Houthi gains around Bab al-Mandab are giving Iran greater leverage over Saudi Arabia’s energy routes as Hormuz remains under pressure.

The latest Houthi advance in Yemen is being interpreted in Tehran as more than another episode in Yemen’s long war. As reported by Amwaj Media, Iranian media have presented the capture of territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including Mokha and positions around Bab al-Mandab, as a strategic setback for the United States and Saudi Arabia. Yet the more important question is not whether the Houthis have suddenly become an extension of Iranian power, but whether their territorial gains have created a second pressure point against the regional energy system already exposed by the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz.

That distinction matters. The Houthis have their own interests, and their military spokesman has explicitly said that Red Sea navigation remains safe except for Saudi vessels, while demanding an end to the blockade on Yemen. Al Jazeera’s report on the Houthi shipping warning therefore reinforces an important point: the immediate Houthi objective remains Saudi Arabia rather than the closure of international shipping as an end in itself. Iran can nevertheless benefit from the pressure without controlling every Houthi decision.

This is consistent with the argument developed in my analysis of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and its strategic vulnerabilities. Tehran’s regional network is not a single command structure. Its members possess different interests, capabilities and degrees of autonomy. The Houthi advance should therefore not be reduced to a simple Iranian military operation by another name. The strategic value for Iran lies in what the Houthis can accomplish within their own theatre while simultaneously increasing pressure on an American partner.

The significance becomes clearer when Bab al-Mandab is placed alongside Hormuz. My analysis of the future of the Strait of Hormuz argued that Tehran’s leverage comes not merely from military control but from its ability to make the movement of energy and commerce politically uncertain. My earlier analysis of the future of Hormuz as an institutionalized Iranian lever reached a similar conclusion: maritime geography becomes strategic power when alternative routes are themselves vulnerable.

The Houthi advance now exposes precisely that vulnerability. Reuters’ assessment of the Houthi advance notes that the group’s movement toward Bab al-Mandab threatens the second major oil-shipping corridor after Hormuz. The Associated Press has likewise reported on the capture of Mokha and the growing threat to Red Sea shipping. The issue is therefore no longer simply Yemen’s territorial conflict. It is the interaction between two maritime chokepoints.

Saudi Arabia built its East-West pipeline precisely because it could reduce dependence on Hormuz. My analysis of Iran’s proxy strategy and Gulf energy infrastructure examined how alternative infrastructure could reduce Tehran’s maritime leverage while simultaneously creating new strategic targets. The current situation demonstrates the vulnerability of that logic: an alternative route is only strategically useful if the infrastructure at the end of that route remains secure.

That is why my recent analysis of the Gulf’s strategic chokepoint crisis is directly relevant. Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab should not be viewed as two unrelated crises. They form a connected system linking the Gulf, Red Sea, Suez Canal, Indian Ocean and global energy markets. Pressure at both ends does not require Iran or its partners to shut every route. It only needs to make the alternatives sufficiently risky that governments, insurers, shipping companies and energy traders begin pricing geopolitical uncertainty into every movement.

Saudi Arabia is particularly exposed because the kingdom increasingly depends on its western export infrastructure when the Gulf route is constrained. Al Jazeera’s analysis of the Bab al-Mandab threat to Saudi exports explains how the kingdom has expanded reliance on the East-West pipeline and the Red Sea route as Hormuz has become increasingly restricted. The strategic irony is obvious: the infrastructure designed to bypass one chokepoint now depends on another.

My analysis of Iraq’s energy fragility identified the same broader structural problem from Iraq’s perspective. Oil reserves do not automatically produce strategic security. What matters is the ability to move energy from the field to international markets. When export routes become concentrated, geography becomes a vulnerability rather than an asset.

That vulnerability has already been demonstrated in Iraq. My analysis of Iraq’s oil-export collapse during the Hormuz crisis examined how quickly a disruption in maritime routes could translate into fiscal pressure. My subsequent analysis of why Iran is choking Iraq’s economy explored how the energy crisis could also reinforce Tehran’s economic leverage over Baghdad. The Houthi advance adds another layer: even when states develop alternative routes, those alternatives remain exposed to the wider regional security environment.

This is where Iraq becomes strategically important. The attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline from Iraqi territory, reported by Al Jazeera and Reuters, demonstrates that the energy geography of the Gulf cannot be separated from Iraq’s internal security architecture. My analysis of Iraq’s security situation and threats to energy infrastructure highlighted precisely this convergence between armed groups, energy infrastructure and regional escalation.

The Iraqi dimension also explains why Baghdad’s militia problem is becoming an energy-security issue. In Baghdad’s militia test, I argued that the central question is whether Iraq can establish a genuinely unified security architecture rather than simply transfer weapons into formal institutions while preserving informal command networks. My analysis of Iraq’s disarmament crisis and the Peshmerga question further examined how difficult it will be to construct a single security system without reopening Iraq’s unresolved political and constitutional disputes.

