Kurdish Language, Soft Power and Beijing’s Growing Interest in the Kurdistan Region

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

China's plan for Kurdish language teaching in Beijing highlights its growing soft power, economic interests and strategic engagement with Iraq's Kurdistan Region.

The opening of a Kurdish language teaching department in Beijing represents something considerably larger than an academic exchange between two universities. It is another sign that China’s relationship with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is moving beyond trade, oil and infrastructure and into the more strategic territory of culture, education, language and soft power. According to recent announcements, a university in Beijing is preparing to establish a Kurdish language department in cooperation with Salahaddin University-Erbil, complementing the Chinese-language department that Salahaddin University established in 2019. The development should be understood as part of a much longer process through which Beijing has gradually expanded its presence in the Kurdistan Region.

The symbolism is difficult to miss. For decades, Kurdish institutions have sought greater international recognition of Kurdish language, culture and history. Now one of the world's major powers is creating an institutional space for Kurdish language study inside China. That does not mean Beijing is changing its position on Kurdish political questions, nor does it indicate Chinese support for Kurdish independence. In fact, China's traditional policy of respecting territorial integrity and avoiding support for separatist movements makes such a conclusion highly unlikely. But it does demonstrate that Beijing increasingly sees Kurdish society, institutions and human capital as relevant to China's long-term engagement with Iraq and the wider Middle East.

The question, therefore, is not simply why China wants to teach Kurdish.

The more important question is why China is investing in relationships with Kurdish society at precisely the moment when Beijing's economic and geopolitical interests in Iraq are expanding.

From Chinese Language in Erbil to Kurdish Language in Beijing

The relationship has been developing for years.

In 2019, Salahaddin University-Erbil opened Iraq's first university department dedicated to Chinese language studies. The department was established as part of expanding educational and cultural ties between the Kurdistan Region and China.

The trajectory has now begun to move in the opposite direction.

Kurdish language instruction in China would create a two-way cultural relationship: students in Kurdistan learn Mandarin and Chinese culture, while students in China gain access to Kurdish language and society.

This is strategically significant.

Language is one of the most powerful instruments of long-term international influence because it creates networks that survive individual governments and political crises. Students who learn a foreign language often become translators, academics, diplomats, journalists, businesspeople, researchers and government officials. Over time, those networks create familiarity that cannot easily be produced through diplomatic meetings alone.

China appears to understand this very well.

The Chinese Consulate in Erbil has already supported educational and cultural engagement, while Chinese diplomats have participated in events at Salahaddin University. In February 2026, the Chinese Consulate reported that more than 140 students were enrolled across four academic years in the university's Chinese-language department.

What began as a language program is therefore becoming an institutional ecosystem.

And now Kurdish is potentially becoming part of that ecosystem in China.

Beijing's Soft-Power Strategy

China's growing presence in the Kurdistan Region cannot be understood only through the traditional language of investment.

Beijing's influence increasingly operates through what political scientists describe as soft power: the ability to shape preferences and perceptions through culture, education, economic attractiveness, institutional relationships and diplomacy rather than coercion.

China has several advantages in this regard. It can offer scholarships. It can invite politicians, academics and civil servants to China. It can provide technical training. It can facilitate business relationships. It can promote Chinese language education. It can organize cultural events. It can present its development model to foreign audiences. And it can combine these activities with commercial opportunities. This creates a powerful package.

A young Kurdish student who studies Mandarin in Erbil may later receive a scholarship to China. A university professor may participate in a Chinese exchange program. A government official may receive technical training in China. A Kurdish businessman may develop relationships with Chinese companies. A journalist may visit China. Over time, thousands of such individual interactions can produce a network of people with direct experience of Chinese institutions and society.

This is soft power in practice.

Research on China's engagement with the Kurdistan Region has already identified education, culture, training and relationships with political and economic elites as important components of Beijing's growing influence.

Why Kurdistan Matters to China

China does not view the Kurdistan Region in isolation.

The region occupies a strategically important position within Iraq and sits at the intersection of several important economic and geopolitical corridors. Iraq itself is extremely important to China's energy strategy. China identifies Iraq as a major economic partner and reported bilateral trade of more than $54 billion in 2024, while Iraq was China's third-largest source of crude oil imports that year.

The Kurdistan Region adds another dimension.

It possesses significant energy resources, an entrepreneurial private sector, strategic geography and relatively open economic links with foreign companies. Erbil is also an important diplomatic and commercial hub between Iraq, Turkey and the wider region.

For Beijing, the region offers economic opportunities without requiring China to become deeply involved in its most sensitive political disputes.

This explains an important characteristic of China's Kurdish policy.

China wants relationships with Kurdistan without necessarily taking sides on the Kurdish question. That distinction is fundamental.

