The Iraqi oil trap and its paradox: A rentier economy amidst geopolitical shocks

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In an economy dependent on oil exports, and with the disruption of crude oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz due to the US-Iranian war, the core of the problem lies not only in the volume of exports and the revenues generated from them, but also in how these revenues are managed, and in the amount of spending that depletes them. On September 22, 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Zaidi told The New York Times that Iraq had lost nearly $60 billion in oil revenue due to the war with Iran. For approximately two months, Iraq was unable to export 90% of its oil, while 90% of its economy depended on crude oil exports. Before June 2025, when the first round of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran erupted, the Central Bank of Iraq’s reserves had exceeded $110 billion, but by October 2026 they had fallen to less than $60 billion. Although Zaidi’s government managed to balance global polarization and geopolitical tensions during its first five months in office, the biggest problem was the i...
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