About the Peshmerga unification: How Can We Have an Army?

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj How can Kurdish society build a modern army while balancing history, politics, technology, civil authority, and the Peshmerga's legacy? This may appear to be a straightforward institutional question, but it is not. The question of how to create an army in the Kurdistan Region is ultimately a question about political authority, social organization, historical experience, technology, and the relationship between the state and the forces that defend it. At the most basic level, there are two ways of thinking about this problem. We might call them thin theories and deep theories. Thin theory assumes that institutions can be separated from the societies that produce them. Under this approach, armies are broadly comparable institutions that can be constructed according to common models in different places. The assumption is that what works in one environment can, with sufficient administrative effort, be reproduced somewhere else. A similar logic is particularly domina...

Can Hamas be disarmed? the real challenge facing Gaza's post-war future



 By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Hamas' offer to relinquish governance raises a far more difficult question: can the organization surrender its military power, or will Gaza repeat Lebanon's Hezbollah model?

Can Hamas truly be disarmed? Gaza's future depends not only on new governance but on whether armed groups relinquish military power after decades of conflict.

Governance Is Easier Than Disarmament

Hamas' announcement that it may step away from administering Gaza has generated cautious optimism among diplomats seeking to stabilize the territory after years of devastating conflict.

However, surrendering administrative authority is fundamentally different from surrendering military capability.

History demonstrates that armed organizations frequently retain their weapons even after relinquishing formal political responsibilities. Consequently, the central challenge for Gaza is no longer simply who governs—but who controls force.

The Missing Piece of Every Peace Plan

The current international framework envisions several interconnected objectives:

  • A technocratic civilian administration
  • Reconstruction of Gaza
  • International security assistance
  • Humanitarian recovery
  • Hamas' disarmament

Among these, disarmament remains the most difficult.

Without a monopoly on force by legitimate state institutions, any civilian government risks becoming symbolic rather than sovereign.



Lessons From Other Conflicts

History offers mixed precedents.

Northern Ireland demonstrated that political agreements can gradually replace armed struggle through negotiated disarmament and power-sharing.

Conversely:

  • Hezbollah retained its weapons after Lebanon's civil war.
  • Colombia's FARC experienced an uneven demobilization.
  • The PKK remains active despite repeated peace initiatives.
  • Criminal organizations in Latin America have often survived political transitions because they retained coercive power.

These cases illustrate a common lesson: institutions cannot function effectively while parallel armed structures remain intact.

Why Gaza Is Different

Unlike many previous counterinsurgency campaigns, Gaza presents unique operational constraints.

Dense urban terrain, humanitarian concerns, and the continued presence of civilians complicate military operations.

The post-war environment therefore depends on creating credible civilian alternatives alongside security arrangements capable of preventing renewed militarization.

Strategic Implications

The debate surrounding Hamas increasingly concerns three interconnected questions:

  • Can governance be separated from military power?
  • Who guarantees security during transition?
  • Can reconstruction succeed while armed organizations remain intact?

The answers will determine whether Gaza enters a period of recovery or remains vulnerable to renewed cycles of violence.

Conclusion

The future of Gaza ultimately depends less on declarations than on implementation.

Political transition requires institutions.

Long-term stability requires security.

Neither can succeed if armed organizations continue exercising independent military authority alongside civilian governance.

#Hamas #Gaza #Israel #MiddleEast #Security #Counterterrorism #PeaceProcess #Geopolitics #WarAnalysis #KurdishPolicyAnalysis


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