By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Ankara and Baghdad are moving from a relationship defined by disputes over sovereignty and security toward a strategic partnership built around trade, energy, water, and regional connectivity. But Iraq’s internal fragmentation—and the interests of Iran, the United States, and the Kurdistan Region—could determine how far that partnership can go.

Turkey and Iraq are no longer simply managing their disputes—they are building a new strategic partnership around security, energy, water and the Development Road. The Iran war has made Turkey even more important to Baghdad. But could Ankara's rise in Iraq come at the expense of Iran—and the Kurdistan Region?

For most of the post-2003 era, Turkey-Iraq relations were defined by contradiction. Economic ties expanded rapidly, yet political trust remained limited. Ankara viewed northern Iraq primarily through the security threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, while Baghdad repeatedly condemned Turkish military operations as violations of Iraqi sovereignty. At the same time, Turkey developed an unusually close economic and political relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government, creating another source of friction with successive governments in Baghdad. As my recent analysis of Turkey’s evolving relationship with the Kurdistan Region argues, however, Ankara increasingly sees northern Iraq not simply as a security frontier but as an economic corridor, energy partner, and strategic buffer. That equation is changing.

Over the past two years, Ankara and Baghdad have begun constructing something more consequential than another round of bilateral agreements. They are building the foundations of a relationship in which security, energy, water, transport, and geopolitics increasingly reinforce one another. The Development Road has provided the economic architecture, cooperation against the PKK has created a new security framework, and the disruption of traditional Gulf routes during the US-Iran war has dramatically increased Turkey’s strategic value to Iraq.

The emerging partnership does not mean Iraq is abandoning Iran or choosing Turkey over the United States. Baghdad remains committed to balancing among competing regional powers. But the balance itself is changing. Turkey is becoming increasingly indispensable to Iraq precisely because Ankara can offer something neither Washington nor Tehran can provide: a land bridge connecting Iraq’s Gulf access to European markets while simultaneously providing security cooperation, energy infrastructure, water expertise, and an alternative to dependence on vulnerable maritime routes. That makes the Turkey-Iraq relationship one of the most important geopolitical developments unfolding around Iraq today.

From Security Disputes to Strategic Cooperation

The most significant transformation has occurred in security. For years, Turkey's military presence in northern Iraq represented perhaps the greatest obstacle to deeper bilateral relations. Ankara argued that Baghdad was failing to prevent the PKK from operating from Iraqi territory, while Baghdad insisted that Turkish military operations violated Iraqi sovereignty.

The relationship began changing under former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. Baghdad increasingly moved toward Ankara's position on the PKK, including formally designating the organization as banned in 2024 and establishing new mechanisms for security coordination with Turkey.

The PKK's decision to dissolve and disarm in May 2025 potentially accelerated this process.

The disappearance of the PKK as an armed organization does not automatically resolve the security question. It creates new ones. What happens to former fighters? Who controls areas previously occupied by the organization? What happens in Sinjar and Makhmour? And who ultimately assumes responsibility for preventing armed Kurdish groups from using Iraqi territory against Turkey? These questions increasingly require Baghdad's direct involvement.

For Turkey, this is a major strategic opportunity. For years, Ankara had to deal with the PKK through unilateral military operations because it did not trust Baghdad to act. A stronger Iraqi state capable of managing armed groups inside its territory would allow Turkey to gradually convert a security problem into a state-to-state relationship.

This is precisely why the transformation in Ankara-Baghdad relations should not be understood simply as diplomatic rapprochement. It represents an attempt to institutionalize what was previously managed through military power.

The changing security equation also matters for the Kurdistan Region. As I argued in Turkey’s PKK Peace Process Has Reached Its Most Critical Moment, a durable reduction in Turkey-PKK conflict could have consequences far beyond southeastern Turkey, including greater security for northern Iraq, energy infrastructure, cross-border commerce, and the wider Turkey-Iraq economic relationship.

The Development Road Changes the Equation

If security cooperation is the political foundation of the new relationship, the Development Road is its economic engine. The proposed 1,200-kilometer corridor linking the Grand Faw Port in southern Iraq with Turkey and European markets could fundamentally alter Iraq's position in the regional economy. For Baghdad, the project offers the possibility of transforming Iraq from an oil-exporting state located between competing regional powers into a major logistics and transit hub. For Ankara, the logic is equally compelling.

Turkey has long sought to establish itself as the connective tissue between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The Development Road would reinforce this ambition by placing Turkey at the northern end of a major new corridor originating from the Gulf. The strategic implications go far beyond freight.

Infrastructure creates interdependence.

If Iraqi ports, railways, highways, Turkish logistics companies, European markets, and regional supply chains become connected through the same corridor, Ankara and Baghdad acquire a shared economic interest in maintaining political stability along the route.

