Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The United States has published a new National Defense Strategy that should be read in Baghdad and Erbil not simply as another Washington policy document, but as an early warning about the future of the American security relationship with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. The 2026 National Defense Strategy represents a significant adjustment in how Washington thinks about power, partnerships and military responsibility. Its four central priorities are defending the U.S. homeland, deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, increasing burden-sharing among allies and partners, and rebuilding the American defense-industrial base.

For Iraq and Kurdistan, the most important message is not that Washington is abandoning the Middle East. It is that the United States increasingly expects regional partners to become capable security actors rather than permanent beneficiaries of American military protection. The strategy explicitly says that partners in the Middle East should take greater responsibility for their own defense, while the United States provides critical but more limited support.

That distinction could become one of the most consequential developments for Iraq's security architecture since the defeat of ISIS.

The question for Baghdad and Erbil is therefore no longer simply whether the United States will remain in Iraq. The more important question is: What can Iraq and Kurdistan become that Washington will consider strategically valuable enough to invest in?

Washington Is Not Leaving the Middle East—But It Is Changing the Deal

The most common interpretation of an American strategic pivot toward the homeland and China is that Washington will simply withdraw from the Middle East. That would be too simplistic.

The 2026 strategy continues to identify Iran as a major security challenge and argues that Tehran remains capable of rebuilding its conventional military capabilities and supporting proxy networks. It also emphasizes the increasing willingness of Gulf partners to invest in their own defenses and integrate their capabilities against common threats.

This is the central lesson for Iraq.

Washington increasingly wants a Middle East in which regional states can defend their territory, protect critical infrastructure, control their borders and confront armed threats with less dependence on U.S. forces.

That does not mean the United States has no interest in Iraq. Quite the opposite. Iraq sits at the intersection of several strategic problems that Washington cannot completely ignore: Iran, ISIS, energy security, the Gulf, Syria, Turkey, regional transportation corridors and the security of American personnel and facilities.

But the nature of the American relationship with Iraq is changing.

The United States increasingly wants Iraq to become a security provider rather than merely a security consumer.

That should be the starting point for Baghdad's strategic planning.

The Burden-Sharing Message Is Particularly Important for Baghdad

The strongest message in the new strategy may be its emphasis on burden-sharing.

Washington explicitly argues that its allies and partners must do more for their own security. The strategy says that, while the United States will continue supporting partners, countries outside America's highest-priority theaters will increasingly be expected to take primary responsibility for their own defense.

Iraq is not a NATO ally, and the U.S.-Iraq relationship is different from America's treaty alliances. Nevertheless, the strategic principle applies.

Baghdad should assume that future American policymakers will increasingly ask four questions:

Can Iraq defend itself?

Can Iraq prevent its territory from being used against the United States or its partners?

Can Iraq control armed actors operating outside the state's authority?

Can Iraq protect the infrastructure and economic corridors that make the country strategically important?

These questions will matter more than declarations of friendship.

Iraq therefore needs to move away from a model in which security cooperation is measured primarily by the number of American troops, advisers or weapons systems inside the country.

The more sustainable model is an Iraqi security architecture capable of operating with American intelligence, training, technology and limited military support—but capable of functioning independently.

That is precisely the kind of partner the new U.S. strategy is designed to encourage.

Iran Is Where the Iraqi Problem Becomes Most Difficult

The strategy's treatment of Iran is particularly relevant to Iraq.

Washington argues that Iran has suffered major strategic setbacks but remains capable of rebuilding conventional military power and proxy infrastructure. It also describes Iranian-backed networks as a continuing source of regional instability.

For Iraq, this creates an uncomfortable strategic reality.

Iraq has economic, geographic, religious, social and historical connections with Iran that cannot simply be erased. At the same time, Baghdad cannot afford to become the battlefield through which U.S.-Iranian confrontation is repeatedly exported.

Iraq therefore needs something more sophisticated than choosing between Washington and Tehran.

