By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

The possibility of a third round in the US-Israel-Iran war is becoming increasingly difficult to dismiss.

It is not inevitable, and the diplomatic space for de-escalation remains open. But the signals emerging from Tehran, Washington and several key Gulf states are increasingly concerning. Taken together, they suggest that the current conflict may not be moving toward a clean conclusion. Instead, both sides appear to be preparing for another phase in which the question is no longer simply how to end the war, but who will determine its next stage.

My assessment is increasingly pessimistic: a third round is becoming a serious possibility.

The most important change is taking place in Tehran.

Iran Is No Longer Talking Only About Survival

Iran increasingly appears to believe that it has gained enough military leverage to move from a defensive posture toward a more offensive strategy.

That distinction is critical.

At the beginning of a conflict, a state under attack is primarily concerned with absorbing strikes, preserving its command structure and demonstrating that it can retaliate. But once the leadership believes it has survived the initial assault, the strategic calculation changes.

Iran can begin asking a different question: How can we shape the next phase rather than simply respond to it?

This appears to be increasingly reflected in Iranian rhetoric.

Tehran is openly discussing the possibility of taking the initiative rather than merely answering American and Israeli attacks. If that thinking translates into military action, Iran could attempt to seize greater control over the scope and geography of the conflict.

More importantly, it could attempt to influence its timing.

That would represent a significant strategic shift.

For Washington, one of the most important advantages in any major military confrontation is the ability to decide when and where escalation occurs. If Tehran can force the United States to respond to Iranian initiatives, rather than the other way around, that advantage begins to disappear.

Iran would not necessarily need to defeat the United States militarily.

It would only need to make Washington increasingly reactive.

The Geography of the War Is Expanding

This is where the Gulf becomes particularly important.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most strategically sensitive pressure points in the entire conflict. Any serious disruption to shipping through the waterway would immediately transform the war from a confrontation between Iran, Israel and the United States into a global economic crisis.

Trump's increasingly aggressive rhetoric toward the Strait reflects precisely how central this issue has become.

But there is an obvious contradiction.

Threatening to seize or "annex" a strategic waterway does not automatically provide the United States with the ability to reopen it. Military control, maritime security and freedom of navigation are entirely different questions.

Iran understands this distinction.

If Tehran can threaten the Strait without completely closing it, it can create enormous pressure on global markets while retaining strategic ambiguity. It can raise insurance costs, disrupt shipping expectations and force Washington to dedicate substantial military resources to maritime security.

That is a form of leverage even without a formal blockade.

Why Oman Matters

The situation surrounding Oman is even more revealing.

Muscat has traditionally served as one of the most important channels between Washington and Tehran. Its role has been especially valuable because it can communicate with both sides without formally becoming a party to the conflict.

That makes Oman's position strategically unique.

Yet Trump's increasingly hostile rhetoric toward Muscat creates a remarkable contradiction: the United States risks threatening one of the very actors that has helped preserve diplomatic communication.

The problem becomes even more serious if Oman's mediation proposals increasingly reflect the American position.

At that point, Muscat is no longer simply mediating between two sides. It is effectively carrying one side's negotiating position into the other camp.

That can make Oman more useful diplomatically—but also more vulnerable politically.

The irony is difficult to miss.

A mediator becomes essential precisely because communication between the combatants has deteriorated. Threatening that mediator therefore risks damaging one of the few remaining channels capable of preventing another escalation.

Trump Is Facing a Different Strategic Problem

The American side also appears to be experiencing growing frustration.

Trump's instinctive preference for pressure and decisive outcomes creates a difficult problem when dealing with Iran.

Washington may be able to impose enormous military costs on Tehran, but that does not necessarily translate into political capitulation.

Iran's leadership has demonstrated that it is prepared to absorb punishment while preserving its core political and military structures. If Tehran concludes that the United States cannot force an acceptable political outcome without escalating dramatically, it has an incentive to continue resisting.

This creates an escalation trap.

Washington increases pressure because Iran has not surrendered.

Iran escalates because Washington has increased pressure.

Washington then responds to the Iranian escalation.

The result is a cycle in which both sides can claim that they are responding defensively while simultaneously pushing the conflict toward another round.

That is how wars expand without either side formally deciding to start a new war.

The Pakistan-Saudi-Turkey Dimension

Another development deserves attention: Trump's formal endorsement of the Pakistan-Saudi-Turkey defense pact.

The emergence of a stronger security relationship among Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could significantly alter the strategic environment surrounding Iran.

For Tehran, this is not simply a diplomatic development.

Pakistan brings military depth and a nuclear-armed state into the equation. Saudi Arabia brings financial power, geographic proximity and strategic importance in the Gulf. Turkey brings NATO membership, a substantial military capability and influence stretching from Iraq and Syria to the wider Middle East.

The three states do not share identical interests, and their cooperation should not be interpreted as the creation of a unified anti-Iranian military bloc.

But the perception matters.

Iran is increasingly confronting a regional environment in which multiple states are strengthening security relationships with one another while maintaining close ties with Washington.

That can encourage Tehran to act before the regional balance shifts further against it.

And that is precisely what makes the coming weeks potentially dangerous.

