By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Sulaimani, Iraqi Kurdistan — 27 May 2026 

The leader of the Sadrist Movement has moved from rhetoric to action by integrating Saraya al-Salam into Iraqi state institutions, raising explosive questions for Iran-backed militias and the future balance of power in Iraq.

Prominent Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced on Wednesday the disassociation of his Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades) faction from the state and its integration into Iraqi state institutions. This move translates his repeated calls for the state to monopolize the use of force from rhetoric to direct organizational action.

While the decision does not resolve the issue of weapons in Iraq, it does alter Sadr's position within the political discourse. The man who has consistently demanded that armed factions relinquish their influence outside the state has begun with his own group, posing a practical question to other armed forces, particularly those close to Iran: Who will follow suit?

"The move is political, but it is presented within a security framework," Muhannad Salloum, an assistant professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, told Alhurra.

Salloum believes that the political gains Sadr will reap from this decision outweigh the military gains, given that Saraya al-Salam has been virtually inactive since 2022, making the military impact of its dissolution "limited."

But on the political front, through this move, al-Sadr is presenting himself as “the most prominent Shiite leader to voluntarily place his weapons under the authority of the state, at a time when Prime Minister Ali al-Zubaidi is raising the banner of the state’s monopoly on weapons before the United States,” Saloum adds.

For several months, Washington has been exerting significant pressure on Iraqi authorities and leaders of the Coordination Framework (the ruling Shiite coalition) to deal firmly with the weapons of Iraqi armed factions loyal to Iran.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zubaidi welcomed the announcement by the leader of the Sadrist movement, considering it an “important” step to enhance stability and solidify the principle of the state’s monopoly on weapons. He called on other armed factions to operate under the umbrella of official institutions.

Former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi praised the move, saying that Iraqis, along with “Iraq’s brothers and friends regionally and internationally,” are awaiting decisions that will restore the state’s authority and prestige and pave the way for an Iraq free of illegal weapons.

However, this welcome does not mean that the path is now open for the state to regain its sovereignty. Over the past few years, armed factions in Iraq have transformed into powerful forces with political parties, parliamentary seats, economic influence, and connections within state institutions. Therefore, any attempt to reorganize them could disrupt the balance of power within the Shia community and undermine Iran's influence in Iraq.

Former Sadrist MP Riyad al-Masoudi told Al-Hurra that Muqtada al-Sadr's position is "not new," but rather dates back to the period following the liberation of Iraqi territory from ISIS in 2017.

He added that the problem lies in "the political exploitation of these weapons," which threatens the political system in Iraq.

According to al-Masoudi, addressing the issue requires a legal approach that includes retiring older members, integrating qualified individuals into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and transferring the families of those killed from these groups to the Martyrs Foundation, thus preventing their political and partisan exploitation.

Security expert Sarmad al-Bayati believes the disagreement is not about the principle of monopolizing weapons, but rather about who takes the first step. He told Al-Hurra that by starting with his own faction, Sadr has placed the other factions in an awkward position.

The impact of al-Sadr's decision, if implemented, may not be limited to embarrassing the Sadrists' opponents. Some factions might see it as a way to transition to a more formal status, especially since Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, the Sadrists' traditional rival, announced months ago its readiness to confine weapons to the state.

However, the major obstacle remains with the factions most closely linked to Iran, foremost among them Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, both designated as terrorist organizations by the United States, which refuse to surrender their weapons or allow them to be exclusively held by the state. Between the factions that refuse and those that express initial willingness, there are other hesitant forces that have not yet declared a decisive position.

These calculations cannot be separated from Iran's role in Iraq. Tehran views the armed factions as one of the most important tools of its regional influence, not only in Iraq but also within a network extending to Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Any restructuring of these factions, or any reduction in their independence, will be seen by Tehran as an infringement on a portion of its influence in the region.

Saloum believes Iran will likely manage this issue quietly “by influencing the integration of these factions into state institutions rather than openly opposing it.” “The battle here isn’t over the principle, but the mechanism,” he adds.

Saloum points out that al-Sadr’s initial move creates “a new political benchmark” by which the performance of other factions will be measured, especially within the coordination framework. This raises a pressing question: if al-Sadr has integrated his faction, why haven’t the other factions done the same?

The problem isn’t just about the weapons themselves, but also how they are used in politics and elections, says former MP Sajjad Salem, an opponent of the armed factions. He adds in an interview with Al-Hurra that some factions are more preoccupied with their conflict with al-Sadr than with addressing the issue of weapons themselves.

The Iraqi government finds itself in a difficult position. It affirms its support for the principle of the state’s monopoly on weapons, but it understands that any direct confrontation with the factions could trigger a widespread political and security crisis. Therefore, Baghdad tends to use more cautious terminology, such as “reorganization” and “restructuring,” rather than speaking of a complete dismantling or direct confrontation.

But the problem isn't the terminology. The real question concerns the balance of power on the ground: Can the state integrate the factions into its system, or will the factions remain both inside and outside the state simultaneously?

Al-Sadr’s decision grants him a new political position within this debate. He now presents himself as the one who initiated the movement from within his own faction, rather than simply as a general advocate for the monopoly of arms. In the Shia arena, where political competition intertwines with armed influence, the move could become a tool for exerting pressure on his rivals as much as it is an attempt to redefine the relationship between weapons and the state.

Conversely, other factions might see the move as a maneuver to reshape the balance of power within the Shia political establishment, rather than merely an institutional reform. This makes the response to it as much a matter of political calculations as it is of one’s stance toward the state.

Security expert Fadel Abu Ragheef believes that al-Sadr's call carries a serious tone, but he links its success to the willingness of other parties to respond to it, especially factions with complex political and regional ties.

So far, al-Sadr's move appears to be the beginning of a test. The question remains: Will Iraqi factions truly become part of the state, or will the monopoly on weapons remain a slogan that falls apart each time at the hands of those who wield power on the ground?