By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Sulaimani, Iraqi Kurdistan — 31 May 2026 

Executive Summary

Iraq stands at a potentially historic crossroads. Recent decisions by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to integrate Saraya al-Salam into official state institutions have triggered a broader debate about the future of armed groups operating within Iraq. While Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi's government has moved to establish mechanisms for implementing the integration process, major factions within the Iraqi Resistance Front have publicly rejected any discussion of surrendering their weapons. These competing responses reveal the central security challenge confronting Iraq in 2026: the unresolved relationship between state authority and non-state armed actors.

Muqtada al-Sadr's decision to fold Saraya al-Salam into state institutions has reopened the most consequential question in Iraqi politics: can Baghdad finally subordinate armed factions to national authority, or will competing centers of power continue to define Iraq's future?

Muqtada al-Sadr's integration of Saraya al-Salam into Iraq's security forces and the resistance of Iran-aligned factions highlight a defining struggle over state authority, sovereignty, and regional stability. This policy paper examines implications for Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, the United States, Iran, and international partners.

This paper argues that Iraq is entering a decisive phase in its long struggle to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The outcome will have profound implications not only for Iraqi sovereignty but also for regional security, U.S.-Iraq relations, Iranian influence, Kurdish security, and broader Middle Eastern stability.

The core question is simple but consequential: can Iraq evolve into a normal sovereign state where all armed formations answer to elected institutions, or will competing armed networks continue to exercise parallel authority alongside the government?

Introduction

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq has struggled to construct durable state institutions capable of governing a deeply fragmented political landscape. Foreign interventions, sectarian conflict, insurgency, terrorism, and regional competition have all contributed to the emergence of powerful armed groups operating outside traditional state structures.

Many of these organizations gained legitimacy through their role in combating ISIS after 2014. Their battlefield contributions were undeniable. Yet the success of these forces created a new dilemma. As the threat from ISIS declined, the continued existence of heavily armed factions raised questions about sovereignty, accountability, and national unity.

The recent decision by Muqtada al-Sadr to integrate Saraya al-Salam into state institutions represents one of the most significant developments in this debate in years. Al-Sadr argued that armed groups should be separated from political organizations and ultimately subordinated to official state authority. Shortly thereafter, the Iraqi government announced the formation of a joint committee to oversee implementation of the integration process. However, factions associated with the Iraqi Resistance Front responded by declaring that they would not surrender their weapons. These contradictory reactions highlight competing visions for Iraq's future. One vision prioritizes state centralization; the other emphasizes the continued role of ideological armed movements.

Why Al-Sadr's Move Matters

Muqtada al-Sadr occupies a unique position within Iraqi politics. Unlike many actors in Iraq's fragmented political landscape, he possesses both revolutionary credentials and significant nationalist appeal.

His decision is important for three reasons.

First, it establishes a precedent. If one of Iraq's most influential armed movements can be integrated into official institutions, other factions may face increasing pressure to follow suit.

Second, it alters the political narrative. Discussions about restricting weapons to state institutions are no longer purely theoretical. They now involve a concrete example backed by a major political figure.

Third, it creates new expectations among both domestic and international audiences. Regional partners, Western governments, and Iraqi citizens may increasingly measure Baghdad's credibility by its ability to extend similar reforms across the broader security sector.

The symbolic significance should not be underestimated. For years, Iraqi governments have spoken about strengthening state authority. The Saraya al-Salam initiative represents one of the few tangible attempts to move beyond rhetoric.

Why Resistance Factions Are Refusing to Disarm

The refusal of Iraqi Resistance Front factions to discuss disarmament is not simply a military issue. It reflects deeper strategic calculations.

Many armed groups view their weapons as essential tools for deterrence, political influence, and organizational survival. From their perspective, disarmament could expose them to rivals, reduce their bargaining power, and weaken their ability to shape national policy.

Several additional factors reinforce resistance.

Strategic Uncertainty: Regional tensions remain elevated. Ongoing confrontations involving Iran, Israel, the United States, and various non-state actors have created a perception that security threats remain significant.

Institutional Distrust: Many factions doubt that Iraqi state institutions possess sufficient strength, neutrality, or capacity to protect their interests.

Political Leverage: Armed power often translates into political influence. Surrendering weapons could reduce a faction's ability to shape outcomes in Baghdad.

External Relationships: Some groups maintain ideological, financial, or strategic ties with regional actors. These relationships complicate efforts to centralize authority under the Iraqi state. As a result, disarmament is viewed by many factions not as a technical security reform but as a fundamental redistribution of power.

The State Monopoly Problem

Political scientists often define a sovereign state as an entity possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory. By this standard, Iraq's sovereignty remains incomplete.

The Iraqi government controls significant military and security institutions. Yet numerous armed organizations continue to possess independent command structures, political agendas, and operational capabilities. This creates what may be described as layered sovereignty.

In such systems, multiple actors simultaneously exercise authority. Governments retain formal legitimacy, while armed groups maintain practical influence over security, governance, and political decision-making.

