What happens to Iraq and Kurdistan after the American security umbrella disappears? Iraq and Kurdistan enter a new security era as US forces withdraw, ISIS remains active and regional power competition intensifies.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

29 September 2026

The withdrawal of the remaining U.S.-led coalition forces from Iraq by September 30 marks more than the end of an American military presence. It marks the beginning of a new security phase in which Iraq and the Kurdistan Region will carry a greater share of the responsibility for containing threats that, for more than a decade, have been managed with substantial American military, intelligence, surveillance and air-support capabilities.

The significance of the withdrawal therefore cannot be measured simply by the number of American soldiers leaving Iraq. The more important question is what happens to the security architecture that developed around their presence.

Iraq is not the Iraq of 2011, and the Islamic State is not the organization that seized large parts of the country in 2014. Iraqi security institutions are considerably more experienced, the Peshmerga have extensive counter-ISIS experience, and the territorial caliphate has been defeated. Yet the conditions surrounding the withdrawal are unusually complicated. ISIS cells remain active, Iran-backed armed groups retain substantial influence, Baghdad-Erbil security arrangements remain incomplete, and the Kurdistan Region faces continuing missile and drone threats while lacking an independent air-defence system comparable to the capabilities previously provided by the coalition.

The central security question after September 30 is therefore not whether Iraq will immediately collapse into another 2014. There is little evidence to support such a conclusion. The more serious question is whether Iraq and the Kurdistan Region can prevent the gradual emergence of security gaps that different armed actors could exploit.

The End of an External Security Layer

The American role in Iraq developed into several overlapping functions. The coalition provided counterterrorism assistance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, logistical support, training and, in critical circumstances, air power. In the Kurdistan Region, American and coalition capabilities also contributed to the protection of strategic facilities and helped create a deterrent against missile and drone attacks.

The withdrawal therefore removes a security layer rather than simply removing foreign troops.

This distinction is particularly important for Kurdistan. Kurdish officials have warned that the withdrawal is taking place without an adequate replacement for the air-defence capabilities previously available through the coalition. The Kurdistan Region's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs has described the timing as a concern because of the wider regional security environment.

The problem is not necessarily that the Peshmerga are incapable of protecting the Kurdistan Region. The problem is that the Peshmerga are primarily a ground force confronting a security environment increasingly shaped by drones, missiles, long-range weapons and airspace violations.

This creates a strategic asymmetry.

Kurdistan possesses considerable experience in ground security and counterterrorism, but the removal of an external air-defence and intelligence layer creates a capability gap that cannot be solved simply by increasing the number of ground troops.

For Baghdad, the same challenge exists at a national level. Iraq is now expected to demonstrate that its own security institutions can maintain counterterrorism capabilities without the previous level of coalition support. The new U.S.-Iraq relationship is expected to shift toward bilateral cooperation, including advisory, training and intelligence-sharing arrangements, rather than the previous coalition military mission.

The transition is therefore not from American security to no security. It is from a multinational security architecture toward a predominantly Iraqi one.

The effectiveness of that transition will be one of the defining security questions of the coming period.

ISIS Has Not Returned to 2014

The renewed discussion of ISIS has understandably generated comparisons with 2014. Such comparisons are useful only if their limits are recognized.

ISIS today does not possess the territorial control, military capacity or organizational strength that allowed it to seize Mosul and large areas of Iraq and Syria. Its remaining presence is primarily based on small cells, difficult terrain, clandestine networks and asymmetric attacks.

That does not make the organization irrelevant.

In the days immediately preceding the American withdrawal, Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service forces fought ISIS remnants around Altun Kupri, on the strategic road between Kirkuk and Erbil. Two suspected ISIS suicide bombers were killed and another suspect was arrested. The operation demonstrates both sides of the current security equation: ISIS retains the ability to operate in northern Iraq, while Iraqi forces retain the ability to locate and strike its cells.

This is why the most realistic assessment is not that ISIS is preparing to recreate its 2014 territorial project.

Its more immediate strategic value lies in its ability to exploit gaps.

ISIS does not need to control Mosul to create insecurity. It needs remote areas where security responsibility is fragmented, intelligence is incomplete and military forces cannot maintain continuous presence.

That makes the areas surrounding Kirkuk, Hamrin, Makhmour and other parts of the disputed territories particularly important.