That could fundamentally change the character of their relationship. The Development Road is therefore not simply an infrastructure project. It is potentially a mechanism for producing geopolitical alignment through economic dependence.

My recent analysis, Iraq’s $17 Billion Development Road Could Rise or Fall on Kurdistan, makes an important point: the Development Road cannot be understood simply as a railway connecting Faw to Turkey. Its success depends on geography, security, the Turkish gateway, and the political relationship between Baghdad and Erbil. That introduces a major strategic complication.

The project faces enormous obstacles. The cost of the first phase has been estimated at roughly $20 billion, while questions remain over financing, governance, security, transit revenues, customs, and the distribution of economic benefits. The involvement of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates indicates that the project has already acquired a wider regional dimension, but the financing architecture remains incomplete.

The war with Iran has nevertheless given the Development Road a new urgency. The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz demonstrated how vulnerable Iraq remains to developments beyond its borders. Iraq's dependence on Gulf maritime routes becomes a strategic liability when conflict threatens the world's most important energy chokepoint. The Development Road offers an alternative.

As I argued in Iraq’s $17 Billion Trade Corridor Could Redraw the Middle East, the strategic significance of the project has increased dramatically because the instability around Hormuz has transformed overland connectivity from a long-term economic ambition into a potential strategic necessity.

A functioning overland corridor from the Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to Europe would not eliminate Iraq's dependence on maritime trade, but it would provide something Baghdad has historically lacked: strategic redundancy. And strategic redundancy is becoming increasingly valuable in a Middle East defined by conflict.

Turkey's Leverage Over Iraq

The emerging partnership, however, is not an equal relationship. Turkey possesses significant structural advantages. Security is the clearest example. Ankara retains military forces inside Iraq and maintains considerable freedom of action against perceived threats. Baghdad's growing security cooperation with Turkey has not eliminated the fundamental asymmetry between the two states. Water represents an even deeper imbalance.

Iraq is downstream from Turkey on both the Tigris and Euphrates, while climate change, drought, population growth, inefficient irrigation, and deteriorating infrastructure have intensified Iraq's water crisis. Turkey's control over upstream infrastructure gives Ankara substantial leverage over one of Iraq's most strategically important resources. This creates an uncomfortable contradiction.

Baghdad increasingly needs Turkey for trade and infrastructure at precisely the moment when it also needs Turkey's cooperation on water. The emerging model of Turkish companies undertaking Iraqi water infrastructure projects in exchange for financing tied to Iraqi oil revenues may therefore deepen interdependence—but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying dispute over water flows. Indeed, it could create a new form of dependency.

Iraq could end up using oil revenues to finance infrastructure designed by a country that simultaneously controls much of the water on which Iraqi agriculture and communities depend. That is not necessarily a bad economic arrangement if properly structured. But politically, it gives Ankara significant bargaining power.

Energy: From Transit to Investment

Energy provides a more balanced foundation for the relationship. For decades, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has connected Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, providing Baghdad with an export route that bypasses the Gulf. Turkey benefits from Iraqi crude while reinforcing its ambition to become a regional energy hub. The relationship is now evolving beyond transit.

Turkish involvement in Iraqi oil production—particularly around Kirkuk—represents a qualitatively different form of engagement. Turkey is moving from being primarily a transit state to becoming a participant in Iraq's energy economy. That matters strategically.

A country that merely transports another state's oil has an economic interest in the relationship. A country that invests in producing that oil acquires a deeper stake in political stability, infrastructure security, contractual continuity, and long-term bilateral relations.

This is especially important given the unresolved history of the Iraq-Kurdistan-Turkey oil dispute. My analysis of Turkey’s $1.47 Billion Oil Defeat Reignites Iraq-Kurdistan Energy Battle examined how the international arbitration dispute over Kurdish oil exports exposed the legal and political risks embedded in the Ankara-Baghdad-Erbil energy triangle.

The lesson is significant. Energy cooperation can deepen strategic interdependence, but it can also become a source of political leverage and legal confrontation. The more Turkish capital enters Iraq's energy sector, the harder it becomes to separate the economic relationship from the broader strategic partnership.

This could eventually produce a Turkish-Iraqi economic ecosystem extending from oil fields to pipelines, refineries, electricity, logistics, and transport. Such integration would be difficult for future Iraqi governments to reverse.

The Iran Factor

No analysis of Turkey-Iraq relations can ignore Iran. For two decades, Tehran built enormous influence inside Iraq through political parties, armed groups, economic networks, religious connections, and state institutions. Iran's influence is therefore fundamentally different from Turkey's.

Turkey has economic and military leverage. Iran has embedded political influence. The war with Iran is testing that model.

As Tehran faces greater external pressure, its ability to maintain and finance regional networks could come under strain. At the same time, Washington is pushing Iraq toward greater state control over armed groups and away from the autonomy enjoyed by Iran-aligned factions.

