Kurdish Policy Analysis

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj 

Growing US pressure and Iranian warnings are pushing Baghdad toward a difficult choice: confront Iraq’s powerful militias or preserve a fragile political balance.

Baghdad’s Dangerous Choice

Iraq may be approaching one of the most consequential security confrontations since the post-2003 political order was established. Indicators emerging from Baghdad suggest that the federal government may be considering a significantly more ambitious campaign against Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, potentially including operations to enter and retake strongholds where armed groups have established deep political, military and social control. If such a campaign is genuinely being contemplated, it would represent far more than another attempt to enforce state authority. It would amount to a direct challenge to one of the most powerful pillars of Iran’s influence inside Iraq—and potentially a test of whether the Iraqi state can finally monopolize the use of force.

The difficulty is that Iraq has attempted versions of this confrontation before. Previous governments, most notably that of former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, took steps against militia activity and attempted to demonstrate that armed groups could not operate entirely beyond state authority. Yet those efforts remained limited. Iran’s penetration of Iraqi political and security institutions, combined with the considerable military, financial and political strength accumulated by militia organizations, prevented Baghdad from transforming isolated enforcement actions into a comprehensive strategy.

What makes the current moment different is the growing convergence between Iraqi, American and regional pressure. Washington has increasingly demanded that Baghdad prevent Iraqi territory from being used by armed groups to attack US interests and regional partners. The attacks conducted by Iran-aligned militias against American and foreign targets in Iraq and across the region have intensified this pressure. For Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, or any Iraqi leader facing similar demands, the question is no longer simply whether militias should be disarmed. The question is whether Baghdad can refuse to act without risking an even deeper confrontation with Washington and regional powers.

The Kadhimi Precedent—and Its Limits

The experience of the Kadhimi government demonstrates why confronting Iraq’s militias is so difficult. Kadhimi entered office promising to restore the authority of the Iraqi state and reduce the ability of armed factions to operate independently. His government took several steps against militia-linked actors, including arrests and security operations designed to signal that Baghdad retained ultimate authority over armed organizations.

But these measures stopped well short of dismantling the broader militia system.

The reason was structural. Iran-aligned armed groups had become deeply embedded within Iraq’s political architecture. Some maintained formal relationships with state institutions while simultaneously retaining autonomous chains of command. Others possessed parliamentary influence, economic networks, social organizations and extensive armed capabilities. The distinction between “state” and “non-state” actors therefore became increasingly difficult to enforce in practice.

This created a paradox for successive Iraqi governments. Baghdad formally possessed sovereignty, but exercising that sovereignty against powerful armed factions could itself generate a crisis capable of destabilizing the government. Any prime minister attempting a comprehensive confrontation therefore had to calculate not only whether the Iraqi security forces could defeat a particular militia, but whether the political system could survive the consequences.

That calculation remains at the center of the current crisis.

Why Washington’s Pressure Matters

The United States has increasingly attempted to make militia disarmament a central component of its relationship with Baghdad. The pressure has grown as Iranian-backed groups have expanded their regional activities and launched attacks against US and foreign targets.

For Washington, the issue is fundamentally connected to the security of American personnel and facilities, but it is also part of a broader strategy aimed at reducing Iran’s ability to use Iraq as a strategic platform. Iraq occupies an unusually important position in this contest. It borders Iran, hosts US interests, possesses enormous oil reserves and remains connected to the regional networks through which Iran projects political and military influence.

That makes Baghdad both an arena and an instrument in the wider US-Iran confrontation.

If American pressure forces the Iraqi government to move against the militias, Baghdad will face an uncomfortable dilemma. Acting too aggressively could trigger armed resistance from groups that possess considerable military capabilities and political influence. Acting too cautiously could convince Washington that Baghdad is unwilling or unable to control its own territory.

The space between those two outcomes is becoming increasingly narrow.

Ghaani’s Message to Baghdad

Against this backdrop, reports that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani visited Baghdad on August 10 are particularly significant. According to Iraqi media reports cited by informed sources, Ghaani warned Iraqi militia leaders against entering into an armed confrontation with the Iraqi government and urged them to reach a settlement that could prevent the weapons of these groups from being formally handed over to the state.