China's "Decaf" Relationship With Kurdistan

China's engagement with the Kurdistan Region has been described by analysts as a deliberately limited or "decaf" relationship: active in trade, culture and education, but cautious regarding security, political recognition and sovereignty questions.

This approach makes sense from Beijing's perspective.

China has its own sensitivities concerning Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong and Xinjiang. It therefore has little interest in legitimizing political movements that could be interpreted as challenges to territorial integrity.

At the same time, Beijing does not need to reject cooperation with Kurdish institutions.

The result is a careful balancing act.

China can maintain relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government, interact with Kurdish political parties, invest in the region, operate a consulate in Erbil, support cultural programs and develop university partnerships while continuing to recognize Baghdad as the sovereign authority over Iraq.

This allows Beijing to gain economic and diplomatic benefits without making a political commitment to Kurdish nationalism.

The Kurdish language initiative fits perfectly within this framework.

Supporting Kurdish language education is not the same thing as supporting Kurdish independence.

But it does demonstrate that Beijing increasingly recognizes the importance of Kurdish society.

The Economic Dimension Is Becoming More Important

Culture may attract attention, but economics remains one of the foundations of China's engagement.

Chinese companies have become increasingly visible in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, particularly in energy, construction, infrastructure and telecommunications. The Chinese Consulate in Erbil said in August 2026 that discussions with the KRG Board of Investment focused on expanding investment and economic and trade cooperation, including infrastructure and telecommunications.

The KRG, meanwhile, has openly welcomed greater Chinese investment.

This is hardly surprising.

Kurdistan needs capital, infrastructure, technology, industrial development and diversification. China possesses enormous industrial capacity and can offer financing, construction expertise, technology and large-scale contracting capabilities.

For Beijing, the KRI offers another potential destination for Chinese companies seeking opportunities connected to the Belt and Road framework.

The relationship is therefore increasingly reciprocal.

Kurdistan wants investment and access to Asian markets.

China wants energy security, commercial opportunities, strategic access and deeper relationships across the Middle East.

Why Education Is Strategically Important

The most underestimated part of this relationship may be education.

Infrastructure can be built by one company and completed in a few years.

An educational relationship can last for generations.

A university partnership produces students, professors, researchers, translators and professionals who continue to interact with the partner country long after a specific infrastructure project has ended.

This makes the proposed Kurdish language program potentially more important than it initially appears.

Chinese students who study Kurdish may eventually become specialists on Kurdish politics, history, literature, economics and society.

Chinese researchers will have greater linguistic access to Kurdish sources.

Kurdish scholars will gain another institutional gateway into Chinese academia.

And Chinese diplomats and businesses will eventually have access to people who understand Kurdish society from the inside rather than exclusively through Arabic, English or Turkish-language sources.

For China, this is valuable knowledge infrastructure.

For Kurdistan, it is an opportunity to make Kurdish scholarship more internationally visible.

The Symbolism for the Kurdish Language

There is also a cultural dimension that should not be underestimated.

Kurdish is spoken by tens of millions of people across a region divided among several states, yet Kurdish scholarship remains comparatively underrepresented in major global academic institutions.

A Kurdish language department in China could therefore have symbolic importance beyond Sino-Kurdish relations.

It would tell Chinese students and scholars that Kurdish is not simply a regional vernacular.

It is a language worthy of systematic academic study.

That could eventually contribute to the development of Kurdish-language teaching materials, dictionaries, translation projects, academic exchanges and research on Kurdish literature and history.

The initiative also creates an opportunity for Kurdish institutions.

If properly managed, Salahaddin University and other Kurdish universities could use the partnership to internationalize Kurdish studies rather than merely provide language instruction.

That means developing joint research centers, translation projects, academic conferences, digital archives and comparative studies.

Kurdistan should not approach the initiative simply as a diplomatic gesture.

It should treat it as an academic opportunity.

China's Growing Political Network

China's influence in Kurdistan is not restricted to universities.

The Chinese Communist Party has developed relationships with Kurdish political parties, including training and exchange programs. The KDP's foreign relations office has described recurring delegations to China for training, exchanges and meetings with Chinese officials. The same source says more than 28 Chinese companies currently operate in the Kurdistan Region.

This matters because China's political model of international engagement differs significantly from that of many Western governments.

Beijing does not rely exclusively on state-to-state diplomacy.

It can cultivate relationships with political parties, universities, business communities, journalists, civil servants and cultural institutions simultaneously.

This creates a broad network of influence.

The strategy is patient.

China does not necessarily need an immediate political return from every relationship.

It can invest in familiarity today in anticipation of economic and geopolitical benefits tomorrow.

A Different Kind of Competition With the West

China's growing presence also has implications for the United States and Europe.

The Kurdistan Region has historically maintained particularly strong political, security and economic relationships with Western countries. The United States played a decisive role in the fight against ISIS, while European governments and organizations have invested heavily in humanitarian assistance, governance, education and civil society.

