By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Washington is reshaping Iraq, Syria and Turkey through energy, trade and connectivity—with Kurdish actors emerging as a crucial link between the region’s competing systems.

For decades, Washington’s relationship with the Kurds in Iraq and Syria was defined primarily by security: counterterrorism, the fight against ISIS, military partnerships, and the management of regional instability. That framework is now changing. The emerging American approach to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey appears increasingly centered on energy, trade, infrastructure, technology, and regional connectivity rather than a large permanent U.S. military footprint.

Within this emerging architecture, the Kurds occupy an increasingly complicated position. They are not being treated as a single political bloc, nor are they necessarily the central pillar of Washington’s regional strategy. Instead, Kurdish political actors are becoming a connecting layer between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—linking energy production to export routes, political negotiations to security arrangements, and local actors to regional economic corridors.

What will happen to the Kurds in the new US strategy? In Iraq, Syria and Turkey, the role of the Kurds is being redefined. The Kurds will no longer be just US security partners, they will become the link between US policy and network of relations in the three countries. From now on, US strategy will no longer be limited to security and permanent military presence, but will expand to energy, trade, new routes and oil and gas pipelines, technology, and investment. The paradox is that the Kurds in these three countries cannot control the situation in all three countries, but they may no longer need to.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) will have its own position in the fields of oil, trade and relations with Turkey. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is gaining more and more importance in terms of gas and political mediations. The Kurds in Syria will play a prominent role in the political transition and will remain an important actor until the country's fate is decided. Whether Washington supports the Kurds or not is not as important as how far the Kurdish actors themselves can reorganize their political relations and turn it into leverage.

This shift is strategically important because it changes the meaning of Kurdish power. The Kurdish question is no longer only about autonomy, federalism, military forces, or territorial disputes. It is increasingly about connectivity: who controls energy routes, who can facilitate political communication, who can stabilize border regions, and who can connect otherwise fragmented political systems.

The emerging American model appears to envision Iraq as a major energy hub, Turkey as the principal commercial and logistical gateway, and Syria as a potential transit corridor toward the Mediterranean. The Kurdistan Region sits directly between these strategic spaces.

That geography gives the Kurds importance even as Washington simultaneously pushes for stronger central governments in Baghdad and Damascus.

The role of Tom Barrak in this new equation

the recent trip of Tom Barak, the special representative of the US President, to Baghdad, Erbil and Damascus seems to be a series of diplomatic meetings and economic agreements. But juxtaposing the agreements signed in Iraq and Syria indicates the formation of a pattern that goes beyond a few energy projects; A model that can be seen as America's attempt to create a common economic-security architecture in Iraq and Syria.

In this context, Washington is trying to consolidate its influence not through the deployment of military forces, but by relying on a network of pipelines, oil fields, energy infrastructure, communication technology, and large investments.

The first sign of this strategy was revealed in the joint statement of the Iraqi and American governments after the meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and Tom Barak on June 15. In this statement, the Iraqi government pledged to complete the process of disarmament and dissolution of armed groups outside the government's control; An issue that has always been one of Washington's main demands.

In contrast, America announced a package of economic and energy projects; including:

Licensing of Starlink activities in Iraq

Chevron's entry into the West Qurna-2 and Nasiriyah oil projects

Ensuring the security of HKN, Western Zagros and Hunt companies

Construction of LNG import terminal by Excelerate Energy in Khor Al-Zabair

Signing of the memorandum of understanding for the reconstruction of the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline with the participation of TI Capital

Almost simultaneously, similar developments took place in Syria. Syrian Energy Minister Muhammad al-Bashir met with major American energy companies in Washington between June 9 and 13.

Shortly after, Syrian Oil Company signed the first oil field development contract with ConocoPhillips and Novaterra Company; The contract is considered the first official cooperation between a large American oil company and the new Syrian government. At the same time, the authorities of Haskeh province also confirmed that the American company HKN Energy has started operations in some oil fields that were previously in the hands of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and were recently officially handed over to the Damascus government.

One of the most important signs of this change is the concentration of responsibilities in the hands of Tom Barak. He now holds three key positions at the same time: American ambassador to Türkiye,  US special representative for Syria, Special Representative of the President of the United States for Iraq Affairs

In this way, the three axes of Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus are managed through a single channel; A matter that shows that Washington has found a new regional perspective on these three countries.

