Migration has become one of the most divisive political issues of the twenty-first century, but the intensity of the political debate often obscures a more fundamental reality: migration is not simply a humanitarian issue, an economic phenomenon or a border-security problem. It is a geopolitical force shaped by war, demographics, labour markets, inequality, development, state capacity and the changing relationship between states and their populations.

Hein de Haas’s How Migration Really Works: A Factful Guide to the Most Divisive Issue in Politics, based on more than three decades of migration research, is particularly valuable because it challenges 22 common assumptions about migration and asks a more difficult question: what actually drives people to move, and how much power do governments really have to control that movement? 

The answer has profound geopolitical implications. States can influence migration, sometimes dramatically, but they cannot simply command it out of existence. Migration emerges from the interaction of forces that governments can regulate but rarely control completely. The result is a persistent tension between political promises of immigration control and the structural realities of global mobility.

Migration Is Growing, But the World Is Not Being Emptied

The first misconception concerns scale. The number of international migrants has increased substantially. According to the latest United Nations International Migrant Stock estimates, approximately 304 million people were living outside their country of birth in 2024, nearly twice the number recorded in 1990. UN International Migrant Stock 2024

That number is politically significant, but it must be placed in context. International migrants still represent only a small minority of the world's population. The growth in absolute numbers does not mean that most people are becoming international migrants or that borders are becoming irrelevant.

This distinction matters geopolitically because migration debates frequently confuse absolute growth with proportional transformation. A country can experience a historically significant increase in immigration while the global proportion of people living abroad remains relatively limited. Conversely, a migration flow that is modest on the global scale can have enormous political consequences in a particular country, border region or city.

The geopolitical importance of migration therefore cannot be measured simply by counting migrants. What matters is where they are going, why they are moving, how quickly populations are changing, and whether states possess the institutions necessary to manage those changes.

Migration Is Not Synonymous With Refugees

Another major analytical failure is the tendency to treat migrants and refugees as interchangeable categories.They are not.

A worker moving across a border, an international student, a family migrant, a refugee escaping war and an asylum seeker requesting protection may all be described politically as "migrants," but their motivations, legal positions and implications for host states are fundamentally different.

The distinction is especially important when examining forced displacement. The latest UNHCR Global Trends report estimates that 117.8 million people were forcibly displaced at the end of 2025, including refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people. UNHCR Global Trends 2025

The largest component of this crisis is not international migration at all. Approximately 68.7 million people remained internally displaced within their own countries at the end of 2025. Sudan alone accounted for 9.1 million internally displaced people. UNHCR Global Trends — Internal Displacement

This changes the geopolitical picture considerably. The dominant image of displacement is often a refugee travelling from a conflict zone toward Europe or North America. In reality, most displaced people remain much closer to their places of origin.

The implication for international policy is significant: supporting neighbouring states, resolving conflicts and rebuilding institutions may be more important to the global displacement system than simply strengthening distant borders.

The Development Paradox

One of de Haas's most important arguments is also one of the least intuitive. Development does not necessarily reduce migration immediately. In fact, development can initially increase people's capacity to migrate.

Poor people may want to migrate but lack the resources to do so. International migration requires money, information, passports, transport, social networks and often educational or professional qualifications. As countries develop, more people acquire those capabilities.

De Haas has argued for years that development increases people's capabilities and aspirations to move and that the relationship between development and migration is therefore more complicated than the conventional assumption that development simply eliminates migration. Hein de Haas's research on migration and development. This has profound implications for foreign policy.

European governments frequently assume that development assistance to Africa, the Middle East or South Asia will reduce migration toward Europe. Development is undoubtedly essential for long-term stability, but expecting it to produce an immediate decline in migration misunderstands the relationship between development and mobility.

A population that becomes wealthier, better educated and more connected to the outside world may initially become more capable of moving.

The geopolitical consequence is that development and migration should not be treated as opposing processes. Development can create mobility, and mobility can subsequently contribute to development through remittances, skills, investment and transnational networks.

