By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The Iraqi judiciary has just delivered a verdict that could prove more consequential than the crime that produced it. On August 31, Iraq’s Central Criminal Court sentenced Amir Rahim Jabbar Lazim to 15 years in prison under the Anti-Terrorism Law for his role in the kidnapping of American journalist Shelly Kittleson in Baghdad on March 31. The case has been linked by U.S. officials to Kataib Hezbollah, one of Iraq’s most powerful Iran-aligned armed organizations.

Iraq's Central Criminal Court convicted Amir Rahim Jabar Lazim under the anti-terrorism law for his role in Kittleson's March 31 abduction in the Saadoun area. The American journalist, who contributes to Al-Monitor and Foreign Policy, was released on April 7 and shared the court document herself, thanking the judiciary and those who aided her freedom. The case ties to Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, marking the first sentencing amid Iraq's push against such groups, with Kittleson able to seek civil compensation.  

The sentence matters, but not because one militia member is going to prison. Iraq has arrested, prosecuted, imprisoned, released, reintegrated and politically accommodated armed actors for years without resolving the deeper question of who ultimately controls coercive power in the country. The significance of the Kittleson case lies instead in what it says about the relationship between the Iraqi judiciary and armed factions that possess political influence, military capabilities and connections extending beyond the formal institutions of the state.

The central question is therefore larger than Kittleson herself. Can Iraq establish a credible principle that membership in, association with, or political protection from a powerful armed faction does not place an individual beyond the reach of Iraqi law? If Baghdad can answer that question affirmatively and repeatedly, the verdict could become an early marker of a more ambitious attempt to consolidate state authority. If it cannot, the sentence will remain another isolated example of Iraqi institutions exercising authority selectively inside a security system that remains fundamentally fragmented.

The timing makes the case particularly important. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government is already attempting to bring militia weapons under state control, with September 30 emerging as the target associated with the broader transition surrounding the end of the international coalition mission. The government's stated objective is not simply administrative reform but the restoration of state sovereignty over armed organizations. The National’s analysis of Iraq’s militia-disarmament deadline Yet the effort has encountered resistance from some of the most powerful Iran-aligned factions, making the Kittleson prosecution part of a much larger contest over whether Baghdad can convert formal authority into effective power.

The Kidnapping Was a Test of the State Before the Verdict Was Ever Delivered

The Kittleson kidnapping exposed the contradiction at the heart of Iraq's security architecture. A foreign journalist was abducted in the country's capital by armed men reportedly connected to an organization with extensive political and military influence. Her release followed pressure from Iraqi authorities and influential Shiite political figures, while Kataib Hezbollah publicly demanded that she leave Iraq. Reuters reported at the time that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed Kittleson's release and thanked the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, the FBI and the Pentagon for their roles in securing it. Reuters’ reporting on Kittleson’s release

That episode mattered because it demonstrated that the Iraqi government was not necessarily the only actor capable of influencing the fate of an armed operation carried out inside Baghdad. The state could negotiate, investigate and prosecute, but an armed faction could still exercise enough independent leverage to become part of the political equation surrounding the release of a foreign hostage. That is precisely the kind of ambiguity that weakens sovereignty even when the constitutional institutions of the state remain intact.

The subsequent conviction therefore represents an attempt to move the balance in the opposite direction. The judiciary has asserted that participation in the kidnapping carries a criminal consequence irrespective of the political environment surrounding the organization allegedly responsible. That is a modest institutional step, but it is also the kind of step from which a state-building process can begin. The important question is whether the principle will be applied consistently to other politically sensitive cases or whether it will stop once it reaches actors with sufficient political weight to make prosecution dangerous.

This is why the Kittleson case should be understood alongside the broader reporting and analysis surrounding Iraq's militia system. Kurdish Policy Analysis examined the original abduction in How an American Journalist Was Kidnapped—and Quietly Freed—by Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq, arguing that the episode offered an unusually clear window into the shadow power exercised by Iran-aligned armed groups inside the Iraqi political system. The new verdict gives that earlier episode a second chapter: the question is no longer simply how the journalist was abducted and released, but whether the Iraqi state can impose consequences afterward.

Iraq Does Not Have a Simple “Militia Problem”

The language of "militia disarmament" can obscure the actual institutional problem facing Iraq. The country does not have a single armed organization waiting to surrender its weapons to Baghdad. It has a complex ecosystem of armed factions with different political relationships, military capacities, economic networks and degrees of loyalty to the Iraqi state. Some formations operate formally within the Popular Mobilization Forces, while others maintain organizational structures and political identities that remain distinct from the conventional security establishment.

That distinction matters because formal incorporation does not necessarily produce genuine state control. A fighter can receive a government salary and still retain political loyalty to a faction. A unit can appear on an official organizational chart while preserving an independent command culture. A militia can operate within a state institution while its political leadership maintains relationships with external patrons. The question is therefore not whether armed factions have been given legal status, but whether the government can actually determine when, where and how they use force.

