Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Iraq’s September disarmament deadline risks expanding into a wider struggle over militias, the Peshmerga, Iranian influence and Baghdad’s authority.

As Baghdad moves toward a September 30 deadline for bringing weapons under state control, Iraq is confronting a question far more difficult than whether armed factions will surrender their arsenals. The deeper issue is whether the country can establish a single security architecture without reopening the unresolved constitutional, political, and territorial disputes that have defined the Iraqi state since 2003. Iran-backed armed groups are now attempting to make the Peshmerga part of that equation, demanding that Kurdish forces be subjected to the same fate as militias operating outside the formal chain of command. On the surface, the argument appears symmetrical: if Baghdad wants non-state weapons eliminated, why should one region retain a powerful armed force? In legal and political terms, however, the comparison is considerably more complicated.

The emerging confrontation therefore risks turning what was initially presented as a national disarmament initiative into a much broader struggle over the structure of the Iraqi state itself. The dispute is no longer simply about weapons. It is about who has the authority to command armed forces, which institutions possess constitutional legitimacy, how Iraq balances federalism with central authority, and how far Tehran's influence can shape Baghdad's security decisions. If these questions are handled without a political framework acceptable to Baghdad, Erbil, Washington, Ankara and the major Shiite factions, the September deadline could become the opening phase of a new security crisis rather than the conclusion of one.

The Militia Question Is Bigger Than Disarmament

According to US researcher Paul Davis, expectations that Iraq's major Shiite armed groups will voluntarily surrender their weapons by the end of September are low. His assessment reflects a problem that has confronted successive Iraqi governments: Baghdad may possess the formal authority to demand that weapons be placed under state control, but its ability to enforce that demand against heavily armed factions remains limited.

The political structure surrounding the militias makes the problem even more difficult. Several major Iran-aligned factions have accumulated military capabilities, political influence and economic networks that give them considerable autonomy. Some operate within or alongside Iraq's formal security institutions, while maintaining organizational structures and command relationships that are not fully subordinated to the Iraqi state in practice.

That ambiguity is precisely what makes the current disarmament initiative so consequential. A state cannot easily claim a monopoly on legitimate force when powerful armed organizations can simultaneously participate in government, operate security formations and resist government orders. Yet attempting to dismantle those organizations through force could itself destabilize the state that Baghdad is trying to strengthen.

Davis argues that the Iraqi government is caught between its national policy and Tehran, one of its most important external partners. The dilemma is fundamental. Baghdad may want to demonstrate sovereignty by bringing all weapons under state control, but some of the armed factions see their military capabilities as essential to Iran's broader regional strategy.

For Tehran, these organizations are not simply domestic Iraqi political actors. They form part of a wider network of influence that has allowed Iran to project power across Iraq and beyond. Their weapons therefore have strategic value that extends well beyond Iraq's internal political system.

This creates an immediate contradiction. Baghdad can issue a deadline, establish committees and negotiate political formulas, but the ultimate question is whether the factions themselves believe that surrendering their weapons serves their interests. If they conclude that disarmament would permanently weaken their political position or Iran's regional influence, a government decree alone is unlikely to change their calculation.

Why are Shiite groups calling for the dissolution of the Peshmerga?

While armed groups link their disarmament to the dissolution of the Peshmerga, the move is seen as a political attempt to put pressure on Ali Zaydi's government.

Abu Mujahid al-Asaf, representing the brigade, said in a statement Tuesday that the dissolution of the Peshmerga was a condition for any understanding, calling them a "dangerous militia.

This discourse is a clear strategy to justify the groups' weapons and portray the official forces of the region as a threat to the integrity of the country, in order to divert pressure on themselves.

In a speech today, the Iraqi president denied the accusations and described the Peshmerga as a "military and constitutional force" alongside the army.

According to the presidency, the Peshmerga is not part of the problem of “unprogrammed weapons”, but an official institution responsible for protecting sovereignty.

According to political observers, the conflict shows that the armed groups want to divert attention from the issue of disarmament by creating "internal enemies. Targeting the Peshmerga at this time is not only a military problem, but also political pressure for the government to back down from its security decisions and legitimize the retention of non-state forces.

