Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Mazloum Abdi has announced the dissolution of the SDF as an independent military force and its integration into the Syrian state. But this is not simply the end of the SDF. It is a strategic gamble: can Syrian Kurds convert a decade of military leverage into lasting constitutional, political and cultural rights? The battlefield is ending. The harder struggle is beginning.

Mazloum Abdi’s announcement on August 25 that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have completed their integration into the Syrian state and will dissolve as an independent military force marks the end of one of the most consequential experiments in modern Kurdish politics. Speaking at the Syrian presidential palace after meeting President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Abdi declared that the SDF’s military mission had ended and described the transition as a move from the battlefield toward reconstruction, peace, and a new Syrian chapter. Syria’s official news agency confirmed that Abdi announced the dissolution and full integration of the SDF into state institutions.

The strategic argument is straightforward: the Syrian Kurds have concluded that preserving autonomous military power is no longer viable under the new regional balance of power, and are therefore attempting to convert the leverage accumulated through a decade of war into political, constitutional, and cultural rights inside the Syrian state. This is not simply the collapse of the SDF. It is a transformation of Kurdish strategy—from territorial and military autonomy toward institutional bargaining. Whether that becomes a historic compromise or a strategic surrender will depend almost entirely on what Damascus delivers in return.

The timing is significant. The SDF did not dissolve in the geopolitical environment in which it was created. It emerged during the collapse of the Syrian state, expanded during the campaign against ISIS, and became indispensable to the United States because it provided an effective local force against the Islamic State. Today, however, Damascus is rebuilding state authority, Washington's priorities have changed, Turkey remains hostile to independent Kurdish military structures on its border, and the SDF has already lost much of the territorial and strategic space that once sustained its autonomy. The conditions that created the SDF's power have therefore largely disappeared. That is the central fact behind Abdi's decision.

From the Battlefield to the State

The announcement should be understood as the culmination of a process that has been underway for months rather than as a sudden decision. On August 4, al-Sharaa and Abdi met in Damascus specifically to discuss completing implementation of the January 29 agreement and integrating the SDF into Syrian state institutions. Syrian officials subsequently said the process had moved from negotiations into practical implementation.

KPA's earlier analysis, “SDF Chief Sits Down with Al-Sharaa as Syria Moves to Absorb Kurdish Forces into Its Military”, identified this trajectory months ago: the fundamental question was no longer whether Damascus wanted the SDF inside the state, but how the military and civilian structures would be absorbed. Today's announcement confirms that the process has moved beyond an abstract political agreement.

The January agreement itself established the basic direction. Reuters reported at the time that the Syrian government and the SDF agreed to integrate Kurdish civilian and military authorities into central government structures, while Damascus would regain control over strategic assets including oil fields, border crossings, and other institutions. The agreement followed fighting in which government forces recovered significant territory from the SDF.

That sequence matters because it reveals the balance of power behind today's announcement. This was not an integration negotiated between two equal sovereign entities. It was an integration negotiated after the strategic environment had turned against the autonomous Kurdish project. That does not make Abdi's decision irrational. It makes it realist.

The SDF Won the War It Was Created to Fight

There is a temptation to describe today's development simply as a Kurdish defeat. That interpretation misses the extraordinary contradiction at the heart of the SDF's history. The SDF was militarily successful. It became the principal local partner of the United States against ISIS. Its forces fought some of the most important battles of the anti-ISIS campaign, while its Kurdish core became internationally recognized as an effective military force. The organization subsequently became the security pillar of a Kurdish-led autonomous administration in northeastern Syria.

But military success did not produce permanent political sovereignty.

This is precisely the argument developed in KPA's recent analysis, “Did the Syrian Kurds Trade Autonomy for Lasting Rights—or Simply Surrender Their Leverage Before Damascus Proves It Can Be Trusted?”. The SDF achieved extraordinary battlefield results, but those victories could not guarantee the survival of the political order that emerged around them once the regional balance changed. That distinction is essential.

The SDF could defeat ISIS because Washington needed it to defeat ISIS. It could maintain autonomous institutions because the Syrian state was too weak to restore control. It could retain territory because the United States provided an external deterrent. Once those conditions changed, the political value of military autonomy diminished. The SDF did not suddenly become weak. The strategic environment became stronger than the SDF.

Washington's Realist Lesson

The United States is central to understanding why Abdi has chosen this moment to close the SDF chapter. For years, Washington's relationship with the SDF was based primarily on counterterrorism. The United States needed a capable local partner against ISIS, and the SDF needed American military, intelligence, diplomatic, and political support. That arrangement produced one of the most important U.S.-Kurdish military partnerships in the Middle East.

