Kurdish Policy Analysis

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The Kurdistan Region is confronting a security dilemma that goes far beyond the latest wave of drone attacks. In an exclusive interview with Al-Monitor, Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Masrour Barzani called for stronger air-defense capabilities as the region faces what he described as more than 1,000 drone and missile attacks since the war between the United States, Israel and Iran began on Feb. 28. The latest strike on Aug. 17 targeted Barzani’s private office and the residence of the director of the KRG Security Council, turning an already serious security problem into a direct political warning.

For Erbil, the message is increasingly clear: the Kurdistan Region cannot afford to remain dependent on external air-defense protection while simultaneously becoming a target in a widening regional confrontation. Barzani said the KRG has been unable to acquire effective systems capable of protecting the region against drones and missiles and has relied heavily on American support, including Patriot air-defense systems. He warned that the withdrawal or redeployment of those systems could create a dangerous security vacuum.

This creates a strategic contradiction at the heart of Washington’s relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan. The United States is reducing its military footprint in Iraq, while the Kurdistan Region is asking for precisely the defensive capabilities that would allow it to survive the transition without becoming more vulnerable. The question is therefore not simply whether America should remain militarily present. It is whether Washington can reduce its direct military role while transferring enough defensive capacity, intelligence, early-warning capability and technology to trusted partners such as the KRG.

Barzani's argument is deliberately framed around defense rather than escalation. He insists that Kurdistan has not threatened its neighbors and does not want to become part of the conflict. Yet the region's geography, American military presence, energy infrastructure and political relationship with Washington have made it increasingly difficult for Erbil to remain outside the wider strategic contest.

The drones therefore represent more than an immediate military threat. They are also instruments of coercion. Barzani argued that the attacks appear designed to intimidate the Kurdistan Region and potentially drag it into a conflict it has repeatedly sought to avoid. His comments about Iranian-made Hadid-110 drones raise another question: if Tehran denies responsibility, who is acquiring and operating weapons that Barzani says originated in Iran?

That ambiguity is strategically useful for Iran-linked actors. Attribution disputes can delay political responses while allowing pressure on Erbil to continue. The result is a form of gray-zone warfare in which infrastructure, energy facilities, military positions and political figures can be targeted without necessarily triggering a conventional interstate confrontation.

For the Kurdistan Region, this is particularly dangerous because its economy and security architecture are closely connected. Energy infrastructure has become both an economic asset and a strategic vulnerability. Barzani explicitly linked the repeated attacks to damage against infrastructure and the energy sector, arguing that insecurity is interrupting the region's economic development and discouraging investment.

That makes air defense an economic issue as much as a military one.

An energy company deciding whether to invest in Kurdistan does not assess only geological potential, production costs or regulatory conditions. It also evaluates whether pipelines, facilities, personnel and surrounding infrastructure can survive a sustained campaign of drones and missiles. If investors believe that critical infrastructure can be attacked with limited consequences, the security premium attached to Kurdistan rises—and economic opportunities become harder to realize.

This is why Barzani's appeal to the United States is broader than a request for weapons. He called for early-warning systems, counter-drone capabilities and defensive systems capable of protecting civilians, infrastructure and the energy sector.

The distinction matters. The KRG does not necessarily need an offensive military architecture. It needs the ability to detect, track and intercept incoming threats before they reach populated areas or strategic facilities. A layered defensive network could therefore become the foundation of a more sustainable security partnership between Washington and Erbil.

But Washington's challenge is equally difficult. The United States wants to reduce its military exposure in Iraq without abandoning partners whose security remains intertwined with American interests. Barzani's interview makes clear that Erbil understands this transition is coming. He explicitly said the KRG supports America's right to make its own decisions regarding troop withdrawals, while warning that the withdrawal should not produce a regional security vacuum.

The answer may ultimately be a shift from American protection to American-enabled protection.

Instead of permanently deploying large numbers of US personnel and high-value systems, Washington could increasingly focus on helping the KRG build its own defensive architecture. That would allow the United States to reduce its footprint while preserving influence, protecting American personnel and companies, and strengthening a partner that has historically been central to US policy in Iraq.

Barzani's broader message to Washington is also economic. He strongly endorsed the Trump administration's emphasis on "commerce and not conflict," arguing that stronger economic ties among Iraq, Turkey, Syria, the Kurdistan Region and international companies can contribute to regional stability. He particularly highlighted American investment in energy, agriculture, infrastructure and technology.