Iran Is Also Reshuffling Its Leadership

The reshuffling of senior Iranian leadership under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei adds another layer of uncertainty.

Leadership changes during wartime are rarely insignificant.

They can reflect an attempt to consolidate command, remove officials considered insufficiently effective, reorganize decision-making or prepare the state for a different phase of conflict.

It would be premature to conclude that the reshuffle proves Iran is preparing for another offensive.

But it is another indicator that Tehran is not behaving as though the war is simply winding down.

Instead, Iran appears to be adapting.

The question is what it is adapting for.

If the answer is another round of confrontation, then the leadership changes could be part of a broader effort to ensure that the political and military system is better prepared for sustained conflict.

The Gulf States Are Watching Carefully

The position of the Gulf states may ultimately prove decisive.

Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates all have different relationships with Washington and Tehran, but none has an interest in seeing the war spiral uncontrollably.

The Gulf's primary concern is not ideological victory.

It is stability.

A prolonged US-Israel-Iran confrontation threatens energy infrastructure, shipping, investment, tourism and economic diversification projects across the region. Even states that strongly support Washington have an interest in preventing the conflict from becoming a permanent regional war.

This explains why Gulf diplomacy is becoming increasingly important.

The Gulf states are simultaneously trying to protect themselves from Iranian retaliation, maintain their strategic relationships with Washington and prevent the region from being transformed into another permanent battlefield.

That balancing act becomes much harder if Iran decides to move onto the offensive.

The Real Question: Who Controls Escalation?

The central issue now is not simply whether another round will happen.

It is who will control escalation if it does.

Washington wants to preserve its ability to determine the tempo of the conflict.

Tehran increasingly appears determined to prevent that.

If Iran can launch attacks that force Washington to react, threaten critical maritime routes, activate regional partners and create political pressure on US allies, then Tehran can partially determine the rhythm of the war.

That does not mean Iran has achieved military superiority.

It means something more subtle: Iran may be trying to acquire escalation dominance.

The United States has vastly greater conventional military capabilities. But wars are not won through capabilities alone. Geography, political tolerance, alliance cohesion, economic resilience and the ability to impose costs all matter.

Iran's strategy may therefore be to make American power increasingly expensive to use.

Why a Third Round Is Possible

There are several reasons why the next phase could become a third round rather than simply an extension of the existing conflict.

First, Tehran increasingly appears confident that it has survived the initial pressure and can impose costs of its own.

Second, Washington appears increasingly frustrated that military pressure has not produced a definitive political outcome.

Third, the geography of the confrontation is expanding toward the Gulf and potentially beyond.

Fourth, regional security alignments are changing, particularly with deeper cooperation among Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Fifth, Iran is reorganizing elements of its leadership while preparing for what could become a prolonged confrontation.

And finally, diplomatic channels remain fragile.

This combination is dangerous because none of these developments alone guarantees another war.

Together, however, they create the conditions under which another escalation can become increasingly difficult to prevent.

The Diplomatic Window Is Still Open

None of this means a third round is inevitable.

In fact, the same developments that make escalation possible also create incentives for diplomacy.

Iran has an interest in preserving its state and military infrastructure. The United States has an interest in avoiding an open-ended regional war. Israel has an interest in reducing the long-term threat posed by Iran. Gulf states want stability. Oman wants to preserve its diplomatic role.

Every major actor therefore has something to lose from uncontrolled escalation.

The problem is that strategic interests do not always produce strategic restraint.

Miscalculation can do the opposite.

A missile strike that kills the wrong person, an attack on a Gulf facility, a confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz or a breakdown in backchannel negotiations could rapidly eliminate the political space that currently exists.

The most dangerous wars are often not those that leaders consciously choose.

They are the wars that become difficult to stop once the first escalation has already occurred.

The Next Phase Will Be About Initiative

The emerging contest between Washington and Tehran is increasingly a contest over initiative.

Iran wants to prove that it can dictate the timing and geography of escalation.

The United States wants to demonstrate that overwhelming military power still determines the boundaries of the conflict.

Israel wants to prevent Iran from rebuilding its strategic capabilities.

The Gulf states want to ensure that none of these objectives destroys the regional order they are trying to build.

And Oman is attempting to keep a diplomatic bridge standing while the foundations beneath it become increasingly unstable.

That is why I am increasingly convinced that a third round is a serious possibility.

Not because another war is inevitable.

But because too many actors are now preparing for what happens if the current war does not end on the terms they want.

The coming days and weeks will therefore matter enormously.

If Tehran continues moving toward an offensive posture, if Washington continues escalating its rhetoric and military pressure, and if the diplomatic channels represented by Oman become weaker rather than stronger, the space between one round of war and the next could become dangerously narrow.

The question may soon no longer be whether there will be a third round. It may be who fires the first shot—and who controls what comes after it.

Further Reading: Why the Military Balance Still Favors Washington: US Not Losing to Iran — Kurdish Policy Analysis. Read the full analysis

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, where he writes on Kurdish politics, Iraq, Iran, regional security, geopolitics and energy. He holds a PhD in English Literature from Brunel University London and has extensive experience in international relations, political analysis, interpretation and higher education.