The latest developments strengthen that argument. If Iraqi territory can be used to threaten critical Saudi energy infrastructure, the consequences extend beyond Baghdad’s domestic politics. Iraq becomes part of the regional contest over energy routes. That is why my analysis of Iran’s “2+6” regional security concept is also relevant: Tehran increasingly sees Iraq not simply as a neighboring state but as a central component of its regional security architecture.

Yet Iran’s relationship with Iraq is more complicated than simple domination. My recent analysis of Iran, Iraq and Kurdistan argued that Tehran combines diplomacy, economic relationships, political networks, armed organizations and coercive pressure. That same mixture is visible in the wider regional environment. Iran can benefit from pressure generated by aligned groups without necessarily controlling every tactical decision they make.

The Houthis illustrate this distinction particularly well. My analysis of Iran’s 7,000-kilometer frontline examined Tehran’s expanding strategic geography, while my analysis of Iran’s cross-border campaign against Iraqi Kurdistan showed how Iranian security concerns increasingly cross national borders. The broader pattern is not necessarily centralized command. It is the creation of multiple pressure points that complicate the strategic calculations of Iran’s opponents.

That is why the current Houthi advance should not automatically be described as a decisive Iranian victory. Al Jazeera’s assessment that the advance consolidates an existing Houthi capacity rather than completely transforming the maritime threat is important. The Houthis have already demonstrated an ability to disrupt Red Sea shipping. Territorial gains make that capability more credible, but they do not eliminate the group’s own military, political and economic constraints.

Nor does the advance mean that Iran can simply command the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The Houthis have their own political calculations inside Yemen, and their current messaging is specifically focused on Saudi vessels. Al Jazeera’s report on Iranian reactions to the Houthi advance shows that Tehran has celebrated the development as a strategic success while stopping short of announcing that Bab al-Mandab will be closed.

That nuance is important because the strongest Iranian media rhetoric is partly about political psychology. Hardline commentary can portray Houthi gains as proof that the “Axis of Resistance” remains capable of imposing costs on the United States and its partners. But military symbolism is not the same thing as strategic transformation.

The wider condition of the regional network matters. My analysis of Iran’s proxy strategy beyond Israel examined the increasing use of regional armed partners to apply pressure while avoiding direct confrontation. My analysis of US pressure on Iraq to curb Iran-backed militias explored the corresponding pressure on Baghdad. Together, these developments show why Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf cannot be treated as separate security files.

The same logic affects Kurdistan. My analysis of why Iraqi Kurdistan is paying the price for the US-Iran confrontation examined how regional conflicts increasingly reach the Kurdistan Region despite Kurdish efforts to maintain neutrality. My subsequent analysis of Iran’s hidden war in Kurdistan showed why Tehran views the Region through the lens of its own western security frontier. My broader Kurdistan geopolitical crossroads analysis placed that vulnerability within the Region’s wider geography between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria.

Energy adds another dimension. My analysis of Kurdistan’s energy-security dilemma argued that energy infrastructure is inseparable from security and political agency. The same principle applies across the Gulf: pipelines, ports, refineries and maritime corridors are no longer merely economic infrastructure. They are strategic assets that can become instruments of pressure during conflict.

The implications for Iraq are particularly significant. My analysis of Iraq and the United States’ $60 billion energy deals examined Baghdad’s effort to attract investment and develop alternatives to Hormuz. My analysis of the Iraq–Turkey pipeline cliff examined the strategic importance of the northern export route. And my analysis of the Kurdistan oil crisis and the battle for Kurdish autonomy showed why the northern pipeline is increasingly important not only to the Kurdistan Region but to Iraq’s national energy resilience.

The emerging lesson is straightforward: connectivity is becoming a form of security power. My analysis of Iraq’s $17 billion Development Road explored how alternative overland connectivity could reduce Iraq’s exposure to maritime chokepoints. My analysis of Turkey’s oil arbitration defeat examined another part of the northern energy equation. My analysis of Iraq’s budget crisis demonstrated why these infrastructure questions ultimately become questions of state stability.

The same logic explains why Baghdad’s relationship with the Kurdistan Region is increasingly strategic rather than merely constitutional. My analysis of Dana Gas’s Baghdad gas agreement showed how Khor Mor gas can reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian energy. That matters because diversification creates bargaining power. My analysis of the KRG’s fuel-import strategy similarly examined how domestic energy resilience can become part of wider strategic autonomy.

The Houthi advance therefore exposes a larger regional problem. The Gulf is developing multiple routes to escape individual chokepoints, but those routes are themselves becoming interconnected targets. Hormuz affects the Gulf. Bab al-Mandab affects the Red Sea. Iraq’s pipelines connect both the regional security environment and global energy markets. The more these systems become interconnected, the more difficult it becomes for any state to isolate one conflict from another.

