Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Kurdistan’s Baghdad turn signals a new phase of federal integration, security cooperation and economic interdependence after the coalition withdrawal.

The Kurdistan Region is entering a fundamentally different phase in its relationship with Baghdad. The end of the Global Coalition's military mission in Iraq on September 30, followed by President Nechirvan Barzani's appearance in Baghdad on October 1, has produced a powerful political signal: the future of Kurdistan's security, economy and political stability will increasingly be tied to the strength of the Iraqi state and the federal relationship between Erbil and Baghdad.

This does not mean that the longstanding disputes between the Kurdistan Region and the federal government have suddenly disappeared. Budget allocations, salaries, oil and gas, constitutional provisions, disputed territories and the distribution of political and security authority remain unresolved issues. What appears to be changing is the political environment in which these disputes will be negotiated.

For years, the Kurdistan Region's relationship with Baghdad was shaped by a combination of constitutional federalism, political confrontation and external security guarantees. The presence of the US-led coalition provided an additional layer of security, particularly after the rise of ISIS in 2014. With the coalition's mission now concluded, that external security framework has changed, requiring both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region to reconsider their relationship within a more explicitly Iraqi framework.

President Nechirvan Barzani's message in Baghdad was significant in this context. He argued that sovereignty is not simply the departure of foreign forces but the ability of the state to exercise constitutional authority, including over decisions of war and peace. He also called for the outstanding issues between Erbil and Baghdad to be resolved, beginning with the relationship between the two governments and the question of arms control.

This represents more than diplomatic language. It points toward a political recalibration in which the Kurdistan Region increasingly sees Baghdad not merely as a source of recurring disputes, but as part of its strategic depth.

Barzani made this point even more explicitly in September, describing the Kurdistan Region as an integral part of Iraq's federal structure and arguing that the security and stability of Iraq are inseparable from the security and stability of Kurdistan. He also warned against continuing to treat Erbil–Baghdad disputes through temporary annual arrangements rather than seeking durable constitutional solutions.

The logic of the emerging phase can therefore be summarised in four interconnected principles: one state, coordinated security, an increasingly integrated economic framework and a constitutional political order. This does not necessarily mean the disappearance of Kurdistan's federal autonomy. Rather, it suggests that Kurdish political actors may increasingly seek to protect that autonomy through stronger institutional integration with Baghdad rather than through political distance from it.

From security dependence to political integration

The security dimension is the most immediate driver of this transformation.

The coalition withdrawal removes a security umbrella that Kurdish forces have depended upon for years, particularly for intelligence, air power and counter-ISIS capabilities. The Peshmerga's formal unification on September 21 was therefore highly consequential, although significant questions remain about whether the two historically separate command structures can become fully integrated in practice.

Baghdad is simultaneously presenting the end of the coalition mission as the beginning of a new sovereignty phase. Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi has identified the coalition withdrawal, Peshmerga unification, regulation of weapons under state authority and the development of an Iraqi air-defence system as elements of this transition. This places the Kurdistan Region inside a broader Iraqi transformation.

The central question is no longer simply whether Baghdad and Erbil can coexist within the federal system. It is whether both can build institutions capable of functioning within that system without repeatedly returning to crisis. That distinction is critical. For Baghdad, stronger integration of the Kurdistan Region can reinforce the concept of a unified Iraqi state. For Erbil, a functioning federal relationship can provide more predictable access to constitutional rights, federal revenues, security cooperation and national institutions. The interests are not identical, but they are increasingly interdependent.

The economic bargain

The economic dimension may ultimately be even more important than the security dimension.

The Kurdistan Region's fiscal relationship with Baghdad has for years been characterised by recurring disputes over budget allocations, public-sector salaries, oil revenues and the constitutional status of energy management. These disputes have repeatedly demonstrated the limits of treating the federal and regional economies as separate political systems. The post-coalition environment could strengthen the argument for a more durable economic settlement.

A more stable relationship would potentially allow Baghdad and Erbil to move from annual bargaining toward institutionalised arrangements covering revenues, expenditure, energy exports, public-sector salaries and infrastructure investment. The objective would not necessarily be economic centralisation. It would be greater predictability within the federal system. This is where the idea of reconstruction and economic growth becomes relevant.

If the security environment remains stable and Erbil–Baghdad relations become more predictable, the Kurdistan Region could enter a period in which economic policy becomes less dominated by emergency fiscal disputes and more focused on infrastructure, investment, diversification and reconstruction.

That possibility should not be confused with a guaranteed period of prosperity. The region continues to face structural fiscal, institutional and political challenges. But the political conditions for longer-term economic planning could improve if the major disputes with Baghdad move from recurring confrontation toward durable agreements.

