New agreements with Washington, militia reform, and shifting US priorities could redefine Iraq's political landscape while forcing the Kurdistan Region to rethink its strategic position

Ali al-Zaidi's Washington visit signals a shift from security cooperation to economic partnership with the US, raising major implications for Iraq, militias, and the Kurdistan Region.

A New Phase in US-Iraq Relations?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's recent visit to Washington may prove to be one of the most consequential diplomatic engagements between Iraq and the United States since the defeat of the Islamic State.

Speaking on The New Region's GeoSpace podcast, Kurdish scholar and political analyst Dr. Mohammed Shareef argued that the visit represents more than a routine diplomatic exchange. Instead, it signals a strategic transition in US-Iraq relations—from a partnership dominated by military cooperation to one increasingly centred on investment, economic development, and institutional reform.

The visit reportedly resulted in 48 memoranda of understanding (MoUs) worth approximately $60 billion, underscoring the scale of Washington's renewed economic engagement with Baghdad.

According to Shareef, the Trump administration appears determined to redefine the bilateral relationship.

"The beginning of a transition from a military security relationship to an economic partnership."

If this assessment proves accurate, Iraq could be entering a fundamentally different phase of relations with Washington—one in which economics gradually replaces counterterrorism as the principal pillar of cooperation.

Can Zaidi Succeed Where Others Failed?

Ali al-Zaidi has inherited many of the same structural problems that challenged previous Iraqi governments: endemic corruption, competing centres of power, weak state institutions, and powerful armed factions operating beyond direct government control.

Yet Shareef argues that Zaidi may possess advantages unavailable to his predecessors.

Most importantly, the new prime minister appears to enjoy support from several influential actors that rarely align simultaneously.

Internationally, Washington has strongly backed his reform agenda.

Domestically, Iraq's highest Shiite religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr both broadly favour strengthening state institutions and limiting the role of armed groups outside government control.

That convergence gives Zaidi unusual political momentum.

"He has US support, support from the Marja' and Sadr domestically. I think he's in a very good position to be able to implement."

This combination potentially provides the political legitimacy necessary to pursue reforms that previous administrations either postponed or avoided altogether.

Militia Disarmament Remains the Greatest Test

Despite this favourable political environment, Shareef cautions that Iraq's most difficult challenge remains unresolved: the future of Iran-aligned militias and armed factions operating within or alongside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Disarming these groups has long been considered one of Iraq's most politically sensitive issues.

According to Shareef, resistance should be expected.

Many armed factions possess substantial military capabilities, economic networks, and political influence accumulated over years of conflict.

Voluntarily surrendering heavy weapons would significantly reduce both their leverage and autonomy.

Shareef therefore described Zaidi as being caught "between a rock and a hard place."

Recent arrests of senior officials under anti-corruption campaigns demonstrate intent but fall short of dismantling entrenched patronage networks.

As Shareef observed:

"They were not really the big fish."

In other words, symbolic actions alone are unlikely to alter Iraq's fragmented security architecture.

Syria's Lessons May Not Apply to Iraq

Some analysts have suggested that Iraq could eventually accommodate armed factions politically without requiring complete disarmament, drawing comparisons with political transitions elsewhere in the region.

Shareef rejects that comparison.

He argues that developments in Syria have instead reinforced the belief among many Iran-backed groups that the regional environment has fundamentally changed.

Rather than viewing armed resistance as a sustainable long-term strategy, some may increasingly recognise that future political relevance depends upon transitioning into conventional political actors.

Whether this transformation occurs voluntarily remains uncertain.

What Does a Stronger Baghdad-Washington Partnership Mean for the Kurdistan Region?

Perhaps the most significant part of Shareef's analysis concerns the Kurdistan Region.

Contrary to assumptions that improved US-Iraq relations automatically benefit the Kurdistan Region, Shareef argues the opposite often occurs.

According to him, the position of Iraqi Kurdistan within US foreign policy is constantly reassessed according to three principal variables:

• Political developments in Baghdad.
• America's broader regional alliances.
• Washington's long-term strategic vision for the Gulf and Middle East.

His conclusion is sobering.

"Whenever US relations with Baghdad strengthen, it usually means that US relations with the Kurdistan region weaken."

This observation reflects a recurring pattern in American policy.

When Baghdad demonstrates greater political stability and stronger governance, Washington often prioritises engagement with Iraq's federal government over maintaining exceptional political attention toward Erbil.

That does not imply abandonment of the Kurdistan Region, but it does suggest that Kurdish leaders cannot assume strategic relevance will remain constant.

The Kurdistan Region Must Adapt

Rather than viewing changing US priorities as inevitable decline, Shareef argues the Kurdistan Region retains considerable agency.

Its future importance depends largely on domestic reform.

He identifies several priorities:

• Completing formation of the long-delayed tenth KRG cabinet.
• Restoring regular parliamentary activity.
• Strengthening democratic institutions.
• Combating corruption.
• Unifying the Peshmerga under a single command.
• Diversifying the economy beyond hydrocarbons.

These reforms would not merely improve governance internally; they would reinforce the Kurdistan Region's value as a reliable Western partner.

As Shareef noted:

"The more Kurdistan becomes democratic and institutionalised, the more the United States would be happy."

This suggests that Washington's long-term commitment depends increasingly on governance quality rather than historical goodwill alone.

Analysis: Iraq's Strategic Balance Is Changing

Shareef's analysis points toward a broader transformation underway in Iraq.

For nearly two decades, US-Iraq relations were defined primarily by military cooperation, counterterrorism operations, and security assistance. If Washington is now shifting its focus towards investment, infrastructure, trade, and economic integration, Baghdad's political priorities will inevitably evolve as well.

This creates opportunities for Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. A stronger economic partnership with the United States could attract foreign capital, improve investor confidence, and strengthen Iraq's state institutions. Success in these areas would also enhance Baghdad's leverage over competing political factions.

However, the security dimension cannot simply be left behind. Iraq's fragmented political system, the continued influence of Iran-backed armed groups, and entrenched patronage networks mean that economic modernisation will only succeed if accompanied by meaningful governance reforms. Militia disarmament remains the central obstacle. Without consolidating the state's monopoly over force, Iraq risks pursuing economic transformation while its security architecture remains divided.

For the Kurdistan Region, the implications are equally significant. Shareef's warning reflects a long-standing dynamic in American regional policy: as federal institutions in Baghdad strengthen, Washington often channels more of its diplomatic attention through the central government. This does not necessarily diminish the strategic value of the Kurdistan Region, but it raises the threshold for maintaining that value.

Erbil can no longer rely solely on its historical partnership with the United States or its role in defeating the Islamic State. Future influence will increasingly depend on democratic governance, institutional reform, political unity, economic diversification, and security sector modernisation.

Ultimately, the success of Zaidi's Washington strategy will not be measured by the number of memoranda signed or the value of investment pledges. It will be judged by whether Iraq can convert international confidence into lasting domestic reforms while preserving political stability. If Baghdad succeeds, it could reshape Iraq's regional position. If it fails, both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region may find themselves navigating an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.

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