But it was never an unconditional commitment to Kurdish sovereignty. That is the central argument of KPA's “When the Common Enemy Disappears, Alliances Change: Mazloum Abdi’s Realist Lesson for the Syrian Kurds”. International partnerships are usually built around converging interests. When the strategic objective changes, the relationship changes with it.

The lesson is uncomfortable but important. The Syrian Kurds interpreted their military importance as potential political leverage. Washington largely interpreted the SDF as a highly effective instrument for a particular security objective. Those two interpretations overlapped for years. They diverged when the regional strategic environment changed.

This does not mean the United States abandoned the Syrian Kurds in a simplistic sense. It means Washington's priorities increasingly shifted toward state consolidation and the stabilization of Syria as a recognized sovereign state.

KPA's broader analysis, “The Kurds as the Connecting Link in Washington’s New Regional Strategy”, argues that this reflects a wider transformation in American regional strategy: Washington increasingly appears interested in stronger state institutions in Iraq and Syria while retaining Kurdish actors as politically and economically important partners rather than treating Kurdish autonomy itself as the organizing principle. That distinction explains today's announcement better than the language of betrayal.

Abdi Is Trading Military Leverage for Political Guarantees

The most important part of Abdi's speech may not have been the dissolution of the SDF. It was his discussion of Kurdish rights.

Abdi emphasized President al-Sharaa's promises regarding education in the mother tongue and said efforts were underway to implement Kurdish-language education during the current school year. He also framed the future Syrian state as one belonging to Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Christians, and other communities. This is the political bargain at the heart of the transition.

The Kurdish leadership is effectively saying: we will no longer insist on maintaining a separate military structure if the Syrian state recognizes us as a constituent part of the country and protects our political and cultural rights. That is a dramatic change in Kurdish strategy.

Instead of defending autonomy through military institutions, Kurdish leaders will have to defend Kurdish interests through constitutional politics. And that is considerably more difficult.

A military structure provides immediate leverage. Constitutional rights depend on laws, courts, institutions, political coalitions, and the willingness of the central government to respect them. The danger is therefore obvious: once the SDF disappears, the Kurdish leadership loses one of its strongest instruments of coercive bargaining.

The promise is equally significant: if Damascus genuinely institutionalizes Kurdish rights, the Kurds could potentially become an accepted constituent of a new Syrian political order rather than a permanently contested autonomous entity.

Damascus Has Won the Sovereignty Argument

From Damascus's perspective, today's development is a major strategic victory. The Syrian state has achieved what successive governments sought for years: the dismantling of an autonomous Kurdish military structure and the reintegration of northeastern Syria into the national security architecture.

SANA's reporting confirms that the government views the process as the transition from agreement to actual implementation. But victory creates responsibility.

Damascus can no longer simultaneously demand Kurdish integration and treat Kurdish political and cultural rights as secondary questions. The January agreement itself contained provisions recognizing Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, alongside commitments concerning political participation and state institutions.

The credibility of the new Syrian state will therefore be tested through implementation. If Kurdish-language education is permitted, Kurdish political participation is protected, former SDF personnel are integrated fairly, and Kurdish communities receive meaningful representation within state institutions, today's announcement could become the foundation of a genuine national settlement.

If integration instead becomes a mechanism for centralizing power while gradually eliminating Kurdish political influence, the underlying conflict will not have disappeared. It will simply have moved from the battlefield into politics.

The Most Dangerous Phase Begins Now

This is why the end of the SDF should not be confused with the end of the Kurdish question. The military question may have been settled. The political question has not.

The Syrian Kurdish leadership is now entering its most vulnerable phase because it must negotiate from inside the state rather than from outside it. The SDF gave Kurdish leaders a fallback option: if negotiations failed, there remained an organized military structure capable of defending territory. That option is now disappearing.

The Kurdish leadership's bargaining position will consequently depend on political organization, international diplomacy, institutional representation, and the ability to maintain unity.

KPA's earlier analysis, “Mazloum Abdi’s Kurdistan Visit Signals Rising Pressure on Syrian Kurds”, examined precisely this problem: as pressure from Damascus increased, Abdi increasingly needed regional political backing and coordination rather than simply military reinforcement. That regional dimension is becoming even more important now.

Erbil Matters More After the SDF Disappears

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq cannot replace the SDF. But it can potentially help replace some of the political leverage that the SDF once provided. Erbil maintains relationships with Washington, Baghdad, Damascus, and Syrian Kurdish actors. That gives the Kurdistan Region a potential diplomatic role in ensuring that the Syrian Kurdish question does not become another regional military crisis.