What happens to the two-administration question?

The most uncertain part of this transition concerns the internal political structure of the Kurdistan Region. It remains unclear whether deeper integration with Baghdad will occur through a more unified Kurdistan Regional Government or within a system in which Erbil and Sulaymaniyah retain significant political and administrative distinctions.

The PUK–KDP relationship remains central to this question. The history of the Kurdistan Region shows that political competition between the two major Kurdish parties has often translated into institutional fragmentation. Yet both parties also have a strong interest in preserving the political, economic and security gains accumulated by the Kurdistan Region. This creates an important paradox.

The internal Kurdish political structure may remain divided, while the strategic direction of the region increasingly moves toward Baghdad.

In other words, two administrations and deeper federal integration are not necessarily mutually exclusive.The decisive question will be whether Kurdish political actors can maintain sufficient coordinati on on the issues that require a unified position toward Baghdad: constitutional rights, federal revenues, security, energy, disputed territories and foreign relations.

The Barrack framework and the new Iraqi equation

The emerging direction also corresponds with the broader US effort to redefine its relationship with Iraq. US Special Presidential Envoy Tom Barrack has engaged both Baghdad and Erbil on the future of US–Iraq relations, including state control over arms and the development of a more durable economic partnership. In June, Barrack and Nechirvan Barzani discussed US–Iraq relations, the Kurdistan Region and the need to resolve outstanding Erbil–Baghdad issues within the constitutional framework.

It would therefore be too simplistic to describe the emerging approach as merely a withdrawal of American involvement. The deeper transformation is from an Iraq whose security architecture depended heavily on international military presence toward an Iraq expected to assume greater responsibility for its own security, sovereignty and political order. That transformation inevitably affects Kurdistan.

The phrase “one state, one security system, one economy and one political decision” captures the direction of travel, but not necessarily the final institutional outcome. Iraq remains a federal state, and the Kurdistan Region's constitutional position remains an essential part of that federal arrangement. The challenge is therefore to reconcile state unity with federal autonomy.

The end of the withdrawal question

For the Kurdistan Region, one of the most important consequences of this new phase may be psychological as much as institutional.

For years, the possibility of Baghdad–Erbil confrontation, fiscal pressure or political separation has existed alongside the assumption that external actors would remain important security guarantors. The coalition's departure changes that calculation.

The Region can no longer build its long-term strategy around the expectation that an external military presence will indefinitely compensate for unresolved internal and federal institutional problems. The alternative is not necessarily isolation. It is integration on negotiated terms.

This explains the significance of Nechirvan Barzani standing in Baghdad on Iraq's Sovereignty Day and explicitly defining Kurdistan's future through the federal constitution and Iraqi state institutions. His message was not that Kurdish autonomy had ended. It was that Kurdish security and prosperity should increasingly be secured through a functioning Iraqi federal state. That is a significant strategic adjustment.

A new phase for Kurdistan

The Kurdistan Region's future may therefore be less about choosing between Erbil and Baghdad than about redefining the relationship between them.

The next phase will test whether Baghdad can provide the constitutional, financial and security guarantees required by the federal system, and whether Kurdish political actors can maintain sufficient unity to negotiate those guarantees effectively. If both sides succeed, the result could be a transition from recurring crisis management toward longer-term institutionalisation. If they fail, the same unresolved disputes could simply reappear under a new security environment. The opportunity, however, is real. 

The withdrawal of the coalition has closed one chapter of Iraq's post-2003 history. It has also created pressure for Baghdad and Kurdistan to assume greater responsibility for their own political and security arrangements. The Peshmerga's unification, the renewed emphasis on state authority and Nechirvan Barzani's call for constitutional solutions all point toward a more integrated Iraqi political order.

Whether Kurdistan enters that order as a unified regional government or continues to contain substantial Erbil–Sulaymaniyah institutional differences remains uncertain. But the strategic direction is becoming clearer.

Kurdistan's future is increasingly being negotiated not outside Iraq, but through its relationship with Iraq.

The coming years will therefore be defined less by the question of whether Kurdistan belongs within the Iraqi state and more by a much more consequential question: what kind of federal Iraq can protect Kurdistan's constitutional position while giving Baghdad the institutional authority required to govern a sovereign state?

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj Mohammed is the Founder and Researcher of Kurdish Policy Analysis, an independent platform focused on Kurdistan, Iraq and Middle East geopolitics. He holds a PhD in English Literature from Brunel University London and has extensive experience in policy analysis, international relations, research and political affairs.