Any new military operation launched by the United States will not succeed unless the Iranian regime is overthrown in the process. Without the fall of the regime, Iran will celebrate a major American defeat, become the dominant power in the region, and the United States will be unable to return to its military bases or regain its previous political and economic weight in the area.
This is very clear and evident within the United States, which is currently in the third wave of preparations for a military operation and a larger war, being prepared with greater precision than before. It is one of the most complex decisions the United States will make since the 2003 invasion of Iraq — this is the third round of this conflict.
The 12-day war that Trump and Netanyahu launched against Iran was planned to last only 100 hours, enough time for the regime to fall and a new party to come to power that would hand everything over to the United States — including oil, the nuclear program, and loyalty to Trump — just as happened in Venezuela.
But what happened was the complete opposite. The 12-day war and the 39-day war failed to overthrow the regime. Instead, they brought to power a new, younger, and more hardline group than before, and further destabilized the international economy.
The reason for this is that Trump, under heavy pressure from Netanyahu and Mossad, started the operation from the end by assassinating Iran’s Supreme Leader and conducting airstrikes, believing this action would succeed without a major ground invasion. In reality, as American national security experts say, the operation should have begun with a prolonged economic blockade and continuous economic attrition, then transitioned to air and ground military operations through trained groups, culminating in the assassination of the Leader and the collapse of the exhausted regime.
Trump’s mistakes and the continuous brainwashing by Netanyahu turned the American decision for war into a personal, one-track decision without alternatives for the failed 100-hour plan. This created a disaster inside the United States because Trump’s decisions inherently conflict with the institutional nature on which the American state is built.
However, since the end of the 39-day war, the national security institutions forced Trump to submit to them, adhere to their preparations, and no longer act according to his own desires and political whims on the Iran file. America’s reputation is at stake, and it can no longer bear another futile humiliation. This correction happened through the institutions intervening to fix Trump’s decisions by implementing a major economic blockade on Iran and leaving the military bases and strategists to plan a safer exit from this major disaster in a more precise manner than the one Trump had drawn up.
Given Iran’s strength, stubbornness, and adherence to its own principles, values, and constants, no peaceful diplomatic solution appears on the horizon — unless a major power such as China or Russia decides to end this war and force Iran to make concessions.
This is naturally difficult to happen, because these powers know very well that using Iran to humiliate America’s global reputation and status and to exhaust its power is one of their most important goals in the project of breaking American unilateralism and hegemony in the international system that the United States promotes.
Someone might ask: Will the results of the Israeli elections affect the American decision to go to war against Iran if Netanyahu loses the election on 27/10/2026?
The direct answer: No, it will not affect it, because Netanyahu has largely succeeded in making this war America’s war — a war to restore America’s dignity and reputation and to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, the United States is going to this war whether Netanyahu is in power or not.
Someone else might ask: Will the results of the American midterm elections on 3/11/2026 affect Trump’s decision?
The direct answer: No, it will not affect it unless the Republican Party loses two-thirds of Congress, which is difficult to happen even though Trump’s popularity and reputation have been badly damaged after his failure in the war with Iran and the rise in energy prices in American and global markets following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
In conclusion, we are talking about a future war that is inevitable and from which there is no other escape. Some say it will not go beyond the second or third month of 2027; others say it will happen and end within this year. But what we know is that this war will not end as easily as some claim, especially if Iran manages to hold out longer, break America’s will, withstand the third round of American strikes, and retaliate against those who participate in attacking it. Therefore: this war will completely change the form of hegemony in the region and the balance of power.
In light of this geopolitical reshaping and restructuring that I am talking about, America and Iran must behave as states, and no side any longer has time for arbitrary decisions or wasting time and opportunities.
The region is entering a new project of a new century whose title is networks of transportation, gas, energy, investment in rare minerals, artificial intelligence, digitalization, and mutual dependence on each other’s economy and energy.
The coming war between America and Iran will not be merely a military war, but a multi-dimensional one in which economy, cyber, information, and economic and social impacts are intertwined. America will try, through tighter sanctions, cyber attacks, and cutting off Iran’s oil exports, to completely incapacitate the country’s economy before using ground forces.