A list of US companies reinforces the same picture. HKN Energy now operates in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, in the federal Iraq and in the north-east of Syria. In addition to negotiations related to Iraqi projects, Chevron also has exploratory agreements on the coast of Syria.

In addition to the new Damascus contract, ConocoPhillips is also present in a consortium consisting of TotalEnergies and QatarEnergy to explore Syria's offshore Block No. 3. Baker Hughes, together with Hunt and Argent LNG, has participated in the development of Syria's comprehensive energy plan.

In this way, many companies that invest in Iraq have entered the Syrian market at the same time.

One of the most important components of this project is the revival of the historic Kirkuk-Banias pipeline. This pipeline, which was built in 1952, has been unused since 2003. Its restoration could transport up to one million barrels of Iraqi oil per day to the Mediterranean coast, reducing Baghdad's dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand, Syria will also benefit from the transit income and become a regional energy corridor. The placement of the American company TI Capital in the reconstruction project of this pipeline also shows that Washington intends to play a direct role in the most important energy artery between Iraq and the Mediterranean.

The main feature of this strategy is to change the way of American influence. In the past, military presence was the most important tool to maintain Washington's influence in the region. But now America seems to want to maintain the same level of influence through economic infrastructure.

Pipelines, power plants, LNG terminals, the Starlink satellite internet network, oil fields and joint ventures are all projects that have made the host country dependent on the technology, parts, capital and services of American companies for decades. In this model, America mostly plays the role of coordinator and political guarantor; American companies provide capital and technology; Türkiye provides the transit route and logistics capacity.

This process also has important implications for Kurdish actors. A significant part of the first projects of this plan are located in areas that were previously under the influence of Kurdish forces; From Haskeh oil fields to Kirkuk oil transfer routes.

The handing over of the SDF oil fields to the American company HKN, along with Washington's pressure to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces into the structure of the Damascus government, shows that the new American model is based on strengthening central governments rather than self-governing structures.

Despite this, it is still not possible to talk about the formation of a completely new order in the region.

Reviving the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline will require billions of dollars of capital and a few years of time, many of the agreements in Syria are still at the level of memorandums of understanding, and the case of armed groups in Iraq remains unresolved.

However, the series of recent developments show that America is pursuing a coherent strategy to link Iraq and Syria in the form of a common economic and energy network; A network whose purpose is to reduce the dependence of these two countries on the countries of the United States and to replace military influence with economic influence.

However, it is still premature to describe this process as the beginning of a "new order". Iran remains one of the main players in regional equations and what is being formed today.

From Military Presence to Economic Architecture

The most significant change in Washington’s regional strategy is not simply what the United States is doing, but how it is attempting to exercise influence.

The traditional American model relied heavily on military power. Bases, troops, air operations, intelligence partnerships, and local armed forces were the principal instruments through which Washington shaped regional security. The emerging model is different.

Energy infrastructure, oil fields, gas projects, pipelines, LNG facilities, telecommunications, technology companies, investment agreements, and trade corridors can create influence that lasts considerably longer than a military deployment.

This is particularly visible in the growing convergence between American economic engagement in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, Washington has encouraged Baghdad to move toward greater state control over weapons while simultaneously supporting expanded American commercial participation in energy and infrastructure. In Syria, American companies are increasingly examining opportunities in oil, gas, technology, and reconstruction as Damascus attempts to reintegrate territories and institutions previously outside its effective control.

The strategic logic is straightforward: economic integration can become a mechanism of political stabilization.

Instead of attempting to control the region directly, Washington can help construct networks in which Iraq, Syria, and Turkey become increasingly economically interconnected. American companies provide capital, technology, expertise, and investment; Turkey provides logistics and access to European markets; Iraq supplies substantial energy resources; and Syria potentially becomes a Mediterranean transit route.

The result would be a regional architecture in which infrastructure itself becomes an instrument of geopolitical influence.

The Kurds' Position in the New U.S. Blueprint

Developments over the past two years indicate that Washington is implementing a new architecture for Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—one centered not on a massive U.S. military presence, but on economic integration, energy corridors, regional trade, and the devolution of security responsibilities to local allies. In this framework, Turkey is emerging as the primary gateway for energy and trade, Iraq as a hub of energy resources, and Syria as a transit route to the Mediterranean.

Amidst this, the Kurds have also assumed a new role. They are defined within this new order not as a monolithic bloc, but as a collection of distinct actors, each serving a different function.

