Turkey, Iraq and the KRG face a decisive test as PKK disarmament moves from declaration to territorial implementation in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The most consequential development in the Turkish-Kurdish peace process may no longer be taking place inside Turkey. It is increasingly taking place in the mountains, towns and political jurisdictions of Iraqi Kurdistan, where Ankara, Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government are now confronting the practical question of what happens to the PKK after it has declared the end of its armed struggle. A September 9 report by Turkish Minute, citing Iraqi reporting, says Turkey, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government are discussing a plan for approximately 4,200 PKK members to surrender their weapons and vacate 18 positions in northern Iraq. The figure itself remains unconfirmed by Iraqi military officials, and another report has put the number closer to 3,800, but the more important development is not the precise number of fighters. It is the emergence of a trilateral mechanism involving Ankara, Baghdad and Erbil, with the PUK also becoming directly relevant because several of the sites lie in areas under its influence.

This is the next stage of a process that has already moved considerably beyond the symbolic announcement of PKK dissolution. In my earlier analysis of Turkey’s PKK peace process reaching its most critical moment, I argued that the real test would begin after the weapons stopped being used: who verifies disarmament, who manages former fighters, who controls vacated territory, and whether Turkey can convert the end of armed conflict into a sustainable political settlement. Those questions are now becoming concrete in Iraqi Kurdistan. The reported plan to monitor 72 PKK positions, while initially addressing 18 sites, shows that this is not simply a ceremonial surrender. It is the beginning of a territorial and security-management process that requires several governments and security institutions to coordinate over geography that has been contested for decades.

The significance of the reported first stage is particularly important. According to the report, the areas include Amedi, Kani Masi, Zakho, Avashin, Said Sadiq, Ranya, Dukan, Koya, Mount Korek and Sidakan, while the principal PKK command area in the Qandil Mountains is excluded from the initial phase. That distinction should not be overlooked. It means that the process is beginning with a substantial but geographically defined withdrawal rather than representing the completion of PKK disarmament throughout northern Iraq. The exclusion of Qandil indicates that the most politically and strategically sensitive part of the organization’s historical infrastructure remains a separate question, even as other positions become subject to verification and handover.

This is why the development should be understood as an implementation phase rather than the conclusion of the peace process. My analysis of the PKK’s withdrawal from 81 border positions examined the earlier movement away from positions along the Turkey-Iraq border and the significance of that redeployment. The new reporting suggests that the process is moving from withdrawal to institutional verification. That transition matters because withdrawing from a position and establishing who controls it afterward are two different strategic acts. The first reduces the presence of an armed organization; the second determines the security architecture that replaces it.

The emerging mechanism also confirms the argument made in The PKK after dissolution: peace dividend or strategic transformation?: dissolution does not automatically resolve the political and security questions created by four decades of conflict. A movement can announce dissolution, but the state still has to determine what happens to its members, weapons, infrastructure and political networks. Iraq now finds itself at the center of that problem because much of the PKK’s historical rear area has existed on Iraqi territory. Consequently, the Turkish peace process has become partly an Iraqi state-building exercise.

That is precisely why Baghdad’s role is becoming more important. Iraqi Armed Forces spokesman Sabah Noman has confirmed that Baghdad, Erbil and Ankara have established a joint mechanism to secure areas vacated by the PKK, with Iraqi Border Guard forces and Peshmerga units expected to deploy to those locations while Turkish intelligence personnel verify whether the relevant positions have actually been emptied. This arrangement represents a significant conceptual change from the previous security model, in which Turkey frequently acted against the PKK through unilateral military operations inside Iraqi territory while Baghdad protested violations of sovereignty. The emerging model attempts to replace unilateral military management with a coordinated state-to-state and regional-security mechanism.

That development fits the broader transformation described in Turkey and Iraq’s emerging partnership. Ankara and Baghdad are increasingly connecting security cooperation with energy, trade, transport, water and regional connectivity. The PKK issue has historically been one of the principal sources of tension between the two countries, but the prospect of disarmament gives both governments an opportunity to move toward a more institutionalized security relationship. If that happens, Turkey’s military presence in northern Iraq could gradually become less central to the bilateral relationship, while Iraqi institutions assume a larger responsibility for security along the northern frontier.

The Kurdistan Region is the critical intermediary in this process. The geography of the reported first stage cuts across areas associated with both the KDP and PUK spheres of influence, which means the implementation of disarmament cannot realistically be reduced to an Erbil-Ankara relationship. This is particularly significant for Sulaymaniyah, where the PUK has historically maintained a distinct relationship with Ankara and where several relevant locations fall within or near its political and security sphere. My analysis of Could Shifts in Iraqi Kurdistan Turn Former Foes into Turkish Partners? argued that changing regional conditions were already pushing Turkey and Iraqi Kurdish actors toward a more pragmatic relationship. The reported disarmament mechanism could now test whether that pragmatism can be institutionalized.

