Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Iran is beginning to articulate what could become a competing regional security architecture in response to the emergence of the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Mecca Pact. At the center of Tehran’s thinking is Iraq. On August 24, Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad Mohammad Sadegh Al-Kazem called for a proposed “2+6” framework bringing together Iran, Iraq and the six Gulf states across security, politics, economics and social cooperation. His proposal comes at a moment when Tehran is reassessing its regional position following the latest war and amid growing efforts by Arab and regional powers to construct security arrangements less dependent on Washington. The timing is significant: Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s newly appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has also signaled a broader transformation in Tehran’s post-war strategic thinking.

The “2+6” concept should therefore not be dismissed as another diplomatic slogan. It reflects an Iranian attempt to turn geography into strategy. Iraq occupies the space between Iran and the Arab Gulf, possesses deep economic and political ties with Tehran, and simultaneously maintains relations with the United States, Turkey and the Gulf monarchies. If Tehran could position Baghdad as the institutional bridge between Iran and the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, it would create a regional platform in which Iran could participate without accepting an architecture designed primarily around containing it.

This is precisely where the proposal collides with the logic of the Mecca Pact. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a mutual-defense agreement in August that has been widely interpreted as part of a broader effort by regional powers to hedge against strategic uncertainty and strengthen their own security capabilities. Although the agreement does not explicitly identify Iran as an adversary, Iranian officials have clearly interpreted it through that lens. Tehran's response is consequently moving beyond denunciation toward the construction of an alternative diplomatic framework.

Iraq is indispensable to that strategy because it is the one major Arab state that can plausibly speak simultaneously to Tehran and the Gulf. Baghdad has repeatedly attempted to position itself as a mediator between Iran and Arab states, while its economic relationship with Iran remains extensive. At the same time, Iraq cannot simply become an Iranian appendage. Its government must balance relations with Washington, Ankara, Riyadh and other Gulf capitals, making Baghdad both the greatest opportunity and the greatest uncertainty in Tehran’s proposed architecture.

The significance of the “2+6” proposal is therefore less about whether such an organization will formally emerge tomorrow and more about what it reveals about Iranian strategic priorities. Tehran appears to understand that its future influence cannot rely exclusively on armed partners, ideological networks or bilateral relationships. It increasingly needs an institutional and economic framework capable of integrating Iran into a regional order rather than leaving it isolated outside one.

That distinction matters. Iran's regional strategy has traditionally depended heavily on asymmetric power: missile capabilities, armed partners, intelligence networks and strategic relationships extending from Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and Yemen. But the current environment is forcing Tehran to think about security in broader terms. Rezaei's recent return to a senior national-security role, alongside his warnings that Iran is prepared to respond to economic pressure and threats to its regional interests, suggests that Tehran's post-war thinking combines deterrence with an effort to reshape the regional diplomatic environment.

The proposed “2+6” framework could serve precisely that purpose. Rather than confronting the Gulf states as a bloc, Tehran is offering a structure in which they would have a seat alongside Iran and Iraq. The language of economic and social cooperation is particularly important because it provides a softer entry point than an explicitly military alliance. Trade, energy, transportation, water, investment and border security could create the practical foundations for political and eventually security cooperation.

For Iraq, however, the proposal presents a complicated strategic dilemma. Baghdad could gain enormous diplomatic value by becoming the meeting point between Iran and the Gulf. An Iraqi government capable of hosting such a framework could transform the country's geography from a vulnerability into a strategic asset. Instead of being the battlefield where competing regional powers project influence, Iraq could attempt to become the institutional space where those powers negotiate their differences.

But this would require Baghdad to demonstrate considerably greater strategic autonomy than it has often been able to achieve. Iran has substantial political influence in Iraq, while the United States remains deeply relevant to Iraqi security and economic calculations. Turkey has major economic and security interests in northern Iraq, and Gulf states have expanded their economic engagement with Baghdad. Any Iraqi government that openly aligned the country with Tehran's proposed architecture would risk alienating other partners.

That is why the wording of the “2+6” concept matters. A framework encompassing all six Gulf states, Iraq and Iran would allow Baghdad to participate without formally choosing between Tehran and the Arab Gulf. It could also give Iran something it currently lacks: a diplomatic mechanism through which its security concerns could be discussed alongside those of its neighbors rather than being treated exclusively as a threat to them.

