnership rather than simply a trade relationship. That distinction is central to the emerging international order.

Increasingly, the most strategically valuable commodities are not only oil and gas. They include data, computing capacity, semiconductors, critical minerals, energy infrastructure, transportation corridors, advanced manufacturing and technological standards. Power is increasingly embedded in infrastructure.

The Middle-Power Moment

Carney's argument that middle powers need to act together is therefore more consequential than the Canada-EU proposal itself. Middle powers traditionally operated within systems dominated by great powers. Their influence depended largely on their ability to build coalitions, exploit institutional rules and maintain relationships with larger states.

That remains true, but the opportunities are changing. If great-power competition intensifies, middle powers become more valuable because large powers need partners. The United States needs European allies. Europe needs Canada and Britain. China needs trading partners. India seeks strategic autonomy while balancing major powers. Gulf states are expanding diplomatic relationships across competing camps. Turkey is developing independent regional influence while maintaining relationships with NATO, Russia, Europe, the Gulf and Asia. The world is consequently becoming less hierarchical and more networked.

This is also the central argument of KPA's analysis of the new geopolitical map. The international system is increasingly characterized by overlapping partnerships rather than fixed blocs. States seek enough relationships that no single external actor can easily dictate their strategic choices. Canada is now attempting to do precisely that.

What Does This Mean for Kurdistan?

The Canadian example has direct relevance to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Kurdistan is obviously not comparable to Canada in terms of sovereignty, economic scale or international legal status. But the strategic problem is surprisingly similar: how does a geographically important political entity preserve room for maneuver when larger powers surround it?

The Kurdistan Region sits between Iraq, Türkiye, Iran and Syria. It possesses energy infrastructure, strategic geography, a substantial diaspora, international relationships and a long record of cooperation with Western governments. Yet those assets become leverage only when they are converted into institutional capability. That is the central argument of From Autonomy to Agency: Kurdistan's Next Strategic Transformation.

The Canadian experience demonstrates why diversification matters.

Canada cannot move its geography. It cannot stop being adjacent to the United States. It cannot simply substitute Europe for America overnight. What it can do is increase the number of relationships through which it can pursue its interests. Kurdistan faces a comparable strategic constraint.

It cannot change its neighbors. It cannot remove Iraq from its political geography. It cannot eliminate Türkiye's security interests, Iran's regional influence or Washington's strategic importance. But it can increase the number and quality of its external relationships.

That is why the idea of Kurdistan as a geopolitical crossroads matters. Geography becomes leverage only when several actors have an interest in preserving access to the same territory, infrastructure, markets or political relationship. A diversified Kurdistan would not need to choose between Washington, Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran, Europe, the Gulf and Asia. It would need to build institutional relationships with all of them while preventing excessive dependence on any one. That is strategic agency. The same logic applies to Iraq.

KPA's analysis of Turkey and Iraq's emerging partnership argued that Baghdad's strategic challenge is to prevent geographic centrality from becoming strategic dependency. Iraq sits between Iran, Türkiye, the Gulf and the wider Western system. Its geography can become either a vulnerability or a source of bargaining power. The same is true for Kurdistan within Iraq. Connectivity projects, energy corridors and trade routes are not simply economic infrastructure. They are instruments of strategic power.

Continental Drift

The phrase “continental drift” may therefore be more useful than “European expansion.” The continents themselves are not moving. Strategic communities are.

Canada is physically in North America but increasingly constructing political and security relationships across the Atlantic. Europe remains geographically European but is developing partnerships that extend beyond the continent's traditional political boundaries. Britain left the EU but remains deeply embedded in European security. Norway remains outside the EU while being closely integrated into European economic and security structures. Ukraine is geographically European and increasingly central to European strategic thinking without yet being an EU member.

The boundaries of Europe are consequently becoming less straightforward. This does not mean geography has become irrelevant. Quite the opposite. Geography still determines trade routes, military logistics, energy infrastructure and strategic vulnerability. But geography no longer determines political community by itself.

