Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran face a widening struggle over pipelines, Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, reshaping Gulf geopolitics and energy security.

The Middle East is entering a more dangerous phase of the Iran–Gulf confrontation in which the central strategic issue is no longer simply the exchange of missiles and drones, but the control of the region’s energy and maritime arteries. In the space of days, Saudi Arabia has faced attacks launched from Iraqi territory against its East-West oil pipeline, Qatar has publicly backed Riyadh’s restraint, Iran and the Gulf states are preparing another diplomatic effort in Oman, and Iran-aligned Houthi forces have seized strategically important territory around the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Taken together, these developments reveal an emerging regional contest over whether energy can continue to move through the Gulf and Red Sea despite the wider war.

The most consequential development for Iraq and the Gulf is the reported drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline. According to Shafaq News' report on the Saudi pipeline attack, several drones launched from Iraqi territory struck the pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions, causing damage and injuries. Saudi Arabia subsequently confirmed that the attacks originated from Iraq.

The importance of the target goes far beyond physical damage to an oil pipeline. Saudi Arabia constructed the approximately 1,200-kilometre East-West pipeline precisely because it provides an alternative to exporting crude through the Strait of Hormuz. Its strategic value has therefore increased dramatically since the disruption of Hormuz. If the Gulf's eastern oil infrastructure is vulnerable and the western alternative is simultaneously attacked, Saudi Arabia's ability to move its oil to global markets becomes considerably more constrained.

This creates a particularly difficult strategic dilemma for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has reportedly chosen not to retaliate immediately, following a request from Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, giving Baghdad an opportunity to prevent attacks launched from Iraqi territory. Riyadh nevertheless made clear that it reserves the right to take measures necessary to protect its sovereignty and critical infrastructure.

That decision is significant. Riyadh is effectively testing whether Baghdad possesses sufficient authority over Iraqi territory and armed groups to prevent Iraq from becoming a launchpad for attacks against Saudi Arabia. If Baghdad succeeds, the immediate crisis could remain contained. If it fails, pressure for direct Saudi action against the perpetrators—and potentially against infrastructure or positions inside Iraq—will grow considerably.

The Iraqi government's response is therefore more than a domestic security matter. It has become a test of Iraq's sovereignty. Baghdad has condemned the attacks and ordered an investigation, while an Iraqi military commander responsible for operations in Maysan was subsequently dismissed following investigations connecting attacks on Saudi Arabia to launches from Iraqi territory.

The problem is that Iraq occupies an increasingly difficult position between Iran and the Arab Gulf. Iraqi territory provides strategic depth for Iran-aligned armed groups, while Iraq simultaneously seeks deeper economic and political relations with Saudi Arabia and the wider Gulf. The continuation of attacks from Iraqi territory threatens to undermine precisely the regional economic integration that Baghdad has been attempting to develop.

This is why the Saudi response should not be understood merely as another episode in the confrontation between Riyadh and Iran-aligned militias. It is also a confrontation over whether Iraq can function as a sovereign regional state or as an arena through which other actors project power.

The wider regional picture makes the situation even more dangerous. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline was supposed to reduce its vulnerability to Hormuz. Yet at precisely the moment when that alternative route has become strategically important, the southern maritime alternative is also deteriorating.

The capture by the Houthis of Mayyun Island, also known as Perim, together with other strategic positions around the Bab al-Mandab, represents a major development. The Times of Israel's report on the Houthi takeover of the Bab al-Mandab area reports that Houthi forces moved onto Mayyun after government forces withdrew and subsequently consolidated their position along the Bab al-Mandab coast. The development follows the Houthi capture of additional territory along Yemen's western coastline, including Mocha and nearby islands.

The strategic significance is profound. Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab are not independent crises. They form two ends of the broader energy and trade system connecting the Gulf with the Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Mediterranean and European markets. If Iran can exert pressure around Hormuz while its Houthi allies exert control around Bab al-Mandab, the strategic effect is greater than the sum of the two theatres.

For Saudi Arabia, this produces an extraordinary dilemma. Its eastern oil infrastructure is exposed to pressure from the Gulf, while its western export infrastructure is exposed to pressure from Yemen and the Red Sea. The East-West pipeline was supposed to provide strategic redundancy; Houthi control of Bab al-Mandab threatens the maritime route to which that redundancy ultimately leads.

This is the emerging geography of the conflict: Iran and its partners are not necessarily required to destroy the entire Gulf energy system. They only need to make its principal routes sufficiently insecure to increase the political and economic cost of maintaining normal flows.

The consequences extend beyond Saudi Arabia. Global energy markets have already reacted to the simultaneous pressure on Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab and Saudi infrastructure, with Brent crude moving above $100 per barrel amid the latest escalation.

But the military escalation is occurring alongside an equally important diplomatic effort. Amwaj Media's reporting on the planned GCC-Iran-Iraq gathering in Oman points toward an emerging recognition among regional governments that military pressure alone cannot resolve the crisis. The planned gathering in Oman is particularly significant because it brings together the GCC, Iran and Iraq at precisely the moment when regional actors are confronting the consequences of an increasingly fragmented security environment.

