Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The strategic equation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz would change dramatically if the United States could establish sufficiently secure maritime corridors through the strait and prevent Iran from effectively interdicting commercial traffic. The central issue is not simply whether ships can physically pass through Hormuz. It is whether Washington can create enough predictable oil flow to convince global markets that a prolonged disruption is survivable—and therefore remove Tehran's most powerful source of economic leverage.

Under normal circumstances, roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day move through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the world's most consequential energy chokepoints. If the United States and its partners could consistently move approximately 10 million barrels per day through the strait, the strategic consequences would be substantial. Half of normal Hormuz flows would not restore the global oil market to normal, but it could dramatically reduce the effectiveness of an Iranian attempt to turn the waterway into an economic weapon.

The calculation becomes even more important when alternative routes, strategic stockpiles and changes in demand are taken into account.

The question would therefore cease to be whether Iran could temporarily disrupt Hormuz.

It would become whether Iran could sustain that disruption long enough to force Washington and its partners to change course.

The Numbers Change the Strategic Equation

The first pillar of such a strategy would be maintaining a significant flow of crude through Hormuz.

If 10 million barrels per day could move safely through the strait, the remaining disruption would be serious but potentially manageable when combined with alternative sources of supply.

The United Arab Emirates already possesses an important strategic advantage through its pipeline connection to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. The system can move approximately 1.5 million barrels per day without requiring tankers to transit the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia also has the ability to redirect substantial volumes toward the Red Sea through its East-West pipeline system, with capacity of roughly 5 million barrels per day and potential expansion depending on operating conditions. This creates another mechanism through which Gulf crude can reach international markets without passing through Hormuz.

These alternative routes do not eliminate the strategic importance of the strait.

They reduce Iran's ability to turn the strait into an absolute economic chokehold.

That distinction is crucial.

China Could Become the Hidden Variable

The most underestimated variable in this equation may not be Washington, Riyadh or Abu Dhabi.

It may be Beijing.

China is the world's largest oil importer and has spent years building substantial strategic petroleum reserves. Estimates of China's total crude stockpile vary significantly, but the country has accumulated an enormous strategic buffer, potentially approaching or exceeding one billion barrels when strategic and commercial inventories are considered.

That gives Beijing something that most other major oil consumers do not possess: time.

If China were simultaneously reducing consumption by several million barrels per day and releasing crude from its reserves, the immediate pressure on international markets could be substantially reduced.

China would still have enormous economic incentives to avoid a prolonged energy crisis. But strategically, a large inventory provides Beijing with room to absorb a temporary disruption.

This is particularly important because the effectiveness of an Iranian blockade depends partly on psychology.

If traders believe that every lost barrel will immediately translate into an additional barrel of scarcity, prices can explode.

If traders believe that lost Gulf production can be partially compensated through strategic reserves, alternative pipelines, lower demand and additional production, the psychological effect is considerably weaker.

The battle therefore becomes not only a military contest over the waterway.

It becomes a contest over market expectations.

Additional American and Venezuelan Production Matters

Additional production from the United States and Venezuela would further complicate Iran's calculation.

An increase of approximately 500,000 barrels per day may appear modest compared with the 20 million barrels normally associated with Hormuz.

But in a severely constrained market, marginal barrels can have disproportionate strategic value.

Oil markets do not respond simply to absolute supply.

They respond to expectations about whether supply will be sufficient tomorrow, next week and next month.

If additional American and Venezuelan production is combined with Gulf alternative routes, Chinese inventory releases and reduced demand, the effective supply shock created by a partially closed Hormuz could become significantly smaller than the headline numbers initially suggest.

This would make it harder for Tehran to achieve the economic shock required to force Washington into rapid concessions.

The Real Weapon Would Be Time

This is where the strategic equation becomes particularly interesting.

Iran's ability to use Hormuz as leverage depends on the assumption that the United States and global markets cannot tolerate prolonged disruption.

But if Washington can maintain even a substantial fraction of normal flows, while alternative routes and strategic reserves compensate for the remainder, the United States gains something extremely valuable:

time.

Time changes the bargaining relationship.

Iran could potentially disrupt shipping.

But maintaining a blockade indefinitely would impose enormous costs on Iran itself.

The Iranian economy depends heavily on energy exports and access to international markets. A prolonged disruption would therefore create a paradox: the more aggressively Tehran closes the strait, the more pressure it places on its own economy.

The United States, by contrast, has greater capacity to absorb prolonged economic and logistical pressure.

This asymmetry could eventually become the foundation of a coercive strategy.

Hormuz Is Not Just a Strait—It Is a Bargaining Instrument

Iran's strategic value in Hormuz comes from geography.

The Strait is narrow, heavily trafficked and essential to the export economies of several Gulf states.

But geography only becomes decisive when the actor controlling the chokepoint can impose costs that its opponent cannot tolerate.

That is why alternative infrastructure matters so much.

The UAE's Fujairah route, Saudi Arabia's Red Sea infrastructure and other potential logistical alternatives effectively reduce the number of barrels that Iran can hold hostage.