In Iraq, the United States and its regional partners distinguish between the two main Kurdish parties. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) remains a key player in the oil sector and in trade with Turkey, owing to its control over the majority of oil fields, the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing, and the oil pipeline to the port of Ceyhan.

In contrast, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has gained increasing importance due to the concentration of natural gas resources in the areas under its influence. The development of the Khor Mor gas field and gas transmission projects has established the party as a cornerstone of Iraq’s new energy agenda and a key factor in reducing Baghdad’s reliance on Iranian gas.

Simultaneously, the peace process between Turkey and the PKK has altered the Patriotic Union’s position. While the party’s past closeness to the PKK was once viewed by Ankara as a threat, that same connection can now facilitate a mediating role in managing relations between the PKK, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Turkish government.

This shift does not imply a decline in the importance of the Democratic Party; rather, it indicates that the two Iraqi Kurdish parties have assumed distinct roles within the new order: the Democratic Party focuses on oil, trade, and ties with Turkey, while the Patriotic Union concentrates on the gas sector and the management of political issues concerning the PKK and northern Syria.

This pattern is also evident in Syria. Discussions regarding the future of Syrian Kurds have frequently taken place not in Damascus or Washington, but in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Meetings involving Mazloum Abdi, Masoud Barzani, Bafel Talabani, and Nechirvan Barzani—attended by U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack—demonstrate that the Kurdistan Region has become the primary hub for coordinating Kurdish affairs in the region.

From Washington’s perspective, the ultimate goal remains the strengthening of central governments; consequently, the U.S. emphasizes integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces into the structure of the Damascus government. Nevertheless, achieving this objective still requires Kurdish political and social networks.

Consequently, within the new U.S. framework, the Kurds play the role of a "connecting layer"—neither the central pillar of the regional order nor an actor independent of states, but rather a link connecting energy routes, trade, political negotiations, and lines of communication among Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

This approach also explains why the prolonged impasse in forming the Kurdistan Regional Government’s cabinet has not generated significant external pressure; from the perspective of international actors, as long as oil exports, gas project development, and communication channels between Kurdish parties remain intact, the delay in forming the local government will not hinder the implementation of the broader regional strategy.

The Kurds' position within the new U.S. strategy has evolved from a mere "security issue" into a factor of geopolitical connectivity.

Why the Kurds Matter to This Architecture

The Kurdish position becomes clearer when viewed through this wider economic map.

The Kurdistan Region occupies a strategic position between Turkey, federal Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Its territory contains important oil and gas resources and some of the most significant land routes connecting Iraq to Turkey. But the Kurdish role is not uniform.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party, or KDP, has traditionally been closely associated with the oil economy, commercial relations with Turkey, and the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing. Its political influence in the western and northern parts of the Kurdistan Region gives it a particularly important role in any economic architecture linking Iraqi energy resources with Turkish infrastructure and international markets. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, or PUK, occupies a different strategic space.

The concentration of major gas resources and projects in areas where the PUK exercises considerable political influence gives it growing relevance to Iraq’s energy transition. The development of the Khor Mor gas field and associated infrastructure has made natural gas an increasingly important component of the PUK’s strategic significance. This creates an unusual division of Kurdish geopolitical labor. The KDP is particularly important to oil, Turkey, trade, and western connectivity.

The PUK is increasingly important to gas, eastern connectivity, Baghdad, and political mediation. Neither role makes one party more important than the other. Instead, their strategic relevance increasingly derives from different positions within the same regional network. This distinction matters for Washington because the United States does not necessarily need a unified Kurdish political actor to pursue its objectives. It may instead need different Kurdish actors capable of performing different functions. That is both the strength and the vulnerability of the emerging Kurdish position.

The PUK’s New Strategic Importance

The PUK’s role may become particularly significant as the regional political environment surrounding the PKK changes. For years, the PUK’s historical relationship with the PKK was viewed by Ankara as a major security problem. But if the Turkish-PKK conflict moves further toward a political settlement, relationships that were previously considered liabilities could acquire a different strategic value.

A political network that once generated suspicion can potentially become a communication channel. The PUK could therefore find itself positioned between Ankara, the PKK, the Syrian Democratic Forces, Baghdad, and Washington. Its value would not necessarily derive from controlling territory but from its ability to communicate across political boundaries that remain difficult for formal governments to bridge.