This is where the security and economic dimensions of Kurdistan's relationship with Washington converge.

A more economically integrated Kurdistan could become a bridge between Iraq, Turkey and Syria. But economic integration requires security. Pipelines, electricity networks, roads, energy facilities and foreign investment all depend on the ability to protect infrastructure from armed groups and external attacks.

In this sense, air defense is not simply about protecting Erbil from drones. It is about protecting the economic architecture that Washington and the KRG increasingly want to build.

The same logic applies to Iraq's unresolved militia problem. Barzani expressed strong support for Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's efforts to bring armed groups under state authority and backed the Sept. 30 deadline for militias to disarm. He warned, however, that failure to secure compliance could create a difficult situation for Baghdad and potentially produce confrontation or chaos.

This places the Kurdistan Region at the intersection of two increasingly important Iraqi questions: who controls armed force, and who controls the country's strategic infrastructure.

For Erbil, militia disarmament is not an abstract constitutional issue. If armed groups outside effective state control can continue launching drones toward Kurdistan, then Baghdad's sovereignty remains incomplete. Barzani's position is therefore that Iraq must address the problem as an Iraqi national-security issue rather than simply as an extension of the US-Iran confrontation.

Yet the political dimension inside Kurdistan cannot be separated from the security challenge. Barzani also criticized the failure to form a new KRG government more than 20 months after the October 2024 regional elections. He argued that the political deadlock has weakened governance and called for parliament to resume its work and for Kurdish parties to prioritize the broader national interest.

That paralysis has strategic costs.

A government facing sustained external attacks needs functioning institutions capable of making rapid decisions, coordinating security policy, negotiating international assistance and reassuring investors. Political fragmentation makes each of those tasks harder. The longer the government-formation crisis continues, the more difficult it becomes for the Kurdistan Region to present a unified strategic response to an increasingly dangerous regional environment.

The irony is that Kurdistan's strategic importance to Washington may be increasing at precisely the moment that America's traditional military presence is shrinking.

Barzani emphasized that the US-Kurdish relationship should not be defined solely through military cooperation. He wants the partnership to evolve toward deeper political and economic ties, while maintaining sufficient security cooperation to prevent the withdrawal of American forces from producing instability.

That may ultimately be the most important message from the interview.

The future of the US-Kurdistan relationship will likely depend less on how many American troops remain in Kurdistan and more on whether Washington can help Erbil develop the institutional and technological capacity to protect itself. If the United States succeeds, Kurdistan could become an example of how American influence can survive a military drawdown through technology, investment, intelligence and strategic partnership.

If it fails, the consequences could extend beyond Kurdistan.

Repeated drone attacks against energy infrastructure could undermine investment. Political pressure could deepen Kurdish divisions. Baghdad could struggle to enforce its authority over armed groups. Iran-linked actors could gain greater freedom to operate. And American companies could become increasingly reluctant to invest in a region that lacks reliable defensive infrastructure.

Kurdistan therefore faces a strategic choice, but Washington faces one too.

Erbil must accelerate the development of an indigenous, layered air-defense and early-warning architecture while strengthening political cohesion and security coordination with Baghdad. Washington, meanwhile, must determine whether its commitment to Kurdistan can evolve from a model based primarily on American military protection into one based on enabling Kurdistan to protect itself.

The drone attacks have exposed the vulnerability.

But they have also clarified the strategic opportunity.

If Kurdistan can transform American security dependence into American-supported security capacity—and simultaneously convert its relationship with Washington into deeper economic and political integration—it may emerge from the current crisis more resilient rather than weaker.

For now, however, Barzani's warning is difficult to ignore: the Kurdistan Region is vulnerable, and the withdrawal of air-defense systems could turn that vulnerability into a strategic vacuum.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent platform focused on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, regional security, geopolitics and energy. He holds a PhD in English Literature from Brunel University London, with research focused on war literature and conflict.

Further Reading: Baghdad’s Security Monopoly Leaves Kurdistan Exposed — an analysis of how Baghdad’s acquisition of advanced counter-drone systems, while excluding the Kurdistan Region, has exposed the deeper security and federalism dilemma between Baghdad and Erbil. 

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