This is precisely the problem explored in Iraqi Factions’ Cosmetic Disarmament Masks Deep Institutional Limbo. The central issue is not the disappearance of militia labels but the unresolved questions of command, financing, weapons and political authority. Iraq has repeatedly demonstrated that organizational restructuring can occur without fundamentally changing who controls armed power.

The international literature is reaching a similar conclusion. Chatham House has described the government's current effort as a longstanding challenge: how to establish meaningful state authority over armed groups that operate through the PMF but remain outside Baghdad's direct command in practice. Chatham House’s analysis of Iraq’s armed factions The Washington Institute has likewise warned that some factions' willingness to accept state control may represent political repositioning rather than genuine disarmament, particularly when the groups are seeking greater legitimacy as conventional political actors. The Washington Institute’s analysis of Iraqi militia “disarmament” The lesson is important. Disarmament is not fundamentally a weapons problem. It is a command problem.

The Judiciary Could Become Baghdad’s Most Important Weapon

That distinction explains why the Kittleson verdict could matter more than another government declaration demanding that militias surrender their arsenals. Baghdad does not necessarily need to begin with a military confrontation. It can begin by establishing the legal consequences of operating outside the state's authority.

Kidnapping is particularly useful in this respect because the facts of the crime can be separated from the broader political debate about the legitimacy of the militia involved. A state does not need to resolve its relationship with Iran before it can prosecute a kidnapping. It does not need to settle the future of the PMF before it can prosecute an unlawful detention. It does not need to eliminate every armed faction before it can establish that attacks on diplomatic facilities are crimes.

This creates the possibility of an incremental strategy in which the judiciary gradually establishes boundaries that political negotiations have failed to enforce. Investigations into kidnappings, attacks on diplomatic facilities, assassinations, illegal detention, weapons trafficking and financial crimes could collectively produce something more consequential than a single disarmament agreement: a legal environment in which armed factions increasingly face costs for acting independently.

The danger, however, is selective justice. If low-level operatives are prosecuted while commanders and political patrons remain beyond investigation, the judiciary risks becoming an instrument for managing the symptoms rather than changing the system. Armed groups can absorb the imprisonment of individual members. What they cannot easily absorb is a sustained institutional challenge to their command structures, financial networks and political immunity. That is why the next cases will matter more than the current one.

The September Deadline Is Where the Political Test Begins

The Kittleson verdict arrives at a moment when Baghdad is already struggling to make its militia policy credible. The government has set September 30 as the deadline associated with bringing weapons under state control, but recent reporting indicates that the deadline itself is becoming politically difficult to enforce. Recent reporting on possible delays to Iraq’s militia deadline

The problem is not simply that some factions reject disarmament. It is that the factions do not necessarily accept Baghdad's definition of the problem. For the government, the issue is sovereignty: there cannot be multiple independent centers of coercive power inside a functioning state. For the factions, the issue is framed differently. Some present their weapons as part of a broader "resistance" architecture directed against foreign military presence and regional adversaries.

This produces a fundamental political contradiction. Baghdad can insist that the state must control all weapons, while militia leaders can respond that their weapons are necessary precisely because Iraq remains exposed to foreign military power. The result is an argument in which both sides claim to be defending Iraqi sovereignty.

But sovereignty cannot ultimately be defined by who possesses the largest arsenal. It must be defined by who has legitimate authority to decide when force is used. That is the principle Baghdad needs to establish.

Iran Is the Structural Problem Behind the Tactical Problem

Iraq's militia question cannot be separated from Iran, but neither should it be reduced to a simple contest between Tehran and Washington. Iran's influence in Iraq has developed through political parties, economic relationships, religious networks and armed organizations. The armed component is particularly significant because it provides Tehran with strategic depth that conventional diplomatic relationships cannot replicate.

Kataib Hezbollah occupies an important position within this architecture. Its relationship with Iran means that the Iraqi government's effort to impose state authority over the organization is not merely an internal administrative dispute. It potentially affects the wider balance between Iraqi sovereignty and Iranian strategic influence.

The factions themselves understand this. Recent reporting indicates that some of the most powerful Iran-aligned groups continue to reject disarmament, while others have signaled greater willingness to place weapons under state control. Recent reporting on Iraqi factions rejecting disarmament The resulting division inside the Iran-aligned camp may ultimately be more important than the government's deadline itself. This is the fault line Baghdad should exploit.

The objective should not necessarily be to treat every armed group as an identical adversary. The government should distinguish between factions prepared to transform themselves into political actors operating without independent military structures and factions determined to preserve autonomous armed capabilities. The former can potentially be incorporated into normal political competition. The latter represent a direct challenge to state sovereignty.