The PUK’s role is therefore more than a technical detail. Senior PUK official Ghiyath Surji has argued that Baghdad should receive the weapons because the handovers are taking place on Iraqi soil, while also noting that the PUK would participate because some PKK positions are located in areas under its control. The question of who physically receives the weapons may appear procedural, but it is actually a question about sovereignty. If the weapons are surrendered to Baghdad, the process reinforces the Iraqi state’s formal authority over armed groups and territory. If arrangements become fragmented between Baghdad and Kurdish institutions, the process could reproduce precisely the institutional ambiguity that has complicated northern Iraq’s security environment for years.

The distinction between the KDP and PUK is therefore becoming strategically important. In Türkiye, the Kurdistan Region, and the New Regional Equation, I argued that Ankara’s relationship with the Kurdistan Region was increasingly becoming part of a broader strategic equation involving Baghdad and the PKK peace process. The latest development demonstrates why that equation cannot function through one Kurdish party alone. A disarmament process spanning Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah requires coordination between Kurdish security institutions and a clear relationship with Baghdad.

This is also where the Kurdistan Region’s unresolved institutional weakness becomes a strategic liability. Kurdistan Is Running Out of Patience with the PUK–KDP Power Struggle examined how prolonged political competition between the two major Kurdish parties weakens the region’s ability to respond collectively to external pressures. The PKK disarmament process provides another example of that problem. When Ankara, Baghdad and international actors are negotiating questions involving Kurdish territory and security, the absence of a fully functioning and unified Kurdish political position reduces Erbil’s ability to shape the outcome.

The same problem appears in the wider governance crisis. How to solve the government crisis in the Kurdistan Region? argued that the prolonged failure to form a new cabinet was no longer merely an internal political dispute but was weakening the region’s strategic position. KDP-PUK Impasse: Kurdistan Governance Evolution 2026–2031 similarly placed institutional fragmentation at the center of Kurdistan’s future strategic vulnerability. The PKK issue demonstrates the practical consequences: external powers increasingly need to negotiate with Baghdad, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah simultaneously because the region does not possess a fully unified security architecture.

The transformation is occurring within a wider regional environment in which Turkey’s relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan is itself changing. Kurdistan Strategic Outlook 2027 argued that Turkey could become both Kurdistan’s most important external economic partner and its most complicated strategic relationship. That contradiction has historically been driven partly by the PKK: Ankara sought deep economic integration with the Kurdistan Region while simultaneously treating parts of northern Iraq as a security frontier. A successful disarmament process could reduce that contradiction, but only if the security vacuum created by PKK withdrawal is filled by legitimate and coordinated Iraqi and Kurdish institutions.

This is why the reported plan cannot be evaluated simply by counting how many PKK members surrender weapons. The more important measurement will be whether vacated territory becomes governed territory. The difference is fundamental. A mountain position can be emptied without creating effective state authority, just as a camp can be vacated without resolving the status of the surrounding communities, roads, border areas and security responsibilities. The next phase must therefore be judged by institutional control, civilian security, border management and the ability of Baghdad and the KRG to prevent a return to fragmented armed governance.

The issue also connects directly to the broader transformation of Iraq’s security architecture. In Kurdistan After the Coalition, I argued that the Kurdistan Region is entering a period in which its traditional dependence on international military structures is changing and the future of security will increasingly depend on the quality of Kurdish institutions and Baghdad-Erbil coordination. PKK disarmament is unfolding within precisely this transition. As the international coalition reduces its traditional role and regional states assume greater responsibility for security, Baghdad and the KRG will face greater pressure to manage their own territory.

The Turkish process also cannot be separated from the broader Kurdish transformation across the region. The PKK after four decades: can Öcalan’s movement survive its own dissolution? examined the organization’s transition from an armed insurgency into a broader political and ideological network. Ocalan Declares the Kurdish Century examined the political implications of Abdullah Öcalan’s argument that Kurdish actors can no longer be excluded from the regional equation. The significance of the current moment is that the PKK’s military infrastructure is being reduced at precisely the time when Kurdish political questions remain deeply embedded in the regional order.

That is also why the emerging process should not be interpreted as the disappearance of the Kurdish question. As Turkey ends one Kurdish war, Iran opens another front examined how the geographical center of Kurdish strategic competition may be shifting toward Iran as the Turkish conflict moves toward a different phase. Iran’s hidden war in Kurdistan: why Tehran keeps striking Iraq likewise showed why Iraqi Kurdistan remains strategically important to competing regional powers. The reduction of one armed conflict therefore does not remove the strategic importance of Kurdish territory; it changes the actors, mechanisms and calculations surrounding it.