It needs strategic sovereignty.

Strategic sovereignty means that Iraqi territory cannot be treated as an extension of another country's strategic depth. Iraqi airspace cannot become a launchpad for attacks on neighboring countries. Iraqi territory cannot become a sanctuary for armed groups operating outside state control. At the same time, Iraq should not become a platform for military operations against Iran that Baghdad has not authorized.

This is difficult.

But it is precisely because it is difficult that Iraq needs a national security doctrine rather than short-term crisis management.

Baghdad's Biggest Opportunity: Turn Sovereignty Into a Security Asset

The new American strategy creates an opportunity for Baghdad.

Washington is looking for partners that can do more themselves. Iraq can present its sovereignty not as an obstacle to American strategy but as the foundation of a stronger partnership.

The Iraqi government should therefore propose a new U.S.-Iraq security framework built around five pillars.

First, airspace sovereignty.

Iraq needs a genuinely integrated national air-defense and airspace-monitoring system. The country cannot protect its sovereignty if it cannot reliably identify what is flying over its territory, distinguish civilian from military traffic and respond to missile and drone threats.

Second, counter-drone capability.

The experience of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region demonstrates that drones have fundamentally changed the regional security environment. Cheap unmanned systems can threaten airports, energy infrastructure, military bases and diplomatic facilities without requiring a conventional military campaign.

The United States has itself placed renewed emphasis on countering unmanned aerial threats as part of its homeland-defense priorities.

Iraq should therefore make counter-UAS technology, electronic warfare, radar integration and air-defense coordination a central component of future security cooperation.

Third, intelligence integration.

Iraq should seek deeper intelligence-sharing arrangements with the United States and European partners while building its own national intelligence capabilities.

Fourth, border security.

The Iraqi-Syrian border remains strategically important because instability in Syria can rapidly affect Iraq. Border surveillance, biometric systems, drones, sensors and intelligence-led counterterrorism should become permanent elements of Iraqi security planning.

Fifth, critical infrastructure protection.

Oil fields, electricity facilities, airports, telecommunications infrastructure and major transportation corridors are national-security assets.

The next Iraqi security doctrine should treat them as such.

Kurdistan Has an Especially Important Role

For the Kurdistan Region, the new U.S. strategy may represent both a warning and an opportunity.

The warning is straightforward: the Kurdistan Region cannot assume that American military protection will automatically remain at today's level.

The opportunity is more important.

Kurdistan has something that many regional actors lack: a long record of security cooperation with the United States, extensive experience fighting ISIS, established Peshmerga institutions, strategic geography and a political relationship with Washington that has developed over decades.

The Kurdistan Region's leadership has already used engagement with U.S. officials to emphasize air defense, oil-export continuity and protection of critical infrastructure.

But Kurdistan now needs to go further.

Instead of asking Washington only for protection, Erbil should present itself as a capable security partner that can help Washington achieve regional objectives at lower cost.

That requires transforming the Peshmerga from politically divided forces into a genuinely unified, professional and interoperable security institution.

Peshmerga Reform Is No Longer Only a Kurdish Issue

For years, the reform and unification of the Peshmerga has been discussed primarily as an internal Kurdish political problem.

That is no longer sufficient.

Under the logic of the new U.S. strategy, Peshmerga reform should be understood as part of Kurdistan's broader strategic value to the United States and Iraq.

A unified Peshmerga could provide:

• stronger counterterrorism capabilities;

• better border surveillance;

• improved intelligence collection;

• more effective counter-drone defenses;

• greater interoperability with Iraqi forces;

• stronger protection for critical infrastructure;

• faster responses to ISIS activity;

• and a more credible contribution to Iraq's overall defense.

The United States has spent years helping build Kurdish security capabilities. The next phase should be about institutional maturity rather than permanent dependency.

That means standardized training, unified command structures, professional logistics, common communications systems, transparent budgets and clearly defined constitutional responsibilities.