Every barrel that can reach global markets without passing through Hormuz weakens Tehran's leverage.

Every barrel that can be replaced from strategic reserves buys policymakers additional time.

Every barrel of additional production reduces the size of the supply deficit.

And every barrel of consumption that disappears reduces the pressure further.

Individually, none of these mechanisms solves the problem.

Together, they could transform it.

The United States Would Need to Think in Terms of a “Minimum Viable Flow”

The critical strategic threshold would therefore not necessarily be restoring the normal 20 million barrels per day.

It could be establishing a minimum viable flow sufficient to prevent a global energy panic.

If 10 million barrels per day could reliably transit Hormuz under sufficiently secure conditions, while another several million barrels are supplied through alternative pipelines, strategic stockpiles and additional production, the market might be able to absorb the remaining deficit.

The exact threshold would depend on global demand, inventories, spare production capacity, shipping availability, insurance costs and the duration of the disruption.

But the broader strategic concept is sound:

Washington does not necessarily need to reopen Hormuz completely to defeat the economic purpose of an Iranian blockade. It may only need to keep enough oil moving to prevent the blockade from becoming economically decisive.

That is a very different objective.

The Nightly Corridor Concept

A particularly important possibility would be establishing predictable windows during which commercial shipping could transit the strait.

If 10 million or more barrels per day could be moved through protected corridors during repeated transit periods, the United States and its partners could begin creating a new normal.

The objective would be to demonstrate that Iran can disrupt shipping but cannot permanently prevent it.

That distinction could become politically devastating for Tehran.

A successful Iranian blockade would require sustained denial.

A partially successful U.S.-led corridor would demonstrate the opposite: Iran can impose costs, but it cannot dictate the flow of global energy.

The longer that pattern continued, the weaker Iran's bargaining position could become.

But the Military Problem Would Remain Extremely Difficult

This scenario should not be mistaken for an easy military solution.

Keeping Hormuz open under hostile conditions would be extraordinarily complicated.

The United States and its partners would have to contend with missiles, drones, mines, fast attack craft, electronic warfare, cyber operations and potentially attacks against commercial vessels and infrastructure.

The objective would therefore require far more than naval escorts.

It would require layered air and missile defense, persistent surveillance, mine-countermeasure capabilities, electronic warfare, intelligence integration and protection of ports and offshore infrastructure.

The United States would also need to distinguish between maintaining commercial access and initiating a much larger regional war.

That distinction could become increasingly difficult if Iran attempted to escalate against U.S. bases, Gulf infrastructure or commercial shipping outside the immediate strait.

The Gulf States Would Become Central Players

This would not be an American operation alone.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE would become central to the economic strategy because their alternative export routes reduce dependence on Hormuz.

For Riyadh, the ability to move crude toward Yanbu provides strategic insurance.

For Abu Dhabi, Fujairah provides an even more direct mechanism for bypassing the strait.

These routes would effectively transform Gulf geography.

Hormuz would remain enormously important, but it would no longer be the only door through which Gulf energy could reach the world.

That changes the strategic balance.

Iraq Would Face a More Complicated Strategic Environment

For Iraq, the consequences would be enormous.

Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Iraq remains heavily exposed to the security environment surrounding the Gulf and has significant energy infrastructure concentrated in the south.

Basra's oil exports are particularly important to Iraq's economy.

Any prolonged conflict around Hormuz would therefore create a direct Iraqi economic vulnerability even if Iraqi territory were not directly attacked.

Baghdad should consequently treat the Strait of Hormuz crisis as a national economic-security problem rather than simply an external military confrontation.

Iraq should immediately prioritize redundancy in export infrastructure.

The country needs multiple pathways through which its hydrocarbons can reach international markets.

That means strengthening southern export infrastructure while simultaneously developing and protecting alternative northern and western routes where politically and commercially feasible.

Iraq should also accelerate strategic storage capacity.

A country that produces millions of barrels of oil per day but lacks sufficient strategic flexibility in storage and transportation remains vulnerable to external chokepoints.

The lesson of Hormuz is clear:

Energy security requires redundancy.

Kurdistan Has a Role in Iraq's Energy Redundancy

The Kurdistan Region could become increasingly important in this environment.

Kurdistan's geographic position creates potential opportunities for northward energy transportation and regional connectivity.

But that opportunity requires Baghdad and Erbil to resolve their long-running disputes over oil exports, pipeline arrangements, revenue-sharing and constitutional authority.

The strategic environment is becoming too dangerous for Iraq to treat energy infrastructure as merely a political bargaining instrument.

If Hormuz becomes contested, every additional export route becomes more valuable.

For Baghdad and Erbil, therefore, energy cooperation should be treated as part of national security.

A functioning, predictable northern export corridor would not replace southern exports.

It would provide strategic redundancy.

That redundancy could become extremely valuable during a regional crisis.

Iraq Should Also Prepare for the Price Shock

There is another dimension Baghdad cannot ignore.

