From the shadows to supreme power: why Iran chose Ahmad Vahidi to lead its confrontation with the United States

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By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis Who Is Ahmad Vahidi? The Secretive IRGC Commander now shaping Iran's confrontation with the United States From the founding of the Quds Force to commanding the Revolutionary Guards, Ahmad Vahidi's rise signals a new era in Iran's military-led decision-making. As Tehran braces for a prolonged confrontation with Washington, one of Iran's most secretive and hardline military figures has emerged at the center of power—signaling a dramatic shift in how the Islamic Republic intends to wage its geopolitical struggle. Who is Ahmad Vahidi? Explore the rise of Iran's IRGC commander and how his growing influence could reshape Tehran's strategy toward the United States and the Middle East. For decades, Ahmad Vahidi remained largely behind the scenes, shaping Iran's military doctrine and regional strategy away from the public spotlight. Today, however, he stands at the heart of Iran's national security apparatus, overs...

Baghdad's Strategic Reorientation: Is Iraq Turning Away from Iran and Back Toward the Arab World?


By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis

As Iraq deepens economic and diplomatic ties with Gulf Arab states, Baghdad is pursuing a more balanced foreign policy while carefully managing its enduring relationship with Iran.

The Iraqi government is intensifying diplomatic movements towards the Gulf countries, coinciding with Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's expected visit to the United States.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein paid a visit to Kuwait with a delegation that included the National Security Advisor, the governor of Basra and senior Foreign Ministry officials.

The aim of the visit is to "discuss the development of relations with Kuwait in a way that strengthens the interests of the two brotherly peoples," Hussein said in a post on X.

Hours after his arrival, Hussein announced in a separate statement that Kuwaiti authorities had agreed to release the Iraqi fishermen detained by the coast guard last week, explaining that they would return to Basra province accompanied by the governor after legal procedures were completed.

The Iraqi minister said the decision was in response to a request made by the Iraqi delegation during their meeting with Kuwait's First Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Sheikh Fahd Yousef Saud Sabah.

The Iraqi government is "eager to develop relations with Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries, which needs to send a positive message to strengthen this direction," a government source said, adding that the foreign minister carried several important issues.

The delegation also discussed economic issues, including strengthening investment partnerships and the possibility of supplying Kuwaiti gas to Iraq to operate power plants, the source told Sharq al-Awsat newspaper.

Iraq will not enter any axis

The move comes as Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi prepares to visit the United States. He told reporters that Washington's sending dollars to Iraq after a months-long standstill was a "sign of goodwill" towards Baghdad.

Zaydi said an "economic and political partnership declaration with Washington" would be signed during his expected visit, and pointed to the possibility of expanding the exchange of security information between the two countries.

He stressed that Iraq "will not enter any axis" in light of regional tensions, but said Baghdad continues its efforts to bring the United States and Iran closer together in order to reach a solution to their differences and achieve stability in the region.

The prime minister said his foreign trip will not only include Washington, but also visits to several Arab countries and stressed that "it is important for Iraq to be part of the Arab world. He said Baghdad would seek an economic partnership with Saudi Arabia during an expected visit to Riyadh before leaving for Damascus, while stressing the importance of strengthening economic cooperation with Syria as a neighboring country.

On energy, Zaydi rejected rumors that Iraq intends to withdraw from OPEC, stressing that his country will remain a member of the organization, but will try to get a "fair share" of oil exports.

The effect of Iranian hegemony

Observers believe that Iraq's moves towards the Gulf countries come as part of an attempt to restore balance to Iraq's foreign policy, along with opening up to the United States, in light of the region's environmental turmoil.

Isam Faily, a political science professor at Mustansiriyah University, told Sharq al-Awsat newspaper that the government faces a challenge of balancing Iran's hegemony inside Iraq with the prospects for relations with the United States.

He believes the prime minister is "serious about limiting the hegemony of Iran's wings in preparation for a new Iraqi project based on economic opening and energy projects in the region.

For his part, Ihsan Shamari, head of the Center for Political Thought, said Iraq could improve its relations with the Gulf countries if it adopted a new vision to redefine these relations, adding that previous governments have not made any significant progress in this direction. He said Baghdad needed to restore the Gulf's confidence by reducing the influence of Iranian hegemony and resolving the issue of armed factions and groups, paving the way for broader economic and trade partnerships.

Ghalib Daami, an academic and professor of political science at Mustansiriyah University, believed that “uncontrolled weapons” are the biggest obstacle to developing relations with the Gulf countries, and believes the current government is serious about fighting corruption and addressing armed groups.

Growing partnerships with Gulf Arab states, expanding economic integration, and a more balanced foreign policy suggest Baghdad is gradually recalibrating its regional strategy. But can Iraq reduce its dependence on Iran without destabilizing its own political landscape?

For more than two decades, Iraq's foreign policy has largely been shaped by its deep political, economic, and security ties with neighboring Iran. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Tehran has become one of the most influential external actors in Iraq, cultivating extensive relationships with political parties, armed groups, religious institutions, and commercial networks.

Today, however, subtle but significant shifts suggest that Baghdad may be pursuing a new strategic direction.

Rather than severing relations with Iran, Iraq appears to be adopting a policy aimed at diversifying its regional partnerships by strengthening political and economic engagement with the Arab world, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

This emerging strategy reflects changing regional dynamics, evolving security priorities, and Baghdad's growing desire to position itself as an independent regional actor rather than an arena for geopolitical competition.

From Strategic Dependence to Strategic Balance

For years, Iraq's relationship with Iran was shaped by necessity.