The objective should not be to build a Kurdish military against Baghdad.

The objective should be to build a professional Kurdish regional security force within a functioning Iraqi national-security architecture.

That distinction is essential.

Erbil Should Stop Selling Geography and Start Selling Capability

Kurdistan's geography is strategically important, but geography alone is no longer enough.

Erbil sits close to Iran, Turkey, Syria and the Iraqi heartland. It is positioned near important energy infrastructure and transportation routes. It has been an important platform for international counterterrorism operations.

But Washington's new strategic philosophy asks a different question:

What can this partner actually contribute?

Erbil should therefore develop a formal "Kurdistan Security Contribution Framework" for its dialogue with Washington.

The framework could identify specific Kurdish contributions in five areas: counterterrorism, border security, air defense, energy infrastructure protection and intelligence.

Instead of saying, "We need American protection," Erbil should increasingly say:

"Here is what we can provide. Here is what we can defend ourselves. Here is what we need from the United States to become more capable."

That is a much stronger negotiating position.

Energy Could Become Kurdistan's Strategic Shield

The new U.S. strategy also has an important economic dimension.

Washington wants to rebuild the American defense-industrial base and strengthen the economic foundations of national power.

For Iraq and Kurdistan, this suggests that energy should no longer be treated purely as a source of government revenue.

Energy infrastructure is strategic infrastructure.

Kurdistan's oil and gas fields, pipelines, electricity networks and future gas projects should therefore be incorporated into a comprehensive national and regional security framework.

This could include integrated surveillance, physical protection, cyber defense, counter-drone systems and emergency-response capabilities.

The objective should be to make Kurdistan's energy infrastructure difficult to disrupt and economically attractive to international investors.

A secure energy corridor is not merely a commercial asset.

It is a geopolitical asset.

Iraq Should Build an “Iraqi Model” of Burden-Sharing

Baghdad should not simply copy the U.S. demand that allies spend a particular percentage of GDP on defense.

Iraq has different economic and security circumstances.

Instead, Baghdad should establish measurable national-security targets.

For example, Iraq could commit to:

1. A multi-year defense modernization plan.

2. Integrated national air and missile defense.

3. A national counter-drone architecture.

4. Border-security modernization.

5. Joint intelligence mechanisms.

6. Professionalization of military logistics.

7. Critical infrastructure protection.

8. Cybersecurity for energy and financial systems.

9. A national defense-industrial strategy.

10. A unified doctrine for dealing with non-state armed groups.

This would demonstrate to Washington that Iraq understands the new strategic environment.

The PMF Question Cannot Be Avoided

There is another issue that Baghdad will find increasingly difficult to avoid: the relationship between the Iraqi state and armed groups operating outside the conventional chain of command.

The new American strategy's emphasis on partners taking responsibility for regional security makes the question of state authority even more important.

A country cannot convincingly claim strategic sovereignty while allowing multiple armed centers of power to make decisions that can trigger international conflict.

This does not mean Iraq must solve the issue overnight.

But Baghdad needs a long-term process for ensuring that decisions concerning war, peace, foreign military action and the use of national territory ultimately belong to state institutions.

This is not simply an American demand.

It is a prerequisite for Iraqi sovereignty.

Kurdistan and Baghdad Need a New Security Bargain

Perhaps the most important recommendation is that Baghdad and Erbil should stop treating their security relationship as an unresolved constitutional dispute and begin treating it as a national strategic asset.

The Kurdistan Region should contribute capabilities.

Baghdad should provide constitutional guarantees, funding mechanisms and national coordination.

The Peshmerga should become interoperable with Iraqi forces.

Federal and regional intelligence institutions should share information.

Air-defense systems should operate through coordinated national mechanisms.

Border security should be jointly planned.

Energy infrastructure should be protected as part of Iraq's national economic-security architecture.

