By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj / Kurdish Policy AnalysisIran's network of allied armed groups has long been viewed through the lens of its regional "Axis of Resistance." Organizations such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and Yemen's Houthis have become synonymous with Tehran's strategy of projecting power beyond its borders. Yet beneath this well-known network lies another, less-discussed pillar of Iran's security architecture: the Fatemiyoun Division, composed largely of Afghan Shiite fighters, and the Zainabiyoun Brigade, made up primarily of Pakistani Shiite volunteers.
Originally established to fight alongside the Syrian government during the Syrian civil war, these formations have evolved beyond expeditionary forces. Increasing evidence suggests that Tehran is increasingly relying on these foreign fighters not only to support operations abroad but also to reinforce internal security, protect strategic infrastructure, and bolster the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during periods of heightened domestic and regional tension.
This shift illustrates the growing importance of foreign proxy forces in Iran's broader national security strategy.
While Hashd al-Shaabi, Hezbollah and the Houthis are used by Iran to attack countries, Afghanistan's Fatimid fighters and Pakistan's Zainab fighters are used by Iran to control the country's interior.
In the heat of the US attack on Iran, a video has been released by Iranian media showing a convoy of Fatimid vehicles flying their own flag. They showed their solidarity with Iran through a large military parade.
The Fatimid Brigade was established in 2013 by the Quds Force as part of the export of the Islamic Revolution and participation in operations in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.
According to the videos, Fatimid convoys and fighters are stationed in Tehran and other important areas such as Khuzestan province and Abadan.
Iran is reportedly using Pakistan's Zainab Brigade to strengthen its security council and counter military challenges.
#Iran #IRGC #Fatemiyoun #Zainabiyoun #MiddleEast #Geopolitics
The Fatimids
The Iranian Quds Force established the Fatimid Brigade during the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, which consists of Afghan immigrants from Tehran and Afghan Shiite fighters.
Ali Reza Tawasli, also known as Abu Ahmad, was the founder and first commander of the Fatimid Brigade of Afghanistan. He was killed in 2014. Fatimid forces fought alongside Assad's forces in Syria against ISIS, and some are still suspected of remaining in Syria.
Despite disputes between Tehran and the Taliban over water resources and religious differences, Tehran reportedly benefits from the support of the Fatimid Brigade, which is of Afghan origin.
According to the Brookings Institution, Iran continues to recruit Afghan fighters and increase the number of fighters in the Fatimid Brigade, and the Taliban are unlikely to object.
To recruit Afghan fighters and increase the number of Fatimid fighters, the Quds Army, the outer wing of the Revolutionary Guards, used the slogan “defend the shrine of Sayyida Zainab” among Afghan immigrants living in Iran.
Fatimid fighters are paid monthly salaries and financial support, promised permanent residence and even Iranian citizenship. However, some of these fighters returned to Afghanistan after being wounded in the fighting against ISIS and were not given citizenship.
Exact figures on the number of members of the Fatimid brigade who have participated in the defense of the Assad regime have not been released. But Zuhair Mujahid, an officer in the brigade, said in 2018 that about 2,000 members of the Fatimid brigade had been killed and about 8,000 wounded in Syria and Iraq.
Between 2018 and 2021, security forces of the former Afghan government arrested and imprisoned a number of members of the Fatimid Brigade while they were returning to Afghanistan from Iran.
The detainees were released after the fall of the Afghan government and the return of the Taliban to power.
The Origins of Iran's Foreign Shiite Militias
The Fatemiyoun Division emerged around 2014 as Iran intensified its intervention in Syria to support President Bashar al-Assad. The unit was recruited primarily from Afghanistan's Hazara Shiite community, many of whom were refugees living in Iran.
The Zainabiyoun Brigade followed a similar model, recruiting Shiite volunteers from Pakistan, particularly from communities in Parachinar and other Shiite-populated regions.
Iran presented participation in these groups as both a religious duty—defending Shiite holy shrines in Syria—and an opportunity for economic advancement. Fighters reportedly received salaries, legal residency benefits, and military training under the supervision of the IRGC's Quds Force.
Over time, both organizations gained valuable combat experience fighting against ISIS and various Syrian opposition groups.
From Syria to Iran
As the intensity of the Syrian conflict declined, questions emerged regarding the future role of these battle-hardened foreign fighters.
Rather than disbanding the units, Iran appears to have incorporated them into its broader security planning.