KPA's analysis “Iraq and Syria Are Quietly Rebuilding a Strategic Partnership—and the Stakes Go Far Beyond Security” highlighted the growing importance of the Erbil-Baghdad-Damascus triangle and the potential for the Kurdistan Region to function as a bridge between political actors.

That role could become considerably more important now. The Syrian Kurds have lost an independent military instrument. They therefore need political networks capable of communicating their interests to Damascus, Washington, Ankara, and other regional actors.

The Kurdistan Region is one of the few Kurdish political spaces capable of doing that. But there is a limit. Erbil cannot guarantee the Syrian Kurds' future. Ultimately, the political settlement will depend on Damascus and the ability of Syrian Kurdish leaders to organize themselves within the new Syrian state.

Turkey Has Less Reason to Fear the Northeast—But Will Still Watch Closely

Today's announcement also addresses one of Ankara's most persistent security concerns. Turkey has long opposed the existence of an autonomous Kurdish military structure along its southern border. The disappearance of the SDF as an independent armed organization therefore removes one of the central sources of Turkish strategic anxiety in northern Syria.

But Ankara is unlikely to treat the announcement as the end of the problem. Turkey will want to know whether the former SDF command structure has genuinely disappeared or simply been transferred into Syrian state institutions under another name.

This is where implementation again becomes decisive. If former SDF forces operate fully under Syrian state command, the Turkish security calculation changes significantly. If autonomous command structures survive inside the Syrian military, Ankara may remain suspicious.

KPA's broader analysis, “As Turkey Ends One Kurdish War, Iran Opens Another Front”, places the Syrian development within a larger regional transformation: Kurdish armed structures are increasingly being dismantled, absorbed, or politically reoriented across the region. That makes Syria part of a broader strategic transition rather than an isolated event.

The Kurdish Question Is Moving From Security to Constitutional Politics

The most important forecast is therefore not that Kurdish influence will disappear. It is that the nature of Kurdish influence will change. For more than a decade, Kurdish power in northeastern Syria was fundamentally territorial and military.

The next phase will be political and institutional. The critical questions will be: Who represents Kurdish interests in Damascus? What constitutional protections are established? What happens to Kurdish-language education? How are former SDF commanders incorporated? What political authority remains at the local level? How much administrative discretion survives? What guarantees exist if a future Syrian government attempts to reverse today's concessions?

These questions will determine whether today's announcement becomes a successful peace settlement or merely the end of one side's ability to resist. The Syrian government has an opportunity that previous governments never possessed. It can build a Syrian state that is centralized enough to preserve territorial integrity but pluralistic enough to recognize the country's ethnic and religious diversity. That would be a fundamentally different Syria.

The Strategic Lesson for the Kurds Is Larger Than Syria

There is also a wider Kurdish lesson here. Kurdish movements across the Middle East have repeatedly demonstrated that they can become indispensable military partners when states collapse or international powers face security crises.

But indispensability is not sovereignty. External powers may arm Kurdish forces, finance them, train them, or depend upon them. None of those relationships automatically produces a permanent political guarantee.

The Syrian experience demonstrates this with unusual clarity. The SDF became one of the most powerful Kurdish-led military institutions in modern history. Yet its survival ultimately depended on a geopolitical environment that it did not control. When that environment changed, the organization had to adapt. That is why Abdi's decision should not be analyzed simply through the emotional vocabulary of victory and defeat.

It is better understood as a strategic adaptation to an unfavorable balance of power. The question now is whether the adaptation is successful.

Forecast: Three Possible Futures

The first scenario is a negotiated Kurdish incorporation. Damascus honors its commitments, Kurdish-language education expands, political representation becomes institutionalized, former SDF personnel are integrated without systematic marginalization, and Kurdish communities gain meaningful participation in the new Syrian political system. Under this scenario, the dissolution of the SDF becomes the foundation of a durable Syrian settlement.

The second scenario is centralized absorption. The Syrian state integrates the SDF but gradually eliminates meaningful Kurdish institutional autonomy and limits the political influence of former Kurdish authorities. In this scenario, Damascus wins the sovereignty battle but fails to resolve the Kurdish political question. The result would be a more centralized Syria but not necessarily a more stable one.

The third scenario is political backlash. If Kurdish expectations are systematically disappointed, frustration could rebuild support for forms of political resistance, even if the military architecture of the SDF does not return. This would be the most dangerous outcome because it would transform today's agreement from a peace mechanism into a temporary pause.