If accurate, the message would reveal an important Iranian calculation.

Tehran may understand that the political environment surrounding its Iraqi allies has changed. A direct militia-government confrontation could produce consequences that Iran would prefer to avoid. Rather than encouraging its Iraqi partners to fight Baghdad openly, Tehran may therefore be seeking a negotiated mechanism that preserves the essential power of the militias while allowing the Iraqi government to claim that state authority has been restored.

That distinction is crucial.

Disarmament on paper does not necessarily mean the disappearance of militia power. Weapons can be transferred into state institutions, reorganized under official structures or placed under political arrangements that preserve the command networks of the original organizations. Iraq has considerable experience with this kind of hybrid security architecture.

The real question is therefore not simply whether militia weapons will be handed to the state. It is who will ultimately control those weapons, the personnel who operate them and the political leadership that commands them.

Iran’s Wider Economic Calculation

The militia issue cannot be separated from the broader struggle over Iraq’s economic and strategic options.

Iran has a powerful interest in preventing Iraq from becoming less dependent on routes and infrastructure vulnerable to Iranian pressure. This is particularly important as Baghdad explores alternative oil export corridors and other mechanisms that could reduce its exposure to disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait remains one of the most important energy chokepoints in the global economy. Any sustained disruption would expose the vulnerability of states whose oil exports depend heavily on maritime routes through the Gulf. Iraq, despite its enormous energy resources, is particularly exposed because its export infrastructure is concentrated in vulnerable geographic corridors.

For Tehran, this creates both leverage and opportunity.

Iran can benefit strategically if Iraq remains dependent on regional arrangements that limit its ability to diversify its energy export routes. An Iraq with fewer alternatives is an Iraq with fewer options during a regional crisis. Conversely, an Iraq capable of expanding alternative pipelines and export corridors would possess greater strategic autonomy.

This explains why discussions about Iraqi militias may have consequences far beyond Baghdad’s security architecture.

The struggle over armed groups is also part of a larger struggle over Iraq’s strategic independence.

The Hormuz Connection

The possibility of a sustained US naval blockade or severe disruption around the Strait of Hormuz introduces another layer to the crisis. Increased economic pressure on Iran could eventually create incentives for elements within the Iranian establishment to accept greater concessions in negotiations.

But economic pressure does not automatically produce political moderation.

Iran’s recent appointments and the composition of its decision-making circles suggest that the officials currently exercising significant influence may be inclined toward maintaining hard-line positions rather than rapidly compromising under pressure. If that assessment is correct, Tehran could respond to pressure not by reducing its regional influence but by attempting to preserve strategic depth through its network of allied actors.

Iraq would be one of the most important arenas for that strategy.

Iran does not necessarily need Iraqi militias to defeat the Iraqi government. It only needs them to remain sufficiently powerful to prevent Baghdad from becoming completely independent of Iranian influence. This is a much lower threshold—and one that is considerably easier to maintain.

The result could be a prolonged contest in which Baghdad attempts to consolidate state authority while Tehran seeks to preserve influence without provoking a direct confrontation.

Why a Major Crackdown Would Be Different

A genuine Iraqi campaign to enter and retake militia-controlled strongholds would mark a significant escalation. Unlike limited arrests or targeted security operations, such a campaign would require large-scale mobilization, intelligence preparation and political coordination.

The militias would also almost certainly detect preparations for any major operation.

That creates a dangerous strategic problem. The more extensive the mobilization becomes, the greater the possibility that armed groups will prepare defensive positions, disperse personnel, move weapons or attempt to negotiate before fighting begins.

Baghdad would therefore face a classic dilemma: surprise is essential for a successful security operation, but the political and military mobilization required for a major crackdown makes complete surprise extremely difficult.

There is also the question of loyalty within Iraq’s security institutions. A state campaign against powerful armed groups would require confidence that Iraqi security forces would obey central government orders even when those orders conflict with the interests of politically connected factions.

That cannot be taken for granted.

The Real Battle Is Over the Iraqi State

The deeper issue is therefore not merely the existence of militias. It is the nature of the Iraqi state itself.

Since 2003, Iraq has developed a political system in which formal institutions coexist with powerful informal networks. Political parties maintain armed wings, security organizations overlap with partisan structures, and economic influence often intersects with military power.