Migration Is Also a Global Economic System

Migration is not simply a transfer of people from poorer countries to richer countries. It is also a system of economic exchange. Migrants provide labour in destination economies while simultaneously transferring money, skills and knowledge back to their countries of origin.

This is particularly visible through remittances. The World Bank estimated remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries at approximately $685 billion in 2024, demonstrating the enormous economic importance of international mobility to developing societies. The geopolitical implication is significant. A migrant in Europe, North America or the Gulf may simultaneously be part of the labour market of the destination state and part of the economic survival system of a family or community thousands of kilometres away.

Migration therefore creates transnational economic relationships that governments cannot easily contain within national borders. This is one reason migration has become inseparable from development policy, foreign policy and economic diplomacy.

The Myth of a Fixed Number of Jobs

One of the most persistent political arguments against immigration is that immigrants take jobs from citizens. The argument appears intuitive: if there are a fixed number of jobs, increasing the labour supply must reduce opportunities for existing workers.

But economies do not function as fixed containers of employment. Migrants are not only workers. They are also consumers, taxpayers, entrepreneurs and producers. Their presence changes demand, investment and economic activity.

Recent research illustrates this complexity. A 2024 study by Alessandro Caiumi and Giovanni Peri examining immigration's effects on US wages and employment found evidence that immigration generated positive wage and employment effects for many native workers rather than simply displacing them. NBER — Immigration's Effect on US Wages and Employment Redux

This does not mean immigration benefits every worker equally. The distribution of gains and costs matters. A highly skilled migrant entering a technology sector may complement existing workers. A large concentration of lower-skilled workers may create greater competition in particular occupations. A rapid population increase may also place pressure on housing and public services if supply cannot adjust quickly.

The serious geopolitical question is therefore not whether migration is universally beneficial or harmful. It is who benefits, who bears the costs, and how governments distribute the gains.

Migration and State Capacity

This is where migration becomes a question of geopolitics rather than simply economics.

The same number of migrants can produce very different political consequences in two countries because state capacity differs.

A country with strong institutions, functioning asylum procedures, adequate housing, flexible labour markets and effective integration policies can absorb migration more effectively than a country with weak institutions, housing shortages, political fragmentation and limited administrative capacity.

Migration therefore tests the capacity of the state. The political debate often focuses on whether migrants are "good" or "bad" for society. A more useful question is whether the state has the institutional capacity to govern mobility.

This distinction is becoming increasingly important as wealthy countries simultaneously face labour shortages and political pressure to restrict immigration.

The OECD's latest International Migration Outlook illustrates the contradiction. Permanent migration into OECD countries declined by approximately 4 percent in 2024, but the 6.2 million new permanent immigrants recorded that year remained 15 percent above 2019 levels. OECD International Migration Outlook 2025

Migration is therefore moderating from the post-pandemic surge without returning to the pre-pandemic baseline. That is precisely the kind of structural persistence that de Haas's framework helps explain.

Europe Is Trying to Resolve the Contradiction

Europe provides the clearest contemporary test of whether migration can be governed rather than simply politicised.

On 12 June 2026, the European Union's Migration and Asylum Pact entered into application across member states. The framework introduces common rules covering border screening, asylum procedures, responsibility-sharing, returns and cooperation between member states. European Commission — EU Migration and Asylum Pact enters into application

The significance goes beyond European asylum policy. The EU is attempting to construct a system based on a political compromise: stronger borders without eliminating legal migration; faster asylum decisions without abandoning the asylum system; greater returns without assuming that every rejected applicant can immediately be removed; and solidarity between states without eliminating national political differences. That is effectively a move toward managed migration.

The EU's challenge, however, is implementation. The Pact is legally ambitious, but the existence of common rules does not automatically create common administrative capacity. Contemporary reporting has highlighted concerns about preparedness and the practical difficulties of implementing the new system. Reuters — EU migration overhaul enters into force. This is precisely where migration policy becomes a test of European state capacity.

Europe's Falling Asylum Numbers Do Not Mean the Migration Question Is Over

There is evidence that asylum pressure has declined from its recent highs.

