By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Sulaimani, Iraqi Kurdistan — Kurdish Policy Analysis

The rise of Syria's new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa is reshaping regional alliances and weakening the strategic importance of the SDF in Washington's calculations. What does this mean for Syrian Kurds, Iraqi Kurdistan, and America's future role in the Middle East?

As Damascus rebuilds relations with Washington after Assad’s fall, the Syrian Democratic Forces face a harsh geopolitical reality: America’s alliances are driven by interests, not sentiment.

After the fall of the Assad regime and the seizure of power by Ahmed Sharia, the map of coalitions in Syria has changed radically. Meanwhile, the strong relationship between the United States and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has gradually cooled, and the previously tight coordination between them has faded or disappeared.

From the balance of forces to the change of equations

In recent history, the United States has used SDF forces to fight ISIS fighters, while using areas under its control as an important position of influence in the region; Especially at a time when much of Syria was under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, an ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But the change of power in Damascus completely changed this US strategic need.

New Damascus; A replacement that meets Washington’s wishes

The new Syrian government, led by Ahmed Shara, has become the main advocate of US interests in the region. This new authority has not posed a threat to Israel's security, and at the same time has taken on the task of fighting ISIS on behalf of the United States.

The most important steps Damascus has taken that have attracted Washington's attention are: 

Weakening Iran's position: Reducing Tehran's political and military hegemony in Syria. 

Expulsion of SDF: Expulsion of SDF forces from the entire country.

These changes have enabled the new Syrian government to implement US agendas in the region, reducing Washington's need for local forces such as Hezbollah.

Support for the central government and neglect of self-governments

The current White House administration has adopted a clear policy of supporting the strengthening of the central government in Damascus, while showing some form of hostility or neglect towards the self-governing authorities (including West Kurdistan).

Analysts believe that the political and geographical weight that Syria now exerts on the United States cannot be done by a local force such as SDF. This new equation has led to strengthening relations between the White House and Damascus, while Washington's alliance with SDF is weakening.

So the same is true for our Kurdistan Region. The strengthening of Baghdad and Iraq's distance from Iran will further weaken the Kurdish position

If the Kurds had read their recent and distant history, they would never have made these mistakes. The Kurdish power in the West has ended. The Syrian government will return to power in a few steps

The day will come when the United States will lose all its hegemony in the region because in the eyes of the freedom-loving people of the region, the United States supported freedom, rights of peoples and human rights, not extremist groups.

For nearly a decade, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stood as one of Washington's most valuable partners in the Middle East. Together, American forces and Kurdish-led fighters dismantled the territorial caliphate of ISIS, established a relatively stable autonomous administration in northeastern Syria, and created what many observers believed was a durable strategic partnership.

Today, that assumption is increasingly being challenged.

The dramatic collapse of the Assad regime and the emergence of a new political order in Damascus under Ahmed al-Sharaa have fundamentally altered Syria's geopolitical landscape. The shift has not only transformed internal Syrian politics but has also forced Washington to reassess its regional priorities.

The result is a strategic reality many Kurdish leaders and supporters are reluctant to acknowledge: the political value of the SDF to the United States may be declining precisely as the value of Damascus is rising.

This is not necessarily because the SDF has become less capable. Rather, it is because the strategic environment that once made the SDF indispensable has changed.

The End of the Old Syrian Equation

For years, American strategy in Syria was built around several interconnected objectives.

First, defeating ISIS.

Second, limiting Iranian influence throughout the Levant.

Third, preventing the Assad regime from fully reestablishing control over Syria.

The SDF became a critical instrument for achieving these goals.

American military planners viewed Kurdish-controlled territories as a reliable zone of influence that could serve as a counterweight to both Damascus and Tehran. The partnership was practical, effective, and relatively inexpensive.

The arrangement allowed Washington to maintain leverage inside Syria without committing large numbers of troops or becoming directly involved in Syria's broader civil war.

However, geopolitical alliances rarely survive unchanged when the strategic environment shifts.

The fall of Assad has transformed the very conditions that made the SDF so valuable.

Damascus Is No Longer Assad's Damascus

Many analysts continue to evaluate Syria through the lens of the Assad era.

This may be a mistake.

The new Syrian leadership has moved aggressively to present itself as a pragmatic actor capable of cooperating with regional and international powers.

Whether one agrees with its ideological foundations or not, the new government understands an essential reality: survival depends on international legitimacy.

To gain that legitimacy, Damascus has sought to align itself with several core American objectives.

Among the most significant developments are efforts to reduce Iranian influence inside Syria and weaken the operational freedom previously enjoyed by Iran-backed militias.

For decades, Tehran viewed Syria as the critical bridge connecting Iran to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. That strategic corridor was one of the pillars of Iranian regional power.

The new Syrian authorities appear determined to dismantle much of that architecture.

If Damascus can effectively limit Iran's presence, curb militia activity, and maintain pressure on ISIS remnants, it begins to offer Washington something the SDF alone cannot provide: influence over the entirety of Syria rather than just one region of it.

This distinction is enormously important.

Why Washington Prefers States Over Non-State Actors

One of the most enduring lessons of international relations is that major powers generally prefer dealing with sovereign governments rather than autonomous movements.

The reason is simple.

