Abdul El-Sayed defies $60 Million campaign against him, wins Michigan Democratic Senate Primary

Image
  By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis Despite massive spending by outside groups and high-profile endorsements for his opponent, Abdul El-Sayed secured a decisive Democratic Senate primary victory and now heads into a closely watched November showdown. Abdul El-Sayed has scored one of the most closely watched political upsets of the 2026 election cycle, defeating Representative Haley Stevens in Michigan's Democratic Senate primary despite facing more than $60 million in outside spending , much of it from pro-Israel political groups. The victory marks a significant breakthrough for the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and sets up a high-stakes general election contest against Republican Mike Rogers in November. El-Sayed's campaign prevailed even after Stevens received late endorsements from Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and influential national Democrats, including Representative James Clyburn . Those endorsements failed to reverse momentum behind El-S...

Killer Drones Are Coming Whether We Like It or Not, AEI Warns


By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis

A new American Enterprise Institute report argues that autonomous warfare is no longer a future possibility but an inevitable reality—and that America's greatest obstacle is not technology, but its own military bureaucracy.

A new AEI report argues killer drones and autonomous warfare are inevitable and urges the United States to rapidly reform its military before China and other rivals gain the advantage.

Killer Drones Are Coming Whether We Like It or Not, AEI Warns

For years, debates over autonomous weapons have centered on ethics. Should machines be allowed to decide when to kill? Can artificial intelligence comply with international humanitarian law? Should governments negotiate a global treaty banning so-called "killer robots" before the technology spreads further?

A new report from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) argues that these debates, while important, have already been overtaken by reality.


According to the report, lethal autonomy is no longer a future possibility but an inevitable feature of modern warfare. The real strategic question is no longer whether autonomous weapons should exist, but whether the United States or its adversaries will determine how they are developed, deployed, and constrained.

The report contends that shrinking military-age populations, rapid advances in artificial intelligence, increasingly affordable drones, and the proliferation of precision strike capabilities are fundamentally transforming warfare. Nations that fail to adapt, it argues, risk losing future conflicts before they begin.

Unlike many discussions of autonomous weapons that focus primarily on morality, the report concentrates on military effectiveness. Its central claim is that the greatest obstacle to American competitiveness is no longer technology—it is the Pentagon's institutional structure.


The End of Massed Armies

For generations, military power depended on concentration.

Large air bases, aircraft carriers, armored formations, logistics hubs, and centralized command structures allowed armed forces to generate overwhelming combat power.

According to the report, that model is rapidly becoming obsolete.

Cheap commercial satellites, artificial intelligence, machine learning, long-range missiles, loitering munitions, and inexpensive drones have dramatically reduced the cost of locating and destroying military targets.

What was once hidden is now increasingly visible.

What was once survivable is now vulnerable.

The report argues that modern battlefields have become "missile-rich but sanctuary-poor," leaving even the world's most sophisticated militaries exposed to continuous surveillance and precision attack.


Why Concentration Has Become Dangerous

The authors identify the first major operational challenge facing modern militaries: concentration itself.

Large headquarters.

Massive logistics depots.

Forward operating bases.

Aircraft parked together.

Fuel storage facilities.

Warships operating in predictable formations.

Each provides an attractive target for increasingly cheap precision weapons.

The report points to recent conflicts—including Ukraine and the Middle East—as evidence that inexpensive drones can inflict damage once reserved for advanced air forces and expensive cruise missiles.

Rather than asking whether concentrated forces can survive, the authors assume they increasingly cannot.


Dispersal Creates a New Problem

Military planners have already begun responding through dispersal.

The U.S. Marine Corps' Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.

The U.S. Air Force's Agile Combat Employment.

The Navy's Distributed Maritime Operations.

All seek to spread forces across wider areas to complicate enemy targeting.

However, dispersal creates another challenge.

Separated forces must still coordinate.

They require communications.

Sensors.

Logistics.

Shared intelligence.

Artificial intelligence.

Those digital connections become targets themselves.

The report argues that future wars will increasingly revolve around disrupting data rather than simply destroying equipment.


Information Is the New Battlefield

According to the report, future militaries must expect attacks against their information networks through five principal methods:

  • Jamming communications.
  • Spoofing sensors.
  • Flooding networks with false information.
  • Delaying decision-making.
  • Exploiting electronic signatures.

This means success depends not merely on stronger weapons but on autonomous systems capable of continuing operations even after communications are degraded.

Instead of waiting for constant human instructions, machines must increasingly interpret commander's intent and continue functioning independently within predefined limits.


Why Drones Alone Are Not Enough

The report emphasizes that autonomy extends well beyond armed drones.

It identifies five major capability areas requiring increasing automation:

  • Autonomous logistics.
  • Autonomous sensing.
  • Autonomous command and control.
  • AI-enabled decision support.
  • Limited autonomous engagement.

This broader framework challenges the common perception that "killer drones" represent the entirety of military AI.

Instead, the report portrays autonomy as an integrated ecosystem affecting virtually every military function.

Autonomous cargo vessels.

Self-routing supply convoys.

Distributed sensor networks.

Machine-assisted intelligence analysis.

Predictive maintenance.

Battlefield logistics.

Target prioritization.

The actual weapon that fires may represent only a small part of the transformation.


