Kurdish Policy Analysis

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Sulaimani, Iraqi Kurdistan — 28 May 2026 

As Gulf rivalries deepen and Somalia becomes a proxy arena, the Horn of Africa is sliding into a fragmented security architecture shaped less by African states than by competing Gulf and Red Sea power blocs.

An in-depth analysis of the Saudi–UAE–Somalia triangle and how intensifying Gulf competition is reshaping security, sovereignty, and proxy dynamics across the Horn of Africa.

Introduction: A Region No Longer Managing Its Own Fault Lines

The Horn of Africa has long been unstable, but the nature of that instability is shifting. What once centered on internal state fragility, insurgencies, and border disputes is increasingly being overlaid by an external geopolitical contest: a widening rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with Somalia positioned as one of its most exposed theatres.

Recent developments, including Somalia’s diplomatic rupture with Abu Dhabi and its gradual realignment toward Doha, Ankara, and Riyadh, underscore a deeper transformation. The region is no longer merely influenced by external actors—it is being structurally reorganized by them.

In this emerging order, Somalia is not just a weak state navigating external pressure. It is becoming a hinge point in a broader Red Sea system where Gulf powers project influence through ports, federal regions, security assistance, and competing alliance networks.

From Cooperation to Fragmentation: The Somalia–UAE Break

For much of the past decade, Somalia’s relationship with the UAE was characterized by fluctuating cooperation. Abu Dhabi invested in port infrastructure, trained Somali forces, and built relationships with federal member states such as Puntland, Jubaland, and Somaliland. These sub-national relationships proved decisive.

As Somalia’s central government in Mogadishu attempted to reassert control over external partnerships, tensions escalated. The turning point came amid allegations surrounding UAE involvement in regional diplomatic controversies, including the sensitive issue of Somaliland’s contested status and its external recognition dynamics.

Mogadishu’s response was sweeping: cancellation of agreements with the UAE and an attempt to reassert federal sovereignty over external security and economic ties.

Yet the move exposed a structural weakness. Somalia is not a unitary actor in practice. Federal member states retain substantial autonomy and, in many cases, maintain their own external relationships. Puntland and Jubaland openly rejected Mogadishu’s decision, while Somaliland continues to operate as a de facto independent entity with extensive external engagement.

The result is a fractured sovereignty landscape in which external powers can bypass the central state entirely.

The UAE’s Peripheral Strategy in the Horn

The UAE’s approach in the Horn of Africa has been consistently described as decentralized and node-based. Rather than relying exclusively on central governments, Abu Dhabi has cultivated relationships with regional administrations, port authorities, and security forces.

This strategy has included investments in key maritime infrastructure and logistical hubs across Somalia’s coastline, particularly in strategic ports such as Bosaso and Kismayo, as well as in Somaliland’s Berbera corridor. These nodes are not merely commercial assets—they are strategic footholds along critical Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping routes.

In security terms, the UAE has also engaged in training and support programs for regional forces, particularly in semi-autonomous regions where governance structures are more stable than in Mogadishu’s contested political environment.

This approach has generated friction with Somalia’s federal government, which views such engagements as violations of sovereignty. But from Abu Dhabi’s perspective, the logic is pragmatic: influence follows stability, and stability in Somalia is distributed rather than centralized.

Saudi Arabia’s More Cautious but Expanding Footprint

Saudi Arabia’s engagement in Somalia has historically been less visible but increasingly strategic. Riyadh’s core interests in the Horn revolve around three pillars:

First, maritime security across the Red Sea corridor, which is vital for global energy exports.

Second, livestock and agricultural imports from the Horn, which contribute significantly to Saudi food security.

Third, limiting rival Gulf influence—particularly that of the UAE—in strategically sensitive coastal zones.

While Saudi Arabia has not developed the same dense network of sub-state partnerships as the UAE, it has increased its diplomatic and financial engagement with Mogadishu. Recent defense and cooperation frameworks signal a cautious but notable shift toward deeper involvement.

Importantly, Saudi Arabia appears to prefer engagement through central governments rather than fragmented regional authorities. This contrasts sharply with the UAE’s decentralized model and creates structural competition between two distinct governance philosophies.

Somalia as a Proxy Arena: Fragmentation as Opportunity

The consequence of this divergence is the gradual transformation of Somalia into a proxy environment.

Rather than a unified state interacting with external powers, Somalia now functions as a layered political system in which:

• The federal government aligns increasingly with Qatar, Turkey, and selectively Saudi Arabia
• Regional states maintain independent ties with the UAE
• Somaliland operates as a quasi-state with external recognition dynamics
• External actors engage selectively with different levels of authority

This fragmentation is not accidental. It is structurally incentivized by the inability of any single Somali authority to fully control its territory or coastline.

In effect, external actors are not simply exploiting fragmentation—they are reinforcing it.

The Broader Gulf Competition: From Yemen to the Horn

The Saudi–UAE divergence did not originate in the Horn of Africa. It emerged through overlapping conflicts in Yemen and has gradually expanded into a wider Red Sea–Indian Ocean theatre.

In this emerging system:

• The UAE has developed strong relationships with maritime and coastal nodes across the Horn, Sudan, and the Red Sea littoral
• Saudi Arabia has leaned toward state-centric partnerships and coalition-building with Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar in some contexts
• Both actors are increasingly entangled in Sudan’s civil war, Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation pressures, and Somalia’s contested federal system

What is emerging is not a formal bloc system, but a fluid alignment structure where regional conflicts are interconnected through external sponsorship networks.

Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Spillover Risk

Somalia is not an isolated case. The same competitive logic is visible in Sudan, where rival external support networks have contributed to the entrenchment of conflict dynamics.

Ethiopia, meanwhile, occupies a pivotal position in Red Sea geopolitics. Its internal instability and maritime aspirations intersect directly with Gulf strategic interests, making it a key node in the broader system.

Across the Horn, these overlapping crises create feedback loops:

• External funding sustains competing armed actors
• Ports and logistics infrastructure become geopolitical assets
• Local conflicts are embedded into wider regional rivalries

The Horn is therefore not merely experiencing instability—it is being integrated into a transregional competition system.

Conclusion: A New Red Sea Order Without a Center

The Saudi–Somali–UAE triangle illustrates a broader transformation: the dissolution of a state-centered regional order in the Horn of Africa and its replacement with a networked, multi-actor competition system.

Somalia sits at the center of this shift not because it is uniquely important, but because it is structurally open—its fragmented sovereignty allows external actors to project influence through multiple entry points simultaneously.

The result is a region where sovereignty is no longer a fixed condition, but a negotiated and contested space.

Unless external rivalries stabilize or regional governance strengthens, the Horn of Africa is likely to remain a zone where local conflicts and Gulf geopolitics are no longer separable—but mutually reinforcing.

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