Kurdish Policy Analysis

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis 

Why the PKK Went Into Retreat: How Turkey, the US, and Syria Reshaped the Kurdish Armed Struggle

A new assessment examines how shifting geopolitics, Turkey's military adaptation, changing US priorities, and the Syrian conflict transformed the PKK from a growing regional actor into a movement seeking peace negotiations.

Why did the PKK retreat after decades of insurgency? An analysis of Turkey's military strategy, US policy shifts, Syria, and the movement's return to peace talks.

Summary

For much of the early 2000s, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) appeared to be in decline. Following the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the organization abandoned its immediate goal of an independent Kurdish state, declared ceasefires, and attempted to reinvent itself around democratic autonomy while relocating much of its leadership to the mountains of northern Iraq.

The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 dramatically altered the group's fortunes. The PKK established itself as the dominant Kurdish force in northeastern Syria through its affiliate, the People's Protection Units (YPG). Rather than joining the broader Syrian opposition, it reached a pragmatic understanding with the Assad government, allowing it to consolidate territory while rival rebel factions became increasingly fragmented.

The turning point came during the 2014 Battle of Kobani. As ISIS threatened to overrun the city, the United States intervened with airpower in support of Kurdish fighters. This evolved into a close military partnership, with Washington backing the newly branded Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the campaign against ISIS. Although the SDF was presented as a multiethnic force, the article argues that its leadership remained closely tied to experienced PKK cadres.

Buoyed by its battlefield successes in Syria, the PKK attempted to reignite its insurgency inside Turkey in 2015. The strategy proved disastrous. Urban warfare prompted a devastating Turkish military response that destroyed neighborhoods across southeastern Turkey and significantly eroded local Kurdish support for the organization. According to the review, this episode exposed the PKK's failure to adapt its military strategy to changing political realities.

The article also argues that the PKK overestimated the durability of US support. While Washington partnered with Kurdish forces to defeat ISIS, that cooperation remained narrowly focused on counterterrorism. Once ISIS lost its territorial caliphate, the United States did little to prevent Turkish military operations against Kurdish-held areas, including the capture of Afrin in 2018. Many within the PKK concluded that American support had always been conditional and temporary.

Turkey further strengthened its position after 2020 by deploying domestically produced armed drones against PKK positions in northern Iraq and Syria, steadily reducing the group's operational freedom. The collapse of the Assad government in late 2024 created additional uncertainty for Kurdish authorities in northeastern Syria, leaving them increasingly vulnerable while negotiations with Syria's new leadership progressed only slowly.

Facing mounting military pressure, diminishing international backing, and limited strategic alternatives, the PKK returned to negotiations. In 2025, Abdullah Öcalan again called on fighters to lay down their arms, opening a new chapter of peace talks with Ankara. The review suggests that, after decades of armed struggle, the organization increasingly recognized that political compromise offered a more realistic path than continued insurgency.

Key Takeaways

• The Syrian civil war temporarily revived the PKK's regional influence through the YPG and later the SDF.
• The US partnership was driven by the campaign against ISIS rather than long-term political support for Kurdish ambitions.
• The PKK's decision to resume armed conflict inside Turkey in 2015 proved to be a major strategic setback.
• Turkey's advances in drone warfare significantly weakened the PKK's operational capabilities.
• The movement ultimately returned to peace negotiations after recognizing that the regional environment had fundamentally changed.