China is entering a space where Western influence already exists.

But it offers a different proposition.

Western engagement often emphasizes governance, democracy, human rights and institutional reform.

Chinese engagement tends to emphasize economic development, infrastructure, trade, technical expertise and state capacity.

For Kurdish political and economic elites, both models have attractions.

And that creates competition.

If Western institutions reduce their engagement while China continues expanding scholarships, exchanges, investment and cultural diplomacy, the relative balance of influence could gradually change.

This does not mean China will replace the United States in Kurdistan.

It is unlikely to.

The security relationship between Washington and the Kurdistan Region remains qualitatively different from China's economic and cultural engagement.

But influence does not need to be exclusive.

A region can have an American security relationship, European educational partnerships, Turkish economic links, Iranian cultural and political influence and an expanding Chinese commercial and educational presence simultaneously.

Kurdistan's foreign relations are becoming increasingly multipolar.

What Does China Want From Kurdistan?

There is no single answer. China's interests appear to include several overlapping objectives.

First, energy security. Iraq is an important oil supplier to China. Second, commercial opportunities. Chinese companies can participate in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications and construction. Third, Belt and Road connectivity. Iraq's geography makes it relevant to China's broader regional economic strategy.

Fourth, political relationships. Beijing benefits from maintaining relationships with influential actors across Iraq. Fifth, soft power. Education, culture and language create long-term familiarity with China. Sixth, strategic diversification. A deeper presence in Kurdistan gives Beijing additional relationships in a region historically dominated by Western and regional powers.

None of these objectives requires China to endorse Kurdish independence.

Indeed, China's strategy works precisely because it does not.

What Does Kurdistan Want From China?

The Kurdish side has its own strategic calculations.

The Kurdistan Region needs investment and economic diversification.

It needs access to Asian markets.

It needs educational opportunities for students.

It wants international partnerships that can reduce overdependence on any single external power.

And Kurdish leaders understand that China's position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council gives Beijing significant diplomatic weight.

For a region that has repeatedly experienced uncertainty in its relations with Baghdad and neighboring states, maintaining relationships with major global powers is strategically valuable.

The Kurdish language initiative can therefore be interpreted as part of a broader process of mutual accommodation.

China gains access and influence.

Kurdistan gains recognition, educational opportunities and another major international relationship.

But Soft Power Is Not Neutral

There is an important caution. Soft power is still power.

Cultural exchange is valuable, but governments use cultural diplomacy to advance national interests. Scholarships, university partnerships, media exchanges and training programs can create genuine mutual understanding, but they can also influence how societies perceive the sponsoring country.

Kurdish institutions should therefore welcome Chinese engagement while maintaining academic independence and institutional transparency.

The goal should not be to reject Chinese soft power.

Nor should it be to become dependent on it.

The goal should be to use international partnerships to strengthen Kurdish institutions while preserving intellectual pluralism.

That principle should apply equally to Chinese, American, European, Turkish, Iranian and other foreign partnerships.

A New Phase in China's Kurdish Strategy

The proposed Kurdish language department in Beijing may eventually prove to be one of the most symbolic developments in China's relationship with the Kurdistan Region.

The irony is striking.

For years, Kurdish institutions opened doors to foreign languages as a means of connecting Kurdistan with the world.

Now China is opening a door in the opposite direction.

Kurdish is traveling to Beijing.

That journey is not merely linguistic.

It represents the emergence of a relationship in which China increasingly wants to understand Kurdistan while Kurdistan increasingly wants to understand China.

The relationship is still unequal.

China possesses vastly greater economic, political and technological power, while the Kurdistan Region remains a sub-state entity whose foreign policy operates within the constitutional framework of Iraq.

But inequality does not eliminate strategic opportunity.

For Kurdistan, the challenge is to turn Chinese interest into tangible benefits: investment, technology transfer, scholarships, research partnerships, infrastructure, employment and access to Asian markets.

For China, the challenge will be to demonstrate that its engagement can produce genuine mutual benefit rather than simply expand Chinese commercial and political influence.

And for the United States and Europe, the lesson should be equally clear.

Kurdistan is no longer a peripheral space in the competition for international influence.

It is becoming part of a wider multipolar Middle East in which China, the United States, Europe, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf states all seek economic, political and cultural relationships.

The Kurdish language may be the latest instrument through which Beijing enters this competition.

But the deeper story is about something much larger.

China is not suddenly discovering Kurdistan.

It has been building relationships there for years.

The opening of a Kurdish language department in Beijing simply makes that strategy visible.

And if the relationship continues along its current trajectory, the next decade may see China become one of the most important external economic and cultural actors in the Kurdistan Region—not by replacing the West, but by adding another powerful pole to Kurdistan's increasingly multipolar foreign relations.

About the author: Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a Kurdish policy analyst and founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Kurdistan, Iraq, geopolitics, energy, security and international affairs.

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