Unlike Hezbollah or the Houthis, whose primary function is projecting Iranian influence abroad, the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun increasingly appear suited for missions closer to home.
Their foreign status offers Tehran several strategic advantages.
Because they are not integrated into Iran's domestic political landscape, they may be viewed as more insulated from internal political rivalries or local tribal dynamics. Their loyalty is cultivated primarily through the IRGC rather than through Iran's conventional military institutions or provincial political networks.
Reinforcing Internal Security
Iran has experienced repeated episodes of domestic unrest in recent years, including nationwide protests driven by economic grievances, political dissatisfaction, and social issues.
Maintaining internal stability has therefore become a strategic priority for Tehran.
While Iran's regular security forces—including the IRGC, Basij militia, and Law Enforcement Command—remain the principal institutions responsible for domestic security, foreign auxiliary forces could provide additional manpower for protecting military facilities, logistics centers, border installations, and strategic infrastructure.
Such deployments would allow elite Iranian units to remain focused on higher-priority missions while expanding the state's overall security capacity.
Although open-source information on the operational deployment of Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun units inside Iran remains limited, analysts have increasingly pointed to signs that these organizations are becoming part of Iran's layered security architecture rather than remaining solely expeditionary forces.
A Strategic Reserve for the IRGC
From a military perspective, maintaining experienced foreign formations offers significant flexibility.
The Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades possess years of combat experience acquired during the Syrian conflict.
Their familiarity with urban warfare, irregular operations, and coordinated military campaigns makes them valuable reserve forces.
Should regional tensions escalate into a broader confrontation involving Israel, the United States, or other regional actors, these units could supplement Iranian forces without requiring immediate large-scale domestic mobilization.
For Tehran, preserving these formations represents a relatively low-cost investment in strategic depth.
A Different Role From Hezbollah and the Houthis
Iran's various proxy organizations perform distinct strategic functions.
Hezbollah in Lebanon serves as Tehran's most capable conventional deterrent against Israel.
The Houthis in Yemen provide leverage over Red Sea maritime routes and pressure Saudi Arabia.
The Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq help expand Iranian political and military influence within Baghdad.
By contrast, the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun are increasingly valuable because they can reinforce Iran itself.
Rather than projecting influence abroad, they provide additional resilience to the Iranian state by strengthening military manpower, protecting critical assets, and expanding operational flexibility during periods of crisis.
This division of labor reflects the sophistication of Iran's proxy strategy, with each organization serving a different component of Tehran's broader regional security doctrine.
Why Foreign Fighters Matter
The use of foreign volunteer forces also reduces certain political costs.
Deploying non-Iranian personnel for selected security missions may lessen the burden on Iranian conscripts and regular forces while preserving elite IRGC units for specialized operations.
Additionally, foreign formations often depend heavily on the IRGC for logistics, salaries, training, and organizational support, creating strong institutional loyalty.
This dependence makes them a reliable instrument for missions requiring centralized command and discipline.
However, their long-term integration also presents challenges, including financial costs, logistical requirements, and questions regarding public perception inside Iran.
Regional Implications
The continued existence of the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun brigades demonstrates that Iran's proxy network remains adaptable despite changing regional dynamics.
As conflicts in Syria evolve and regional tensions shift toward direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, Tehran appears to be repurposing assets originally developed for expeditionary warfare.
This adaptation reflects a broader trend in Iranian military planning: maintaining flexible, multi-layered security capabilities capable of responding to both external threats and internal challenges.
For neighboring states, understanding these organizations is increasingly important.
They represent not only instruments of Iranian foreign policy but also components of Iran's national resilience strategy.
Conclusion
The Fatemiyoun Division and the Zainabiyoun Brigade have evolved far beyond their original role as expeditionary forces in Syria. While Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and the Houthis remain central to Iran's regional influence, these Afghan and Pakistani formations increasingly represent a different strategic asset: a reserve force that can strengthen Iran's internal security architecture and expand the operational capacity of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Whether used to protect strategic infrastructure, reinforce security during periods of heightened tension, or provide trained manpower in the event of a wider regional conflict, these organizations underscore Tehran's preference for layered security built on both domestic institutions and allied foreign formations.
As regional competition intensifies, Iran's "hidden foreign legion" may become an increasingly important—but often overlooked—pillar of its national defense strategy.
#Iran #IRGC #Fatemiyoun #Zainabiyoun #MiddleEast #Geopolitics
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