By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Iraq and Syria are rebuilding ties through security, energy and diplomacy, reshaping regional trade routes and the post-Assad Middle East order.

Nearly two years after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Iraq and Syria are quietly moving away from the suspicion and strategic anxiety that defined their initial relationship with Damascus’s new authorities. What began as a cautious intelligence dialogue has gradually evolved into something much more consequential: a pragmatic effort to rebuild political, security, judicial and economic ties between two neighbors whose fortunes have always been deeply intertwined. The shift is not yet a full strategic partnership, but Baghdad increasingly appears to have reached a conclusion that it once resisted—that disengagement from Damascus is no longer a viable policy.

The transformation is striking because Iraq initially viewed the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa with profound concern. His previous association with al-Qaeda in Iraq, the uncertain fate of ISIS detainees and prisons in northeastern Syria, the possibility of renewed militant infiltration across the roughly 600-kilometer border, and the future of armed networks operating inside Syria all created reasons for Baghdad to keep its distance. Yet the longer the new Syrian authorities remained in power, the more Iraq's calculations began to change. Rather than attempting to isolate Damascus, Baghdad increasingly chose engagement as a means of containing the risks emerging from Syria.

That evolution is visible even in Iraqi political rhetoric. Nouri al-Maliki, one of the most outspoken critics of al-Sharaa, held him responsible in February 2025 for killings and destruction that had affected Iraqis. Less than a year later, Maliki described al-Sharaa as a brother and expressed readiness to establish bilateral relations with Damascus if he won Iraq's elections. At the same time, Maliki sharply contrasted the new Syrian leadership with Bashar al-Assad, accusing the former Syrian president of having exported terrorism into Iraq. The message was clear: whatever Baghdad's reservations about al-Sharaa, the strategic environment created by Assad's fall required Iraq to reconsider its assumptions.

From Security Contact to Institutional Engagement

The first major Iraqi contact with the new Syrian authorities came only 18 days after Assad's fall. On December 26, 2024, Iraqi National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri traveled to Damascus at the head of a senior delegation. At a time when formal political relations remained largely frozen, the visit established an important principle: Baghdad was prepared to talk to the new authorities even before it was prepared to embrace them politically.

The initial agenda was dominated by security. Border control, preventing armed groups from entering Iraq, ISIS detainees and the future of Syrian prisons were at the center of the discussions. The symbolism of the meeting was striking as well, with al-Sharaa receiving al-Shatri while visibly carrying his personal weapon, an image that reflected the uncertainty surrounding Syria's new political order.

But the relationship did not remain confined to intelligence channels. By April 2025, al-Shatri returned to Damascus with a broader Iraqi delegation that included representatives from the Border Forces, the Border Crossings Authority and the ministries of oil and trade. The agenda expanded accordingly, encompassing counterterrorism, trade and the possibility of restoring Iraqi oil exports through Syria to the Mediterranean.

A third visit by al-Shatri in August 2025 reinforced the emerging pattern. The discussions continued to focus on border security, counterterrorism and the Iraqi community in Syria, while the question of ISIS families was also moving toward a more structured solution. Iraq ultimately received most of the families transferred from al-Hol camp and placed them into social reintegration programs, reducing one of the most dangerous unresolved consequences of the collapse of the Assad government.

This gradual evolution reveals the logic behind Baghdad's policy. Iraq does not necessarily need to trust Syria's new leadership to engage with it. It needs mechanisms through which security risks can be identified, negotiated and contained. In that sense, pragmatic engagement is not a reward for Damascus. It is an Iraqi security strategy.

The ISIS Question Still Hangs Over the Relationship

No issue better demonstrates the depth of Iraqi-Syrian interdependence than the ISIS detainee file. Iraq currently holds around 7,000 members of the organization, including at least 3,000 Syrian nationals, while the future of ISIS-linked individuals and their families remains a major concern for both countries.

For Baghdad, the issue is simultaneously judicial, political and national-security related. A breakdown in the handling of detainees could create a new generation of militants, while individuals wanted by Iraqi courts may remain inside Syria. Cooperation over trials, transfers, evidence, legal procedures and judicial coordination is therefore becoming as important as military cooperation.

This explains the significance of Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan's recent visit to Damascus. Unlike the earlier intelligence and diplomatic contacts, Zidan's trip expanded bilateral engagement into the judicial sphere. Discussions reportedly included ISIS detainees transferred to Iraqi prisons, judicial cooperation, transitional justice, legal expertise, transparency, corruption and shared cases.

