Who really controls Kurdistan’s gas? The Dana Gas deal, the KRG’s silence and the hidden cost of selling energy to Iraq

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By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis      A $2.239 billion arbitration settlement, a contract running until 2049, expanded rights for Pearl Petroleum and a new battle over gas sales to Baghdad are raising uncomfortable questions about who ultimately controls Kurdistan’s most strategic natural resource. The latest dispute over Khor Mor gas is exposing a much deeper problem in the Kurdistan Region’s energy sector: the public still does not appear to have a clear picture of who controls the region’s gas, who is authorized to sell it, and how much of its future value has already been committed to private companies. At the center of the controversy is Pearl Petroleum, the consortium led by Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum, and a settlement agreement reached with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on August 30, 2017. Kurdistan Parliament member Kawa Sheikh Ali has now sharply criticized that agreement, asking why a government would effectively commit its natural ...

Ali Al-Zaidi and Iraq's Leadership Test: Can a System Insider Reform the System?

 



Iraq's New Prime Minister Faces an Old Problem

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj, Sulaimani, Iraq, 1st May , 2026 ---Ali Al-Zaidi's nomination as Iraq's next prime minister tells us something profound about how power still operates in Baghdad: ideology matters, geopolitics matters, but elite self-preservation matters most.

For most Iraqis, Zaidi emerged from relative obscurity. For Iraq's ruling class, however, he is anything but unknown. His deep connections across Iraq's political and business networks made him an attractive compromise candidate precisely because he poses little threat to the system that elevated him. That may be exactly the problem.

Beyond the False Choice: Washington or Tehran?

Much of the immediate commentary has fallen into a familiar trap: Is Zaidi pro-American or pro-Iranian? It is the wrong question. Iraq's post-2003 history demonstrates that every prime minister, regardless of ideological leanings, must maintain a delicate balance between Washington and Tehran. Geography alone makes this unavoidable. The real question is simpler and far more consequential:

Can Ali Al-Zaidi be pro-Iraq?

A genuinely pro-Iraq leader would prioritize state-building over faction-building, institutions over patronage, and national interests over coalition maintenance. That is a far higher standard.

What Iraq Actually Needs

Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani articulated Iraq's national aspiration clearly in 2024: a country defined by security, stability, progress, and prosperity. Achieving that vision requires three essential pillars:

  • Strong and independent institutions
  • Genuine rule of law
  • Peaceful and predictable transfers of power

These are not abstract ideals. They are the foundations upon which successful states are built. As Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued in Why Nations Fail, nations prosper when institutions constrain arbitrary power and serve the public rather than private networks. Iraq still struggles on all three fronts.

The Contradiction at the Heart of Zaidi's Nomination

Ali Al-Zaidi's rise embodies Iraq's central contradictionHe is a product of the very political economy that has prevented Iraq from developing durable institutions. In Iraq, major commercial success rarely occurs independently of political sponsorship. Government contracts, procurement, and large-scale investment are deeply intertwined with elite networks, patronage, and informal influence.

That does not automatically disqualify Zaidi. But it raises an unavoidable question: Can someone who thrived under a flawed system genuinely dismantle its incentives? History suggests such transformations are exceedingly rare.

Integrity: Iraq's Most Scarce Commodity

In countries where institutions remain weak, personal character becomes a matter of national importance. When legal constraints fail, integrity becomes the final barrier against abuse. When oversight is absent, conscience becomes the only effective check on power. Iraq does not merely need a competent administrator. It needs a leader willing to subordinate personal, factional, and commercial interests to the state. That is an extraordinarily demanding test.

Stability vs Transformation

Zaidi may prove capable of managing Iraq's immediate crises. He may stabilize public finances, navigate regional tensions, and maintain elite consensus. But crisis management is not state-building. Iraq has had many managers. What it has lacked is a reformer capable of confronting the structures that perpetuate dysfunction. The Coordination Framework did not select Zaidi to wage war against the system. It selected him to preserve it. Whether he ultimately transcends that role remains the defining question of his premiership.

The Verdict Will Come Quickly

The Coordination Framework has promised to build "the state on sound foundations." Iraqis have heard such promises before. The real test will not be Zaidi's rhetoric, but his willingness to challenge the networks that brought him to power. A prime minister can either serve the state or serve the system. In Iraq, doing both has proven nearly impossible.

#Iraq #AliAlZaidi #Baghdad #MiddleEast #Geopolitics #IraqiPolitics #Iran #UnitedStates #Governance #Kurdistan



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