Oman's role is not accidental. Muscat has historically maintained channels to both Iran and the Arab Gulf and has repeatedly positioned itself as a mediator when other regional states have been unable or unwilling to communicate directly. The fact that Oman is again becoming a diplomatic meeting point demonstrates that regional governments are beginning to look for mechanisms that can prevent the Iran conflict from becoming an indefinitely expanding regional war.

Qatar's position reinforces this emerging diplomatic logic. Shafaq News' report on Qatar's support for Saudi restraint reports that Doha praised Saudi Arabia's "responsible approach" and supported Riyadh's decision to give Baghdad an opportunity to prevent further attacks from Iraqi territory. Qatar also expressed solidarity with Saudi Arabia and support for measures protecting the Kingdom's sovereignty and critical infrastructure.

This is an important signal from Doha. Qatar is demonstrating that supporting dialogue with Iran does not necessarily mean accepting attacks against Gulf states. The Gulf monarchies increasingly appear to be pursuing a two-track strategy: deterrence against attacks and diplomacy to prevent the conflict from becoming uncontrollable.

That strategy may ultimately be more significant than any individual military operation. The Gulf states have learned that they cannot assume that the United States will always respond to every threat with unlimited military force. At the same time, they cannot afford to abandon the American security relationship. Their emerging approach is therefore one of greater strategic autonomy without complete strategic separation from Washington.

For Iran, the current environment offers both opportunities and dangers. Tehran can demonstrate that the regional security architecture cannot function without taking Iranian interests into account. The ability of Iran-aligned actors to pressure Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab and targets connected to Saudi energy infrastructure gives Tehran substantial leverage.

But this leverage carries a major risk. The more Iran's partners threaten the economic infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the more those states have an incentive to coordinate against Tehran. The danger is that an asymmetric strategy designed to fragment the opposing coalition could eventually produce a more unified Gulf response.

Iraq sits directly at the centre of this contradiction.

Baghdad cannot afford to become the battlefield connecting Iran and Saudi Arabia. Nor can it indefinitely tolerate armed groups using Iraqi territory in ways that expose the state to retaliation from its neighbours. The Saudi pipeline attacks therefore represent another warning that Iraqi sovereignty is becoming inseparable from regional economic security.

For the Kurdistan Region, this wider transformation carries its own implications. Kurdistan sits within the same strategic geography in which Iran, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf are increasingly competing over routes, energy infrastructure and political influence. The more vulnerable regional maritime routes become, the more valuable secure land-based corridors, energy networks and politically stable transit territories become.

But that opportunity exists only if Kurdistan possesses functioning institutions and coherent external economic and security policies. A fragmented political environment weakens the ability of the Kurdistan Region to exploit its geographical position as a strategic corridor. Conversely, institutional consolidation could allow Kurdistan to become more important as regional states search for alternative routes and more resilient supply chains.

The latest crisis therefore illustrates a broader transformation of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The central question is no longer simply who wins a confrontation between Iran, Israel, the United States or the Gulf states. The deeper question is who controls the infrastructure through which the region remains connected to the global economy.

Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline and Iraqi territory have suddenly become parts of one strategic system. The attacks from Iraq, the Houthi advance in Yemen and the diplomatic gathering planned in Oman should consequently be read together rather than as isolated events.

The immediate danger is escalation. Saudi restraint may prevent another cycle of retaliation, but restraint is not indefinite. If Baghdad cannot stop attacks originating from its territory, Riyadh's patience will become increasingly difficult to sustain. If the Houthis consolidate control over Bab al-Mandab, pressure on Saudi Arabia and international shipping will intensify. And if diplomacy fails, the region could move from a contest over leverage into a much broader struggle over the physical infrastructure of global energy.

Yet there is also a diplomatic opening. Qatar's support for Saudi restraint, Iraq's attempt to investigate the attacks, Saudi Arabia's decision to delay retaliation, and the planned GCC-Iran-Iraq meeting in Oman all suggest that regional actors understand the cost of uncontrolled escalation.

The emerging regional order may therefore be defined by an uncomfortable combination of military confrontation and pragmatic diplomacy. States are simultaneously preparing for further conflict and searching for mechanisms to prevent it. For Iraq and Kurdistan, this means that sovereignty, institutional capacity and control over territory are becoming more strategically important than ever.

The lesson from the current crisis is straightforward: in the Middle East, geography has become a weapon. Pipelines, ports, islands, straits and transit corridors are no longer merely economic assets. They are instruments of geopolitical power. And as the struggle over Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab demonstrates, whoever can influence the region's connectivity can increasingly influence the political choices of states far beyond the immediate battlefield.

#Iraq #SaudiArabia #Iran #Gulf #Hormuz #BabAlMandab #Geopolitics #EnergySecurity #MiddleEast #Kurdistan