By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

As the U.S.-led coalition prepares to leave Iraq, a reported decision not to renew Pentagon assistance to the Peshmerga could mark one of the most consequential shifts in Washington’s relationship with the Kurdistan Region since the defeat of ISIS.

The reported end of U.S. military assistance to the Peshmerga could reshape Kurdistan’s security architecture as coalition forces withdraw from Iraq.

The reported U.S. decision to end military assistance to the Peshmerga after September 30 could represent far more than a budgetary adjustment. If implemented, it would mark a strategic turning point in the relationship between Washington and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq—and potentially reshape the security balance in northern Iraq at a moment of profound regional uncertainty.

According to a BBC report citing four sources familiar with the matter, the Pentagon has informed Kurdish leaders that it does not plan to renew a memorandum of understanding governing security assistance to the Peshmerga when the agreement expires on September 30.

The date is symbolically and strategically significant.

It coincides with the expected withdrawal of the remaining U.S.-led coalition forces from Iraq and the formal conclusion of a military mission that emerged from the war against ISIS. The same transition could also reportedly lead to the closure of the last remaining U.S. military base in Iraq, located in Erbil.

For the Kurdistan Region, the implications could be substantial.

For more than a decade, the Peshmerga have occupied a unique position in Washington’s security architecture in Iraq. They were among the most effective local forces fighting ISIS, receiving training, equipment, intelligence support and financial assistance from the United States and other coalition members.

The question now is whether the end of the anti-ISIS coalition will also mean the end of the strategic security relationship that developed alongside it.

From Anti-ISIS Partnership to Strategic Uncertainty

The reported decision comes after years of gradual transformation in the U.S. military presence in Iraq.

At the height of the Iraq War, the United States deployed roughly 170,000 troops across the country. Today, analysts estimate that fewer than 1,000 American personnel remain.

The mission has changed as well.

Washington's central justification for maintaining a military presence became the campaign against ISIS. As the group lost its territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the political and strategic logic for an open-ended coalition deployment weakened.

The September 30 deadline therefore represents the end of one era.

But ending a military mission does not automatically eliminate the security problems that justified cooperation in the first place.

ISIS no longer controls major cities in Iraq. Yet the organization has not disappeared. Its remaining networks continue to exploit security gaps, difficult terrain and political disputes between Baghdad and Erbil.

The areas often described as the disputed territories remain particularly vulnerable.

These spaces sit between the jurisdictions of the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Security responsibilities are fragmented, coordination remains inconsistent and the absence of a fully integrated security architecture has repeatedly created opportunities for extremist networks.

This is precisely why the future of Peshmerga support matters.

The challenge is no longer whether Kurdish forces can defeat ISIS in a conventional war. They demonstrated that capacity during the coalition campaign.

The question is whether Iraq's post-coalition security system can prevent the re-emergence of the conditions that allowed ISIS to expand in the first place.

$61 Million—and a Much Larger Strategic Relationship

In fiscal year 2026, the Peshmerga reportedly received approximately $61 million through Pentagon programs supporting the campaign against ISIS.

The funding supported weapons, training and stipends.

In purely financial terms, $61 million is a relatively modest figure within the scale of the U.S. defense budget.

Strategically, however, the relationship has carried far greater importance.

American assistance has helped connect the Peshmerga to Western military structures, training standards and intelligence networks. It has also served as an external incentive for security-sector reform inside the Kurdistan Region.

The Peshmerga remain a formidable force, with approximately 180,000 personnel according to the figures cited in the BBC report. Yet the force has also faced long-standing challenges involving institutional fragmentation, command structures and the integration of different political and military formations.

For years, international partners have encouraged greater unification and professionalization.

If U.S. assistance is significantly reduced or terminated, one consequence could be the weakening of external leverage supporting that process.

That does not mean the Peshmerga would suddenly lose their ability to defend the Kurdistan Region.

They would not.

But military partnerships are not simply about money. They involve training cycles, institutional relationships, intelligence cooperation, interoperability and political confidence.

Those elements are much harder to replace.

Washington Is Sending a Different Message

The Pentagon's public position suggests that Washington increasingly sees Iraqi forces—including the Peshmerga—as capable of assuming primary responsibility for counterterrorism.

Following a meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi in July, the Department of Defense emphasized that Iraqi security forces, including the Peshmerga and other Kurdistan Region security institutions, would lead the fight against terrorism.

On one level, this is a logical evolution.

