Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj 

Iraq is entering a potentially dangerous phase in which the struggle between the state and Iran-aligned armed groups is moving beyond the question of weapons and military bases toward the country's critical infrastructure and transportation networks. The Iraqi government's decision to suspend flights operated by Iranian airlines has created a new point of confrontation between Baghdad and powerful factions that oppose restrictions on Iraq's relationship with Tehran. At the same time, assessments that Iran-backed militias could target electricity infrastructure, oil-export routes and Baghdad International Airport point toward a broader strategy of coercion: rather than directly challenging the Iraqi government militarily, armed groups could seek to impose economic and political costs that make state policy increasingly difficult to sustain.

The aviation dispute is especially significant because it demonstrates how rapidly a regional confrontation can be transferred into Iraq's domestic political arena. Baghdad suspended Iranian flights following US pressure and sanctions affecting Iranian aviation, with Reuters reporting that Iraqi authorities ordered the suspension of Iranian flights to Baghdad after Washington threatened sanctions against airports and service providers facilitating Iranian carriers. The decision subsequently expanded to other Iraqi airports, including Najaf, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Baghdad has since sought exemptions from Washington, illustrating the difficult position of an Iraqi government attempting to maintain relations with Iran while avoiding exposure to the US financial and sanctions system.

The reaction from Iran-aligned groups reveals why the airport dispute matters beyond civil aviation. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba has threatened to organise sit-ins at Iraqi airports in protest against the suspension of Iranian air traffic. Such an action would represent a form of political pressure that deliberately exploits the boundary between legitimate political mobilisation and disruption of state infrastructure. If airport operations were obstructed, the immediate target would not necessarily be an American facility. The pressure would instead fall directly on Iraqi state institutions, passengers, airlines and the government responsible for maintaining normal civilian operations.

This is the emerging pattern that deserves attention. The contest is increasingly about who controls the functioning of the Iraqi state. If the government makes a sovereign decision and armed groups can disrupt an airport until that decision is reconsidered, the issue becomes larger than the original dispute with Iran. It raises the question of whether formal state authority can be translated into operational authority. A government may possess the constitutional power to regulate airspace, aviation and infrastructure, but that authority becomes weaker if armed actors can impose costs for exercising it.

The same logic applies to electricity infrastructure. Iraq's power system remains one of the country's most politically sensitive sectors because electricity shortages have direct consequences for households, businesses and public confidence. Critical infrastructure is also highly vulnerable to asymmetric attacks. A relatively inexpensive drone, explosive device or sabotage operation can create consequences disproportionate to the cost of the attack. For an armed group seeking leverage over the government, this makes infrastructure disruption an attractive instrument of coercion.

The potential targeting of energy infrastructure would have implications far beyond Iraq's electricity supply. Iraq's oil sector is the foundation of the federal budget, and disruptions affecting production, transportation or export routes would therefore become fiscal and political problems for Baghdad. If attacks were capable of interfering with alternative oil-export corridors through Turkey, Jordan or Syria, the consequences could extend into regional energy markets. Recent reporting has already documented concerns about Iran-aligned Iraqi groups conducting attacks against energy infrastructure beyond Iraq, including an attack on Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline that was attributed by Saudi and Iraqi sources to Iran-backed actors, although responsibility for individual attacks can remain contested.

This is why critical infrastructure should be understood as part of Iraq's geopolitical battlefield. The traditional model of militia activity focuses on attacks against military bases, diplomatic facilities or foreign personnel. The newer model can be more sophisticated. Instead of attacking an American target directly, an armed group can attack the infrastructure that connects Iraq to international markets, aviation networks and regional energy systems. The resulting disruption can generate pressure on Baghdad without necessarily producing the same immediate international response as a direct attack on US forces.

Such a strategy would also exploit Iraq's economic dependence on oil. Approximately 90 percent of Iraq's state budget depends on oil revenues, according to the Institute for the Study of War's recent assessment. That makes energy infrastructure a strategic vulnerability. Any sustained disruption could reduce government revenue, complicate salary payments and public spending, weaken investor confidence and intensify political competition over increasingly scarce resources.

The strategic danger is therefore not necessarily a single large attack. It is the possibility of cumulative disruption. A series of smaller attacks against electricity substations, pipelines, transport infrastructure or airports could generate uncertainty without crossing the threshold of a conventional military confrontation. The objective would be to make normal governance increasingly expensive. In such an environment, the government could face pressure from multiple directions simultaneously: Washington demanding compliance with sanctions, Tehran seeking continued economic and political access, armed groups resisting government decisions, and the Iraqi public demanding uninterrupted services.

This would place Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in an increasingly complicated political position. Baghdad's suspension of Iranian flights has already forced the government to balance sovereignty, economic interests and security considerations. Iraqi officials have stressed that the aviation decision is not necessarily an anti-Iran political position and have sought US exemptions for civilian travel. This suggests that Baghdad is attempting to prevent the aviation dispute from becoming a permanent rupture with Tehran while simultaneously avoiding sanctions that could damage Iraqi institutions and companies.

The militia response could make that balancing strategy much more difficult. If airport disruptions occur, Baghdad could face a dilemma between enforcing state authority and avoiding an escalation with powerful armed factions. A forceful response could produce confrontation. A weak response could establish a precedent in which armed groups effectively acquire veto power over government policy. The strategic problem for Baghdad is therefore not simply how to prevent an airport protest. It is how to preserve the principle that the government, rather than armed factions, determines national aviation and foreign-policy decisions.

