Kurdish Policy Analysis

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj 

The attacks are not simply spillover from the US–Israel–Iran war. For Tehran, Iraqi Kurdistan has become the frontline where an external war, an internal insurgency problem, and a decades-old struggle over Kurdish political power converge.

Iran’s attacks on Iraq’s Kurdistan Region are more than wartime spillover. Tehran sees Iranian Kurdish opposition groups there as a persistent strategic threat. The war did not create Iran’s Kurdish problem

When Iranian missiles and drones began striking targets across Iraq’s Kurdistan Region after the outbreak of direct US–Israeli–Iranian hostilities in February 2026, the immediate explanation appeared straightforward. The war had expanded.

Iran was retaliating against American interests across the Middle East. US military facilities in Iraq were potential targets. Erbil, home to a major US diplomatic and military presence, was therefore exposed. That explanation is correct—but incomplete.

Iran’s campaign against the Kurdistan Region cannot be understood simply as another example of wartime spillover. The geography of the attacks, their changing targets and, most importantly, their continuation during periods of ceasefire reveal a deeper strategic calculation. For Tehran, Iraqi Kurdistan is not merely territory adjacent to Iran. It is a security problem.

It is where Iranian Kurdish opposition organizations have established themselves outside the reach of the Islamic Republic. It is where political organizations, military cadres and networks capable of influencing events inside Iran have operated for decades. And it is a region that Tehran increasingly views through the lens of a potentially dangerous convergence between Kurdish opposition activity and American and Israeli pressure on the Iranian state. That makes Iraqi Kurdistan an unusually sensitive battlefield.

The central question is therefore not simply why Iran attacked Kurdistan during the war. It is why Iran continues to see Kurdistan as a threat even when the wider war temporarily stops.

From wartime spillover to strategic target

Eurasia Review — “Beyond Spillover: Understanding Tehran’s Attacks on the Kurdish Region in Iraq” argues that Iran’s attacks on the Kurdistan Region should not be viewed simply as accidental spillover from regional conflict, but as part of a broader strategy aimed at containing Kurdish political and security actors and projecting Iranian power beyond its borders. The analysis highlights how Tehran’s strikes expose the Kurdistan Region’s vulnerability to Iranian pressure while raising broader questions about Iraq’s sovereignty, the limits of Baghdad’s ability to protect the region, and the increasingly contested security environment along Iran’s western frontier

The pattern of Iranian attacks since February 2026 tells an important story. During the initial phase of the war, Iranian drones and missiles targeted a broad collection of sites across the Kurdistan Region, including the US consulate in Erbil, Harir Air Base, Erbil International Airport, Peshmerga facilities and civilian infrastructure. Some attacks clearly belonged to Iran’s broader retaliation campaign.

The presence of American forces in the region made Kurdistan strategically relevant to Tehran's war planning. But alongside those targets was another category: camps and positions belonging to Iranian Kurdish opposition organizations. That distinction matters.

Following the April 7 ceasefire, attacks did not simply disappear. Instead, their character changed. Iranian Kurdish opposition groups—including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI), Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and Komala—became increasingly prominent targets.

The geography also became revealing. Targets were spread across the Kurdistan Region, including areas around Erbil and Sulaimaniyah. This suggests that Tehran's military calculus cannot be reduced to the presence of US forces.

If American military infrastructure were the only concern, the persistence of attacks against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups during periods of reduced US–Iran confrontation would be difficult to explain. But if those groups are viewed as part of Iran's internal security problem, the pattern becomes much clearer. The war did not create the target. It changed the threat perception surrounding it.

Tehran’s long memory of the Kurdish question

Iran's anxiety about Kurdish political and military organizations is not new. The Islamic Republic has confronted Kurdish armed movements almost continuously since its establishment.

The Kurdish rebellion that followed the 1979 revolution established an enduring security paradigm in Tehran: Kurdish political mobilization was not merely an ethnic or political issue but a potential challenge to the territorial integrity and survival of the state.

The subsequent insurgencies involving organizations such as the PDKI and Komala, followed decades later by the rise of PJAK, reinforced that perception. From Tehran's perspective, the problem is particularly difficult because the conflict does not remain inside Iran's borders. The Kurdish political geography of the region cuts across those borders.

Iranian Kurdish organizations can operate from Iraqi territory, maintain political networks abroad and exploit periods of instability inside Iran. Iraqi Kurdistan therefore becomes an external sanctuary connected directly to an internal Iranian security problem. That makes the border more than a geographical line. It becomes a strategic vulnerability.

This explains why Tehran has repeatedly pressured Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government to constrain Iranian Kurdish organizations. It also explains the importance of the 2023 Baghdad–KRG agreement concerning the relocation and disarmament of Iranian Kurdish groups along the Iranian border.