This is also interpreted as pressure on Zaydi, who is supported by the Kurdish parties in the issue of disarmament, because the Kurds accuse these groups of carrying out repeated attacks on oil and gas fields and official headquarters of the Kurdistan Regional Government through drones and missiles

The Three Conditions

The position reportedly emerging from some of the most powerful Iran-backed factions illustrates the scale of the confrontation.

Kataib Hezbollah has linked any discussion of surrendering weapons to three broader conditions: the complete withdrawal of US forces, the departure of Turkish forces from Iraq, and the dissolution of the Peshmerga.

Other prominent factions, including Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, have similarly connected the question of weapons to the presence of foreign military forces and the structure of Iraq's security institutions.

The logic is politically powerful even if its legal foundations are disputed. These factions can portray disarmament not as a domestic Iraqi security reform but as part of a broader process of restoring national sovereignty. From their perspective, asking Iraqi armed groups to surrender their weapons while American and Turkish forces remain on Iraqi territory creates an obvious political contradiction.

But that argument also creates a dangerous expansion of the agenda.

The original question is whether Iraqi armed factions should possess weapons independently of the state. The new demands transform that question into a comprehensive renegotiation of Iraq's relationship with the United States, Turkey and the Kurdistan Region.

That is an entirely different political project.

If every armed faction can attach additional conditions to disarmament, the process risks becoming open-ended. Washington's military presence becomes part of the negotiation. Turkey's military presence becomes part of the negotiation. The Peshmerga become part of the negotiation. Eventually, almost every unresolved issue in Iraq's post-2003 political order can be presented as a prerequisite for disarmament.

The result could be paralysis.

The Peshmerga Are Not Simply Another Militia

The most contentious demand is likely to be the call for the dissolution of the Peshmerga.

There is a fundamental distinction between the Peshmerga as the Kurdistan Region's official security force and armed organizations that maintain independent political-military structures outside Iraq's constitutionally defined federal framework.

The Kurdistan Region's security forces have a constitutional and legislative basis within Iraq's federal system. The Peshmerga are not merely an armed organization that appeared outside the state and subsequently negotiated political recognition. They are embedded within the constitutional relationship between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region.

That does not mean the Peshmerga question is settled.

The Peshmerga themselves face long-running challenges involving institutional fragmentation, political command structures, party affiliation and the incomplete unification of forces under a genuinely unified regional military institution. The distinction between forces associated historically with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and those associated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan remains politically significant.

But those shortcomings do not automatically make the Peshmerga equivalent to Iran-backed militias.

Indeed, this distinction is central to the future of Iraqi security reform.

The real constitutional question is not necessarily whether the Kurdistan Region should have security forces. It is whether those forces should operate according to a clearly defined legal chain of command, with transparent institutional authority and an agreed relationship with Iraq's federal security architecture.

That is a very different question from demanding their dissolution.

The Dangerous Logic of “Equal Disarmament”

Iran-backed factions are nevertheless likely to continue using the Peshmerga issue because it provides them with a powerful political argument.

Their position can be summarized relatively simply: if Baghdad insists that armed power must ultimately belong to the state, then every armed formation outside the Iraqi federal security structure must be subjected to the same standard.

The difficulty is that “equal treatment” does not necessarily mean treating legally different institutions identically.

Iraq's constitution created a federal system in which the Kurdistan Region possesses recognized regional institutions. The Peshmerga question therefore intersects with federalism, regional autonomy and the division of authority between Baghdad and Erbil.

The militia question intersects with something different: the state's monopoly over coercive power and the existence of armed organizations whose political and military autonomy can challenge the authority of the government.

Conflating the two could produce a dangerous outcome.

If Baghdad accepts the premise that the Peshmerga must be dissolved as the price of militia disarmament, it would effectively allow armed factions to redefine the constitutional structure of Iraq through political pressure. Conversely, if Baghdad ignores legitimate concerns about fragmentation within the Peshmerga, it risks reinforcing the argument that Iraq operates according to different security standards for different political actors.