The same dilemma applies to energy infrastructure. If the government publicly attributes an attack to a militia faction but cannot prevent a repetition, its credibility suffers. If it responds militarily, the confrontation could escalate. If it avoids attribution or enforcement, the perpetrators may conclude that infrastructure attacks provide relatively low-cost political leverage. This creates an asymmetric strategic environment in which the government bears a much greater cost for escalation than the armed groups it is attempting to constrain.

The possibility of infrastructure attacks must also be viewed through the wider Iranian regional strategy. Recent assessments indicate that Iran has relied increasingly on Iraqi militia networks during the current US-Iran conflict, including newly formed cells reportedly operating under direct or indirect IRGC influence. The Institute for the Study of War has reported allegations that such networks have been involved in attacks against US and regional targets and that Iran may be increasingly relying on newer cells because of command-and-control problems involving some established Iraqi partners. These reports should be treated as assessments rather than definitive proof of Iranian command over every action undertaken by Iraqi armed groups.

That distinction is essential. Not every action by an Iraqi militia should automatically be interpreted as an operation ordered directly by Tehran. Iraqi armed organisations possess their own political interests, economic networks and domestic calculations. Some groups may act because they perceive an Iraqi government decision as threatening their interests even when no explicit Iranian order exists. Nevertheless, the broader relationship with Iran creates a strategic environment in which pressure on Baghdad can serve both domestic militia objectives and wider Iranian regional interests.

The most important consequence may therefore be institutional rather than physical. If armed groups succeed in demonstrating that they can interfere with airports, energy infrastructure or other critical systems whenever government policy conflicts with their interests, Iraq's state-building process will face a major structural problem. The country could retain elections, ministries, security institutions and a formally sovereign government while simultaneously operating with an informal system of armed vetoes.

This problem becomes even more significant as US forces complete their withdrawal. American military presence previously provided a layer of deterrence against some forms of militia activity and offered Iraq additional intelligence, surveillance and defensive capabilities. With the coalition mission ending, the Iraqi government will increasingly be expected to manage internal security through its own institutions. The transition therefore raises the stakes of every confrontation between Baghdad and armed groups.

The challenge for Iraq is not simply to eliminate militias. That objective is politically and institutionally complex, particularly because many members of the Popular Mobilization Forces are formally incorporated into Iraq's security architecture. The deeper requirement is to establish a clear distinction between legally authorised security institutions and armed political organisations operating outside effective government control. Without that distinction, the state will continue to possess overlapping centres of authority.

Critical infrastructure protection should consequently become a central component of Iraq's post-coalition security strategy. Airports, electricity networks, oil facilities, pipelines, telecommunications systems and major transport corridors should not be treated merely as economic assets. They are strategic national infrastructure. Their protection determines whether the Iraqi government can maintain economic activity, deliver public services and exercise sovereignty during periods of regional crisis.

The aviation dispute offers a particularly clear warning. An airport is not merely a place where aircraft land. It is a node connecting Iraq to the international financial, diplomatic, religious and commercial system. Disrupting Baghdad International Airport therefore has consequences that extend well beyond aviation. It can affect diplomatic travel, trade, medical movement, religious pilgrimage, international investment and the perception of Iraq's security environment.

The potential targeting of oil infrastructure is even more consequential. Iraq's geopolitical influence depends partly on its ability to remain an uninterrupted energy exporter. If internal armed conflict begins to threaten multiple export corridors, Baghdad's economic vulnerability could increase dramatically. That would give armed groups another instrument of political pressure while simultaneously making Iraq more vulnerable to external economic coercion.

The emerging geopolitical contest can therefore be understood as a struggle over infrastructure sovereignty. The state that controls airports, electricity, energy exports, borders and telecommunications possesses the practical foundations of sovereignty. Armed groups that can disrupt those systems without facing effective consequences possess a parallel form of power. The central Iraqi state may formally control these assets, but operational control is what ultimately determines political authority.

The immediate period surrounding the US military withdrawal and the suspension of Iranian flights is therefore likely to be particularly sensitive. Baghdad is attempting to establish a new security relationship with Washington, manage its relationship with Tehran, impose greater authority over armed groups and maintain economic stability simultaneously. These objectives are interconnected. Pressure on one area can rapidly create vulnerabilities in another.

For the Kurdistan Region, the implications are also significant. Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airports are now directly affected by the wider US-Iran confrontation, demonstrating that Kurdish territory cannot insulate itself from the strategic competition surrounding Iraq. At the same time, the region's energy infrastructure remains strategically important to Iraq's wider economy. Any expansion of attacks against energy or aviation infrastructure would therefore have implications for both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region.

Iraq's post-American security order will ultimately be tested not by the absence of US soldiers alone but by the state's ability to prevent armed actors from turning critical infrastructure into political leverage. If Baghdad can protect airports, energy facilities and electricity networks while maintaining a credible monopoly over security decisions, the withdrawal could become part of a genuine transition toward greater Iraqi state capacity. If armed factions can repeatedly disrupt these systems and force government concessions, the result will be a different kind of post-American Iraq: formally sovereign, but strategically fragmented.

The emerging confrontation is therefore not simply between Iraq and Iran, nor between Baghdad and the militias. It is a contest over whether the Iraqi state can make decisions and ensure that those decisions remain operationally enforceable. The airport dispute is an early indicator of that struggle. Critical infrastructure may become the next arena in which Iraq's sovereignty is tested.

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