This creates an unusual convergence. Turkey wants a stronger Iraqi central government because it would be better positioned to control the PKK, secure the Development Road, and implement bilateral agreements.

The United States wants a stronger Iraqi government because it would be better positioned to limit the autonomy of Iran-backed armed groups.

These objectives are not identical, but they increasingly overlap. That convergence could give Ankara and Washington an opportunity to reinforce one another in Iraq without formally creating a Turkish-American alliance over Baghdad. For Iraq, however, this creates another balancing challenge. The more Baghdad cooperates with Turkey and the United States, the more Tehran and its Iraqi allies may perceive the relationship as a threat to their influence. The Development Road is particularly sensitive in this regard.

A major Turkey-Iraq corridor could provide an alternative to Iranian transport routes and reduce Tehran's strategic leverage over regional connectivity. Iran's own North-South Transport Corridor ambitions could therefore come into direct competition with the Development Road. Infrastructure, in other words, is becoming another arena of regional strategic competition.

The Kurdistan Region's Strategic Dilemma

The Kurdistan Region may be one of the most important—and potentially most vulnerable—actors in this transformation. For years, Erbil occupied a privileged position in Turkey's Iraq policy. Turkish-Iraqi trade was heavily connected to the Kurdistan Region, and the Habur-Ibrahim Khalil crossing became one of the principal commercial arteries between Turkey and Iraq.

The emerging Baghdad-Ankara partnership changes that equation. My analysis Turkey, Syria, and Iraq Are Building a Corridor That Could Sideline Kurdistan examined precisely this possibility: Ankara and Baghdad are developing alternative transport routes that could make Kurdish territory less indispensable to Turkey-Iraq trade. That is strategically significant.

For decades, the Kurdistan Region's geographic position gave Erbil leverage because Turkey's access to Iraq was heavily dependent on Kurdish territory. If alternative routes through Syria or other federal crossings become operational, that leverage could weaken.

The proposed Fishkhabur-Ovaköy crossing could create a federal alternative to the existing route through the Kurdistan Region. If the Development Road becomes increasingly centered on infrastructure under Baghdad's direct control, Erbil could lose some of the geographic leverage it previously enjoyed over Turkey-Iraq trade.

This is strategically important. The Kurdistan Region's economic influence has historically been reinforced by geography. Its location between Iraq and Turkey gave Erbil leverage over trade, energy, and transit. A new federal corridor could weaken that structural advantage.

For Erbil, therefore, the Development Road should not be viewed simply as an Iraqi infrastructure project. It is a contest over the future geography of power.

As I argued in The Future of Kurdistan in the Middle East, Kurdistan's strategic objective should be to become a node rather than a bottleneck—to integrate itself into Iraqi, Turkish, Gulf, and European connectivity networks rather than assuming geography alone will guarantee its relevance. That principle is becoming increasingly urgent.

Turkey's Changing Relationship With the Kurds

There is another paradox here. The deepening Ankara-Baghdad relationship does not necessarily mean Turkey is abandoning Erbil. In fact, Turkey may increasingly need a stable Kurdistan Region even as it develops alternative routes around it. This is why Ankara's evolving Kurdish policy matters.

As explored in Türkiye, the Kurdistan Region, and the New Regional Equation, the relationship between Ankara and the Kurdistan Region is moving beyond the old model in which security concerns and economic interests constantly collided.

Turkey increasingly views stability in Iraqi Kurdistan through several overlapping lenses: border security, energy, trade, regional connectivity, and competition with Iran. That creates an important strategic distinction. Turkey may want a stronger Baghdad. But it does not necessarily want a weaker Erbil.

What Ankara ultimately wants is a northern Iraq in which Baghdad, Erbil, and Turkish interests are sufficiently coordinated to prevent instability from threatening trade and security corridors. The problem is that Baghdad may have a different vision.

Federal authorities may see the Development Road as an opportunity to reduce dependence on Kurdish infrastructure and restore central control over trade and energy. Erbil, meanwhile, wants integration without surrendering the autonomy and economic leverage it has accumulated since 2003. Turkey sits between these competing objectives.

Baghdad's Balancing Act

Iraq's greatest strategic challenge is ensuring that its growing relationship with Turkey does not become another form of dependency. Baghdad cannot replace Iran with Turkey. Nor can it replace Iran with the United States. The fundamental objective of Iraqi foreign policy remains diversification.

Turkey can provide Iraq with access to European markets. Iran provides enormous economic and political connectivity to the east. The Gulf states offer investment and maritime access. The United States remains the most important external security actor and a major source of diplomatic and military influence.