Following the rise of ISIS in 2014, Iranian military assistance and support for various armed factions played an important role in Iraq's security landscape. At the same time, Iraq became increasingly dependent on Iranian electricity and natural gas imports to meet domestic energy demands.

Economically, bilateral trade expanded into tens of billions of dollars annually, making Iran one of Iraq's largest trading partners.

Yet successive Iraqi governments have also recognized the risks of excessive dependence on any single regional power.

The current trajectory suggests Baghdad is seeking strategic balance rather than strategic alignment.

Instead of replacing Iran with another patron, Iraq aims to broaden its diplomatic and economic options.

A Return to the Arab Diplomatic Fold

One of the clearest indicators of this shift has been Iraq's expanding engagement with Arab capitals.

Relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, and other Gulf states have improved considerably over recent years.

Baghdad has hosted regional summits, promoted dialogue between rival Middle Eastern powers, and increasingly portrayed itself as a bridge between competing regional blocs.

Joint economic projects—including electricity interconnection initiatives, infrastructure investments, industrial cooperation, and cross-border transport corridors—have accelerated.

For Gulf investors, Iraq represents one of the region's largest untapped markets.

For Baghdad, Arab investment offers an opportunity to diversify economic partnerships while reducing structural vulnerabilities.

Economic Integration Driving Foreign Policy

Economic considerations increasingly appear to be shaping Iraq's diplomatic priorities.

The government's development agenda emphasizes infrastructure modernization, energy diversification, logistics, transportation, and private-sector growth.

Projects such as the Development Road, linking the Persian Gulf to Turkey and Europe, require broad regional cooperation involving Arab partners alongside Turkey and international investors.

Similarly, electricity integration with Gulf states aims to reduce Iraq's long-standing dependence on Iranian energy imports.

These initiatives are driven less by ideological realignment than by practical economic calculations.

Maintaining Relations with Tehran

Despite growing Arab engagement, suggestions that Iraq is "turning its back" on Iran should be viewed cautiously.

Iran remains deeply connected to Iraq through geography, religion, trade, security cooperation, and cultural ties.

The two countries share more than 1,400 kilometers of border, extensive commercial exchange, and millions of annual religious pilgrims.

Baghdad cannot simply disengage from Tehran without significant political and economic consequences.

Instead, Iraqi policymakers appear to be pursuing a strategy of reducing overdependence while preserving functional cooperation.

This reflects a broader foreign policy doctrine based on equilibrium rather than confrontation.

Domestic Political Constraints

Any major foreign policy shift must also navigate Iraq's complex domestic political environment.

Several influential political parties maintain close relationships with Tehran, while others advocate stronger integration with the Arab world and Western partners.

The government therefore faces the challenge of balancing competing domestic constituencies while preserving political stability.

A sudden geopolitical realignment would likely provoke internal resistance.

Gradual diversification, however, offers greater political sustainability.

Regional Geopolitics Favor Diversification

Broader regional developments have also created opportunities for Iraq's diplomatic repositioning.

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran has reduced immediate regional tensions, giving Baghdad greater room to pursue balanced diplomacy.

Meanwhile, expanding Gulf investment strategies have increased interest in Iraq's energy, infrastructure, and transport sectors.

Arab governments increasingly view Iraq not simply as a security challenge but as a potential economic partner connecting the Gulf with Turkey, Europe, and the wider Middle East.

This changing perception strengthens Baghdad's bargaining position.

Strategic Autonomy as Iraq's Long-Term Goal

Rather than choosing between Tehran and the Arab world, Iraq's broader objective appears to be achieving greater strategic autonomy.

Successive governments have repeatedly emphasized that Iraq should avoid becoming a battlefield for regional rivalries.

Instead, Baghdad seeks to transform itself into a platform for dialogue, regional trade, and economic connectivity.

This vision aligns with Iraq's efforts to host mediation talks, strengthen regional diplomacy, and attract investment from multiple international partners simultaneously.

If successful, Iraq could evolve from being an object of regional competition into a more influential diplomatic actor in its own right.

Challenges Ahead

The transition, however, will not be straightforward.

Iraq continues to face persistent security challenges, institutional weaknesses, corruption, infrastructure deficits, and heavy economic dependence on oil revenues.

Energy diversification remains incomplete, leaving Baghdad reliant on Iranian electricity and natural gas during periods of peak demand.

Regional crises involving Iran, the United States, Israel, or neighboring Syria could also complicate Iraq's balancing strategy.

Maintaining neutrality becomes considerably more difficult whenever tensions escalate across the Middle East.

A Balancing Strategy Rather Than a Strategic Divorce

Describing Iraq's evolving foreign policy as simply "turning away from Iran" oversimplifies a far more nuanced reality.

Baghdad is not abandoning Tehran; nor is it fully aligning itself with the Arab bloc.

Instead, Iraq appears to be pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy that expands cooperation with Gulf Arab states while preserving necessary ties with Iran.

This balancing strategy reflects both geopolitical necessity and economic pragmatism.

Whether it succeeds will depend on Iraq's ability to strengthen state institutions, diversify its economy, reduce external dependencies, and maintain constructive relations with competing regional powers.

For Baghdad, the ultimate objective is not replacing one sphere of influence with another, but reclaiming greater strategic independence in an increasingly competitive Middle East.

"Iraq is a real opportunity," political science professor Talib Mohammed Karim told Sharq al-Awsat newspaper.

#Iraq #Iran #ArabWorld #GulfStates #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #ForeignPolicy #RegionalSecurity #Diplomacy #EconomicIntegration

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