In response, Iran will implement a strategy of “deep defense” and “multi-front retaliation.” This means attacking American and Israeli interests anywhere in the region, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Arab Gulf. Any major attack on Iran will lead to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz for a period, pushing oil prices to historic levels and throwing the global economy into a deep crisis.
In this situation, Israel plays the role of “inciter” and “executor,” but it cannot win the war alone. America will be forced to participate directly, because there is a risk that Iran could inflict major damage on Israel through its missiles and drones and change the balance of power in the Middle East.
China and Russia will not enter the war directly, but they will provide logistical, intelligence, and economic support to Iran. Their goal is to exhaust America and divert its attention from Ukraine and the South China Sea. The longer the war lasts, the greater the benefit for their “multipolar” project.
For Iraq, this war is both a great opportunity and a great danger at the same time. If Iraq cannot pursue an independent and intelligent policy, it will become the battlefield between the powers. The militias will also pressure to push the country into Iran’s camp.
In this phase, Iraq must draw three red lines:
First – not allow its territory to become a base for attacks against any side.
Second – preserve its economic relations with all parties (America, China, Iran, the Gulf).
Third – through active diplomacy, try to play a mediating role rather than remaining a mere spectator.
If the war drags on, the region will enter a new phase of a “great freeze,” in which countries will be forced to form new alliances. If Iraq is smart, it can use this phase to benefit from its geography, oil, and population and become a connecting point between East and West.
But if it continues with a policy of “waiting” and “choosing neutrality,” it will lose the opportunities and become a major victim of this historic transformation. The region no longer waits for a country that only watches events; either you participate in shaping the future, or the future will be shaped without you.
In the end, the America-Iran war is not merely the end of one phase, but the beginning of a new phase in which “soft power,” “economic power,” and “energy and information networks” replace pure military “hard power.” The countries that prepare themselves today will win tomorrow. Those who wait will remain on the sidelines.
The coming America-Iran war, if it starts, will most likely proceed in three stages:
First – a wide air and missile attack to destroy Iran’s air defenses, nuclear facilities, and command centers.
Second – an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian retaliatory attacks on American bases and its allies in the Gulf and Iraq.
Third – the possible entry of limited ground forces or support for internal groups to weaken the regime.
In this war, Iran will not rely only on its regular army. The “Axis of Resistance” network (Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, the Houthis, and Syrian groups) will become a main part of its defense and retaliation strategy. This means the war can easily expand and reach Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.
Economically, closing the Strait of Hormuz even for two weeks could push oil prices above $150 per barrel. This will have a direct impact on the economies of America, Europe, China, and India, and will lead to sharp inflation and social unrest in many countries.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain are in a very sensitive position. On one hand they want Iran weakened; on the other they fear their territory becoming a battlefield. Therefore they will try to maintain a balance: providing political and logistical support to America while avoiding direct military participation.
Turkey will play a different role. Ankara does not want Iran to completely collapse (because that would create a large vacuum on its borders), but at the same time it will benefit from a weakened Tehran to increase its influence in northern Syria and Iraq. Turkey will try to appear as a “mediating power.”
For Iraq, the most dangerous scenario is that the war leads to a return of internal conflict or a division of power among the factions. If the Iraqi government cannot control the militias and its territory, the country will become a direct battlefield between America and Iran.
In this phase, Iraq needs a policy of “active neutrality,” not just verbal neutrality. This means: not allowing any force to launch attacks from its territory against another side; maintaining strong diplomatic relations with all parties; and preparing for energy, food, and financial crises, because the war will directly affect Iraq’s oil revenues.
If the war lasts longer than three months, the possibility of major internal changes in Iran increases. Popular discontent and divisions within the ranks of power may emerge. But if the regime withstands the first wave of attacks, it will emerge stronger and impose the identity of “defender” on society.
In the end, this war is not merely a conflict between Washington and Tehran. It is a struggle over who will determine the future of the Middle East and the international system. The countries that are now preparing themselves for different scenarios will have more opportunities tomorrow. Those still busy with internal games and minor disputes will be the first victims of this historic transformation.
Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj, is the founder and editor of Kurdish Policy Analysis.
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