Kurdish Disunity Crisis: KDP and PUK and Kurdish Influence in Iraq Collapses

Veteran Kurdish politician Hoshyar Zebari says deepening KDP–PUK divisions are weakening Kurdish leverage in Baghdad and Washington, while the United States grows increasingly frustrated with political paralysis in the Kurdistan Region.

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Sulaimani, Iraqi Kurdistan — 26 May 2026 

Senior Kurdish politician Hoshyar Zebari warns that divisions between the KDP and PUK are weakening Kurdish power in Baghdad and Washington as the US pressures Kurdish leaders to unite, reform the Peshmerga, and end political paralysis in the Kurdistan Region.

For decades, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was viewed in Washington as America’s most reliable ally in Iraq — a stable pro-Western enclave surrounded by regional chaos, Iranian influence, and collapsing Arab political systems.

Today, that image is beginning to fracture.

In unusually blunt remarks during a lengthy interview in Washington, veteran Kurdish politician Hoshyar Zebari delivered a warning that many Kurdish officials privately acknowledge but rarely state publicly: Kurdish political disunity is rapidly eroding Kurdish influence in both Baghdad and Washington.

The message from American officials, Zebari said, was unmistakable.

The United States still supports a strong Kurdistan Region within a federal Iraq — but patience is running out.

After nearly two weeks of meetings with officials tied to President Donald Trump’s administration, Congress, the National Security Council, and major think tanks, Zebari said Kurdish leaders were repeatedly told that Washington sees Kurdish unity as essential for continued strategic cooperation.

“The reason is the Kurdish division and disunity,” Zebari admitted. “If we can solve that, I think all the other problems will be solved as well.”

His comments expose a growing geopolitical reality: the Kurdish issue is no longer merely an internal Kurdish dispute over ministries and power-sharing. It is becoming a strategic liability affecting Iraq’s stability, American military planning, and the balance of power across the Middle East.

Washington’s Frustration Is Growing

The immediate source of American frustration is the failure of Kurdish parties to form a government nearly 18 months after parliamentary elections.

The October 2024 Kurdistan elections produced a fragmented political map. The ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party won 39 seats, while the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan secured 23 seats in the 100-seat parliament.

But instead of producing a coalition government, the elections deepened mistrust between the two dominant Kurdish factions.

Negotiations collapsed repeatedly over cabinet posts, security control, governance mechanisms, and competing visions for power-sharing. The paralysis has left the Kurdistan Region governed by a caretaker administration while critical institutions remain weakened or inactive.

For Washington, this is becoming more than a political embarrassment.

American officials have long pressured Kurdish leaders to unify the Peshmerga forces, reactivate parliament, reform governance institutions, and reduce factional control over security structures.

Those reforms remain largely incomplete.

Zebari acknowledged that US officials criticized both Kurdish parties during meetings in Washington, emphasizing that the same warnings were delivered to PUK leader Bafel Talabani and Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani during their own visits.

“We want our allies and friends to be strong and united, so that we can help you more,” Zebari said, describing the American message.

Behind diplomatic language lies a more serious concern: Washington increasingly fears that Kurdish fragmentation could undermine America’s final strategic foothold in Iraq.

The Peshmerga Question and America’s Strategic Dilemma

One of the most sensitive issues discussed in Washington was the future of the Peshmerga.

For years, the United States has funded and trained Kurdish forces as one of its most dependable anti-ISIS partners. But Kurdish military fragmentation between KDP-affiliated and PUK-affiliated units continues to obstruct the creation of a unified command structure.

The timing is dangerous.

Operation Inherent Resolve — the US-led coalition mission against ISIS — is expected to formally conclude by September. Meanwhile, Iran-backed militias continue demanding the complete withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and the broader region.

Zebari suggested that Kurdish leaders used their Washington meetings to argue that continued American military presence in the Kurdistan Region remains strategically necessary.

“There is no place left for US forces to base themselves except Kurdistan,” he warned.

That statement carries enormous geopolitical implications.

As Iranian influence expands across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, the Kurdistan Region increasingly represents America’s last reliable geographic anchor inside Iraq. Yet Washington’s ability to rely on Kurdistan depends on whether Kurdish institutions can function cohesively.

The unresolved question surrounding the renewal of the US-KRG defense memorandum has therefore become politically explosive.

Although Zebari attempted to project optimism, many Kurdish observers interpret Washington’s hesitation to renew military agreements and fully guarantee future aid as indirect pressure on Kurdish parties to accelerate reforms and unify command structures.

In effect, America may now be signaling that strategic support is no longer unconditional.

Baghdad Is Exploiting Kurdish Weakness

The internal Kurdish split is also reshaping power dynamics in Baghdad.

For decades, Kurdish parties leveraged unity to secure influence over Iraqi federal politics, constitutional negotiations, disputed territories, and budget agreements.

That leverage has weakened dramatically.

Zebari openly admitted that the KDP itself has become less influential in Baghdad in recent years and acknowledged that Kurdish political fragmentation is enabling rival Iraqi factions to marginalize Kurdish interests.

“There was an alliance against the KDP,” he said while discussing recent disputes over cabinet formation in Baghdad.

At the same time, the Kurdish agenda itself has narrowed.

Once dominated by strategic disputes over Article 140, oil exports, federalism, and disputed territories like Kirkuk, negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad are now increasingly consumed by salary payments and financial transfers.

For many Kurdish analysts, this reflects a historic decline in Kurdish bargaining power.

The shift from constitutional negotiations to salary disputes symbolizes how far Kurdish influence has receded since the post-2003 era when Kurdish parties played kingmaker roles in Iraqi politics.

Trump’s Iraq Strategy and Kurdish Anxiety

Zebari’s remarks also revealed growing Kurdish concern about the direction of US policy under a second Trump administration.

While Washington appears willing to support Iraq’s new leadership under Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, American officials remain deeply worried about Iran-backed militias, drone attacks, and the expanding influence of armed factions tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Zebari indicated that Kurdish officials attempted to present themselves to Washington as stabilizing partners amid Iraq’s deteriorating security landscape.

But there is also anxiety that Kurdish disunity may reduce Washington’s willingness to prioritize Kurdish interests if the US chooses to strengthen relations directly with Baghdad instead.

Trump’s apparent openness toward Iraq’s new leadership suggests that Washington may increasingly focus on preserving broader Iraqi stability rather than exclusively relying on Kurdish autonomy as its regional anchor.

That could fundamentally alter Kurdish-American relations.

The Real Crisis Is Kurdish Political Legitimacy

Perhaps the most important part of Zebari’s interview was not about Washington or Baghdad — but about legitimacy.

The Kurdistan Region once presented itself internationally as a democratic alternative in the Middle East. Today, however, the inability to form a government, unify security forces, or reactivate institutions is damaging that image abroad.

Even Zebari acknowledged that Kurdish political dysfunction now overshadows every other issue.

The crisis is no longer simply about which party controls the Interior Ministry or the Peshmerga Ministry.

It is about whether the Kurdish political system itself can still function as a credible governing model.

The irony is striking: at the exact moment the Middle East is entering a new era of instability — shaped by US-Iran confrontation, Israeli regional escalation, militia expansion, and collapsing state authority — the Kurdish movement finds itself internally divided and strategically weakened.

Washington is watching closely.

Baghdad is taking advantage.

And Kurdish leaders now face a reality they can no longer ignore: without political unity, Kurdish influence in Iraq and the wider region may continue to fade.

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