By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Ghazi Kawani, a young Kurdish tradesman, has died after being shot in the head at close range by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces in the border highlands of the Qandil mountains in Sardasht, West Azerbaijan Province.

According to Kurdistan Human Rights Network reporting, Kawani, from the village of Dolatou in Sardasht, was shot without prior warning in the Jasousan area in the Qandil mountain range last week.

He sustained critical wounds to the head and was transferred to a medical centre in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province, for treatment. The young man died on 23 May, from the severity of his injuries.

Why Iran Targets the Kurds: The Islamic Republic’s Fear of a Borderland Revolt

The killing of Kurdish trader Ghazi Kawani near Sardasht by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards is not an isolated incident. According to Kurdish human rights organizations, Kawani died after being shot in the head at close range by IRGC forces operating in the border region between Iranian Kurdistan and Iraq.

For Tehran, the Kurdish question has never been treated merely as a security issue. It is viewed as an existential challenge to the ideological and territorial foundations of the Islamic Republic itself. The violence directed against Kurdish civilians, traders, activists, and opposition groups reflects a deeper fear inside the Iranian state: that Kurdish unrest could ignite a broader unraveling of regime authority across Iran’s fragile ethnic frontier regions.

The death of Kawani illustrates how Iran’s crackdown on Kurdish regions has intensified amid rising domestic unrest, economic collapse, regional war, and growing instability inside the Islamic Republic.

The Geography of Fear

Iran’s Kurdish-majority provinces — including West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and parts of Ilam — occupy one of the most strategically sensitive regions in the country. These areas border the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where armed Kurdish opposition movements maintain political offices, camps, and cross-border networks.

Cities such as Sardasht have long been militarized by Tehran. The region has witnessed repeated shootings of kolbars — Kurdish border porters and traders who transport goods across mountainous frontiers because of chronic unemployment and economic neglect. Human rights organizations have documented years of killings by Iranian border guards in the area.

For the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, these borderlands are not simply poor peripheral regions. They are viewed as potential gateways for insurgency, separatism, foreign infiltration, and anti-regime mobilization.

Why the Regime Distrusts the Kurds

The Islamic Republic has historically viewed Kurdish political identity with suspicion because Kurdish movements in Iran combine several threats Tehran fears most:

Ethnic autonomy movements

Secular political organizing

Armed resistance traditions

Cross-border nationalist solidarity

Opposition to clerical rule

Unlike some opposition groups inside Iran that seek reform, many Kurdish organizations openly advocate federalism, decentralization, or self-determination.

The memory of the 1979 Kurdish uprising remains deeply embedded in Iran’s security doctrine. Figures such as former IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour participated in campaigns against Kurdish rebels during the early years of the revolution.

That historical trauma continues to shape Tehran’s strategy today.

The 2026 Crisis and Kurdish Mobilization

The situation escalated dramatically during the 2025–2026 unrest inside Iran. Kurdish regions became some of the most active centers of anti-government protest. Human rights organizations documented large numbers of Kurdish protesters killed by Iranian security forces.

At the same time, several Iranian Kurdish political parties coordinated under the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. Tehran increasingly portrayed Kurdish groups as collaborators with foreign enemies during the broader regional confrontation involving the United States and Israel.

This matters because authoritarian regimes under pressure often intensify repression against minorities they perceive as politically disloyal or strategically vulnerable.

In Tehran’s worldview, Kurdish regions represent all of the following at once:

A domestic protest center

A potential insurgent zone

A foreign intelligence corridor

A territorial vulnerability

A symbolic challenge to centralized Persian-Shiite rule

The result is a securitized approach in which ordinary civilians, traders, activists, and opposition figures are frequently treated as extensions of a hostile political threat.

Why Kolbars Become Targets

Kolbars occupy a unique place in Iranian Kurdish society. Many are impoverished laborers carrying consumer goods across dangerous mountain routes simply to survive economically.

But to the IRGC, border trade networks also represent uncontrollable movement beyond state oversight.

The regime fears that these cross-border routes can facilitate:

Weapons smuggling

Opposition financing

Political coordination

Intelligence transfers

Kurdish militant mobility

As a result, Kurdish traders are often treated as security suspects rather than civilians.

The killing of Ghazi Kawani reflects this militarized logic. Shooting a trader in the head sends a broader message to Kurdish border communities: the state is willing to use lethal force to maintain fear and deterrence.

Iran’s Broader Ethnic Problem

The Kurdish issue also intersects with Iran’s wider internal ethnic tensions. Arabs in Ahvaz, Baluch communities in southeastern Iran, and Azeri activists have all experienced intensified repression during periods of national instability.

Recent reports documented the death of Arab detainee Hossein Ghavi in IRGC custody after alleged torture.

This pattern reveals a broader strategy by the Islamic Republic: suppress peripheral minorities before they can transform political unrest into coordinated territorial dissent.

The regime’s fear is not only revolution in Tehran. It is fragmentation across Iran’s borderlands.

Cross-Border Kurdish Dynamics

Iran’s concerns are amplified by developments outside its borders. The existence of the autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq provides Iranian Kurds with:

Political inspiration

Media networks

Refuge opportunities

Organizational infrastructure

Armed opposition bases

Iran has repeatedly launched missile and drone strikes against Kurdish opposition groups inside Iraqi Kurdistan, even during ceasefires linked to the wider regional war.

These attacks demonstrate Tehran’s belief that Kurdish opposition activity cannot be contained within Iran’s borders.

For Iranian leaders, Kurdish nationalism is inherently transnational.

Conclusion

The killing of Ghazi Kawani is not simply another human rights violation along Iran’s border regions. It reflects the Islamic Republic’s long-standing fear that Kurdish political identity, economic desperation, and cross-border organization could eventually evolve into a broader challenge to state authority.

As Iran faces mounting internal crises, external pressure, economic collapse, and declining legitimacy, Kurdish regions are likely to remain among the most heavily securitized parts of the country.

The Islamic Republic does not merely see Kurdish activism as dissent.

It sees it as a threat to the survival of the state itself.

#Iran #Kurds #Kurdistan #HumanRights #Sardasht #MiddleEast #IranProtests #Geopolitics #Kurdish #IranianKurdistan #BorderCrisis