Eurostat reported that EU countries issued more than 205,000 first-instance asylum decisions in the first quarter of 2026, four percent more than in the same period of 2025. Eurostat — Asylum applications and decisions in 2026

EU asylum authorities have also entered 2026 with applications at a relative low compared with recent years, partly because of the sharp decline in Syrian claims and the absence of new large-scale inflows. But the European Union Agency for Asylum warns that this breathing space is contingent rather than evidence that the underlying drivers of displacement have disappeared. EUAA — Latest asylum trends That distinction is crucial.

Migration flows can fall because a war ends, a border route closes, a neighbouring country changes policy, an origin country becomes safer or a transit route becomes more difficult. None of those developments necessarily eliminates the structural drivers of migration.

Borders Matter—but They Do Not Operate in Isolation

One of the most controversial aspects of de Haas's work concerns border controls. It would be wrong to interpret his argument as saying that borders do not matter. Borders clearly affect migration. They change the cost, route, timing and risks associated with movement.

The more important proposition is that border controls can generate unintended consequences. If crossing a border becomes more difficult, expensive or dangerous, migrants who successfully cross may become less willing to return home because re-entry becomes uncertain.

In such circumstances, stronger enforcement can reduce repeated movement while increasing incentives for longer settlement. This is one of the paradoxes of migration policy: a policy designed to reduce immigration can sometimes change the composition and duration of migration rather than simply eliminate it.

That does not mean states should abandon border controls. It means border control should be evaluated according to actual outcomes rather than political intentions.

The Climate Migration Debate Is Also More Complicated

Climate change will increasingly affect human mobility, but the geopolitical debate is often distorted by dramatic predictions of a future in which hundreds of millions of people simply cross international borders. The IPCC's assessment is more nuanced. Climate hazards can contribute to migration and displacement, but migration decisions are shaped by economic conditions, livelihoods, political stability, social networks and adaptive capacity.

Most climate-related displacement is expected to occur within countries, rather than through mass migration across continents. This distinction matters for Middle Eastern and African policy. Climate stress can undermine agriculture, water security and livelihoods, which can accelerate urbanisation, internal displacement and regional mobility. But whether these processes ultimately become international migration depends heavily on state capacity and economic opportunity. Climate change therefore acts less like a single migration trigger and more like a threat multiplier.

Migration Is Becoming a Demographic Question

The geopolitical importance of migration is becoming even clearer when demographic change is considered. Many advanced economies are ageing while facing labour shortages. Governments simultaneously want to reduce immigration and maintain economic growth, pension systems, healthcare provision and productive labour forces.

This produces a structural contradiction. A state can restrict migration politically, but demographic ageing does not disappear because immigration is unpopular. This does not mean that migration is a substitute for family policy, automation, productivity growth or labour-force participation. It means that immigration is one of the tools available to states confronting demographic decline.

The future political struggle may therefore be less about whether migration exists and more about which migrants states want, under what conditions, and for what strategic purposes. That represents a major shift from traditional migration policy.

The Emerging Competition for Human Capital

The next phase of global migration may involve competition rather than simply confrontation. Ageing economies will increasingly compete for: doctors; nurses; engineers; researchers; technology specialists; construction workers; agricultural workers; carers; entrepreneurs; and students.

This creates a geopolitical competition for human capital. Countries that once regarded migration principally as a security threat may increasingly view particular categories of migrants as strategic economic assets. At the same time, countries of origin may become concerned about brain drain.

The result is an emerging tension between two principles: the right of individuals to pursue better opportunities and the strategic interest of states in retaining skilled populations.

This tension will become particularly important for developing countries whose educated young populations represent both their greatest economic potential and their most mobile resource.

Migration and the Politics of Sovereignty

The deeper geopolitical issue is sovereignty. Modern states are built around the idea that governments control who enters their territory, who lives within it and under what legal conditions. Migration challenges that assumption.

Economic globalisation has made capital mobile. Digitalisation has made information mobile. Global labour markets have made skills mobile. Conflict has made populations mobile. States therefore confront a paradox: they remain sovereign, but they operate in a world in which many of the forces shaping population movement lie beyond their direct control.

