Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj 

Washington’s September 30 withdrawal deadline marks a new test for U.S. partnerships with Kurdish actors in Iraq and Syria.

The 30 September deadline marks an important moment in the changing relationship between Washington and its Kurdish partners in Iraq and Syria. On that date, the United States is due to complete the withdrawal of its remaining coalition forces from Iraq, while the Pentagon’s memorandum of understanding with the Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga is set to expire. The deadline represents another stage in Washington’s effort to reduce its military footprint in the Middle East and place greater responsibility for regional security on local and regional actors. The withdrawal timetable has been confirmed by Baghdad, while Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has said that Iraq aims to complete the disarmament of Iran-aligned militias by 30 June 2027, separating the coalition’s departure from Baghdad’s longer effort to establish state control over armed groups. The history of the U.S.–KRG military relationship and the approaching expiration of the memorandum have been documented by Kurdish History, while Al Jazeera has reported on Iraq’s September 30 withdrawal deadline.

The timing is significant because Washington’s Kurdish partnerships are changing at the same time as the wider regional security architecture is being reorganised. On 25 August, Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, announced the dissolution of the force and the integration of its personnel into the Syrian army. Two days later, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed Abdi as a presidential adviser. Al Jazeera reported the SDF’s integration into the Syrian military, followed by its report on Abdi’s appointment as presidential adviser. The developments in Syria and Iraq therefore place Washington’s two principal Kurdish military partnerships at different but connected stages of transition.

Taken together, these developments reveal a broader shift in the basis of American engagement. The emerging regional approach places greater emphasis on economic integration, energy corridors and regional connectivity, while Turkey, Iraq and Syria assume greater security responsibilities. The architecture remains under development, and the material supplied for this assessment describes its premises as being tested by exceptionally difficult regional conditions. The U.S.–Iran war has disrupted trade and energy networks, exposing the tension between the economic and security dimensions of the emerging order.

A new hierarchy of leverage

The changing approach can be seen in the growing importance attached to economic and diplomatic infrastructure alongside the reduction of the American military presence. U.S. officials have outlined a regional order in which Turkey functions as an energy and trade gateway, Iraq as a resource hub and Syria as a transit corridor toward the Mediterranean, with greater security responsibilities devolved to Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus.

The economic side of this approach was illustrated by Washington’s investment in its diplomatic presence in Erbil. According to the material, the United States opened an $800 million consulate there in December, described as its largest anywhere in the world, while simultaneously preparing to close its remaining military base in the city. Al Jazeera’s reporting on the impact of the U.S.–Iran war on the Kurdistan Region provides the broader context for the changing American presence.

The extension of Iraq’s disarmament timetable adds another dimension. U.S. forces are scheduled to leave before Baghdad expects to complete its effort to bring armed factions under state control. The material identifies this separation between the coalition’s departure and Iraq’s longer disarmament process as one of the risks inherent in the changing approach.

For Kurdish actors, the shift creates a different hierarchy of strategic leverage. The Kurdistan Democratic Party retains importance to Washington through its control of the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing and significant pipeline infrastructure connecting the Kurdistan Region to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Washington pushed for the resumption of Kurdish oil exports after a two-and-a-half-year halt. Al Jazeera reported the resumption of Kurdish oil exports to Türkiye.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has acquired a different form of strategic relevance through the resources under its control. Expansion of the Khor Mor gas field is intended to help Iraq reduce its dependence on Iranian gas. The New Lines Institute’s analysis of the Kurdish gas sector examined the strategic importance of Kurdish gas resources. PUK President Bafel Talabani also met with U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack and Mazloum Abdi in March to discuss constitutional protections for Syria’s communities, as documented by PUK Media.

The Peshmerga and SDF occupy a different position. Their principal strategic contribution has been military manpower and capability. The SDF’s territorial position and U.S. backing have changed, and the force has now been integrated into the Syrian army. Al Jazeera’s account of the SDF’s dissolution and Abdi’s subsequent appointment documents this transition, while Anadolu Agency has reported on the potential end of U.S. assistance to the Peshmerga.

The emerging pattern is therefore visible in the different forms of leverage available to Kurdish actors. Commodities, infrastructure and strategic access remain important within the emerging regional framework, while the value of military manpower is affected by Washington’s reduction of its direct security commitments. The change is consequently not simply about troop numbers. It concerns the basis on which regional partnerships retain strategic relevance.

The limits of commodity leverage

The Kurdistan Region provides a clear illustration of the tensions within this emerging model. Washington’s approach places substantial importance on pipelines, gas fields and regional connectivity. These assets create economic interdependence and provide channels through which influence can operate. At the same time, they depend on a sufficiently stable security environment.

The U.S.–Iran war has demonstrated that vulnerability. According to reporting cited in the source material, the Kurdistan Region lost roughly 70 percent of its trade amid the conflict. Al Jazeera documented the economic impact of the war on the Kurdistan Region, including the disruption to trade and energy.

The Khor Mor gas field became an example of this exposure. Iranian strikes forced the field offline in July, cutting gas production and reducing electricity generation in the Kurdistan Region. The Jerusalem Post reported on the Iranian targeting of Kurdistan and the impact on gas production. HKN Energy subsequently shut down its Kurdistan operations despite having recently signed an agreement to develop another field.