Iraq's advantage lies precisely in its geography. Its disadvantage is that geography also makes it a battleground for competing powers. The challenge for Baghdad is therefore to convert geographical centrality into strategic autonomy. The Turkey-Iraq relationship can help achieve that—but only if Iraq negotiates from a position of institutional strength.

A weak Iraqi state will simply exchange one form of dependence for another. A stronger Iraqi state can instead turn competition among Turkey, Iran, the United States, and the Gulf into bargaining power.

This broader regional connectivity question is also central to my recent analysis, The Kurds as the Connecting Link in Washington’s New Regional Strategy, which argues that Washington is increasingly viewing Iraq, Syria, and Turkey through interconnected questions of energy, trade, infrastructure, and regional connectivity. That is precisely where Turkey's growing role becomes strategically important.

A New Regional Order Is Taking Shape

The significance of the Turkey-Iraq rapprochement extends beyond bilateral relations. The Middle East is gradually moving toward a more interconnected regional order in which infrastructure, energy, security, and trade routes increasingly overlap. The old divisions between economic diplomacy and military strategy are becoming less meaningful. The Development Road illustrates this transformation perfectly.

It is simultaneously an economic project, an energy corridor, a geopolitical alternative to Iranian routes, a potential European supply chain, and a mechanism for strengthening Baghdad's relationship with Ankara. The same is true of water. It is no longer merely an environmental issue. It is a strategic resource capable of shaping relations between states.

Energy is no longer simply about exports. It determines alliances, investment patterns, infrastructure, and political influence. Security cooperation is no longer confined to counterterrorism. It is becoming intertwined with the ability to secure economic corridors.

This is why the Turkey-Iraq relationship deserves greater attention. The two countries are not forming a formal alliance. They are doing something more subtle. They are creating mutual dependence across multiple strategic sectors.

Conclusion: Turkey's Iraq Moment

The emerging Turkey-Iraq partnership represents one of the most consequential shifts in Iraq's regional position since 2003.

Ankara and Baghdad are moving from a relationship dominated by disputes over sovereignty, the PKK, water, and the Kurdistan Region toward one increasingly structured around shared economic and security interests. The Development Road provides the strategic vision; energy provides economic substance; security cooperation provides political momentum; and the regional disruption caused by the Iran war provides urgency. But the partnership remains fragile.

Iraq's political fragmentation, Iran's enduring influence, Turkish military operations, water disputes, financing challenges, and tensions over the Kurdistan Region could all limit its development. The central question is therefore not whether Turkey and Iraq are becoming closer. They clearly are. The real question is what kind of regional order this partnership will produce.

If Baghdad succeeds in strengthening its institutions while preserving its strategic balance, Turkey could become one of the pillars of a more autonomous Iraqi foreign policy. If Baghdad remains fragmented, however, Ankara's growing economic, military, and infrastructural leverage could simply create a new hierarchy of dependence.

For Turkey, the opportunity is historic. For Iraq, it is equally dangerous and promising. And for the wider Middle East, the emergence of a Turkey-Iraq strategic axis could signal that the region's future will be shaped less by traditional alliances than by control over corridors, energy, water, infrastructure, and the ability to connect competing economic worlds. The map of the Middle East is being redrawn. Increasingly, one of its most important lines runs from Faw to Turkey—and from Baghdad to Ankara.

Further Reading from Kurdish Policy Analysis

For readers interested in the wider strategic implications, the following KPA analyses provide additional context:

• Iraq’s $17 Billion Development Road Could Rise or Fall on Kurdistan — Examines why Kurdistan's geography, security environment, and relationship with Turkey could determine whether Iraq's Development Road becomes a successful Asia-Europe corridor or another unfinished megaproject.

• Turkey, Syria, and Iraq Are Building a Corridor That Could Sideline Kurdistan — Explores how alternative Turkey-Iraq routes through Syria could reduce the Kurdistan Region's traditional leverage over regional trade and connectivity.

• Turkey’s $1.47 Billion Oil Defeat Reignites Iraq-Kurdistan Energy Battle — Examines the legal and geopolitical consequences of the Iraq-Kurdistan-Turkey oil dispute and what it reveals about the fragile foundations of the regional energy relationship.

• Türkiye, the Kurdistan Region, and the New Regional Equation — Analyzes Ankara's evolving relationship with Erbil and the emergence of a new strategic equation linking Turkey, Baghdad, the Kurdistan Region, and the PKK peace process.

• The Future of Kurdistan in the Middle East — Places the Turkey-Iraq relationship within the wider transformation of Kurdistan's geopolitical position and argues that connectivity could become one of the Region's most important sources of strategic relevance.

• The Kurds as the Connecting Link in Washington’s New Regional Strategy — Examines how Washington's emerging approach to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey increasingly connects energy, trade, infrastructure, and Kurdish actors.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a geopolitical analyst and founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, regional security, energy, and the changing geopolitical order of the Middle East.

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