No country wants to maintain a permanent foreign military deployment indefinitely. Iraq has repeatedly demanded a transition away from the coalition framework, while Iraqi political leaders have portrayed the withdrawal as an assertion of national sovereignty.

Al-Zaidi's government has gone further, presenting October 1 as the beginning of a new chapter in which Iraq is free from foreign military forces.

Yet sovereignty and security are not always identical.

The ability to remove foreign forces does not automatically create a more stable security environment. The durability of the transition will depend on whether Iraq's institutions can manage the threats that remain after the coalition leaves.

And that challenge extends well beyond ISIS.

The Iran-Aligned Militia Question

Washington's priorities increasingly appear to be shifting.

A U.S. State Department spokesperson told the BBC that the United States is focused not only on completing the troop withdrawal but also on ensuring that Baghdad is positioned to disarm Iran-aligned militias and protect Iraqi sovereignty.

This is a striking element of the emerging U.S. approach.

For years, Washington's military engagement in Iraq was publicly centered on the fight against ISIS. But Iraq's security environment has become increasingly shaped by another problem: the existence of powerful armed groups operating outside—or alongside—the conventional state security structure.

The question is whether Baghdad can realistically disarm or fully integrate those forces.

That will be extraordinarily difficult.

Some Iran-aligned groups possess significant military capabilities, political representation and deep institutional networks. Their relationship with the Iraqi state is complex and cannot simply be resolved through a declaration from Baghdad or pressure from Washington.

This creates an uncomfortable paradox.

The United States is reducing its direct military footprint while simultaneously expecting the Iraqi government to confront one of the most politically sensitive security challenges in the country.

Whether those two objectives can be reconciled remains uncertain.

Why Kurdistan May Matter Even More After the Withdrawal

There is another strategic dimension to the reported U.S. decision.

The closure of the American military presence in Erbil could reduce the immediate exposure of U.S. forces to Iranian missile and drone attacks.

Iran has previously targeted locations associated with U.S. interests in the Kurdistan Region. American facilities in and around Erbil have repeatedly been viewed as potential targets during periods of heightened confrontation between Washington and Tehran.

From a narrow force-protection perspective, reducing the number of American troops in Iraq lowers Washington's vulnerability.

But there is a broader regional consequence.

The Kurdistan Region has long served as one of the most secure and politically reliable environments for Western diplomatic and commercial engagement in Iraq.

Last December, the United States opened its massive new consulate complex in Erbil, reportedly costing approximately $800 million. At the opening ceremony, senior U.S. officials described the facility as evidence of the value Washington places on its relationship with the Kurdistan Region.

That investment makes the current moment particularly significant.

Washington appears to be reducing one form of presence while maintaining another.

The United States may no longer require a major military footprint in Erbil, but it clearly retains substantial diplomatic, political and economic interests in the region.

The critical question is whether Washington intends to separate those interests from the security partnership that helped sustain them.

The Risk of a Security Vacuum

The greatest danger is not necessarily an immediate collapse in security.

That is unlikely.

The Peshmerga remain a large and experienced force. Iraqi security institutions are considerably stronger than they were during the collapse of Mosul in 2014. ISIS is significantly weaker than it was at the height of its territorial expansion.

The risk is more gradual.

Security vacuums rarely appear overnight. They emerge when coordination deteriorates, intelligence sharing weakens and political disputes prevent effective responses.

The disputed territories are particularly vulnerable to this dynamic.

For years, Kurdish and Iraqi forces have struggled to establish a permanent and fully coordinated security mechanism across these areas. Joint coordination centers have helped at times, but the underlying political dispute remains unresolved.

The departure of coalition forces could remove an important mediator and facilitator.

Without sustained external engagement, Baghdad and Erbil will face greater pressure to manage these security arrangements independently.

That could ultimately be a positive development—if it leads to genuine institutional cooperation.

But if political competition returns to the forefront, the security gaps that ISIS previously exploited could widen once again.

A Test for the Peshmerga Reform Process

The reported end of direct Pentagon assistance could also create a major test for the Kurdistan Region itself.

For years, Kurdish leaders have argued that the Peshmerga require modernization, institutional unification and greater independence from political party structures.

International assistance has been an important part of that agenda.

If Washington reduces its role, the responsibility for reform will fall even more heavily on Kurdish institutions.

This could create two very different outcomes.

The first is negative.

Reduced international support could slow reform, reinforce institutional fragmentation and increase dependence on political parties.

The second could be more constructive.