States possess legal authority, international recognition, diplomatic institutions, and territorial legitimacy.

Non-state actors, regardless of their effectiveness, remain inherently temporary from the perspective of great powers.

History repeatedly demonstrates this pattern.

The United States has partnered with countless local forces across the world—from Afghanistan to Iraq and Syria—but those relationships have almost always been subordinate to broader strategic interests.

When a central government emerges that can serve Washington's objectives more effectively, local partners often find themselves marginalized.

This does not mean betrayal.

It means strategic reprioritization.

In the Syrian case, the White House increasingly sees stability flowing through Damascus rather than through fragmented zones of influence.

Consequently, strengthening Syria's central government appears more attractive than indefinitely supporting competing autonomous administrations.

The Strategic Dilemma Facing the SDF

The SDF now faces a difficult geopolitical challenge.

Its original value stemmed largely from its role as America's primary anti-ISIS partner and a counterweight to Assad and Iran.

If Damascus can credibly assume those responsibilities, Washington's dependence on the SDF naturally declines.

This does not mean the United States will immediately abandon its Kurdish partners.

American military cooperation remains important, particularly regarding ISIS detention facilities and counterterrorism operations.

Yet the relationship increasingly appears transactional rather than transformational.

The central question is no longer whether the SDF helped defeat ISIS.

That chapter is already written.

The question is whether the SDF remains indispensable in the next phase of Syria's evolution.

The answer is becoming less clear.

A Warning for Iraqi Kurdistan

The lessons extend far beyond Syria.

Political leaders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq should pay close attention to the changing dynamics between Washington, Damascus, and the SDF.

Historically, Kurdish political influence has often increased when central governments were weak and regional instability created opportunities for external partnerships.

Conversely, Kurdish leverage has tended to decline when central governments became stronger and more internationally accepted.

The emerging relationship between Baghdad and Washington could eventually follow a similar trajectory.

If Iraq continues strengthening state institutions, improving relations with Arab neighbors, and reducing dependence on Iranian influence, Washington's strategic focus will increasingly shift toward Baghdad rather than Erbil.

Such a development would not eliminate the importance of the Kurdistan Region.

However, it would alter the balance of political influence.

The lesson is straightforward: Kurdish leaders cannot assume that strategic relevance today guarantees strategic relevance tomorrow.

The Historical Pattern Kurds Cannot Ignore

Kurdish political movements have often excelled on the battlefield while struggling to convert military achievements into permanent political settlements.

This pattern stretches from the aftermath of the First World War to modern Iraq and Syria.

Again and again, Kurdish forces have served as valuable allies to global powers.

Again and again, those alliances have proven vulnerable to changing geopolitical circumstances.

The challenge is not military weakness.

The challenge is dependence on external calculations over which Kurdish actors exercise limited control.

History teaches a painful lesson: major powers do not maintain partnerships because of shared sacrifices.

They maintain partnerships because of continuing strategic utility.

Once that utility declines, relationships inevitably evolve.

The changing position of the SDF may represent the latest example of this enduring reality.

The Return of the Syrian State

Many observers still debate how quickly Damascus can reassert authority across Syria.

The timing remains uncertain.

The direction, however, appears increasingly clear.

Most regional and international actors prefer a unified Syrian state over prolonged fragmentation.

Turkey wants border security.

The Arab states seek regional stability.

Europe wants to prevent refugee flows.

The United States wants to avoid another ISIS resurgence while reducing long-term military commitments.

All of these objectives point toward strengthening state institutions in Damascus.

This trend does not necessarily mean the end of Kurdish political influence in Syria.

It does mean that Kurdish aspirations will likely need to be negotiated within a broader Syrian framework rather than pursued through indefinite autonomous arrangements protected by foreign powers.

That is a difficult reality, but it is one that many geopolitical trends increasingly support.

America's Credibility Problem

There is another dimension to this story that extends beyond Syria.

For decades, the United States cultivated an image as a defender of democratic values, human rights, and the aspirations of local populations.

Yet many communities across the Middle East increasingly judge American policy through a different lens.

They see shifting alliances, changing priorities, and relationships defined primarily by strategic interests.

Whether fair or not, this perception has contributed to growing skepticism regarding American commitments.

If Washington is viewed as supporting actors only while they remain useful, then trust inevitably erodes.

The consequences extend far beyond Kurdish politics.

They shape how future partners throughout the region evaluate American promises.

Conclusion: Interests Trump Sentiment

The transformation underway in Syria is a reminder of a timeless geopolitical truth.

Nations do not have permanent friends.

They do not have permanent enemies.

They have permanent interests.

The rise of a new government in Damascus has changed the strategic equation that once made the SDF indispensable to Washington.

As Syria's central government gains legitimacy and assumes responsibilities previously carried out by Kurdish-led forces, American priorities are adapting accordingly.

For the SDF, the challenge is no longer military survival.

It is political adaptation.

For Iraqi Kurdistan, the lesson is equally important: long-term security cannot rest solely on external partnerships.

And for Washington, the Syrian transition represents another test of whether strategic pragmatism can coexist with the values it claims to champion.

The coming years will reveal whether the Kurds can once again navigate a changing Middle East—or whether they are witnessing the gradual closing of one of the most significant geopolitical opportunities in their modern history.

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