The danger is therefore less a conventional ISIS offensive and more the persistence of an insurgency capable of exploiting institutional weaknesses.

The Disputed Territories Remain the Critical Security Space

The geography between federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region represents one of the most complicated security environments in the country.

The disputed territories are not simply a political dispute between Baghdad and Erbil. They also contain mountains, rural areas, agricultural communities, former ISIS operating zones and areas where security responsibilities have historically overlapped.

This creates precisely the kind of environment in which an organization such as ISIS can survive.

A terrorist organization does not require a vacuum covering an entire province. A collection of small gaps can be sufficient.

If Iraqi forces control one area and Kurdish forces control another, but coordination between them is weak, militants can exploit the spaces between them. If intelligence is held separately rather than shared rapidly, the tactical advantage can shift toward clandestine organizations.

This makes Baghdad-Erbil security cooperation increasingly important after the coalition withdrawal.

The most important security question for the disputed territories is therefore not necessarily which side controls a particular piece of territory. It is whether the two security systems can operate together effectively enough to deny ISIS the spaces in between.

The recent Altun Kupri operation is significant precisely because it demonstrates how closely the security of Kirkuk and the Kurdistan Region is connected. The location lies on a major route linking Kirkuk with Erbil, making instability there relevant to both federal Iraq and Kurdistan.

Iran and ISIS Represent Different Security Challenges

Another important analytical distinction is between ISIS and Iran-aligned armed groups.

They should not be treated as interchangeable threats.

ISIS is an insurgent organization operating outside the state.

Iran-aligned armed groups are embedded to varying degrees within Iraq's political and security structures while maintaining independent military capabilities and external relationships.

The U.S. withdrawal changes the strategic environment for both.

For ISIS, the concern is the loss of some intelligence, surveillance, logistics and air-support capabilities.

For Iran-aligned groups, the change is primarily about the balance of power inside Iraq.

Iranian influence in Iraq has never depended solely on the presence or absence of American troops. It is embedded in political parties, armed organizations, economic networks and long-standing relationships.

The American departure nevertheless removes an important counterweight.

Reuters reported on September 29 that Iranian-aligned groups regard the withdrawal as strategically advantageous, while Iraqi and Kurdish officials have expressed concern about the consequences for the country's security balance.

This does not mean that Iraq is becoming an Iranian-controlled state.

Iraq remains a competitive political system with multiple centers of power and interests. Baghdad has its own interests, Kurdish political actors retain significant autonomy, Sunni political forces remain important, and Iraqi institutions continue to resist the complete displacement of state authority.

The more immediate issue is whether armed groups can increasingly exercise security influence independently of the formal state chain of command.

That question is already unresolved.

The government's effort to bring armed factions under greater state control has also encountered resistance, with the timetable for disarmament moving beyond the September deadline.

Consequently, October 1 will not mark the disappearance of the militia problem.

It will expose the Iraqi state to a new test: whether sovereignty can be strengthened while powerful armed organizations remain part of the country's political-security structure.

Kurdistan's Security Environment Is Becoming More Complex

The Kurdistan Region faces an unusually complicated combination of security pressures.

ISIS remains active in areas close to the Region.

Iran retains the capability to conduct missile and drone operations.

Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups remain part of the wider Iraqi security landscape.

Turkey continues its military campaign against the PKK.

Baghdad-Erbil relations remain unresolved on several strategic questions.

And the Kurdistan Region has only recently begun the difficult process of bringing its party-aligned Peshmerga formations under a unified institutional command.

The Peshmerga unification process is therefore strategically important.

A more unified Peshmerga structure would give Kurdistan a stronger institutional basis for confronting security threats. But unification must ultimately be measured by command, intelligence, logistics, deployment and operational coordination rather than simply by administrative declarations.

This is particularly important after the American withdrawal.

For years, external support partially compensated for institutional fragmentation. The new environment places greater pressure on Kurdish institutions to demonstrate that they can coordinate security independently while maintaining effective cooperation with Baghdad.

The Kurdistan Region's security future will consequently depend not only on the strength of its military forces but also on the quality of its institutions.

The Most Important Risk Is Fragmentation

The central security problem emerging after the U.S. withdrawal is therefore not one particular actor.

It is fragmentation.