The prospect of reduced U.S. assistance could force Kurdish leaders to accelerate genuine Peshmerga reform and build a more sustainable domestic security system.

Which path emerges will depend largely on political will inside the Kurdistan Region.

The Peshmerga's future cannot permanently depend on foreign funding.

But neither should decades of partnership and institutional cooperation disappear without a credible alternative framework.

Is the Pentagon Decision Final?

One important detail remains unresolved.

A source familiar with Pentagon operations reportedly told the BBC that a final decision is still under review and that Washington is considering ways to maintain some level of security support for Iraq and the Kurdistan Region after the withdrawal.

That distinction could prove crucial.

The expiration of the existing memorandum of understanding does not necessarily mean the complete termination of U.S.-Kurdish security cooperation.

Washington could move toward a different model.

Instead of direct coalition-era funding, assistance could potentially be delivered through broader bilateral arrangements with Baghdad. Training programs could continue on a reduced basis. Intelligence cooperation could survive even without a large military presence.

The United States and Iraq have already discussed the possibility of a future bilateral defense framework.

The real issue, therefore, may not be whether the relationship ends.

It may be whether it is being fundamentally restructured.

For Kurdish leaders, this is likely to be the central strategic concern.

A security relationship mediated entirely through Baghdad would be very different from the relatively direct institutional connections the Peshmerga developed with the Pentagon and coalition partners during the anti-ISIS campaign.

Washington's Kurdistan Policy Is Entering a New Phase

The broader picture suggests that U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Kurdistan Region is undergoing a transition rather than a simple retreat.

Washington is withdrawing troops.

It is ending the coalition mission.

It is seeking a new bilateral relationship with Baghdad.

At the same time, it has invested heavily in its diplomatic infrastructure in Erbil.

These developments point toward a different American posture: less military exposure, but continued political and strategic engagement.

For the Kurdistan Region, however, the transition could be uncomfortable.

The military relationship with the United States has been one of the most visible symbols of the strategic partnership between Washington and the Kurds.

Its reduction—even if replaced by other forms of cooperation—will inevitably raise questions about the future direction of U.S. policy.

Kurdish leaders will want clarity.

Does Washington still see the Peshmerga as a strategic security partner?

Will military training continue?

Will intelligence cooperation remain intact?

How will the United States approach security in the disputed territories after the coalition withdrawal?

And perhaps most importantly: what guarantees, if any, will exist if regional tensions once again place the Kurdistan Region on the frontline of a confrontation involving Iran, Israel or the United States?

These questions cannot be answered by symbolism alone.

The Post-Coalition Reality

The end of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq was always likely to produce difficult choices.

The anti-ISIS mission created an extraordinary alignment of interests between Washington, Baghdad and Erbil. ISIS represented an immediate existential threat, and military cooperation became a necessity.

That environment no longer exists in the same form.

The challenge now is to prevent the end of a wartime coalition from becoming the beginning of strategic disengagement.

The Kurdistan Region remains important to Iraq's internal stability. The Peshmerga remain a critical component of Iraq's broader security architecture. And the region continues to occupy a sensitive geopolitical position between Iran, Turkey, Syria and the rest of Iraq.

Reducing U.S. military exposure may make strategic sense for Washington.

But a complete erosion of security cooperation could create longer-term risks that outweigh the short-term benefits.

The coming weeks will therefore be decisive.

If the Pentagon ultimately allows the security memorandum to expire without a replacement mechanism, Kurdish leaders will need to rethink one of the most important pillars of their relationship with the United States.

If, however, Washington develops a new framework for training, intelligence sharing and institutional cooperation, the transition could represent an evolution rather than a rupture.

The difference between those two outcomes will shape Kurdistan's security environment for years.

September 30 may mark the end of the coalition.

It should not automatically mark the end of strategic thinking.

Key Assessment

Fact: The existing security memorandum between the Pentagon and the Kurdistan Regional Government is reportedly set to expire on September 30, alongside the planned conclusion of the coalition's military mission in Iraq.

Assessment: The reported decision not to renew the agreement would weaken one of the most direct institutional links between the U.S. military and the Peshmerga.

Forecast: Washington is more likely to shift toward a smaller, more politically cautious security relationship than to abandon Iraq and the Kurdistan Region entirely. However, the scale and structure of any replacement support will determine whether the Peshmerga emerge from the transition stronger or more strategically isolated.

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is an international relations and geopolitical analyst based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. He writes on Kurdistan, Iraq, regional security, energy politics and Middle Eastern geopolitics for Kurdish Policy Analysis.

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