Iraq’s Development Road faces political, security and regional challenges involving Kurdistan, Türkiye, Iran and Baghdad’s state capacity.

The Development Road is not simply as an infrastructure or trade project, but  a geopolitical corridor whose success depends on unresolved Kurdish, Turkish, Syrian and Iranian dynamics.

One can identify three Kurdish-related issues as particularly important to the corridor's political viability:

• Baghdad–Erbil disagreement over the northern route through the Kurdistan Region.
• The Türkiye–PKK peace process and its implications for northern Iraq.
• The future status and integration of the Kurdish-led SDF in Syria.

In this article I also examine Iran's position, arguing that Tehran has so far avoided outright opposition partly because Iraq presents the project as potentially compatible with Iranian connectivity through the Basra–Shalamcheh rail link.

Iraq and Türkiye completed a framework draft agreement on transport infrastructure on September 21, explicitly covering implementation phases of the Development Road. And on September 24, Baghdad and Ankara agreed to accelerate strategic projects, particularly the Development Road, alongside new security arrangements concerning northern Iraq.

Iraq’s Development Road (IDR) should be understood as a geopolitical and institutional project, not simply a transport corridor. Its success depends less on construction alone than on whether Iraq can resolve several interconnected political, financial, security and regional problems.

1. The three Kurdish questions are the central constraint

One can identify three interconnected Kurdish tracks that could determine how far the Development Road can progress:

1. Baghdad–Erbil disagreement over whether and how the northern route should pass through the Kurdistan Region.
2. The Türkiye–PKK peace process, because security in northern Iraq affects the corridor's northern segment.
3. The future integration of the SDF into the Syrian state, which could influence the wider security environment linking Iraq, Syria and Türkiye.

These are not peripheral Kurdish issues. Together they place a ceiling on the corridor's political and security viability.

2. The Development Road is becoming strategically more important because of regional instability

The Iran war and the disruption around the Strait of Hormuz have, increased the strategic value of alternative land routes.

The Development Road could connect Grand Faw Port → Iraq → Türkiye → European markets, giving Iraq and its regional partners another connectivity option when maritime routes face disruption.

One can see the IDR as part of a broader emerging network involving the Middle Corridor, IMEC, the revived Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline and potentially the Hijaz railway. These projects could compete with one another, but they could also become complementary parts of a larger regional connectivity system.

3. Iraq's biggest challenge may be governance rather than engineering

A major point is that building the physical infrastructure is only part of the problem.

The new Ali al-Zaidi government needs to maintain the technical committees and implementation teams created under the previous government, protect the project from ministerial turnover and establish credible procurement and financing mechanisms.

This is particularly concerning that the IDR could become another arena for muhasasa and competition over contracts rather than a disciplined national infrastructure project. 

4. Financing remains a major unresolved issue

We need to distinguish between money that has been pledged and money that is actually bankable capital.

The World Bank's $930 million railway programme is important, but they caution that it is not equivalent to dedicated Development Road financing. Meanwhile, the total project is estimated at roughly $17–20 billion, leaving major questions over who will finance the railway, roads, dry ports, industrial zones, security and operations. 

The IDR needs a phased financing architecture, combining Iraqi public funds, Gulf capital, Turkish involvement, multilateral institutions and eventually private investment.

5. Iran is not necessarily opposing the project—but Tehran is suspicious

This is another important distinction. Iran is an outright opponent of the Development Road. Baghdad has deliberately presented the project as an Iraqi development initiative that could potentially connect with Iran through the Basra–Shalamcheh railway. But that Tehran is likely to become more suspicious if the IDR increasingly looks like a Gulf–Türkiye corridor designed to bypass Iran.

Therefore, Baghdad's diplomatic management of Tehran will be important. The project could become more politically contested if Iran interprets it as part of a broader regional effort to reduce its economic and strategic relevance. 

6. Türkiye has a particularly important role

Türkiye is the most engaged external partner. For Ankara, the Development Road is not simply an Iraqi infrastructure project. It fits into Türkiye's broader ambition to become a major regional transportation, trade and energy hub.

The proposed Ovaköy/Faysh Khabur route is especially significant because it could create a more direct federal-to-federal connection between Baghdad and Ankara while reducing dependence on the existing Ibrahim Khalil crossing. That is precisely why the route has political implications for Erbil. 

7. The project could transform Iraq's economic model

The longer-term argument is perhaps the most interesting: The Development Road could help Iraq move beyond an oil-dependent economy. Iraq can envision industrial zones, logistics centres, dry ports, free-trade areas and service industries developing around the corridor.

In that sense, the road and railway are supposed to be the physical backbone of an industrial ecosystem, rather than simply a highway for goods travelling between Faw and Türkiye.

8. The IDR could become an institution-building project

One can go further than conventional infrastructure analysis and argue that industrial nodes along the route could force Iraq to improve: customs; procurement; regulation; logistics; public services; inter-ministerial coordination; and transparency.

Thus, the Development Road could become a test of Iraqi state capacity. Successful implementation could strengthen institutions; poor implementation could reproduce the same governance problems that have affected other Iraqi infrastructure projects. 

9. The corridor could have a regional peace dividend

The IDR can ultimately connect infrastructure with conflict transformation. If the IDR creates economic interdependence among Iraq, Türkiye, Syria and the Gulf, the economic cost of renewed instability could increase. An once can particularly highlight the possibility of future connections through Syria, although they acknowledge that this remains uncertain. The broader proposition is that connectivity can create constituencies for stability by giving communities and governments an economic interest in maintaining peace. 

The core argument is that the Development Road could become a foundation for Iraq's post-oil economy and a new regional connectivity architecture, but its success ultimately depends on Iraq's ability to institutionalize the project while managing Baghdad–Erbil relations, the Türkiye–PKK process, Syrian Kurdish developments, Iranian concerns, financing and domestic political competition.

What I think is particularly useful question is moving the Development Road debate from “Will Iraq build the railway?” to “What political order is required for the corridor to work?” And this largely depends on Baghdad–Erbil relations, Türkiye's strategic geography, Kurdish security, Iran's regional position, Gulf investment, Iraqi state capacity and post-oil economic transformation.

Therefore the three Kurdish tracks are the “binding constraint”, because this ambitious project places the Kurdistan Region at the centre of the Development Road question rather than treating it as a secondary issue.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is an analyst and commentator at Kurdish Policy Analysis.