This logic is also reflected in Baghdad’s Militia Test: Can Iraq Confront Iran’s Armed Proxies?, which examined how the government's struggle with Iran-aligned groups is increasingly becoming a test of Baghdad's ability to establish authority without triggering a wider confrontation. The strategic objective, therefore, should not be "defeat the militias" in one dramatic confrontation. It should be to make autonomous militia power progressively less useful, less profitable and less politically sustainable.

The United States Is Turning Iraq’s Militia Question Into a Sovereignty Question

Washington has its own reasons for pressing Baghdad on the militia issue. The United States is concerned about attacks against its personnel and diplomatic facilities, but the strategic issue extends beyond force protection. Iraq has become one of the most important arenas in the wider contest over Iranian influence in the Middle East.

The recent U.S.-Iran conflict has intensified that problem. Iraqi armed groups have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to drag Baghdad into conflicts it does not necessarily want to fight. The Washington Post's reporting on the government's dilemma illustrates the problem: Iraqi authorities have sought to prevent the country from becoming a battlefield while Iran-aligned factions retain the ability to operate against U.S. and regional targets. The Washington Post’s analysis of Iraq’s balancing act

This creates an uncomfortable reality for Baghdad. Iraq wants strategic autonomy, but it cannot achieve that autonomy while foreign powers and domestic armed factions can use Iraqi territory as a platform for their own conflicts.

Reuters has also reported that Washington is increasingly using Iraq's financial dependence on the U.S.-dominated international banking system as leverage against Iranian influence, highlighting how deeply the militia question is connected to Iraq's economic sovereignty. Reuters’ analysis of U.S. pressure on Iraq

This is why the debate over militias cannot be separated from Iraq's financial system, energy sector or international relationships. A government that cannot control armed groups may struggle to control the financial networks that sustain them. A government that cannot control those networks will struggle to demonstrate genuine sovereignty. And a government whose sovereignty remains contested will remain vulnerable to pressure from both Washington and Tehran.

Baghdad’s Greatest Danger Is a Failed Disarmament Process

There is a temptation to measure success by whether weapons are physically surrendered on September 30. That would be the wrong metric. A militia can hand over weapons while preserving its command network, political influence and financial infrastructure. It can change its name, reorganize its units and continue operating through state institutions. It can formally separate its political and military wings while maintaining informal relationships between them.

In other words, Iraq can achieve disarmament on paper while failing to achieve demobilization in practice. This is why the experience of previous reform efforts should make Baghdad cautious. The Iraqi state has issued orders for militia integration before. Some factions have formally joined state structures before. Yet the underlying political-military networks have survived.

Kurdish Policy Analysis explored this problem in Who Is Abu Fadak? The Powerful PMF Commander Challenging Iraq’s Disarmament Plan. The question surrounding figures such as Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi, better known as Abu Fadak, illustrates why organizational charts alone cannot resolve the problem. The real question is where effective authority resides when political and military structures overlap.

Baghdad therefore needs to measure reform through command relationships rather than declarations. Who appoints commanders? Who controls deployments? Who authorizes weapons use? Who controls budgets? Who can dismiss officers? Who investigates abuses? Who arrests members accused of crimes? Who has the final authority to order a unit into action? If the answer to those questions is not ultimately the Iraqi state, then the monopoly of force remains incomplete.

The Kittleson Case Offers Baghdad a Model

The judiciary can help establish that authority incrementally. The Kittleson prosecution provides one example. The court did not need to resolve the entire militia question to convict an individual accused of participating in a kidnapping. It applied existing Iraqi law to a specific act. The same logic could be extended. If armed factions attack diplomatic facilities, prosecute the perpetrators. If individuals conduct kidnappings, prosecute them. If weapons are transferred illegally, investigate the network.

If militia-linked businesses facilitate sanctions evasion, investigate the financial structures. If commanders knowingly authorize criminal operations, investigate command responsibility. Such cases gradually create a legal perimeter around armed political organizations. This approach is more sustainable than attempting to settle the entire militia question in a single confrontation.

It also gives Baghdad something it desperately needs: institutional legitimacy. A state becomes stronger when its citizens and political actors begin to believe that disputes will ultimately be resolved through institutions rather than through armed leverage. That process takes time. But it is the only durable alternative to perpetual militia bargaining.

Iraq’s Political System Is Approaching a Choice

The current confrontation is therefore about more than disarmament. It is about what kind of political system Iraq wants to become. The post-2003 order developed around a series of compromises between institutions, parties, militias, religious authorities, external powers and competing communities. Those compromises helped prevent the total collapse of the political system, but they also produced a state in which authority is frequently negotiated rather than exercised.

