Gulf states hold sharply different views on the future of the US-Iran conflict, balancing security concerns, economic interests, diplomacy, and regional stability.

The Gulf countries do not view the future of the US-Iran conflict through a single strategic lens. While they share concerns about regional instability, missile attacks, maritime security, and the potential disruption of energy exports, their national interests have produced increasingly divergent approaches. The prospect of a prolonged confrontation between Washington and Tehran therefore presents the Gulf Cooperation Council with a fundamental dilemma: how to preserve the American security umbrella while avoiding becoming the battlefield of an escalating regional war.

Saudi Arabia's position is shaped by its role as the Gulf's largest political and military power. Riyadh remains deeply concerned about Iran's regional influence and missile capabilities, yet it also has strong incentives to prevent another direct regional confrontation. Economic transformation and long-term development require stability, foreign investment, and secure energy markets. Saudi Arabia is therefore likely to support American deterrence against Iran while simultaneously resisting any escalation that could expose its territory and critical infrastructure to retaliation.

The United Arab Emirates faces a similar but more commercially driven calculation. Abu Dhabi seeks to maintain close security ties with Washington while preserving economic and diplomatic channels with Tehran. For the UAE, a major conflict threatens not only regional security but also trade routes, financial markets, and its position as a global commercial hub. Its preferred outcome is likely to be a managed balance of power rather than either Iranian regional dominance or an unlimited military campaign.

Qatar represents a different strategic model. Its foreign policy has traditionally emphasized mediation and maintaining communication with competing powers. Doha's relations with Washington coexist with pragmatic engagement with Tehran, particularly because of shared interests connected to the world's largest gas field. Qatar therefore has strong incentives to position itself as a diplomatic intermediary if the conflict intensifies.

Oman is perhaps the Gulf state's most consistent advocate of de-escalation. Its long history of quiet diplomacy between Iran and Western powers makes Muscat particularly important during periods when formal negotiations collapse. Kuwait and Bahrain, meanwhile, face different constraints, with Bahrain's security relationship with the United States and its domestic sensitivities producing a more confrontational perception of Iranian influence.

The central strategic reality is that the Gulf is no longer simply divided between pro-American and pro-Iranian camps. Instead, Gulf governments are pursuing increasingly sophisticated hedging strategies. They want American protection without becoming operational platforms for an American war. They want deterrence against Iran without triggering Iranian retaliation. And they want diplomacy to succeed without appearing strategically vulnerable.

The future of the US-Iran conflict will therefore test Gulf unity as much as Iranian-American relations. If escalation accelerates, the GCC may discover that its greatest vulnerability is not a lack of military capability, but the absence of a common political vision for what regional security should look like after the conflict ends.

The conflict between the United States and Iran has become one of the main sources of unrest in the Middle East over the past few decades. The tensions and confrontations between the United States, Israel and Iran in March 2026, known as continuous air, missile and cyber attacks, showed that this conflict does not remain only within the borders of these three sides, but also puts the entire Gulf countries. Although memoranda of understanding (MOUs) were signed between Washington and Tehran in Pakistan and later in Geneva, these agreements failed to change the basis of the strategic conflict. Therefore, each Gulf country has a different strategy to deal with the future of this conflict according to its national interests and security.

On the eve of these confrontations, Iran in response to US and Israeli attacks, in addition to targeting Israeli areas, directed some military and security actions against the Gulf countries; These include closing the Strait of Hormuz, missile and drone attacks near US military bases in the region, cyber attacks on financial and energy institutions in some countries, and threats through regional allies to oil and gas pipelines. Although most of these attacks were countered by air defense systems with US assistance, they left a huge psychological and economic impact on the Gulf countries, especially in the energy and tourism markets and created anxiety among investors.

Saudi Arabia has tried to ease relations with Iran in recent years (adopting the Iranian Neighborhood Policy Initiative in 2022), but still sees Tehran as a strategic threat. Riyadh is well aware that any widespread war between the United States and Iran will be the first to suffer in the Gulf and its oil facilities. Saudi Arabia is therefore trying to strike a balance between maintaining its alliance with the United States and continuing dialogue with Tehran. Riyadh supports the presence of US forces, but at the same time opposes any protracted war that jeopardizes its Vision 2030 project and economic growth.

The UAE and Bahrain are more security and militarily tied to the United States than any other Gulf country. Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Navy and the UAE continues to cooperate closely with Washington in military and air force. In the tensions, the two countries saw themselves as direct targets of Iranian reactions because of the presence of US bases and forces on their territory. Missile and drone attacks, along with digital (cyber) attacks, have deepened those concerns. Therefore, the two countries are looking to strengthen the Gulf joint defense system and expand cooperation with the United States and their Western allies, while trying not to cut off economic ties with Iran completely.

Qatar, which hosts the largest US military base in the country, has been trying to maintain relations with Iran. The South/Pars South natural gas field sharing is an essential reason why Doha has always played the role of middleman. From Qatar’s perspective, a widespread war would seriously jeopardize not only regional security, but also the global gas market. Therefore, Qatar's strategy continues to revolve around diplomacy, mediation and keeping the channels of communication between Washington and Tehran open.

Oman has historically been known for its policy of neutrality and neutrality. Muscat has repeatedly hosted and facilitated talks between the United States and Iran and still views that role as important. Oman believes that there is no military solution to the conflict and that the escalation of attacks and reactions will only deepen the threats in the region. Therefore, he tries to keep a diplomatic door open, even if there are political changes in Washington or Tehran.

Analysis of the Gulf countries' positions shows that no country wants a widespread war between the United States and Iran. All of them, despite their differences, share the point that maintaining the security of energy transportation, the stability of the global market and the protection of their domestic economies are of utmost importance. But at the same time, many (especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain) constantly need the US security umbrella because they see Iran's missile, drone and network power as a threat in the region.

Finally, although the US-Iran MOU and diplomatic efforts can ease tensions to some extent, the risk of conflict will continue until the strategic triggers between the US and Iran, including regional hegemony, missile programs and Tehran's cooperation network, are resolved. The Gulf countries will continue to strive to strike a balance between two goals:

1. Maintaining a security alliance with the United States.

2. Preventing conflicts from spilling over into their countries.

Although this strategy is expected to continue now and in the future, any new tensions between Washington and Tehran could force the Gulf countries to take a tougher or clearer stance.

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a geopolitical analyst, researcher, and founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis. His work focuses on Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, Iran, regional security, energy geopolitics, and the evolving strategic landscape of the Middle East.

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