For Tehran, the objective has always been larger than stopping individual attacks. It is about preventing an organized Kurdish opposition infrastructure from becoming a permanent strategic platform across the border.

2026 changed the equation

What makes 2026 different is the convergence of several developments that, from Tehran's perspective, appeared to reinforce one another. The first was the formation of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan in February.

The coalition brought together five major Iranian Kurdish political organizations: PDKI, PAK, PJAK, Komala and the Khabat Organization. The significance was not simply numerical.

Iranian Kurdish politics has historically suffered from fragmentation, ideological divisions and competing organizational structures. A broader coalition therefore raised the possibility—however uncertain—of greater coordination. Its emergence during a period of nationwide unrest and escalating international confrontation made the development particularly sensitive for Tehran.

The Islamic Republic suddenly had to consider a scenario in which domestic instability, external military pressure and Kurdish political mobilization could reinforce one another. That scenario may have been more important to Iranian strategic planners than the actual military capabilities of the Kurdish groups.

States often respond not only to what adversaries can do, but to what they fear those adversaries might become capable of doing under favorable circumstances. And 2026 appeared to offer precisely such circumstances.

The American factor

The second development was the emergence of reports suggesting increased American interest in Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Reports that Washington was considering, supporting or facilitating armed Kurdish opposition activity were especially consequential because of Iran's historical experience with foreign-backed threats.

The issue was further complicated by political contacts between US officials and Iranian Kurdish leaders. Even if the actual extent of American assistance remained uncertain, Tehran did not need certainty to react.

Strategic paranoia can be rational when a state is fighting for regime survival. From Tehran's perspective, an Iranian Kurdish organization based across the border is one thing.

An Iranian Kurdish organization that might receive American intelligence, weapons, political recognition or logistical assistance during an American war against Iran is something entirely different. The distinction fundamentally changes the threat assessment. It transforms an old insurgency problem into a potential fifth-column problem.

The geography of the war matters

The third development was the geography of the US–Israeli campaign against Iran. A significant portion of the strikes against Iranian security infrastructure occurred in western Iran, including Kurdish-majority areas such as Kermanshah, Sanandaj, Ilam and Mahabad.

For Tehran, these were not simply military targets. They were part of Iran's vulnerable western flank. The Iranian state therefore had to consider whether damage to IRGC facilities, intelligence infrastructure, border posts and security installations could create opportunities for armed groups operating from across the Iraqi border.

This is where the Kurdish question intersects directly with the regional war. A weakened border is not necessarily an immediate invasion route. But it can become an opportunity structure. If Iranian security forces are redeployed toward the Gulf, central Iran or other fronts, western border provinces may become relatively more vulnerable. If Kurdish opposition groups are simultaneously more organized and politically coordinated, Tehran may fear that an external military campaign could create the conditions for a renewed internal insurgency.

The result is a classic security dilemma. Washington and its allies may see pressure on Iranian security infrastructure as a way of weakening Tehran. Tehran may see the same strikes as potentially opening the door to Kurdish armed mobilization. The more Iran fears that possibility, the more aggressively it seeks to eliminate Kurdish capabilities before they can become operationally significant.

Why ceasefires have not solved the problem

Perhaps the most revealing feature of the 2026 campaign is what happened during ceasefire periods. A ceasefire between Iran and the United States does not automatically resolve Iran's Kurdish security concerns. That is because the two conflicts are related but not identical.

The first is an interstate and regional confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States. The second is an internal conflict involving the Iranian state and Kurdish political and armed movements. A ceasefire can suspend the first without resolving the second.

This explains why attacks against Iranian Kurdish organizations have continued even when the intensity of the wider US–Iran confrontation has declined. From Tehran's perspective, waiting for another war to end before dealing with the Kurdish threat may be precisely the wrong strategy. The logic is preemption.

If Iranian Kurdish organizations become stronger during a ceasefire, establish new networks, obtain weapons, deepen political relationships with foreign governments or exploit unrest inside Iran, Tehran's future security problem could become harder to manage. The rational response, from the perspective of Iranian security planners, is therefore continuous pressure.

That pressure can take several forms: missile strikes, drone attacks, intelligence operations, diplomatic pressure on Baghdad and Erbil, border militarization and political demands for the disarmament or relocation of Kurdish organizations. The result is what might be described as permanent vigilance without permanent war.

Kurdistan’s dilemma: neutrality is not enough

For the Kurdistan Region, this creates an extremely difficult strategic environment. The KRG has repeatedly sought to avoid becoming a party to the broader confrontation between Iran, the United States and Israel. But neutrality does not necessarily produce immunity.

A territory can be neutral in political terms while remaining strategically important to all sides. The Kurdistan Region hosts American diplomatic and military infrastructure. It shares a long border with Iran. It is home to Iranian Kurdish political organizations. It has its own security forces and complex relations with Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara and Washington.