The defeat of ISIS removed one of the main arguments for maintaining an extraordinary security architecture indefinitely. Iraq's conventional forces are stronger than they were in 2014, and the territorial caliphate has been dismantled. Yet the political structures created during the war against ISIS remain deeply embedded in the state.

The country now faces the question that follows every emergency security system: when does an extraordinary arrangement stop being temporary and become the permanent political order? Iraq has reached that point.

The PMF's role cannot remain permanently justified by the circumstances of 2014 if the country's strategic environment has fundamentally changed. Nor can the government simply demand dissolution without addressing the political and economic interests that allowed these organizations to become so powerful. The transition must therefore be institutional, gradual and enforceable.

Three Futures for Iraq

The first possibility is that the Kittleson conviction remains essentially symbolic. Baghdad continues prosecuting selected militia members while avoiding cases that threaten the organizational leadership of powerful factions. The September deadline is postponed or diluted, weapons remain largely in factional hands, and the government continues negotiating with armed groups from a position of incomplete authority. In this scenario, Iraq's hybrid security system survives.

The second possibility is controlled integration. Baghdad reaches differentiated agreements with factions willing to surrender independent military structures, while applying greater judicial and financial pressure to organizations that refuse. Some groups gradually transition into conventional political organizations, while the most resistant factions become increasingly isolated. This would not produce immediate disarmament, but it could gradually reduce the autonomous power of the militia system.

The third possibility is genuine state consolidation. The Iraqi government establishes unified command over all recognized security forces, enforces judicial accountability without political exemptions, regulates weapons and financing, and makes independent political-military organizations incompatible with participation in the state. This would represent the most significant transformation of Iraq's political order since 2003. The third scenario is the most desirable. It is also the hardest.

What Baghdad Should Do Now

Baghdad should resist the temptation to define success through deadlines alone. September 30 can be politically useful, but a deadline without an enforcement mechanism risks becoming another date that passes without structural change.

The government should instead establish measurable benchmarks for state control. These should include verified weapons registration, transparent command structures, government control over deployments, financial audits of security formations, judicial investigations into serious crimes and clear procedures for integrating fighters who accept state authority.

The government should also distinguish between political participation and military autonomy. There should be no objection to former militia members becoming politicians, contesting elections or participating in public life. The dividing line should be whether political organizations retain independent armed structures capable of coercing opponents or overriding government decisions.

That distinction would allow Baghdad to avoid turning disarmament into a sectarian struggle. It would also allow some factions a legitimate political exit. The state should make the choice clear: political power is available through institutions; armed power outside state command is not. That is a principle with which a functioning republic can live.

The Kittleson Verdict Is the Beginning of the Test

The 15-year sentence handed to Amir Rahim Jabbar Lazim should therefore neither be dismissed as insignificant nor celebrated as evidence that Iraq has solved its militia problem. It is a test.

The first question is whether the conviction is followed by further prosecutions. The second is whether investigators are permitted to pursue the organizational networks behind individual crimes. The third is whether powerful political actors accept judicial decisions even when those decisions affect their allies. The fourth is whether Baghdad can combine judicial enforcement with a credible political pathway for factions prepared to abandon autonomous military structures. And the fifth is whether the government can withstand pressure from Iran-aligned groups without allowing the country to slide into armed confrontation. Those tests will determine whether the Kittleson case becomes a precedent or an exception. The stakes are larger than one journalist, one militia member or one court ruling.

Iraq is approaching a decisive moment in the evolution of its post-2003 state. The country has spent years building institutions around the reality of fragmented coercive power. It is now attempting to reverse that logic and build a state in which political authority precedes military authority rather than following it.

That transition will not be achieved by speeches about sovereignty.

It will not be achieved by deadlines alone.

And it will not be achieved simply by moving militia units from one organizational chart to another.

It will be achieved when an Iraqi government can investigate a politically connected armed actor, an Iraqi prosecutor can bring the case, an Iraqi court can deliver a verdict, and Iraqi security institutions can enforce that verdict without asking whether the defendant belongs to a faction too powerful to confront.

That is the real significance of the Kittleson conviction.

The question facing Iraq is no longer whether the state formally possesses a monopoly on force. The question is whether the state can make that monopoly real.

If Baghdad succeeds, the Kittleson case may eventually be remembered as one of the early judicial markers of Iraq's transition toward a more coherent state.

If Baghdad fails, the verdict will become something else: another demonstration that Iraq's institutions can exercise authority against individuals while remaining unable to overcome the political structures that protect armed power. For Iraq, that distinction is becoming existential. The country cannot indefinitely remain both a state and a negotiation among armed actors. Eventually, one of those models has to prevail.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent platform covering Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, regional security, energy geopolitics and the changing Middle Eastern order.

His work focuses on Kurdish political development, Baghdad–Erbil relations, security-sector reform, Peshmerga transformation, energy politics and the strategic future of the Kurdistan Region.

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