The Iraqi oil trap and its paradox: A rentier economy amidst geopolitical shocks

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In an economy dependent on oil exports, and with the disruption of crude oil tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz due to the US-Iranian war, the core of the problem lies not only in the volume of exports and the revenues generated from them, but also in how these revenues are managed, and in the amount of spending that depletes them. On September 22, 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Zaidi told The New York Times that Iraq had lost nearly $60 billion in oil revenue due to the war with Iran. For approximately two months, Iraq was unable to export 90% of its oil, while 90% of its economy depended on crude oil exports. Before June 2025, when the first round of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran erupted, the Central Bank of Iraq’s reserves had exceeded $110 billion, but by October 2026 they had fallen to less than $60 billion. Although Zaidi’s government managed to balance global polarization and geopolitical tensions during its first five months in office, the biggest problem was the i...

The Constitutional Card: Why Iraq’s Constitutional Amendment Debate Has Become a Strategic Threat to Kurdish Federal Gains



By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Kurdish Policy Analysis

As Baghdad revisits constitutional reform, Kurdish leaders fear that changes intended to strengthen the Iraqi state could fundamentally alter the balance of power established after 2003—and weaken the foundations of federal Iraq.

As Iraqi parties revive debate over constitutional amendments, Kurdish leaders increasingly see constitutional reform as a strategic challenge that could weaken federalism, reduce Kurdish autonomy, and reshape Iraq’s post-2003 political order. The Constitutional Card: Why Iraq’s Constitutional Amendment Debate Has Become a Strategic Threat to Kurdish Federal Gains

For Kurdish political forces, the Iraqi constitution has never been merely a legal document. It has functioned as a political shield, a historical compromise, and the institutional foundation through which the Kurdistan Region secured recognition inside post-2003 Iraq.

This explains why renewed discussions surrounding constitutional amendment in Baghdad have generated deep concern among Kurdish parties.

When Shiite political forces revived the issue of constitutional reform in 2021, Kurdish actors reacted cautiously and, in many cases, defensively. Their concern was not rooted in opposition to reform itself, but in the fear that constitutional change could become a vehicle for redistributing power away from the federal model and toward stronger central authority.

For Kurdish leaders, the constitution represents the last comprehensive political agreement guaranteeing Kurdish rights within Iraq.

Any attempt to revise it is therefore viewed as touching one of the most sensitive red lines in contemporary Iraqi politics.

Why the Constitution Matters More to the Kurds Than to Others

The Iraqi constitution emerged during a unique historical moment.

After decades of authoritarian centralization and conflict, Iraq’s post-2003 order attempted to create a new political contract between communities and regions.

The constitution recognized Iraq as a federal state.

For the Kurds, this recognition institutionalized realities that had already existed on the ground since 1991, when the Kurdistan Region effectively established autonomous governance under international protection.

Today, however, an unusual contradiction exists.

Although Iraq is constitutionally federal, the Kurdistan Region remains the country’s only functioning federal region.

This creates tension between constitutional design and political reality.

To many Kurdish politicians, weakening federal provisions would not simply change administrative arrangements—it would directly alter the balance of power between Erbil and Baghdad.

The Kurdish Fear: Constitutional Reform as Centralization

Kurdish parties increasingly interpret constitutional amendment efforts through the lens of centralization.

The concern is that reforms promoted under the language of “state strengthening” could gradually expand Baghdad’s authority over finances, energy, security, and regional administration.

From the Kurdish perspective, constitutional reform carries three major risks.

1. Reduction of Constitutional Guarantees

The first fear concerns rights already embedded in the constitution.

Kurdish officials argue that the constitutional framework guarantees recognition of regional institutions, political representation, and regional competencies.

Any amendment process creates uncertainty regarding those protections.

Even modest revisions could establish precedents that later reshape interpretations of federal authority.

2. Transformation of Iraq’s Federal Identity

The second concern relates to identity.

The Kurdish political movement historically supported federal Iraq as a compromise between independence and central rule.

If constitutional reforms gradually move Iraq toward a more centralized governance model, Kurdish leaders fear the political logic of remaining within Iraq may weaken.

3. Changing Regional and Domestic Power Dynamics

The third concern is geopolitical.

Kurdish officials worry that constitutional revision efforts could emerge under favorable regional conditions for stronger centralized states.

In periods where external actors prioritize stability, anti-fragmentation policies, or stronger capitals, constitutional restructuring may receive indirect political support.

Why Some Shiite and Sunni Forces Want Amendments

Supporters of constitutional reform argue that Iraq’s governance problems are rooted partly in institutional weaknesses.

They point to fragmentation of authority, policy paralysis, disputes over competencies, and repeated political crises.

Many Iraqi political actors argue that the constitution created overlapping authorities without effective mechanisms for governance.

Veteran Kurdish politician Mahmoud Osman, who participated in drafting the constitution, previously noted that reservations existed from the beginning.

According to this view, many Iraqi actors accepted constitutional arrangements during a transitional moment but later became dissatisfied with aspects of federalism and provincial powers.

Supporters of amendment often argue that stronger institutions—not necessarily authoritarianism—require clearer central authority.

This argument resonates with segments of Iraqi society frustrated by years of political dysfunction.

The Kurdish Dilemma: Constitutional Defense Without Political Unity

One of the greatest strategic vulnerabilities for Kurdish actors is internal division.

Kurdish officials consistently speak of resisting constitutional changes that weaken regional authority.

Yet achieving that resistance requires coordinated action in Baghdad.

This has proven difficult.

Fragmentation among Kurdish parties reduces negotiating power at the federal level.

Political competition inside the Kurdistan Region can weaken collective leverage precisely when constitutional bargaining becomes most important.

This dynamic creates a paradox:

The constitution is viewed as essential to preserving Kurdish rights, but protecting it depends on political unity that has often proven difficult to sustain.

The Constitutional Veto and Its Uncertain Future

Under Iraq’s constitutional amendment procedures, constitutional changes face institutional obstacles.

One of the most important protections historically discussed is the ability of voters in three provinces to block amendments through rejection thresholds.

For Kurdish actors, this provision represents a critical safeguard.

However, uncertainty remains over whether future political negotiations could attempt to alter procedural mechanisms themselves.

This uncertainty fuels Kurdish concerns.

Because once amendment mechanisms become politically negotiable, constitutional guarantees may appear less permanent.

Beyond Law: A Battle Over Iraq’s Future Model

The constitutional debate is ultimately not just about legal articles.

It reflects competing visions of Iraq.

One vision prioritizes stronger central institutions capable of governing effectively across the country.

The other emphasizes decentralization and power-sharing as safeguards against historical concentration of authority.

For Kurdish leaders, the issue is existential.

For supporters of reform, it is institutional.

The tension between those two visions may become one of Iraq’s defining political struggles over the coming decade.

Whether constitutional reform proceeds or stalls, one reality remains clear:

For the Kurds, the constitution is not simply a document.

It is the architecture of their place inside Iraq.

And any effort to redraw that architecture will inevitably become one of the most consequential political battles in Baghdad.

#Iraq #Kurdistan #Federalism #Constitution #Baghdad #MiddleEast #KurdishPolitics #Geopolitics #IraqPolitics #KurdishPolicyAnalysis

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