The solution therefore cannot be simplistic.

Iraq needs a national security framework that distinguishes between constitutional regional forces, federal security institutions and politically autonomous armed organizations while establishing clear rules governing all three.

That is the only sustainable route toward a genuine state monopoly over force.

Baghdad’s Real Problem Is Enforcement

The most important observation in Davis's assessment may be that the Iraqi army is currently unable to disarm the major armed factions by force.

That reality should shape Baghdad's strategy.

A government can declare a monopoly on weapons much more easily than it can enforce one. Iraq's security forces have grown substantially since the defeat of ISIS, but the political and institutional environment remains fragmented enough that a direct confrontation between the government and the most powerful militias could generate consequences far beyond the original dispute.

The danger is particularly acute because many of the factions possess substantial military experience and political constituencies. A forced disarmament campaign could divide the security establishment, trigger violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq, undermine the government's legitimacy and create openings for external actors to intervene.

For this reason, Baghdad's most realistic strategy is likely to involve gradual integration rather than immediate confrontation.

The challenge is that integration has already been attempted in various forms.

Iraq's experience with the Popular Mobilization Forces demonstrates the difficulty of transforming politically autonomous armed groups into a genuinely unified state security institution. Formal incorporation into the state does not necessarily eliminate independent political loyalties or separate chains of influence.

The problem, therefore, is not merely whether fighters wear state uniforms.

It is whether the state controls their decisions.

A meaningful security-sector reform would require unified command, transparent financing, government control over deployments, parliamentary oversight, judicial accountability and the prohibition of independent political-military structures.

Without those conditions, disarmament can become little more than institutional relabeling.

Iran's Role Is the Strategic Variable

The fate of Iraq's disarmament effort cannot be separated from the broader confrontation between Washington and Tehran.

Davis argues that Iran views the armed factions as an important component of its foreign policy and has instructed them not to surrender their weapons. If that assessment is correct, Baghdad is confronting not simply a domestic political disagreement but an external strategic calculation embedded within Iraq's political system.

This is what makes the September deadline so difficult.

Iran does not necessarily need to prevent Baghdad from issuing a disarmament policy. It only needs to ensure that implementation remains sufficiently difficult that the policy cannot fundamentally alter the strategic balance.

That can be achieved through political pressure, negotiations, factional resistance and the use of constitutional or parliamentary mechanisms without necessarily triggering an open confrontation.

Washington, meanwhile, has its own tools.

Davis points to economic sanctions against militia leaders as one mechanism through which the United States can increase pressure. Sanctions can raise the costs of maintaining autonomous armed networks, but they cannot by themselves create a functioning Iraqi security architecture.

That responsibility ultimately belongs to Iraq.

The United States can provide intelligence, diplomatic pressure, sanctions and security assistance. It cannot substitute for the political decisions required in Baghdad.

The Kurdish Question Could Become the Fault Line

For the Kurdistan Region, the most worrying possibility is that the militia dispute becomes a vehicle for reopening the entire Baghdad-Erbil security relationship.

The Peshmerga have long occupied a unique position within Iraq's post-2003 political order. Kurdish forces played a major role in the fight against ISIS and have maintained responsibility for securing parts of the Kurdistan Region and contested areas.

At the same time, disputes over the constitutional status of territories, federal funding, security coordination and the deployment of federal forces have repeatedly demonstrated that Baghdad and Erbil do not share an identical understanding of national security.

The demand to dissolve the Peshmerga could therefore be interpreted in Erbil not as an ordinary component of security-sector reform but as an attempt to renegotiate the constitutional balance between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region.

That would be a serious mistake.

The Kurdistan Region has its own internal problems regarding the organization and political fragmentation of its security forces. Those problems deserve reform. But the answer should be deeper institutionalization and unification, not the elimination of the Region's constitutionally recognized security capacity.

In fact, Baghdad has an interest in strengthening the professionalism and unity of the Peshmerga.

A more unified Peshmerga structure could improve coordination between federal and regional forces, reduce party-based military fragmentation and create a clearer national security relationship between Baghdad and Erbil.