Even if sufficient oil reaches international markets, a Hormuz crisis could still generate a major increase in oil prices.

For Iraq, this creates a paradox.

Higher oil prices could increase government revenues.

But higher prices could also increase transportation costs, inflation and regional instability.

If conflict expands, Iraq could simultaneously benefit from higher crude prices and suffer from disruptions to investment, trade, aviation, electricity generation and regional commerce.

The Iraqi government should therefore establish a dedicated energy-crisis mechanism capable of monitoring:

• oil export volumes;

• global crude prices;

• domestic fuel consumption;

• strategic petroleum inventories;

• electricity-sector exposure;

• shipping insurance;

• pipeline availability;

• and the security of southern oil infrastructure.

The government should not wait for the market to become chaotic before beginning contingency planning.

Kurdistan Should Protect Its Energy Infrastructure Before the Crisis

For the Kurdistan Region, the lesson is even more immediate.

Oil and gas fields, pipelines, refineries, power stations and airports are increasingly vulnerable to drones and missile attacks.

The region should develop an integrated critical-infrastructure protection system combining radar, counter-drone technology, intelligence-sharing, physical security and rapid-response units.

Energy infrastructure should be treated as a strategic national asset.

The objective should be simple:

A regional conflict should not be allowed to turn Kurdistan's energy sector into an easy target.

This would also strengthen the region's position with international energy companies and investors.

Iran's Strategic Dilemma

The deeper problem for Tehran is that an extended blockade could eventually become self-defeating.

Iran could attempt to demonstrate that it possesses the ability to deny access to Hormuz.

But demonstrating capability is not the same as sustaining strategic leverage.

If the United States can maintain meaningful oil flows, alternative pipelines continue operating, China releases reserves, global consumption declines and additional production comes online, Iran's ability to impose economic pain gradually decreases.

At the same time, the costs of confrontation accumulate.

Iran would face pressure on exports, shipping, investment, currency stability and domestic economic activity.

The longer the confrontation continued, the more important the question would become:

Who can endure the economic war longer?

That is ultimately the central calculation.

The Endgame Would Be Political, Not Naval

The ultimate objective of keeping oil moving would not be to win a permanent naval contest in the Strait of Hormuz.

It would be to alter the political calculation in Tehran.

If Iran concludes that closing Hormuz does not produce the catastrophic global economic disruption necessary to force Washington to capitulate, the strategic value of the blockade declines.

That is when diplomacy becomes possible.

The United States could then offer Iran an off-ramp without appearing to have surrendered to economic coercion.

Tehran could claim that it had demonstrated its ability to disrupt regional commerce.

Washington could claim that the blockade failed to achieve its strategic objective.

The result could be a negotiated reopening of the strait without either side accepting total defeat.

That is how many strategic confrontations ultimately end—not with one side completely collapsing, but when the costs of continuing become greater than the expected benefits.

What Baghdad and Erbil Should Learn

For Iraq and Kurdistan, the larger lesson extends far beyond the current Hormuz crisis.

The Middle East is entering an era in which redundancy itself is becoming geopolitical power.

Countries that have multiple energy routes, multiple trading partners, diversified economies, resilient infrastructure and independent security capabilities will have greater freedom of action.

Countries dependent on a single port, pipeline, electricity source or geopolitical relationship will remain vulnerable.

Iraq and Kurdistan should therefore treat the Hormuz crisis as a strategic warning.

Baghdad should diversify export routes, strengthen strategic reserves, protect southern infrastructure and deepen economic-security planning.

Erbil should strengthen its energy infrastructure, protect its pipelines and fields, expand regional connectivity and use its geographic position to contribute to Iraq's broader energy resilience.

And both governments should recognize that the next great strategic competition may not be decided solely by tanks, missiles or warships.

It may be decided by who can keep energy, trade and finance moving when the region begins to fracture.

The Real Meaning of a 10 Million Barrel Flow

If the United States and its partners could reliably maintain approximately 10 million barrels per day through the Strait of Hormuz, while alternative Gulf pipelines, strategic reserves, lower Chinese demand and additional global production continued compensating for the lost volumes, the strategic balance could shift substantially.

Iran would still possess the ability to disrupt.

But disruption would no longer necessarily equal victory.

And that is the crucial distinction.

A chokepoint becomes a powerful weapon when the world has no alternative.

The strategic objective of Washington and its partners would therefore be to create alternatives faster than Iran can eliminate them.

For Iraq and Kurdistan, the lesson is equally clear.

Do not build national strategy around the assumption that critical infrastructure will always remain open. Build a system capable of surviving when it does not.

The Strait of Hormuz may remain one of the world's most dangerous geopolitical pressure points.

But its power ultimately depends on how much of the global economy remains dependent on it.

The future of energy security will therefore belong not to those who control a single chokepoint—but to those capable of creating enough alternatives that no single chokepoint can determine the outcome.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent geopolitical and policy analysis platform focused on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, energy, security and Middle Eastern geopolitics. He holds a PhD from Brunel University London and has extensive experience in international relations, research and geopolitical analysis.

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