This could be particularly relevant to the future of northeast Syria. Washington has supported the SDF for years as a partner against ISIS. Yet the broader American objective increasingly appears to involve integrating Syrian Kurdish forces into a wider Syrian state framework rather than indefinitely maintaining a separate Kurdish security structure. That creates a paradox.

The United States may want stronger central institutions in Damascus while simultaneously needing Kurdish political networks to make that integration possible. The Kurds therefore become both subjects of integration and instruments of integration.

Erbil and Sulaymaniyah as Regional Diplomatic Hubs

The significance of the Kurdistan Region is also visible in the way Kurdish affairs in Syria are increasingly discussed. Important conversations about the future of Syrian Kurdish forces and their relationship with Damascus, Ankara, and Washington have frequently involved Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

Meetings involving Syrian Kurdish commander Mazloum Abdi, Masoud Barzani, Bafel Talabani, Nechirvan Barzani, and U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack illustrate the increasingly interconnected nature of Kurdish politics across borders.

This is strategically significant. The Kurdistan Region is no longer merely a territorial entity negotiating with Baghdad. It is also becoming a political meeting ground where questions involving Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and the United States intersect. That does not mean Erbil or Sulaymaniyah controls the future of Syria.

It means that Kurdish political networks have become difficult to exclude from negotiations over that future. Washington can therefore pursue centralization in Damascus without completely abandoning Kurdish channels. Indeed, Kurdish networks may be precisely what makes a negotiated transition possible.

The Kirkuk-Banias Corridor and the Mediterranean

The potential revival of the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline illustrates the economic logic behind the emerging regional architecture. The historic pipeline, constructed in the mid-twentieth century and largely inactive since 2003, represents more than an energy project. Its revival would potentially reconnect Iraqi oil resources with the Mediterranean through Syria.

That would change the geography of Iraqi energy exports. Iraq would gain another route to international markets. Syria would gain transit significance and potentially valuable revenues. Turkey would remain a crucial regional logistics hub. American companies could participate in the capital-intensive reconstruction and operation of infrastructure.

Most importantly, the project would demonstrate that infrastructure can connect political systems that have historically been divided by war and rivalry. The pipeline is therefore not simply about moving barrels. It is about creating interdependence. And interdependence is precisely the type of regional influence Washington increasingly appears interested in cultivating.

Syria Is Becoming Part of the Same Economic Equation

The developments in Syria reinforce this interpretation. As Damascus attempts to consolidate control over territory previously administered or influenced by Kurdish-led forces, energy assets in northeastern Syria are increasingly being incorporated into the national framework.

American companies' interest in Syrian oil and gas development adds another layer to this transformation. The potential participation of major American energy firms, alongside international companies and regional investors, could gradually integrate Syria into the same economic system being developed around Iraq.

This creates an important distinction between the political and economic dimensions of American policy. Politically, Washington may support the strengthening of Damascus.

Economically, Washington may simultaneously seek to ensure that Syrian energy resources become connected to international markets. For Kurdish actors, this means that territorial control over energy assets may become less important than their ability to influence how those assets are integrated into the wider regional economy. That is a profound strategic change.

Turkey as the Gateway

Turkey occupies the third corner of this emerging triangle. Its geography makes it indispensable to any strategy connecting Iraqi energy resources and regional trade with European markets. Turkish ports, pipelines, roads, railways, financial institutions, and industrial infrastructure give Ankara a structural role that Washington cannot easily replace. This explains why Kurdish politics cannot be separated from Turkish strategy.

The KDP's deep economic relationship with Turkey provides one channel for regional connectivity. The PUK's political relationships provide another. Meanwhile, the possible transformation of the PKK conflict could reduce one of the most significant security barriers to deeper regional integration.

If the Turkish-PKK conflict moves decisively toward political settlement, the economic consequences could extend beyond Turkey itself. Northern Iraq and northeastern Syria could become less defined by armed conflict and increasingly defined by trade, energy, infrastructure, and cross-border investment. The Kurdish question would not disappear. It would be recontextualized.

Washington’s Preference for Central Governments

Yet there is a crucial limitation to the argument that the Kurds are becoming central to Washington’s strategy. The United States does not appear to be building a regional order based on Kurdish independence or permanent Kurdish self-government. Quite the opposite.

Washington increasingly appears interested in strengthening Baghdad and Damascus as the recognized sovereign centers of Iraq and Syria while incorporating Kurdish institutions into those states. This explains Washington’s emphasis on integrating the SDF into Syria’s national security structure and its broader pressure on Iraqi armed groups to operate under state authority.