Institutions can cross oceans. Supply chains can cross continents. Security networks can cross borders. Digital infrastructure can make distance strategically less significant. And geopolitical shocks can rapidly transform relationships that once appeared permanent. The Canada-EU proposal is therefore part of a much larger story: the reorganization of political space around strategic networks.

The Limits of the Experiment

There are, however, serious limits. Canada cannot simply replace the United States with Europe. The American market remains deeply integrated with Canada's economy. Physical infrastructure, supply chains and geography cannot be redesigned overnight. European markets are important, but increasing Canadian exports to Europe would require major investment in transportation, logistics and industrial capacity. Nor can Europe suddenly substitute Canada for the United States in defense.

Canada is a valuable military partner, but European strategic autonomy requires European states themselves to invest in capabilities, industrial production, intelligence, logistics, air defense and military readiness. The EU also faces internal political constraints.

Twenty-seven governments have different strategic cultures and national interests. Some will see closer Canadian integration as an opportunity. Others may question why a non-European country should receive a special status when European candidates have faced lengthy accession processes. The legal uncertainty surrounding “associate membership” will have to be resolved before the political symbolism can become institutional reality.

There is another danger. If diversification becomes defined primarily as opposition to Washington, it could reproduce the same dependency it is intended to overcome. The objective of strategic autonomy is not to exchange one dependency for another. It is to increase choice. That distinction should remain at the center of the Canada-EU experiment.

The New Geography of Strategic Agency

The deeper lesson is therefore not that Canada is becoming European. It is that the meaning of strategic geography is changing. The international system is increasingly organized around corridors, networks, institutions, markets, technologies and security partnerships that do not correspond neatly to territorial boundaries.

A country can be geographically distant but strategically close. A neighbor can be politically distant but economically indispensable. A non-member can become deeply integrated into an institution without joining it. And a state can remain formally sovereign while becoming highly dependent on another power. This is why the emerging world order cannot be understood simply through maps of alliances.

It must be understood through maps of dependence. Who supplies your energy? Who controls your critical technologies? Where do your exports go? Who provides your security? Which markets can absorb your products? Which institutions can you influence? How many alternatives do you possess if one relationship deteriorates? These questions increasingly define strategic autonomy. The Canada-EU experiment is significant because it attempts to answer them through institutional innovation. Canada is seeking more strategic options. Europe is seeking more strategic capacity.

The United States is discovering that its traditional partners increasingly want greater room for maneuver. And middle powers are discovering that they may possess more collective leverage when they coordinate rather than act individually. This is the world that Carney described when he argued that middle powers must act together. It is also the world in which Kurdistan, Iraq and other strategically located but non-great powers must learn to operate.

The emerging international order will not necessarily be defined by the creation of one new bloc. It may instead be defined by the creation of many overlapping networks. The Canaduropean Union, if it ever acquires institutional form, would therefore be less important as a new European membership category than as a symbol of this broader transformation.

The Atlantic is not disappearing. North America is not becoming Europe. The European Union is not becoming a global state. But the strategic distance between Canada and Europe is shrinking. That is what continental drift means in geopolitical terms. The world is reorganizing not only around where countries are, but around whom they need, what they can provide and how many choices they possess.

For Canada, that means reducing vulnerability created by excessive dependence on one neighbor. For Europe, it means developing strategic capacity without abandoning transatlantic cooperation. For the United States, it means recognizing that allies with greater strategic autonomy are not necessarily less valuable allies. For middle powers, it means discovering the collective power of coordination.

And for Kurdistan, the lesson is particularly direct: geography can create opportunity, but only institutions can turn geography into agency. The international order is not simply drifting. It is being rewired. The countries and political entities that understand this early will have more options when the next geopolitical shock arrives.

The ones that remain dependent on a single market, a single security guarantor, a single corridor or a single external patron will discover that geography can be both an asset and a trap. The Canada-EU experiment therefore deserves attention not because Canada is about to become Europe's 28th state, but because it reveals something much larger about the future of international politics.

The age of fixed geopolitical blocs is giving way to an age of strategic networks. And in that world, the most important question may no longer be where you belong. It may be how many places you can belong to at once.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent publication focused on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, Türkiye, regional security, energy geopolitics and the transformation of the Middle East.

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