Yet there is a fundamental obstacle. The Gulf monarchies may be willing to engage Iran diplomatically without being willing to accept an Iranian-led security architecture. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has spent years building relationships with Iraq while simultaneously strengthening its own security partnerships with Turkey, Pakistan and the United States. The Mecca Pact demonstrates that Riyadh is pursuing strategic diversification rather than placing all of its security calculations in one basket.

This means Tehran's proposal may ultimately function less as an alternative to the Mecca Pact than as a competing layer of regional diplomacy. The Gulf states do not necessarily have to choose. They could maintain the Mecca framework for defense cooperation, their American security relationships for deterrence, economic ties with China and India, and simultaneously participate in an Iranian-backed regional dialogue through an eventual “2+6” mechanism.

If that happens, the Middle East could move toward overlapping security architectures rather than a single alliance system. Countries would participate in different institutions according to the issue: defense with one group, energy with another, trade with a third, and crisis management through another. This would resemble a regional balance-of-power system in which states hedge simultaneously rather than permanently aligning themselves with one bloc.

For Iran, Iraq would be the crucial hinge. Tehran does not need Iraq merely as an ally. It needs Iraq as a bridge.

That distinction could become one of the most consequential developments in the emerging regional order.

Iraq's importance also extends beyond diplomacy. The country is geographically positioned between the Gulf, Iran, Turkey and the Levant, while its energy infrastructure and transport corridors could connect markets across these competing strategic spaces. A functioning Iraqi economic corridor could provide Tehran with opportunities to participate in regional commerce even as sanctions and geopolitical pressure constrain its access to global markets.

This is why economic cooperation appears alongside security and politics in the Iranian proposal. Tehran understands that durable regional influence cannot be sustained through security relationships alone. If Iran can embed itself within trade, transportation, energy and investment networks connecting the Gulf and Iraq, it becomes more difficult for neighboring states to treat Iranian isolation as a viable long-term strategy.

But the strategy contains a paradox. The more Tehran seeks to make Iraq the bridge between Iran and the Gulf, the more important Iraqi sovereignty becomes. A successful Iraqi-mediated regional architecture would require Baghdad to be trusted by states that do not share the same political relationship with Iran. If Iraq is perceived merely as Tehran's instrument, the entire concept loses much of its value.

For Baghdad, therefore, the emerging competition between the Mecca Pact and Iran's “2+6” idea could represent a rare strategic opportunity. Iraq could seek to become the indispensable diplomatic connector between competing regional systems. That would require carefully calibrated neutrality—not neutrality between good and bad actors, but strategic flexibility between competing centers of power.

The Kurdistan Region also cannot be ignored in this equation. Any serious regional architecture involving Iraq's economy, energy, transportation and security environment will inevitably intersect with the Kurdistan Region's geographic position and external relationships. The Region sits at the intersection of Iraq, Iran and Turkey while maintaining extensive political and economic links with Western states. A broader Iraqi role as a regional connectivity hub will therefore have direct implications for Erbil as well as Baghdad.

Ultimately, the question is not whether Iran can persuade all six Gulf states to join a “2+6” security pact. That remains highly uncertain. The more important question is whether Tehran can convince its neighbors that the emerging regional order must include Iran rather than be constructed around Iran's exclusion.

That is a much more realistic objective.

The Mecca Pact represents one response to a changing Middle East: regional powers building collective capabilities because they are less confident that traditional security guarantees will remain sufficient. Iran's “2+6” proposal represents another: constructing an inclusive regional framework in which Tehran's geographical, economic and political weight becomes impossible to ignore.

Between these two approaches stands Iraq.

If Baghdad manages the competition intelligently, it could transform itself from the object of regional rivalry into the platform for regional diplomacy. If it fails, Iraq could once again become the arena in which competing security architectures collide.

The choice may ultimately determine whether Iraq becomes the Middle East's strategic crossroads—or its most vulnerable fault line.

Further Reading

For a broader analysis of Iraq's emerging role in regional competition and connectivity, see “The Kurds: The Connecting Link in the New U.S. Strategy for Iraq, Syria, and Turkey” on Kurdish Policy Analysis.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a Kurdish political and geopolitical analyst and the founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis. His research focuses on Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, Iran, regional security, geopolitics, energy and the evolving strategic order of the Middle East.