The choice is therefore not necessarily between “Peshmerga” and “state.”

It can instead be between fragmented security structures and professional, accountable institutions operating within Iraq's constitutional framework.

September 30 Is a Deadline, Not a Solution

The approaching September 30 deadline has acquired symbolic importance because it creates the impression that Iraq is approaching a decisive moment.

But deadlines do not resolve structural conflicts.

If the major factions remain unwilling to surrender their weapons, Baghdad will have to decide whether to extend negotiations, impose financial and political penalties, pursue gradual integration or attempt coercive enforcement.

Each option carries risks.

A premature military confrontation could produce violence. An indefinite postponement could demonstrate that the state lacks authority. A negotiated integration process could preserve militia influence under a new institutional label. And an agreement that makes Peshmerga dissolution a condition of militia disarmament could destabilize the federal political settlement.

The most realistic outcome may therefore be a prolonged negotiation disguised as a deadline.

The government will seek to preserve the principle that all weapons must ultimately fall under state authority. The militias will seek guarantees that disarmament does not destroy their political and strategic position. Iran will seek to preserve the regional value of its Iraqi partners. Washington will push for greater restrictions on Iran-aligned networks. Erbil will resist any attempt to equate the Peshmerga with constitutionally unrecognized armed organizations.

The question is whether these competing interests can be reconciled without violence.

Iraq Is Approaching a Test of Statehood

Iraq's current security crisis is ultimately about more than militias and more than the Peshmerga.

It is a test of whether the Iraqi state can define the limits of armed political power without destroying the political settlement that holds the country together.

A functioning state requires a monopoly over legitimate coercive force. But Iraq's political order is built around federalism, power-sharing, regional autonomy and a complicated network of political and security institutions. Trying to impose centralization without addressing those underlying arrangements could be as destabilizing as allowing armed groups to retain unchecked autonomy.

The central challenge for Baghdad is therefore to establish one security system without necessarily creating one centralized political identity.

That distinction matters enormously.

The Peshmerga can be incorporated into a coherent national security framework without eliminating the Kurdistan Region's constitutional autonomy. Likewise, former militia fighters could theoretically become part of state institutions if their independent command structures, political-military organizations and autonomous financing mechanisms were genuinely dismantled.

What cannot survive indefinitely is the idea that different armed organizations can each claim their own definition of legitimacy.

If Iraq allows every faction to determine the conditions under which it will accept state authority, the concept of state sovereignty becomes negotiable.

And once sovereignty becomes negotiable, armed power becomes the currency through which political disputes are settled.

That is precisely the cycle Iraq has spent more than two decades trying to escape.

The Coming Confrontation

The September deadline could therefore mark the beginning of Iraq's most consequential security debate in years.

The immediate issue will be whether Iran-backed factions surrender their weapons. The deeper issue will be whether Baghdad can establish a credible system in which no armed organization possesses an autonomous military decision-making capacity beyond the authority of the state.

That process should not be allowed to become a proxy battle over the Kurdistan Region.

The Peshmerga require reform, professionalization and greater institutional unity. But reform is not the same as dissolution, and constitutional regional security forces cannot simply be equated with armed factions whose command structures operate independently of the constitutional state.

Baghdad's challenge is to make that distinction explicit.

If it does, Iraq could begin building a more coherent security architecture while preserving its federal political settlement. If it does not, the militia disarmament campaign could rapidly mutate into a confrontation over the very structure of the Iraqi state.

The outcome will depend not only on Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government, but also on the calculations of Tehran, Washington, Ankara, Erbil and the armed factions themselves.

For now, the central question is not whether Iraq has declared that weapons should belong to the state.

It is whether the state has enough political authority, institutional capacity and strategic independence to make that declaration real.

And that is a much harder test.

Further Reading:

“Baghdad’s Militia Test: Can Iraq Confront Iran’s Armed Proxies?” 

“US-Backed Deal Sets September Deadline for Peshmerga Unification” 

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a Kurdish political analyst and the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, Iran, regional security, geopolitics and the strategic competition shaping the Middle East.

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