The same principle applies to Washington’s evolving regional strategy. In The Kurds as the connecting link in Washington’s new regional strategy, I argued that Kurdish actors increasingly occupy a connecting position between Iraq, Syria and Turkey as regional connectivity becomes more important than the older architecture of permanent military engagement. The PKK disarmament process could reinforce that transformation. If northern Iraq becomes less militarized, the strategic value of the region could increasingly be defined by trade, energy, transport and institutional connectivity rather than by insurgency and counterinsurgency.

This matters because Turkey and Iraq are simultaneously developing alternative economic corridors. Turkey’s New Iraq Trade Corridor Could Break Iraqi Kurdistan’s Economic Leverage examined how Ankara and Baghdad could reduce the Kurdistan Region’s traditional role as Iraq’s northern gateway. Turkey, Syria, and Iraq Are Building a Corridor That Could Sideline Kurdistan examined the same strategic shift through transport and rail connectivity. The emerging peace process therefore presents Kurdistan with both an opportunity and a warning: reduced conflict can strengthen the region’s strategic value, but only if Kurdish institutions can convert security stability into economic and political leverage.

Energy provides another dimension. The Pipeline Cliff: How Turkey’s Expiring Oil Deal Could Trigger Iraq’s Next Economic and Political Crisis examined the central role of Turkey in Iraq-Kurdistan energy relations, while Turkey’s $1.47 Billion Oil Defeat Reignites Iraq-Kurdistan Energy Battle showed how legal disputes continue to shape Ankara-Baghdad-Erbil relations. A more stable security environment in northern Iraq could support deeper economic integration, but security normalization alone cannot resolve the structural disputes over energy authority, revenue, sovereignty and federalism.

The larger strategic picture is therefore becoming clearer. Kurdistan in the New Middle Eastern Geopolitics argued that Kurdish strategic influence will increasingly depend on converting geography, institutions, energy, security capabilities and connectivity into durable power. The PKK disarmament process puts that argument to a practical test. The Kurdistan Region is no longer simply observing a Turkish peace process from the sidelines; parts of its territory are becoming one of the principal arenas in which that peace process must be implemented.

The immediate priority should consequently be institutional clarity. Baghdad, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah need a clearly defined mechanism for receiving weapons, securing vacated positions, verifying withdrawals, managing former fighters and preventing disputes over jurisdiction. Turkey has an understandable interest in verifying that PKK infrastructure has actually been dismantled, while Iraq has an equally important interest in ensuring that verification does not become a substitute for Iraqi sovereignty. The KRG, meanwhile, must ensure that the process does not become another arena in which its internal divisions allow external actors to determine the security arrangements of its territory.

The uncertainty surrounding the reported 4,200 figure reinforces this point. Iraqi military spokesman Sabah Noman did not confirm either the number or the reported list of 18 sites, while another account cited approximately 3,800 fighters. That discrepancy should not be treated as a minor journalistic detail. It demonstrates why the process needs transparent verification mechanisms rather than reliance on competing reports, political statements or intelligence claims.

There is also a deeper political issue. Disarmament is only sustainable when former combatants have a credible political and legal future. Turkey has already established institutional mechanisms dealing with legal procedures, social integration, arms handovers and field checks under its National Solidarity and Integration Coordination Board. The Iraqi side will face a parallel challenge concerning those who leave positions in northern Iraq. Without a clear framework, the physical removal of weapons could leave unresolved questions about movement, residence, political participation and the status of former members.

The strongest conclusion from the latest development is therefore not that the PKK is finally disappearing from Iraqi Kurdistan. It is that the peace process has entered the phase in which institutions matter more than declarations. Turkey has to demonstrate that disarmament can lead to a sustainable political settlement. Baghdad has to demonstrate that Iraqi sovereignty means more than opposing foreign military operations. The Kurdistan Region has to demonstrate that it can manage its territory through coordinated institutions rather than competing party structures.

The reported plan for thousands of PKK members to surrender their weapons could become one of the most important security transitions in northern Iraq in decades. But its success will not be measured by the number of weapons collected or camps vacated. It will be measured by whether the territory left behind becomes governed, whether the borders become more secure, whether Turkey-Iraq relations become more institutionalized, and whether Erbil and Sulaymaniyah can act together when Kurdish interests are directly involved. The real test of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process has therefore moved north of the border: Can Iraqi Kurdistan turn the end of an armed conflict into the beginning of a stronger security order?

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a geopolitical analyst, researcher and founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis. His work focuses on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, regional security, energy geopolitics, governance and the changing strategic order of the Middle East.

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