Those characteristics make it almost impossible for Erbil and Sulaimaniyah to remain strategically invisible. Iran's calculus is particularly difficult for the KRG because Tehran can frame its attacks not as aggression against the Kurdistan Region itself, but as operations against organizations it considers threats to Iranian national security. That creates a dangerous gray zone.

The KRG can argue that Iranian Kurdish opposition groups are political actors operating on Iraqi territory. Iran can argue that Iraqi territory is being used to threaten Iran. The result is a recurring sovereignty dilemma. Every Iranian strike tests the boundaries of Iraqi sovereignty.

Every armed activity by Iranian Kurdish groups tests Tehran's tolerance. And every American military or political interaction with Kurdish actors can intensify Iranian suspicions. The KRG is therefore caught between several security systems that it does not fully control.

The most dangerous miscalculation

The greatest danger may not be that Iran deliberately seeks a larger war with the Kurdistan Region. It is that each side's security calculations can unintentionally produce escalation. Iran may believe that limited strikes against opposition camps are necessary deterrence.

The Kurdish groups may interpret those strikes as evidence that Tehran is vulnerable and therefore increase their operational activity. The KRG may seek to preserve political space for the organizations while preventing them from dragging the region into war.

Washington may view Kurdish groups as potential partners against Tehran. Tehran may interpret those relationships as proof that the Kurdish organizations are becoming instruments of American strategy. Each actor then takes defensive measures.

Those defensive measures are interpreted by the others as offensive preparations. This is the classic security dilemma—but with missiles, drones and a heavily militarized border. The danger is magnified because the Kurdistan Region is densely populated and contains critical civilian infrastructure.

A strike intended to hit an opposition camp can cause civilian casualties, disrupt energy infrastructure or provoke political pressure on the KRG. A strike against an American facility can generate another American response. A Kurdish attack inside Iran can trigger another Iranian bombardment of Kurdish positions in Iraq. The cycle can therefore sustain itself even after the original regional war has cooled.

The Kurdish question is becoming regional again

For decades, the Kurdish question was often treated as a series of separate national problems. Iran had its Kurdish insurgency. Iraq had its Kurdish autonomy dispute. Turkey confronted the PKK. Syria faced its own Kurdish political transformation. But the 2026 crisis demonstrates how artificial those divisions can become during periods of regional war.

Kurdish political organizations operate across borders. Kurdish populations live on both sides of those borders. Regional powers routinely calculate Kurdish political activity as part of their national security strategies.

The result is a transnational security environment in which developments in one Kurdish region can rapidly affect another. Iran's attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan are therefore not simply an Iraqi problem. They are part of the broader regional contest over the future political order of the Middle East.

What Tehran is really trying to prevent

The most important question is not whether Iranian Kurdish organizations currently possess the capability to overthrow the Islamic Republic. They almost certainly do not. The more consequential question for Tehran is whether circumstances could eventually allow Kurdish opposition groups to become a catalyst for wider instability.

Iran is already dealing with economic pressure, social unrest, external military confrontation and internal political divisions. Under those circumstances, even a relatively modest armed Kurdish organization can acquire disproportionate strategic importance. A small military force does not need to defeat the Iranian state.

It only needs to exploit a moment when the state is distracted, overstretched or politically fragmented. That is why Tehran's response can appear disproportionate to the actual capabilities of Kurdish opposition groups. The Iranian state is not necessarily responding to today's threat. It is attempting to prevent tomorrow's threat. That is the logic behind preemption.

The bigger strategic picture

The attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan should therefore be understood through three overlapping layers. First, there is the regional war. American and Israeli operations against Iran create incentives for Tehran to strike US interests wherever it can reach them, including in the Kurdistan Region.

Second, there is the Iranian Kurdish security problem. Tehran has spent decades trying to prevent Iranian Kurdish organizations from developing the capacity to challenge the Islamic Republic from across the Iraqi border.

Third, there is the emerging convergence between the two. The possibility of American support for Kurdish opposition groups, the formation of a broader Kurdish coalition and the targeting of Iranian security infrastructure in Kurdish-majority western provinces have convinced Tehran that the two problems could become one.

That convergence is what makes the current situation fundamentally different. Iraq's Kurdistan Region is no longer merely a place where the Iran war occasionally spills over. It is becoming a strategic intersection between Iran's external war and its internal security struggle.

The next phase will be more complicated

Even if the wider US–Iran conflict remains suspended, there is little reason to assume that Iranian pressure on Kurdish opposition groups will disappear. In fact, a ceasefire may create the opposite incentive. Tehran can redirect attention from long-range regional retaliation toward border security, intelligence operations and the suppression of Kurdish opposition networks.

