About the Peshmerga unification: How Can We Have an Army?

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj How can Kurdish society build a modern army while balancing history, politics, technology, civil authority, and the Peshmerga's legacy? This may appear to be a straightforward institutional question, but it is not. The question of how to create an army in the Kurdistan Region is ultimately a question about political authority, social organization, historical experience, technology, and the relationship between the state and the forces that defend it. At the most basic level, there are two ways of thinking about this problem. We might call them thin theories and deep theories. Thin theory assumes that institutions can be separated from the societies that produce them. Under this approach, armies are broadly comparable institutions that can be constructed according to common models in different places. The assumption is that what works in one environment can, with sufficient administrative effort, be reproduced somewhere else. A similar logic is particularly domina...

Could Shifts in Iraqi Kurdistan Turn Former Foes into Turkish Partners?

 


Why TĂĽrkiye’s Strategy Toward Iraqi Kurdish Actors Is Rapidly Changing


Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj  | Sulaimani, Iraq | 09 May 2026 --For decades, TĂĽrkiye viewed much of Iraqi Kurdistan primarily through the lens of security threats, insurgency, and border instability.

Today, that perception is changing.

A growing number of political, economic, and security developments suggest that Ankara is attempting to transform parts of Iraqi Kurdistan from a zone of confrontation into a zone of strategic partnership. This shift is not happening because historical tensions have disappeared.

It is happening because the geopolitical environment of the Middle East is being fundamentally restructured. As highlighted in analysis by Amwaj.media, evolving political dynamics inside the Kurdistan Region — combined with the changing PKK landscape, Baghdad-Ankara cooperation, and wider regional instability — are creating opportunities for former adversaries to become tactical partners. The implications could reshape:

  • TĂĽrkiye-Kurdistan Region relations
  • Iraq’s internal political balance
  • Kurdish political dynamics
  • Regional security architecture across northern Iraq and Syria

Why TĂĽrkiye Is Recalculating Its Kurdish Strategy

TĂĽrkiye’s approach toward Iraqi Kurdish actors has historically been divided between:

  • cooperation with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
  • hostility toward the Kurdistan Workers' Party and affiliated structures
  • distrust toward factions perceived as closer to Iran or anti-Turkish networks

But regional realities are forcing Ankara to become more pragmatic. Several developments are driving this recalibration:

1. The PKK Peace and Transition Process

The emerging transformation of the PKK into the so-called “Apoist Movement” has created the possibility — however uncertain — of reducing armed conflict between Kurdish militants and the Turkish state. If the insurgency declines, TĂĽrkiye no longer needs to approach all Kurdish political actors primarily through a military-security framework.

2. Iraq Is Becoming Strategically Central to TĂĽrkiye

TĂĽrkiye increasingly sees Iraq as vital for:

  • trade corridors
  • energy routes
  • regional logistics
  • counterbalancing Iranian influence
  • securing borders

Recent Turkish-Iraqi cooperation on security and infrastructure reflects this deeper strategic alignment. As a result, stable relations with Iraqi Kurdish actors have become strategically valuable rather than merely tactical.

3. Regional Realignment After Syria and Gaza

The Middle East is entering a new geopolitical phase shaped by:

  • weakening Iranian regional networks
  • post-Assad uncertainty in Syria
  • Gulf economic realignments
  • US strategic repositioning
  • competition over transport corridors

TĂĽrkiye now seeks stable partnerships across northern Iraq to secure influence during this transition.

From Conflict Zone to Strategic Corridor

Northern Iraq is no longer viewed only as a battlefield against militants. It is increasingly seen by Ankara as:

  • an economic gateway to the Gulf
  • part of the Development Road Project
  • a regional energy corridor
  • a strategic buffer against instability

This transformation changes TĂĽrkiye’s incentives dramatically. According to analysis on TĂĽrkiye-Iraq relations, Ankara increasingly seeks “institutionalized” and sustainable cooperation frameworks with Iraqi actors rather than ad hoc military arrangements. That requires political partnerships inside Iraqi Kurdistan.

The KDP-TĂĽrkiye Relationship Is Deepening

Among Kurdish actors, TĂĽrkiye’s strongest relationship remains with the Kurdistan Democratic PartyThe relationship is built on:

  • energy cooperation
  • cross-border trade
  • security coordination
  • political communication
  • opposition to uncontrolled PKK influence in border regions

For Ankara, the KDP offers:

  • relative predictability
  • institutional governance
  • economic partnership
  • strategic alignment against destabilizing armed actors

This relationship has become one of TĂĽrkiye’s most important regional partnerships outside the Arab Gulf.