That is also why Saudi Arabia’s response will matter. Reuters’ latest reporting shows that the Houthi escalation is occurring alongside pressure on Saudi military and energy infrastructure, while the Guardian’s reporting notes that Gulf diplomacy over Hormuz has been complicated by the worsening Yemen conflict. Riyadh therefore faces a difficult strategic equation: defend its western route without allowing the Yemen conflict to become an uncontrolled regional war.

Washington faces a similarly difficult choice. Reuters reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought U.S. military assistance against the Houthis, while Washington stopped short of direct strikes and instead offered intelligence and targeting support. Reuters’ report on the Saudi request to Trump The United States therefore wants freedom of navigation and protection of regional energy flows without necessarily opening another major military front.

For Iran, the strategic attraction is obvious but limited. Tehran can welcome Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia because it raises the costs of maintaining regional energy flows and complicates Washington’s calculations. But if Iran interprets every battlefield gain by an aligned group as evidence of expanding control, it risks confusing tactical leverage with durable strategic power.

The most important conclusion is therefore not that the Houthis have suddenly transformed the regional balance. It is that Bab al-Mandab has become strategically important at precisely the moment when Hormuz is already under severe pressure. That combination creates leverage because Saudi Arabia’s alternatives are becoming less reliable.

The Houthi advance is consequently best understood as a force multiplier for an already fragmented regional conflict. Yemen remains primarily a Yemeni battlefield, Saudi Arabia remains focused on protecting its security and energy interests, and Iran remains interested in weakening the strategic position of its adversaries. These objectives overlap without being identical.

For Iraq and Kurdistan, the lesson is even more direct. My analysis of Iran’s strategic relationship with Iraq and Kurdistan and my Kurdistan Strategic Outlook 2027 both point toward the same structural conclusion: geography is becoming more valuable precisely because regional connectivity is becoming more vulnerable.

The struggle over the Middle East’s energy system is therefore moving beyond the traditional question of who controls oil fields. The more important question is who can keep the routes open. Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab demonstrate the same strategic reality from opposite ends of the Arabian Peninsula: in a fragmented regional order, control over connectivity can be as consequential as control over territory.

Why the opponents couldn't defeat the Houthis?

Neither local forces nor a Saudi-led 10-nation coalition with the latest weapons and aircraft have been able to end the Houthis, who have ruled Yemen since including its capital. This raises the question: How and why is this youth movement so strong?

From thought to weapons

In the early 1990s, in the harsh mountainous regions of Sanaa province in northwestern Yemen, an armed and political movement called Ansarullah, known as the Houthis, led by religious scholar Hussein Badruddin al-Husseini,” emerged. The movement's initial goal was to revive and preserve the Zaidi sect, a Shiite sect that makes up the majority of the region's population, but subsequent events radically changed the group's direction.

In 2014, the Houthis took a historic step into the capital Sanaa and overthrew the Yemeni government. In 2015, a Saudi-led Arab coalition launched a massive military offensive to oust the Houthis.

Despite the heaviest air strikes and a tight siege, the Houthis not only did not break, but also consolidated their military and political position day by day. Although they now control only about 30 to 33 percent of Yemen's territory, between 70 and 75 percent of the country's population is under Houthi control.

The secret of the Houthis' survival and strength

Despite the huge gap in financial and military capabilities between the Houthis and an alliance like Saudi Arabia, which has the world's most advanced weapons, the Houthis have been able to defend themselves for several strategic reasons.

The most obvious reason is the mountainous geography and the way they fight. The Houthis are based in the harsh mountainous regions of northern Yemen, with a long history of guerrilla warfare and hiding in caves and mountains. This geography makes any ground attack on their positions very dangerous and difficult for the attacking forces, while the air force alone can not settle the war.

On the other hand, the Houthis took advantage of the huge arsenal they seized upon coming to power, to this end, they took advantage of the alliance with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who later and later As their position became stronger, they killed him.

Along with this domestic self-armament, the Houthis have gained a regional ally that has not hesitated to transfer weapons and military technology to them: Iran.

Despite the sanctions, the Houthis have been able to obtain technology from Iran to build suicide drones, long-range missiles and naval mines through smuggling networks. They have also been able to build factories to manufacture and develop these weapons with the help of Iranian and Lebanese experts.

Iranian technology, especially in the field of drones, has played a major role in targeting Saudi Arabia and other countries and strengthening the Houthis.

Another strength of the Houthis' dominance is their weakness and division. The anti-Houthi front (the legitimate government, the Southern Transitional Council, and other local forces) has many political differences and often internal power struggles, making them unable to be serious competitors to the Houthis. This was clearly demonstrated in the recent battle in the capture of the coast of Bab al-Mandeb.

Thus, despite pressure from domestic opponents and major regional and international powers, the Houthis have been able to prove themselves and become one of the main players in the Middle East.

Author: Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent publication focused on Iraq, Kurdistan, Iran, regional security, geopolitics and energy.

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