The KRG will consequently face renewed pressure from Tehran and Baghdad to constrain Iranian Kurdish groups. Washington, meanwhile, will have to decide how much political and security support it is prepared to provide to Kurdish actors without turning the Kurdistan Region into a permanent Iranian target.

And Iranian Kurdish organizations will face their own strategic dilemma: whether to remain primarily political actors or attempt to exploit the unprecedented regional instability surrounding Iran. Each decision will influence the others.

This is why the Kurdistan Region should not be treated as a peripheral theater of the Iran conflict. It is a pressure point. It is a borderland. It is a political sanctuary. And, from Tehran's perspective, potentially a launchpad for a future internal challenge.

Beyond spillover

The most useful way to understand Iran's attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan is therefore to move beyond the language of "spillover." Spillover suggests that the Kurdistan Region is merely an unfortunate victim of a war happening elsewhere.

The reality is more complicated. Kurdistan sits directly on one of Iran's most sensitive strategic frontiers. It contains organizations that Tehran regards as existential or potentially destabilizing threats. It hosts American forces and diplomatic facilities. And it borders Iranian provinces where Kurdish political and military activity has repeatedly challenged the Islamic Republic.

The regional war has not transformed Kurdistan into a battlefield from nothing. It has activated an existing battlefield in a new strategic environment. That distinction matters.

Because if the conflict were simply spillover, the problem could largely disappear when the regional war ends. But if Tehran's campaign is driven by a deeper calculation about the Kurdish opposition, then the attacks can continue through ceasefires, negotiations and even broader regional de-escalation.

The war may eventually end.

Iran's Kurdish problem will not. And as long as Tehran sees Iraqi Kurdistan as the rear base of a potential internal challenge, the region will remain one of the most dangerous fault lines in the Middle East.

The question for Erbil, Washington and Baghdad is therefore no longer simply how to prevent Kurdistan from being dragged into Iran's war. It is how to prevent Iran's Kurdish war from becoming permanent inside Iraq.

What Comes Next?

Three scenarios are particularly important.

1. Contained Pressure

Iran could continue striking Iranian Kurdish positions while avoiding a wider confrontation with the KRG or the United States. This is probably the least destabilizing option. Tehran would seek to weaken Kurdish organizations without creating a new regional war.

2. A Renewed Kurdish Offensive

If Iranian Kurdish organizations conclude that the Islamic Republic has been sufficiently weakened, they could attempt to increase operations inside Iran. That would almost certainly trigger a stronger Iranian response. It could also force Washington, Ankara and Baghdad to clarify their positions.

3. A New Regional Escalation

The most dangerous scenario would be another major US–Iran confrontation combined with renewed Kurdish military activity. That could create the precise convergence Tehran fears most: American and Israeli pressure from the air, Kurdish armed activity on the western frontier and internal unrest inside Iran. In that scenario, Iraqi Kurdistan could become one of the most dangerous theaters in the entire conflict.

The Strategic Lesson

The central lesson is simple:

Iran is not striking Iraqi Kurdistan merely because the war reached Iraq.

It is striking because Tehran believes the region sits at the intersection of several threats to the Islamic Republic. The American military presence matters. The regional war matters. Israeli strategy matters. But underneath all of them lies something older:

Iran's unresolved Kurdish question.

The 2026 war has given that question a new strategic dimension. The emergence of a Kurdish political coalition, reports of potential American support, continuing clashes between Iranian forces and Kurdish militants, and the persistence of Iranian attacks during ceasefires have all reinforced Tehran's perception that its western frontier cannot be left unattended. That is why the attacks continue. And that is why the Kurdistan Region may remain exposed even after the broader Iran war moves toward diplomacy. The missiles and drones are only the visible part of the conflict. Beneath them lies a much older contest over borders, sovereignty, Kurdish political power and the survival strategy of the Islamic Republic.

The war may eventually end. But Tehran's Kurdish problem is likely to remain.

And until that problem is politically contained, Iraq's Kurdistan Region will remain one of the most dangerous fault lines between Iran's internal security struggle and the geopolitics of the wider Middle East.

Sources and Further Reading

• Why Iran Is Striking Sulaimani: Inside the Escalating Attacks on Iraq’s Kurdistan Region — an on-the-ground analysis of how Iranian-aligned attacks have turned Sulaimaniyah into a frontline of the regional conflict. Read the article
• Iranian Kurdish Opposition at a Crossroads as War Alters Strategic Calculus — examines how the war has transformed the strategic choices, opportunities and constraints facing Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan. Read the article
• Could a Kurdish Front Ever Become a Reality in the U.S.–Iran War? — explores the possibility of an Iranian Kurdish ground front and why Tehran increasingly views Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential future battlefield. Read the article

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