The consequences are substantial:

• Reduced policy coherence.

• Increased risk of escalation.

• Weaker investor confidence.

• Greater foreign interference.

• Challenges to democratic accountability.

The existence of parallel security structures complicates every aspect of governance.

Implications for the Kurdistan Region

For the Kurdistan Region, the debate carries particular significance. The Kurdistan Regional Government has long argued that uncontrolled armed groups operating outside formal state structures undermine stability and national cohesion. Escalations involving militias frequently affect Kurdish territory through missile attacks, drone strikes, economic disruptions, or broader regional tensions. A successful effort to strengthen state authority in Baghdad could produce several benefits for the Kurdistan Region:

• Improved security coordination.

• Reduced risk of militia-related escalation.

• Greater predictability in federal-regional relations.

• Enhanced investor confidence.

Conversely, failure could perpetuate instability and uncertainty. The Kurdish perspective therefore aligns closely with broader principles of institutional governance and constitutional order.

Implications for Iran

Iran faces a complex strategic calculation. On one hand, Tehran benefits from relationships with various Iraqi armed groups that contribute to its regional deterrence architecture. On the other hand, Iran also benefits from a stable Iraq that avoids internal collapse and maintains productive economic ties.

A gradual integration process could allow Iran to preserve influence while reducing risks associated with uncontrolled escalation. A confrontational disarmament campaign, however, could create instability that undermines both Iraqi and Iranian interests.

Iran's preferred outcome is therefore likely neither complete militia independence nor rapid forced dismantlement, but a managed transition that protects key strategic relationships.

Implications for the United States

Washington has consistently emphasized the importance of strengthening Iraqi state institutions and limiting the influence of armed groups operating outside government control. Recent American statements have reiterated concerns about Iran-backed militias and their impact on regional stability. For the United States, the current moment presents both opportunities and risks. Opportunities include:

• Strengthening Iraqi sovereignty.

• Reducing attacks against U.S. interests.

• Encouraging security sector reform.

• Supporting long-term state development.

Risks include:

• Triggering confrontation with armed factions.

• Increasing anti-American mobilization.

• Destabilizing Iraq's fragile political system.

American policymakers should avoid framing the issue exclusively through the lens of competition with Iran. Doing so risks transforming an Iraqi governance challenge into another arena for regional rivalry.

Policy Recommendations for Baghdad

1. Pursue Gradual Integration Rather Than Forced Disarmament. Historical experience suggests that negotiated integration is more sustainable than coercive dismantlement.

2. Establish Clear Legal Frameworks: Security reform requires transparent legal structures defining command relationships, accountability mechanisms, and oversight procedures.

3. Separate Political Participation From Armed Authority: Political parties should compete through institutions rather than military leverage.

4. Strengthen Professional Security Institutions: Military and police forces must become sufficiently capable and trusted to absorb additional responsibilities.

5. Expand Economic Reintegration Programs: Many fighters require viable economic alternatives and career pathways.

Policy Recommendations for International Partners

United States: Support Iraqi institutional development rather than factional competition.

European Union: Provide technical expertise for security sector reform and governance modernization.

United Nations: Facilitate dialogue mechanisms that reduce mistrust among competing actors.

Regional States: Avoid using Iraqi territory as an arena for proxy competition.

The Most Likely Scenarios

Scenario One: Gradual State Consolidation

Additional factions slowly integrate into state institutions.

Probability: Moderate.

Scenario Two: Hybrid Status Quo

Some reforms occur, but parallel power structures persist.

Probability: High.

Scenario Three: Escalation and Fragmentation

Disputes over disarmament trigger political or security crises.

Probability: Moderate.

Conclusion

The struggle over weapons in Iraq is fundamentally a struggle over sovereignty.

Muqtada al-Sadr's decision to integrate Saraya al-Salam has created a rare opportunity to advance a long-delayed national conversation about state authority. The refusal of other factions to disarm demonstrates that this conversation is far from settled. The Iraqi government now faces a historic test. It must balance competing interests while building institutions capable of commanding legitimacy across a deeply divided political landscape.

The stakes extend beyond Iraq itself. The outcome will influence regional stability, Kurdish security, Iranian influence, American policy, and the future of governance in one of the Middle East's most strategically important states. Ultimately, the question confronting Iraq is not whether armed groups have shaped the country's past. They unquestionably have. The question is whether they will continue to define its future. A sovereign Iraq requires more than elections, constitutions, and ministries. It requires a political order in which legitimate authority flows through institutions rather than armed networks. Whether Iraq can achieve that objective may become the defining geopolitical story of the country's next decade.

Sources Used

The analysis is based primarily on reporting regarding the Iraqi Resistance Front's rejection of disarmament, Muqtada al-Sadr's decision to integrate Saraya al-Salam into state structures, and the Iraqi government's implementation committee, supplemented by broader reporting on militia-state relations, U.S. concerns regarding armed groups, and debates over restricting weapons to state institutions.