Lessons from Ukraine

Ukraine features prominently throughout the report.

According to the authors, the conflict has demonstrated how rapidly innovation now occurs on the battlefield.

Electronic warfare.

Drone swarms.

Fiber-optic guided drones.

AI-assisted targeting.

Autonomous navigation.

Counter-drone systems.

Each side continuously adapts within weeks rather than years.

Traditional acquisition cycles measured in decades simply cannot keep pace.

The report argues that future military software must evolve more like commercial technology than conventional weapons procurement.


Bureaucracy, Not Technology

Perhaps the report's most striking conclusion is that America already possesses much of the required technology.

Its greatest weakness lies inside the Pentagon itself.

Current acquisition rules were designed for aircraft carriers, fighter jets, tanks, and bombers.

Artificial intelligence behaves differently.

Software evolves constantly.

Algorithms require continuous updates.

Machine learning models must be retrained.

Cybersecurity evolves daily.

Testing never truly ends.

According to the report, existing procurement systems cannot effectively purchase capabilities that change every month.


Reforming the Pentagon

Rather than creating another centralized bureaucracy, the report recommends a decentralized innovation model.

Instead of concentrating decision-making inside one office, funding should support multiple competing operator-technologist teams throughout the military.

The proposal includes:

  • Flexible multi-year funding.
  • Competition between military innovation teams.
  • Faster transition from prototypes to operational deployment.
  • Joint interoperability standards.
  • Simplified acquisition rules.
  • Continuous software development.
  • Accountability based on operational success.

The report argues that competition inside the Pentagon could replicate the innovation dynamics found in the private technology sector.


The Debate Over Killer Robots

The report acknowledges the ethical controversy surrounding lethal autonomous weapons.

Rather than advocating unrestricted machine decision-making, it proposes "bounded autonomy."

Under this model:

Human commanders define:

  • geographic limits,
  • approved targets,
  • operational timeframes,
  • rules of engagement,
  • confidence thresholds.

Machines may then continue operating independently only within those predefined boundaries.

If uncertainty increases, communications fail, or identification becomes unreliable, systems should default to withholding fire rather than engaging targets.

This approach seeks to balance military necessity with accountability.


China, Russia, and the Global Race

Underlying the report is an unmistakable strategic concern.

If democratic governments delay development while authoritarian rivals accelerate investment, future wars may be fought under rules established by America's competitors.

The report repeatedly argues that adversaries will not wait for international treaties or ethical consensus.

Technological diffusion is already occurring.

Commercial AI.

Consumer electronics.

Civilian drones.

Open-source software.

These technologies increasingly possess military applications.

The authors conclude that autonomous warfare cannot realistically be prevented through prohibition alone.


Why the Replicator Initiative Fell Short

The report also examines the Pentagon's earlier Replicator initiative.

Although launched with ambitious goals to rapidly produce thousands of autonomous systems, Replicator ultimately struggled because it lacked permanent institutional support and predictable funding.

The report argues that innovation programs frequently generate successful prototypes but fail to transition them into operational force structures.

In other words, the Pentagon often excels at experimentation but struggles with implementation.


Risks Cannot Be Eliminated

Importantly, the authors do not portray autonomy as a perfect solution.

Autonomous systems can fail.

Algorithms may misidentify targets.

Electronic warfare can deceive machines.

Software vulnerabilities remain inevitable.

Rather than promising flawless performance, the report argues policymakers should compare imperfect autonomy against imperfect human decision-making under battlefield conditions.

In high-intensity warfare, exhausted soldiers operating under enormous stress also make mistakes.

The report suggests the relevant comparison is not between perfect humans and imperfect machines but between two imperfect systems operating in increasingly chaotic environments.


The Future of Warfare

Ultimately, the report paints a stark picture.

Future conflicts will likely involve:

  • Massive autonomous drone swarms.
  • AI-assisted targeting.
  • Distributed logistics.
  • Constant electronic warfare.
  • Continuous cyberattacks.
  • Machine-speed decision-making.
  • Human-machine teams.

Countries unable to adapt organizationally—not merely technologically—may struggle to survive the opening weeks of future wars.


Conclusion

The AEI report presents one of the clearest strategic arguments yet for accelerating American military autonomy.

Its message is intentionally provocative.

The authors do not celebrate killer drones.

Nor do they dismiss the ethical risks.

Instead, they argue that autonomous warfare is already arriving regardless of political preferences, international negotiations, or public discomfort.

From their perspective, the decisive question is no longer whether machines will enter the battlefield—they already have.

The real contest concerns who establishes the rules, institutions, and operational doctrines governing their use.

If the United States fails to modernize its acquisition system, software development process, and military culture, the report warns, technological superiority alone will not be enough.

The future of warfare, it concludes, will belong not simply to the nation with the best weapons, but to the one capable of adapting fastest.

#ArtificialIntelligence #AutonomousWeapons #Defense #MilitaryTechnology #DroneWarfare #Pentagon #NationalSecurity #USMilitary #Geopolitics #FutureOfWar #AI #Innovation #China #Ukraine #DefensePolicy



Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Lindsey Graham Passing Reshapes Republican Foreign Policy—and Raises Questions for the Kurds

Lindsey Graham's Death Leaves a Void in US-Kurdish Relations

Can the stateless Nation of Kurdistan help save the Global Order?