The underlying principle is therefore not Kurdish sovereignty. It is state consolidation combined with economic decentralization. Local actors can retain significant economic and political influence, but the final security architecture remains centered on recognized national governments. For Kurdish actors, this is both an opportunity and a warning. They can remain indispensable without becoming sovereign.

Why the Kurdistan Government Crisis Has Not Triggered Major External Pressure

This framework also helps explain the relatively limited international pressure surrounding the prolonged political impasse over forming a new Kurdistan Regional Government cabinet. From a Kurdish perspective, the delay is politically damaging. It weakens institutional capacity and reinforces public frustration. From the perspective of external actors, however, the calculation may be different.

If oil continues to move, gas projects continue to develop, trade with Turkey remains functional, political channels between the KDP and PUK remain open, and the Kurdistan Region remains integrated into broader Iraqi and regional arrangements, the absence of a fully functioning cabinet may not constitute an immediate strategic emergency for Washington or other external powers. This does not mean that international actors do not care about Kurdish governance. It means that functional connectivity may currently matter more to them than institutional completeness. That should concern Kurdish policymakers.

A region that becomes strategically valuable primarily because it connects other actors can find itself economically important while politically fragmented.

The Kurdish Paradox

The emerging regional order therefore creates a Kurdish paradox. The Kurds may be more strategically relevant to Washington than at any point since the defeat of ISIS, but they may simultaneously have less leverage to shape the final political architecture of Iraq and Syria.

Their value increasingly comes from their position within systems rather than from their ability to operate outside those systems. They connect Turkey to Iraq.

They connect Iraq to Syria. They connect Washington to local actors. They connect political negotiations to security arrangements. And they connect energy resources to regional markets. But being the connecting link is not the same as controlling the network. That distinction will define the next phase of Kurdish geopolitics.

Iran Remains the Major Complication

Any assessment of Washington’s emerging strategy must also account for Iran. An American-backed network connecting Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and the Mediterranean would inevitably challenge Iranian influence. Tehran has spent decades constructing its own networks across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. The competition is therefore not simply over individual oil fields or pipelines.

It is a competition between competing regional architectures. Iran relies heavily on political allies, armed groups, economic relationships, and strategic land routes. Washington increasingly appears to be countering this model with a combination of state institutions, private investment, energy infrastructure, technology, and commercial corridors. The struggle between these two models will determine whether the emerging American strategy can actually survive.

The New Kurdish Role

The most important conclusion is that Kurdish geopolitics is entering a new phase. The Kurds are no longer adequately described simply as a military partner of Washington or a disputed minority divided among four states. They are increasingly part of the infrastructure of regional connectivity.

The KDP's position in oil, trade, and Turkey-facing corridors; the PUK's role in gas and political mediation; the Kurdistan Region's position as a meeting place for Kurdish actors; and Kurdish forces' continuing relevance in Syria all give Kurdish actors a place within the emerging regional network.

But Washington's objective appears to be clear: strengthen states, integrate economies, reduce dependence on Iranian energy and security networks, and replace some elements of military dominance with infrastructure-driven influence.

The Kurds can benefit from this strategy if they understand their new leverage. But they can also lose from it if they mistake connectivity for sovereignty. The central question for Kurdish policymakers is therefore no longer simply whether Washington supports the Kurds.

The more important question is: Can the Kurds turn their role as the region's connecting link into durable political, economic, and institutional influence? That will depend on whether Erbil and Sulaymaniyah can move beyond rivalry, develop complementary economic strategies, strengthen regional institutions, and negotiate collectively with Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, and Washington.

If they succeed, the Kurdistan Region could become one of the most important nodes in the emerging Iraq-Syria-Turkey economic corridor. If they fail, Kurdish actors may remain indispensable to the network while having surprisingly little influence over where the network ultimately leads.

Further Reading

Turkey, Syria, and Iraq Are Building a Corridor That Could Sideline Kurdistan — This analysis examines the emerging Turkey–Syria–Iraq trade and transport corridor and its implications for the Kurdistan Region’s strategic position. It complements the current article’s argument about Kurdish actors becoming a connecting layer within a changing regional connectivity architecture. 

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a Kurdish policy analyst and geopolitical researcher specializing in Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, Iran, Turkey, Syria, security, energy geopolitics, and regional affairs. He is the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis and holds a PhD in English Literature from Brunel University London, with research focused on war literature, conflict, and political representation.

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