Iraq now has to manage several security systems simultaneously: federal forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces, the Counter-Terrorism Service, Kurdish security institutions and the Peshmerga, alongside various local security structures.

The existence of multiple forces does not automatically create instability. The problem arises when responsibilities overlap without effective coordination.

That is where ISIS has historically benefited.

The organization has repeatedly demonstrated that it can survive by exploiting difficult terrain, local grievances, weak governance and gaps between security forces.

The same principle applies to other armed actors, although their political objectives are fundamentally different.

A fragmented security environment creates opportunities not only for terrorist organizations but also for armed groups seeking greater political or military influence.

The strategic objective for Iraq after September 30 should therefore be straightforward: prevent the withdrawal from producing an institutional security vacuum.

That requires intelligence continuity, counterterrorism cooperation, airspace awareness, effective border security and close Baghdad-Erbil coordination.

It also requires maintaining the international partnerships that can provide training, intelligence and technical assistance even after the end of the coalition's military mission.

Iraq Is Not Returning to 2014—But the Lessons of 2014 Remain Relevant

The comparison with 2014 should therefore be handled carefully.

Iraq's security institutions are not the institutions that collapsed in Mosul.

The Peshmerga are not the force they were before the ISIS war.

The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service has accumulated extensive operational experience.

ISIS no longer possesses the territorial infrastructure of its former caliphate.

And the Iraqi state has considerably more experience in identifying and disrupting ISIS networks.

These differences matter.

But the lesson of 2014 was not simply that ISIS was powerful.

The deeper lesson was that security institutions can fail rapidly when political fragmentation, institutional weakness, military disengagement and an organized insurgency converge at the same time.

That lesson remains relevant.

The objective now should therefore not be to prevent an imagined repetition of 2014 in every detail.

It should be to prevent the conditions that allowed a relatively weakened insurgency to become a much larger national security crisis.

The Security Transition Ahead

The first months after September 30 will therefore be important less because of any single dramatic event than because they will reveal whether Iraq's security institutions can absorb the responsibilities previously supported by the coalition.

Several indicators deserve close attention.

The first is the frequency and geographical distribution of ISIS attacks.

The second is the security situation around Kirkuk, Hamrin, Makhmour and the disputed territories.

The third is the level of operational cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil.

The fourth is Iraq's ability to maintain intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities without direct coalition support.

The fifth is the development of Iraqi and Kurdish air-defence capabilities.

The sixth is the behaviour of Iran-aligned armed groups and the government's ability to maintain weapons under state authority.

The seventh is whether Peshmerga unification becomes operationally meaningful.

These indicators will provide a much more useful picture of Iraq's security trajectory than dramatic comparisons with 2014.

Conclusion: A More Difficult Security Era

The American withdrawal from Iraq does not automatically create a security vacuum.

But it removes an important security layer at a particularly complicated moment.

ISIS remains weaker than it was in 2014 but has demonstrated that it can continue operating through clandestine cells and exploit difficult security environments. Iran-aligned armed groups remain influential within Iraq's political and security system. The Kurdistan Region faces a particular vulnerability because the departure of coalition forces also removes important air-defence and intelligence capabilities while the wider region remains exposed to missile, drone and militant threats.

The most realistic outlook is therefore neither imminent collapse nor a return to the pre-2014 security order.

Iraq is entering a more nationally owned but more demanding security environment.

The principal challenge will be whether Iraqi and Kurdish institutions can replace the functions of the departing coalition without reproducing the institutional fragmentation that previously allowed armed actors to exploit gaps in state authority.

For Kurdistan, the challenge is even more direct. The Region must strengthen its own defence capacity, advance Peshmerga institutional unification, improve intelligence coordination and maintain a functional security relationship with Baghdad while preserving its ability to respond to threats from ISIS and other regional actors.

The future of Iraqi security will ultimately depend less on whether American troops remain physically present and more on whether the Iraqi state and the Kurdistan Region can build a security architecture capable of operating without an external military umbrella.

The American withdrawal is therefore not the end of Iraq's security partnership with the United States. It is the beginning of a much harder test of Iraq's ability to provide its own security.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is Founder and Director of Kurdish Policy Analysis and a researcher specializing in Iraq, Kurdistan, regional security and Middle Eastern geopolitics.