If Baghdad and Erbil can achieve this, they can offer Washington something extremely valuable: an Iraq that is harder for Iran or any other external power to manipulate, more capable of defeating ISIS, more capable of protecting American personnel and interests, and less dependent on indefinite American military intervention.

That would serve Iraqi interests first.

It would also serve American interests.

The Risk of Misreading Washington

The greatest danger for Iraq and Kurdistan would be to interpret the 2026 strategy either as an American withdrawal from the region or as a promise of unlimited American protection.

Both interpretations would be wrong.

The document points toward a different model: fewer dependencies, stronger partners, greater regional responsibility and more selective American engagement.

The United States is concentrating its highest strategic resources on the homeland and China while asking partners elsewhere to assume more responsibility. The strategy explicitly states that U.S. forces will focus on homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific while partners in other theaters increasingly take primary responsibility for their own defense with critical but more limited American support.

For Iraq, this is a warning.

For Kurdistan, it is a test.

But it could also be an opportunity.

Iraq's Strategic Choice

The fundamental question facing Baghdad is not whether America will remain interested in Iraq.

It is whether Iraq will remain strategically relevant to America.

There is a major difference.

A dependent Iraq will increasingly struggle to command sustained American attention as Washington prioritizes China, homeland defense and a stronger American industrial base.

A capable Iraq, however, can become part of the solution.

It can secure its borders, protect energy infrastructure, contain ISIS, control its airspace, strengthen intelligence cooperation, reduce the ability of non-state actors to drag the country into regional conflicts and provide a stable platform for trade and energy connectivity.

Kurdistan can play an essential role in that transformation.

But it must also change the way it approaches Washington.

The era of asking only for protection is becoming less sustainable.

The future belongs to partners that can say: we can defend more, contribute more and carry more of the burden—but we need the United States to help us build the capabilities to do it.

That is the language of the 2026 National Defense Strategy.

And Baghdad and Erbil should learn to speak it.

The real strategic lesson of Washington's new doctrine is therefore simple:

America is not necessarily leaving Iraq. America is asking Iraq to grow up strategically.

Whether Baghdad and Erbil seize that opportunity—or continue competing over yesterday's security architecture—could determine the future of Iraq's relationship with Washington for the next decade.

What Baghdad and Erbil Should Do Now

Baghdad should:

1. Develop a new national security strategy aligned with Iraq's post-ISIS environment.

2. Build integrated air, missile and counter-drone defenses.

3. Strengthen border surveillance, particularly toward Syria.

4. Establish clear state authority over decisions involving war and foreign military operations.

5. Expand intelligence-sharing and joint planning with the United States.

6. Protect oil, gas, electricity and telecommunications infrastructure as national-security assets.

7. Develop an Iraqi defense-industrial and military-technology strategy.

8. Build a sustainable burden-sharing model rather than relying on permanent U.S. military support.

Erbil should:

1. Accelerate Peshmerga unification and professionalization.

2. Build dedicated counter-drone and air-defense capabilities.

3. Strengthen intelligence and border-security cooperation with Baghdad.

4. Make energy infrastructure protection a central security priority.

5. Present Washington with a concrete Kurdish contribution to Iraqi and regional security.

6. Institutionalize the KRG-U.S. security relationship beyond individual political leaders.

7. Position Kurdistan as a secure energy, logistics and intelligence hub rather than simply a protected territory.

8. Use its relationship with Washington to strengthen Iraqi sovereignty rather than deepen Baghdad-Erbil strategic fragmentation.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy does not promise Iraq or Kurdistan an American security umbrella forever.

It offers something more complicated—and potentially more valuable: a pathway toward becoming the kind of partner that America has a strategic reason to keep supporting.

Source: 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy — U.S. Department of Defense

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent platform focusing on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, geopolitics, energy and regional security. He holds a PhD in English Literature from Brunel University London, with research focused on war literature, and has extensive experience in international relations, higher education, policy analysis and geopolitical affairs.

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