The first scenario offers the greatest opportunity for Syria. The second is probably the greatest temptation for Damascus. The third is the greatest strategic risk for everyone.

The End of the SDF Is a Beginning, Not an Ending

Mazloum Abdi has announced the end of the SDF as an independent military force. Historically, that is enormous. But strategically, it is only the beginning of the more difficult phase.

The Syrian Kurds have spent more than a decade building power through war. They now have to preserve their political identity through institutions. That requires a different form of leadership and a different conception of power. The battlefield rewarded discipline, command structures and military capability. Politics will reward coalition-building, diplomacy, constitutional negotiation and patience.

Abdi's decision suggests that the Kurdish leadership understands this reality. Whether Damascus does is the more important question. If Syria's new rulers understand that integrating the Kurds means incorporating them as equal citizens rather than merely absorbing their institutions, today's announcement could become one of the foundational moments of postwar Syria.

If Damascus interprets the dissolution of the SDF as unconditional Kurdish surrender, it may discover that dissolving an army is considerably easier than resolving the political question that produced it. The SDF may be ending. The Kurdish question is not.

The next Kurdish struggle in Syria will not be fought over territory. It will be fought over the meaning of citizenship, constitutional rights, language, political representation, and the distribution of power inside the Syrian state.

And that battle may ultimately determine whether the end of the SDF becomes a historic peace—or simply the beginning of another chapter in Syria's unfinished conflict.

Why did the Kurds in Syria do this?

Three events took place in Syria yesterday, these three events were somewhat interconnected or related to each other, while interests, geographical rule and fear of the future motivated all three events.

While Abdi and his delegation were in Damascus to announce an agreement between the Kurds and Damascus, the Druze leader deepened the rift between Damascus and the Druze and put all the apples in Israel's basket, while the Israeli Defense Minister threatened Damascus from Jabal Sheikh.

The Kurds are moving towards an agreement with Damascus, but the Druze are rebelling more than in Syria.

The Druze areas are located on the Israeli border and are currently supported by the country. There are Druze in the army and Israeli society and pressure to support them.

Israel does not seem to want the Druze to become a state, but it is using them as a pressure card to weaken Syria, and the Druze have taken advantage of this support to rebel in Damascus.

Even when Damascus harassed and attacked the Druze, Israel bombed Damascus, so unlike the Kurds, the situation is more favorable for the Druze than to surrender to Damascus.

It is unclear how long Israel's support for the Druze will continue, or what the outcome will be, but what is clear is that Israel does not want a strong and unified Syria, and is trying to weaken it as much as possible.

The situation is different for the Kurds

The situation in Syria is different for the Kurds. The ground is not favorable for them to negotiate with Damascus because the Kurds are left alone in the arena and geographical rule is not in their interest.

After the Paris agreement, Israel turned its back on the Kurds and changed its discourse. The international community supports Damascus, and Turkey views the West and North as one issue and put pressure on this to happen.

The Kurdish geography in Syria relies on Turkey, which is hostile. The nature of the West is not flat and mountainous. Kurds and Arabs are mixed in the cities and towns.

Besides, Turkey, Damascus and the United States agree on the current equations, so when the Kurds chose an agreement, they understood the regional and international equations, so they made this decision.

There is a big mistake at the Kurdistan Regional Government's level in terms of viewing the agreement, because the situation in the West is viewed through the eyes of the Kurdistan Region, while the situation is much different.

In fact, the survival of the Kurdistan Region depends on the conflict between Iran and the United States. If it were not for the poor situation in Iraq and the presence of all these forces, if there was a strong and sovereign central state.

Therefore, the Kurds in Syria quickly understood the equation and did not want to become a pressure card in the hands of Israel or anyone else.

We have a lot of experience with the situation of the Syrian Kurds. In the late 1960s, Israel gave the Palestinians much more than they do now, but the Palestinians refused.

In the mid-1970s, the Kurds did not agree with the Ba'ath regime and were eventually sacrificed. Even in recent history, the smallest example is that Iraq demanded 50,000 barrels of oil from the Kurdistan Region.

Therefore, the agreement reached in Syria is not in line with the Kurdish wishes, because the Kurds want more, but under the shadow of the situation in the region, nothing more can be done.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent platform specializing in Kurdistan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, regional security, energy geopolitics, and Middle Eastern power competition. His work examines the intersection of Kurdish politics, international strategy, conflict, and regional geopolitical transformation.

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