A new analysis argues that Washington's biggest negotiating mistake with Iran has been wanting a deal more than Tehran, warning that only sustained military and economic pressure can produce a durable nuclear agreement.

A new analysis argues the U.S. should negotiate with Iran only after sustained military and economic pressure, warning that wanting a deal too much weakens Washington's leverage.

For more than a decade, U.S. policy toward Iran's nuclear programme has revolved around a single question: should Washington prioritise diplomacy or pressure? A new commentary argues that both the Obama and Trump administrations made the same strategic error at different times—allowing Tehran to believe that the United States desired an agreement more than Iran itself.

The analysis revisits the diplomatic legacy of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), contrasting it with President Donald Trump's current approach to renewed negotiations amid heightened military confrontation in the Persian Gulf.

The Legacy of the JCPOA

According to the commentary, President Barack Obama's administration entered negotiations convinced that decades of confrontation with Iran had failed to produce regional stability. Rather than relying exclusively on America's traditional Sunni Arab partners and Israel, Washington sought to test whether engagement with Tehran could reshape Middle Eastern geopolitics.

The author argues that this strategic shift underestimated Iran's negotiating experience and overestimated the willingness of the Islamic Republic to make lasting concessions.

While acknowledging that international sanctions pushed Tehran toward negotiations, the article contends that Iran ultimately secured substantial economic benefits while preserving much of its nuclear infrastructure and limiting the scope of international inspections.

From this perspective, the central weakness of the JCPOA was not diplomacy itself, but Washington's perceived reluctance to walk away from the negotiating table.

Trump's Return to Pressure

The commentary argues that President Trump initially recognised what he viewed as the shortcomings of the Obama-era agreement, withdrawing from the JCPOA and restoring extensive economic sanctions against Iran.

However, it claims that recent negotiations revealed similar vulnerabilities.

According to the author, concerns over global energy markets and the economic consequences of prolonged conflict encouraged Washington to pursue another negotiated settlement, creating the impression that avoiding escalation had become a higher priority than securing comprehensive concessions.

The article suggests this perception weakened America's negotiating position by convincing Tehran that time favoured the Iranian leadership.

Military Leverage Before Diplomacy

The central argument advanced by the commentary is that successful negotiations can only occur after Iran's strategic leverage has been significantly reduced.

Rather than pursuing immediate diplomatic compromise, the author advocates maintaining military operations against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, missile capabilities, and its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Only after those objectives are achieved, the analysis argues, should Washington present Tehran with a non-negotiable framework requiring:

• the export of highly enriched uranium;
• dismantlement of nuclear weapons-related infrastructure;
• strict international verification measures;
• long-term restrictions on enrichment and conventional military capabilities;
• phased sanctions relief only after full compliance has been independently verified.

The proposal rejects incremental bargaining, arguing that negotiations should function as a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer backed by sustained military and economic pressure.

Strait of Hormuz Remains Central

A recurring theme throughout the analysis is the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz.

The author argues that preventing Iran from exercising leverage over one of the world's most important energy chokepoints should remain Washington's foremost military objective.

In this view, maintaining freedom of navigation would reduce Iran's bargaining power while limiting its ability to influence global oil markets during future negotiations.

Regional Proxy Networks

Beyond the nuclear issue, the commentary also highlights Iran's regional network of allied armed groups.

It argues that negotiations should occur alongside continued efforts by regional partners—including Israel, Iraq and Lebanon—to weaken Iranian-backed proxy organisations operating across the Middle East.

According to the analysis, reducing Tehran's regional influence would complement economic sanctions and military pressure, strengthening Washington's position during any future diplomatic engagement.

A Debate Over Diplomacy and Deterrence

The article ultimately reflects a broader debate within American foreign policy circles over the balance between diplomacy and coercion.

Supporters of sustained pressure argue that Iran responds primarily to overwhelming military and economic leverage, while critics caution that excessive reliance on force could escalate regional instability and reduce incentives for diplomatic compromise.

Whether future negotiations succeed may therefore depend less on the negotiating table itself than on the balance of power established before talks begin.

As tensions continue across the Gulf, the question confronting policymakers is no longer simply whether to negotiate with Tehran, but under what conditions diplomacy can produce a durable agreement that addresses both Iran's nuclear ambitions and wider regional security concerns.

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