The importance of this track should not be underestimated. Security cooperation can respond to immediate threats, but judicial cooperation creates institutional relationships that can survive political changes. If Iraq and Syria begin developing routine mechanisms for extradition, evidence-sharing, prosecution and prisoner transfers, the relationship will have moved beyond ad hoc crisis management toward something much more durable.

Yet the imbalance in diplomatic engagement remains striking. Iraqi officials have repeatedly traveled to Damascus, including intelligence chief Hamid al-Shatri, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and Faiq Zidan. Syrian officials, by contrast, have made relatively few visits to Baghdad, with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani's visits in 2025 representing the principal high-level contacts.

Most notably, al-Sharaa himself has not yet visited Baghdad. The reasons remain politically sensitive on both sides, but the absence also reflects the complicated domestic politics surrounding Syria's new leadership in Iraq. Baghdad may be moving toward engagement, but it has not yet completely normalized its relationship with Damascus.

The Border Is Becoming a Strategic Connector

The next stage of Iraqi-Syrian relations may be determined less by ideology than by geography.

Iraq and Syria share a long border that has historically been both a security vulnerability and an economic opportunity. For years, the border was associated with militant infiltration, smuggling and the movement of armed groups. The emerging relationship is attempting to turn that same geography into an instrument of cooperation.

A major development came on July 6, 2026, when Iraqi and Syrian border forces held their first publicly announced border meeting in the al-Qaim area. The discussions reportedly focused on field coordination, information sharing and control of the border strip.

This may appear bureaucratic, but institutionalized border coordination is precisely the kind of low-profile development that can transform bilateral relations over time. Intelligence-sharing and political declarations are vulnerable to changes in leadership. Border mechanisms create routines. Once officers on both sides regularly communicate, coordinate and exchange information, the political relationship gains an operational foundation.

For Baghdad, this is particularly important because instability in Syria cannot be isolated from Iraqi security. A weak Syrian border can become an Iraqi security problem within hours. Conversely, stronger coordination gives Damascus a greater incentive to cooperate with Baghdad against transnational militant networks.

The border is therefore becoming less of a dividing line and more of a shared security space.

Oil Could Change the Relationship Entirely

The most strategically significant development, however, may be taking place in the energy sector.

On March 31, 2026, Iraqi crude began moving by tanker trucks through the al-Waleed border crossing toward Baniyas. The following day, convoys carrying Iraqi fuel oil reportedly crossed toward the Syrian coast. These initial shipments may have been modest, but their strategic significance is considerably larger.

Iraq has long sought to diversify its export routes, while Syria possesses something Baghdad increasingly needs: potential access to the Mediterranean. The rehabilitation of the historic Kirkuk-Haditha-Baniyas pipeline could therefore transform Iraqi-Syrian relations from a security partnership into an economic interdependence.

The geopolitical significance becomes even greater amid the continuing disruption and strategic vulnerability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. If Iraq can develop a reliable overland and pipeline route toward the Mediterranean, Baghdad would gain an alternative to maritime export routes exposed to regional conflict.

This is not merely an energy project. It is economic statecraft.

A functioning Iraqi-Syrian energy corridor could connect the Iraqi oil fields to Syrian infrastructure and Mediterranean markets while creating incentives for both governments to protect the stability of the route. It could also potentially connect Iraq to a wider regional economic network involving Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.

That possibility explains why Washington's support for the pipeline project matters. The United States has strategic reasons to encourage alternatives to vulnerable Gulf routes while simultaneously supporting the stabilization of Syria and reducing the space available to Iran-linked networks.

The pipeline could therefore become one of the most important pieces of infrastructure in the emerging post-Assad regional order.

Nechirvan Barzani's Quiet Diplomatic Role

There is another actor whose role in this emerging architecture deserves greater attention: Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani.

Barzani has developed a parallel diplomatic channel with Damascus that complements Baghdad's engagement. His meetings with al-Sharaa have focused not only on Erbil-Damascus relations but also on the broader questions connecting Iraq, Syria, the Kurds and regional stability.

On April 17, 2026, Barzani met al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Their discussions included relations among the Kurdistan Region, Iraq and Syria, economic and trade issues, regional developments, the position of Kurds and other communities in Syria, and the agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

Barzani subsequently traveled to Damascus on August 3 for another meeting with al-Sharaa, further strengthening this channel.

The importance of Erbil's role lies partly in its ability to communicate across political divides. The Kurdistan Region maintains relationships with Baghdad, Damascus, Washington and actors inside northeastern Syria. That gives Barzani diplomatic space that neither Baghdad nor Damascus possesses in exactly the same way.

The Kurdish dimension is particularly sensitive because northeastern Syria sits at the intersection of several competing security agendas. Damascus wants to restore central authority. The Syrian Democratic Forces want guarantees over their political and security future. Turkey remains deeply concerned about Kurdish armed structures along its border. The United States continues to play a role in supporting stability and counterterrorism.

