Nine years after the Kurdistan Region’s independence referendum, debate over the referendum and its consequences for the Kurdistan Region continues. Supporters regard it as a historic achievement, while its opponents see it as a factor that weakened the Region’s position within the framework of Iraq.

On September 25, 2017, the referendum process was held in the Kurdistan Region and the disputed territories. At the time, the authorities of the Kurdistan Region claimed that the process was intended to pave the way for “independence” and “separation” from Iraq. However, less than a month later, the political balance shifted dramatically against the Region.

When the referendum was held in the Kurdistan Region, most political parties and factions supported the process. However, less than a month later, when the Iraqi military operation against the disputed territories began, the political parties began accusing one another.

Nine years after the referendum, the financial and economic situation, and even the position of the Kurds within Iraq, have become considerably “weaker.” The Region now depends on Baghdad for its budget and the payment of public-sector salaries, whereas before the referendum, the Kurds had a much stronger position and were able to challenge the Iraqi government more forcefully.

A member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leadership, local kurdish media Panjara and who asked not to be named because he did not want to reopen old wounds, told the media: “The referendum was a wrong decision, taken at the wrong time by several individuals and political factions.”

He added: “Every Kurd likes independence. The slogan of the Union is the right to self-determination. But achieving that national right requires careful analysis and choosing the appropriate time. The decision to hold the referendum and its timing were wrong, and as a result, we lost a large part of the territory of Kurdistan.”

Officials of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), however, continue to take pride in holding the referendum, even after eight years and despite the major changes that have occurred in the Kurdistan Region. They continue to believe that holding the referendum was the “right” decision.

Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, said on the eighth anniversary of the referendum: “A homeland is not a map on paper; rather, it is blood flowing through the veins.”

KDP officials argue that the decision to hold the referendum was the result of what they describe as the Iraqi government’s wrong and poor policies toward the Kurdistan Region, particularly after outstanding disputes remained unresolved.

While KDP officials continue to regard the referendum as a card that has been kept in reserve and believe it could be useful at an appropriate time, they also consistently highlight the high level of public participation in the referendum, which exceeded 90 percent.

Although the KDP, PUK and other political factions discussed the referendum together at the same table until the final moments before it was held, the political balance suddenly changed less than a month later, when the Iraqi offensive against the disputed territories began and those areas were brought under Iraqi control.

The PUK attributed the Iraqi military operation to the consequences of the referendum, while the KDP accused the PUK of coordinating with Baghdad and handing over the disputed territories. The cooperation and meetings between the two major Kurdish forces, which had previously brought them together around the same table, were replaced by political confrontation.

The PUK leader says: “Most of the PUK was against the referendum. Only a small number of its leaders supported it, and even they did so on the condition that the process would not be conducted in the disputed territories, because we knew that we would pay the price.”

He also emphasized: “In holding the referendum, there was a confrontation with the major powers that opposed the process. They supported a unified Iraq, and this is what brought the Kurdistan Region to where it is today and contributed to weakening it.”

The KDP believes that the international community dealt with the Kurdistan Region in a “double-standard” manner, while arguing that by holding the referendum, the Region was exercising Article 38 of the Iraqi Constitution, which gives every citizen the right to express their opinion.

KDP officials say: “In the referendum, the people were simply asked a question and their answer was received. European and American leaders, as well as [then Iraqi Prime Minister] Haider al-Abadi, did not initially express opposition to the referendum, but at the last moment they called for it to be postponed.”

KDP officials often describe the referendum as a card, arguing that it can be used when necessary. Regarding why the card is not being used now, at a time when the Region is in a difficult situation, Abdul Salam Barwari, a senior KDP cadre, says: “International and regional changes, the governing mentality of the surrounding countries, and a number of factors currently present in Iraq prevent us from being able to use the referendum card. But the importance of the card lies in demonstrating that the Kurdish people are not satisfied with Baghdad’s policies.”

Nine years after the referendum that was held for “independence,” the financial situation and the powers of the Kurdistan Region within Iraq continue to weaken. Some observers connect the Region’s current circumstances to the consequences of the referendum.

Political observers believe that the referendum frightened neighboring countries, particularly those with Kurdish populations, because they feared that they could face a similar situation. As a result, they began taking measures to weaken the Region’s capabilities and prevent the Kurds from considering such an initiative again.

According to political observers, the referendum created a new situation in which even the Kurds’ friends encountered difficulties. They felt that the process was not compatible with their interests. The concerns of those allies therefore created an opening for the Kurds’ opponents, making it easier for them to confront the idea of independence among the Kurds.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is an analyst and commentator based in Iraqi Kurdistan.