The contradiction is straightforward. Pipelines and gas fields provide the economic connectivity and strategic leverage sought by Washington, but the security environment surrounding those assets can simultaneously undermine their operation. Economic infrastructure can therefore become a source of strategic relevance while remaining vulnerable to regional conflict.

The same tension has affected Kurdish civilians through salary disputes with Baghdad. The crisis predates the war but has intensified since its beginning. The Arab Weekly reported on the renewed Kurdistan salary dispute. The episode illustrates the broader relationship between economic infrastructure, political bargaining and unresolved security conditions.

Turkey as security provider

Turkey illustrates another element of the transition. Ankara has long regarded the SDF as a PKK-linked force on its southern border. Following the SDF’s dissolution and integration into the Syrian military structure, Turkey has assumed a different position within the emerging Syrian security order.

Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler has said that more than 20,000 Turkish troops have no immediate plans to leave Syria and are training Syrian government forces. The statement was reported by Reuters in an account reproduced by Yahoo News.

The change represents continuity through a change in purpose. A Turkish military presence that had been justified for years in terms of containing Kurdish autonomy is now also connected to support for the Syrian government into which the SDF has been absorbed.

For Washington, the arrangement represents the greater regional burden sharing associated with a smaller U.S. military footprint. It also means that regional security is increasingly shaped by partners whose priorities are not identical to those of the United States.

The unresolved question of Kurdish rights remains part of this transition. Damascus has incorporated the SDF into the state, while the durability of political guarantees for Syria’s Kurds remains connected to the development of constitutional and institutional arrangements. Turkish Minute reported on Abdi’s appointment and the evolving Syrian political framework.

The YPJ provides a particularly important case within this process. Kurdish negotiators have sought to integrate the Women’s Protection Units into the Defence Ministry as an intact formation. Damascus has rejected that arrangement and instead offered individual absorption into the Interior Ministry, according to Al Jazeera’s reporting on the unfinished military integration process.

Women in Kobani have also expressed opposition to the dissolution of the YPJ as an intact formation. Jinha Agency reported their position in March, highlighting the political and social significance attached to the force within Kurdish communities.

The YPJ therefore represents a different type of strategic asset. Its significance is connected to political representation, social legitimacy and its role in the campaign against ISIS rather than to commodities, infrastructure or trade routes.

Israel and divergent interests

Israel introduces another complication into the emerging regional architecture. Washington’s approach places importance on an integrated regional economic system and on a sufficiently unified Syria capable of supporting trade and energy corridors. Israeli preferences toward Syria have not necessarily corresponded to that objective.

Research published by the Belfer Center has documented arguments concerning Israeli preferences for a more fragmented Syrian landscape. New Lines Magazine has separately examined the question of Israel’s preference for weak neighbours.

The issue is therefore one of divergent interests within the same regional system. The United States is attempting to develop an interconnected regional framework through relationships with governments and actors whose strategic priorities can differ from the conditions required for that framework to function.

The emerging architecture consequently involves several interconnected components. Turkey is assuming a larger security role, Damascus is consolidating state authority while dealing with minority questions, Iraq is expected to support energy and trade connections, and the wider regional conflict continues to affect the environment in which those connections operate.

September 30 and the Kurdish transition

The 30 September deadline marks the beginning of another stage in this transition. The expiration of the Peshmerga memorandum will affect the formal structure of the U.S.–Kurdish military relationship as the American military presence recedes from Iraq. The question of the bases being vacated in Erbil and the future shape of the security relationship is therefore becoming more immediate.

The approaching deadline has already attracted attention to the future of U.S. military assistance to the Peshmerga. BBC News reported in August on U.S. plans concerning military aid to a key Middle Eastern ally, while Anadolu Agency described the possible end of U.S. assistance to the Peshmerga as a transitional phase in U.S.–KRG relations.

The Syrian case provides another measure of the changing relationship between Washington and its Kurdish partners. Mazloum Abdi’s appointment as presidential adviser creates a channel into the new Syrian political structure, while the durability of Kurdish rights remains connected to whether political guarantees become constitutional and institutional protections.

The YPJ presents a particularly distinct question because its strategic relevance is not based on control of commodities or infrastructure. Its treatment within Syria’s emerging military structure illustrates the position of Kurdish actors whose principal claims concern political representation, institutional protection and social legitimacy.

The broader transformation remains visible across both Iraq and Syria. Washington is moving toward a regional model in which economic integration, regional partners and local security actors carry more of the responsibilities previously associated with direct American military involvement. The changing status of the SDF, the Peshmerga, the KDP and the PUK reflects different dimensions of that transition.

The U.S.–Iran conflict has simultaneously exposed the vulnerability of the economic infrastructure at the centre of this approach. Trade has been disrupted, energy infrastructure has been targeted, and the relationship between economic connectivity and security has become increasingly visible.

For the Kurds, 30 September is therefore not simply another deadline for the withdrawal of American forces. It marks another stage in the transformation of a relationship that has historically rested heavily on military cooperation. The developments in Iraq and Syria show that the basis of that relationship is changing, with energy, infrastructure, political access and regional connectivity becoming increasingly important alongside military partnerships.

For Washington, the period following the deadline will place greater weight on the regional actors and economic networks through which American influence is increasingly being exercised. For the Kurdistan Region and Kurdish actors in Syria, the transition will continue to test how political and strategic relevance can be maintained as the foundations of U.S. engagement change.

Author bio:

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a geopolitical analyst and founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Iraq, Kurdistan, Iran, Turkey and the wider Middle East.