This is why migration has become such a powerful political issue. It is not only about migrants. It is about whether citizens believe their governments still control the borders, the labour market, demographic change and the social contract.

The Real Political Divide Is Not Open Borders Versus Closed Borders

The most important conclusion from de Haas's work is that the conventional political binary is misleading. The debate is often framed as: open borders versus closed borders.

But neither represents a complete policy. Completely open borders are politically unrealistic for most states. Completely closed borders are equally unrealistic in an interconnected global economy. The real policy spectrum lies between them.

It includes: legal migration pathways, targeted labour migration, credible border controls, functioning asylum systems, integration, development cooperation, readmission agreements and targeted returns. The challenge is to combine these instruments coherently.

That is why the European Migration and Asylum Pact is so important. It represents an attempt to move from fragmented national responses toward a more integrated system of migration governance. European Council — Migration and Asylum Pact. Whether that system succeeds remains uncertain. But the direction of travel is clear.

What the World Still Gets Wrong About Migration

The biggest misconception is that migration can be explained by a single cause. It cannot. Poverty alone does not explain it. War alone does not explain it. Climate change alone does not explain it. Labour demand alone does not explain it. Weak borders alone do not explain it. Migration emerges from the interaction of these forces.

The second misconception is that migration is either inherently good or inherently bad. Neither proposition survives serious empirical scrutiny. Migration creates economic opportunities while producing adjustment costs. It can alleviate labour shortages while increasing pressure on housing. It can generate remittances while contributing to brain drain. It can provide refuge while creating political tensions.

The third misconception is that migration can simply be switched off. States can reduce particular migration flows. They can alter routes. They can increase or decrease legal pathways. They can change incentives. They can improve returns. But governments operate within a larger geopolitical system. They cannot abolish the demographic, economic and political forces that produce migration.

The Geopolitical Future of Migration

The future of migration will therefore be determined by the interaction of five major forces.

Demography will push ageing economies toward greater demand for workers.

Conflict will continue to generate forced displacement.

Development will increase the capabilities and aspirations of populations in emerging economies.

Climate change will increasingly disrupt livelihoods and contribute to internal and regional mobility.

Politics will determine how states translate these pressures into border and migration policies.

The countries that manage this transition most successfully will not necessarily be those that accept the most migrants or those that reject the most migrants. They will be the countries that develop the most effective institutions for distinguishing between different forms of mobility and governing them accordingly. That means separating refugees from labour migrants, skilled workers from irregular workers, temporary mobility from permanent settlement and humanitarian protection from economic migration.

Conclusion: Migration Is a Geopolitical System, Not a Border Crisis

Hein de Haas's central contribution is to force the migration debate away from political slogans and toward causal analysis.

The evidence largely supports his challenge to the most simplistic claims about migration. The world is not being emptied by an uncontrollable migration wave. Poverty does not automatically produce international migration. Development does not immediately stop migration. Immigrants do not simply take a fixed number of jobs from citizens. Climate change will not necessarily translate into one giant wave of international refugees.

But neither does the evidence justify the opposite conclusion that migration is cost-free or automatically beneficial. The real lesson is more uncomfortable. Migration is normal, persistent and politically consequential. States can influence it, but cannot completely control the forces behind it.

The OECD's evidence that permanent migration remains historically high despite its recent decline demonstrates the durability of international mobility. OECD International Migration Outlook 2025 The UN's 304 million international migrants demonstrate its scale. UN International Migrant Stock 2024 And the 117.8 million forcibly displaced people recorded by UNHCR demonstrate how conflict and political instability can rapidly transform population movements. UNHCR Global Trends 2025

The geopolitical question of the coming decades will therefore not be whether migration can be eliminated. It will be whether states can govern human mobility without losing control of their borders, undermining their economies, abandoning humanitarian obligations or fracturing social cohesion.

That is a much harder challenge than building a wall. And it is likely to become one of the defining geopolitical questions of the twenty-first century.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a researcher, geopolitical analyst and international relations professional and the founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent publication focusing on Iraq, the Kurdistan Region and wider Middle Eastern geopolitical affairs.

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