But the PUK Equation Is Also Shifting

Historically, TĂĽrkiye maintained a more difficult relationship with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, particularly due to accusations regarding tolerance of PKK-linked activity in areas around Sulaymaniyah. Turkish officials have openly expressed frustration with what they viewed as insufficient cooperation against PKK networks. However, changing regional conditions may force greater pragmatism on all sides. Several realities are becoming increasingly clear:

  • TĂĽrkiye cannot stabilize northern Iraq through military pressure alone
  • The PUK cannot ignore TĂĽrkiye’s growing regional influence
  • Baghdad increasingly supports stronger Turkish-Iraqi coordination against non-state armed groups
  • Economic pressures encourage regional cooperation

This does not mean ideological trust suddenly exists. But it may create conditions for transactional partnerships where confrontation previously dominated.

The Economic Dimension

Economics is becoming one of the strongest drivers of political realignment. TĂĽrkiye is already one of the Kurdistan Region’s largest trading partners. Future cooperation may expand through:

  • industrial investment
  • energy transit
  • transportation corridors
  • reconstruction projects
  • logistics hubs
  • Development Road infrastructure

The more integrated Iraqi Kurdistan becomes economically with TĂĽrkiye, the harder prolonged confrontation becomes politically and financially. This is one reason Ankara increasingly promotes:

  • institutional cooperation
  • border security coordination
  • long-term infrastructure integration

rather than endless low-intensity conflict.

The Iran Factor

Another major reason behind TĂĽrkiye’s evolving Kurdish policy is Iran.Ankara increasingly fears that instability in northern Iraq creates opportunities for:

  • Iranian-backed militias
  • cross-border armed networks
  • fragmentation inside Iraq
  • expanded Iranian strategic influence

As TĂĽrkiye-Iran competition intensifies across the region, Iraqi Kurdistan becomes a central arena of influence.This means Ankara may prioritize strategic Kurdish partnerships as a way to:

  • contain Iranian leverage
  • stabilize trade routes
  • protect economic corridors
  • secure regional influence

Risks and Contradictions

Despite these shifts, major obstacles remain.

1. Kurdish Internal Divisions

The Kurdistan Region remains politically fragmented between rival power centers. Continued deadlock between Kurdish parties weakens institutional stability and reduces the region’s geopolitical leverage.

2. Turkish Military Presence

Turkish operations and military bases inside northern Iraq remain highly controversial among many Kurdish communities. This creates tensions between strategic elites and public sentiment.

3. The PKK Issue Is Not Fully Resolved

Even if the PKK transforms politically, the long-term future of armed structures, affiliated groups, and regional networks remains uncertain. A failed peace process could quickly reverse current trends.

4. Baghdad’s Balancing Strategy

The Iraqi federal government continues balancing between:

  • TĂĽrkiye
  • Iran
  • Kurdish parties
  • Shiite factions
  • Western interests

That balancing act could complicate deeper Turkish-Kurdish strategic alignment.

A New Middle Eastern Reality

The broader significance of these developments is profound. For decades, the dominant regional paradigm treated Kurdish politics primarily as:

  • a security problem
  • an insurgency issue
  • a territorial threat

That paradigm may now be evolving into something more complex:

  • Kurdish actors as economic partners
  • Kurdish regions as strategic corridors
  • Kurdish diplomacy as part of regional balance-of-power politics

TĂĽrkiye appears increasingly willing to engage with Kurdish actors pragmatically when doing so advances:

  • regional stability
  • economic expansion
  • strategic competition with Iran
  • transportation and energy connectivity

This does not mean historical tensions are disappearing. It means geopolitical necessity is beginning to override older ideological rigidities.

Conclusion

The political shifts unfolding in Iraqi Kurdistan may be laying the groundwork for one of the most important strategic transformations in the modern Middle East: The gradual evolution of former Kurdish-Turkish adversaries into pragmatic regional partners. This transformation is driven not by sentiment, but by changing geopolitical realities:

  • economic interdependence
  • regional instability
  • declining utility of endless conflict
  • competition over influence and trade corridors

Whether this transition succeeds will depend on:

  • the durability of the PKK peace process
  • the stability of Iraqi Kurdistan’s political system
  • TĂĽrkiye’s willingness to institutionalize cooperation
  • the broader regional balance between TĂĽrkiye, Iran, Baghdad, and Western powers

But one thing is increasingly clear: The future relationship between TĂĽrkiye and Iraqi Kurdistan may be defined less by insurgency and confrontation — and more by economics, strategic coordination, and regional power politics.


#Kurdistan #TĂĽrkiye #Iraq #KRG #PKK #Geopolitics #MiddleEast #Turkey #KDP #PUK #RegionalSecurity #KurdishPolitics

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

The Gulf’s strategic chokepoint crisis | Kurdish Policy Analysis

Lindsey Graham Passing Reshapes Republican Foreign Policy—and Raises Questions for the Kurds

Kurdistan in the emerging world order: from autonomy to strategic agency | Kurdish Policy Analysis