About the Peshmerga unification: How Can We Have an Army?

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj How can Kurdish society build a modern army while balancing history, politics, technology, civil authority, and the Peshmerga's legacy? This may appear to be a straightforward institutional question, but it is not. The question of how to create an army in the Kurdistan Region is ultimately a question about political authority, social organization, historical experience, technology, and the relationship between the state and the forces that defend it. At the most basic level, there are two ways of thinking about this problem. We might call them thin theories and deep theories. Thin theory assumes that institutions can be separated from the societies that produce them. Under this approach, armies are broadly comparable institutions that can be constructed according to common models in different places. The assumption is that what works in one environment can, with sufficient administrative effort, be reproduced somewhere else. A similar logic is particularly domina...
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Kurdistan’s two-administration crisis: political paralysis and the failure to form a government | Kurdish Policy Analysis

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Kurdistan’s prolonged political deadlock is weakening its institutions and pushing the region toward two separate administrations.

Nearly two years have passed since the Kurdistan parliamentary elections, with no party being able to make strong decisions and form a government.

The Kurdistan Region is now moving towards becoming an official “two independent administrations” due to the disruption of political work, the closure of parliament and the lack of a unified institution.

Since 2023, when the government's constitutional term expired, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) led by Masrour Barzani has continued only as an “executive government”. This came after the winning parties in the October 2024 elections, especially the two main parties (the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Patriotic Union), failed to agree on the formation of a new government.

The current government, which is run by the KDP because it holds most of the highest positions and includes the PUK and several smaller parties, is no longer implemented throughout the region. This is due to the intensification of political differences with the PUK, the disappearance of the role of public institutions, and the disruption of parliamentary sessions that have not been able to fulfill its legislative and oversight functions for three years.

For these reasons, it has practically led to a “two-administration” system; The KDP administers Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK administers Sulaymaniyah and Halabja. In reality, “two governments” have been formed with independent finances and separate security agencies.

Insisting on shares

The political closure between the two parties came after more than 30 rounds of talks and dialogue failed because both sides refused to give up their demands for a certain share of political, security and economic positions.

The KDP insists on keeping the posts of president, prime minister, interior and natural resources ministries, security council and many other important posts. In return, the PUK is seeking the post of president or prime minister, along with the Interior Ministry and several other ministries, and has expressed its willingness to give up the presidency of parliament.

At the same time, the support and mediation of Western countries and small local parties has been fruitless, leaving the Kurdistan Region with complete political paralysis and financial and economic crisis, and both sides only blame each other.

Even the last initiative, which was held in July and August under the supervision of Salahuddin Bahauddin, the secretary of the Kurdistan Islamic Union, to compromise both sides their conditions and re-activate the parliament ended inconclusively.

50% to 50% application for senior positions

The political situation became more complicated after a new political front was formed between the PUK and the Nawa-i-Nwe Movement to confront the KDP and prevent it from forming a government alone.

The PUK and Nawa-i-Nwe demand that senior posts be divided in half (50% to 50%) with the PUK, but the KDP rejects this demand and believes that according to the election results, it has the right to win both prime minister and president.

Decisions that consolidate the reality of two administrations

A source in the PUK-Nawa-i-Nwe front revealed that after the failure of the solution efforts, the two sides in a meeting in Sulaimani in the presence of Bafel Talabani and Shaswar Abdulwahid, decided to work separately to manage the areas under their control.

According to the source, the PUK and Nawa-i-Nwe have agreed to manage the areas of Sulaimani, Halabja and districts with administrative, political, security and financial independence and based on the monthly domestic revenue of these areas.

The source said that this new arrangement will continue until the new parliamentary elections, unless the PUK and PDK agree on their issues and work together. He also stressed that the two sides will increase their coordination in Baghdad.

Citizens are paying the price

With the emergence of these new attitudes and the continuation of the political and administrative crisis, citizens have become the main victims; This is due to unprecedented increases in fuel prices, higher costs of electricity and utilities, and a lack of job opportunities due to sluggish markets and rising fees.

Political analysts warn that Kurdistan's remaining in these crises will strengthen the two-administration system and make it more difficult to resolve issues, in addition to weakening the role of the Kurds in Baghdad and damage the structure of the region that was formed in


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