Erbil therefore has an interest in preventing the Syrian Kurdish question from becoming another regional military crisis.

Barzani's diplomatic formula—supporting a unified and stable Syria while safeguarding the rights of Kurds and other communities—could become increasingly important as Damascus attempts to consolidate authority without provoking another cycle of conflict.

His movement between Erbil, Baghdad and Damascus also gives him the potential to act as a bridge between three political centers whose interests increasingly overlap.

A New Regional Economic Geography

The emerging Iraqi-Syrian relationship ultimately points toward something larger than bilateral normalization.

Syrian researcher Ahmad Kamel argues that political changes in both countries are creating the conditions for a new regional configuration. Iraq's new government and Syria's post-Assad authorities both have incentives to develop relations based on shared interests and risk management rather than ideological competition.

The economic geography is particularly interesting. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey could potentially form a network of land-based trade and energy corridors that partially reduce dependence on maritime routes exposed to geopolitical disruption.

That does not mean such a network will automatically emerge. Infrastructure requires enormous investment, security guarantees and political stability. Syria remains fragile, Iraq continues to face internal political competition, and regional powers retain conflicting interests in both countries.

But the direction of travel is unmistakable.

Truck traffic is increasing. Border officials are coordinating. Oil is moving through previously dormant routes. Pipeline rehabilitation is being discussed. Judicial institutions are communicating. Intelligence channels are becoming routine. Political leaders are increasingly willing to meet.

These developments represent the gradual institutionalization of a relationship that only months after Assad's fall was defined primarily by fear.

Baghdad's Strategic Calculation

The transformation in Iraqi-Syrian relations should therefore not be mistaken for an emotional reconciliation or a sudden embrace of Damascus. Baghdad remains cautious because the risks have not disappeared.

Iraq still has legitimate concerns about terrorism, armed groups, border security, Syrian Kurdish politics and the future of ISIS detainees. It also has to balance relations with Washington, Ankara, Tehran and the Gulf states while managing its own domestic political divisions.

But Baghdad increasingly appears to believe that these risks can be managed more effectively through engagement than isolation.

That is the central strategic shift.

The old Iraqi policy toward Syria was based largely on containment: keep the border secure, monitor Damascus and prevent instability from crossing into Iraq. The emerging policy is more ambitious. Baghdad is attempting to influence Syria's trajectory by embedding itself in the country's security, judicial, political and economic networks.

If successful, Iraq could become one of the most important external partners in Syria's reconstruction and stabilization.

The danger is that this process could be disrupted by regional competition. Israel's growing confrontation with Turkey inside Syria, Iran's continuing regional networks, US policy toward Damascus, Turkish concerns over Kurdish forces and instability along the Syrian border all create potential spoilers.

Iraq therefore faces a delicate balancing act. It wants Syria to become stable enough to prevent terrorism and facilitate trade, but not so dominated by another regional power that Damascus becomes a strategic threat to Baghdad.

From Caution to Pragmatism

The story of Iraq-Syria relations since Assad's fall is ultimately a story of adaptation.

Baghdad began from a position of deep suspicion toward al-Sharaa and the new Syrian authorities. It worried about jihadist networks, prisoners, armed factions and the possibility of state collapse. But instead of allowing those fears to produce permanent disengagement, Iraqi officials gradually built channels through which the risks could be managed.

The progression—from intelligence contacts to diplomatic visits, from border security to judicial coordination, and from security cooperation to energy diplomacy—is significant.

It suggests that Iraq and Syria are slowly discovering that their mutual vulnerabilities can also become sources of cooperation.

The most important question now is whether that cooperation can become institutionalized before the next regional crisis tests it.

If Baghdad and Damascus can build durable security mechanisms, restore economic corridors and coordinate over the ISIS file, the relationship could become one of the foundations of the post-Assad regional order. If they fail, the same border that once enabled cooperation could again become a conduit for instability.

For Iraq, the strategic lesson is straightforward: Syria can no longer be treated simply as a security problem on the other side of the border.

It is becoming an economic corridor, a diplomatic partner and a strategic variable in Iraq's own regional positioning.

And for Syria, the lesson is equally important: the road back into the Arab and regional system increasingly runs through Baghdad.

The relationship is not yet an alliance. It is not even fully normalized.

But something important is happening.

After decades in which Baghdad and Damascus repeatedly found themselves on opposite sides of regional struggles, Iraq and Syria are beginning to discover the strategic value of being neighbors again.

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About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, regional security, geopolitics and the strategic competition shaping the Middle East.