This system has survived because its major participants have generally preferred negotiated coexistence to existential confrontation.

The danger now is that external pressure could upset that equilibrium.

If Washington insists that Baghdad dismantle or disarm Iranian-backed armed groups, while Tehran simultaneously instructs those groups to avoid a direct confrontation with the government, Iraq could find itself at the center of an increasingly sophisticated contest.

The militias may seek accommodation rather than war.

The United States may seek measurable disarmament rather than another prolonged Iraqi conflict.

Iran may seek to preserve its influence without forcing its allies into an open confrontation.

And Baghdad may attempt to satisfy all three objectives simultaneously.

That is an extraordinarily difficult balancing act.

Three Possible Paths

The first scenario is a negotiated accommodation. Baghdad could reach an arrangement with major militia organizations under which weapons are formally integrated into state structures while political influence and organizational networks remain intact. This would reduce the immediate risk of civil conflict and allow the government to claim progress, but it would leave the deeper problem unresolved.

The second scenario is a limited crackdown. Iraqi forces could target specific militia activities, weapons depots or commanders while avoiding a comprehensive confrontation with the most powerful organizations. This would allow Baghdad to demonstrate action without crossing the threshold that could trigger a broader armed conflict.

The third—and most dangerous—scenario is a full confrontation. If negotiations fail and Washington continues escalating pressure, Baghdad could attempt to dismantle militia strongholds through force. The result could be a major internal security crisis, particularly if armed factions resist and political blocs mobilize against the government.

Of these possibilities, the first two appear substantially more manageable than the third.

But the external environment could determine which path Iraq ultimately takes.

What This Means for Kurdistan

The consequences will extend beyond Baghdad.

For the Kurdistan Region, any major confrontation between the federal government and Iranian-backed militias would create both risks and opportunities. The immediate concern would be the potential spillover of violence, particularly if militia groups attempt to exploit political or geographic vulnerabilities outside Baghdad.

At the same time, a stronger Iraqi state capable of controlling armed groups could fundamentally alter the balance between Baghdad and Erbil. The Kurdistan Region has long argued that Iraq's constitutional order requires genuine federalism and that the existence of powerful armed actors outside effective state control undermines the country's institutional structure.

If Baghdad succeeds in consolidating its security authority, it could strengthen the federal state.

But that does not automatically mean stronger Baghdad-Erbil relations.

A more powerful federal government could also become more assertive toward the Kurdistan Region over disputed territories, energy policy, customs, security arrangements and the distribution of federal resources. The strategic consequences will therefore depend on whether Baghdad's consolidation is accompanied by genuine institutional reform or simply produces a stronger centralized state.

The Coming Test

The coming period may reveal whether Iraq is capable of transforming external pressure into an opportunity for state consolidation—or whether the country's hybrid security system will once again absorb and neutralize the challenge.

The reported message from Ghaani is especially revealing because it suggests that Tehran may not be preparing its Iraqi allies for an immediate showdown. Instead, Iran may be attempting to prevent an escalation that could expose its influence to greater international pressure.

That does not necessarily mean Iran is abandoning its Iraqi network.

It may mean the opposite.

A negotiated militia settlement could allow Tehran to preserve much of its influence while avoiding the political cost of an armed confrontation between Iraqi factions. If the weapons remain nominally under state control but the networks, commanders and political structures survive, Iran could retain significant leverage while Baghdad gains the appearance of greater sovereignty.

For Washington, that may not be enough.

For Baghdad, it may be the only politically sustainable path.

And for Tehran, it could represent a successful compromise.

The central question is therefore becoming unavoidable: can Iraq disarm the militias without destabilizing the state—and can it do so without triggering an Iranian response?

The answer will determine much more than the future of Iraq’s armed groups. It could shape the balance between Baghdad and Tehran, the future of US influence in Iraq, the security of the Gulf, the viability of alternative oil export routes and, ultimately, whether Iraq emerges as a sovereign strategic actor or remains a battlefield for competing regional powers.

Read More: The Battle for Hormuz Will Reshape the Gulf—and Iraq’s Strategic Choices — Kurdish Policy Analysis.

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