By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj
Prime Minister Ali Falah Al-Zaidi faces the defining challenge of modern Iraq: either establish the state's monopoly over foreign policy and security or risk allowing Iraq to become the battlefield of someone else's war.
Iraq's balancing act between Iran and the United States is becoming unsustainable. Prime Minister Al-Zaidi faces a defining strategic choice.
Iraq Can No Longer Play Both Sides: The Time for Strategic Ambiguity Is Over
For nearly two decades, successive Iraqi governments have attempted the impossible.
They have sought to maintain close strategic relations with the United States while simultaneously accommodating Iran's expanding political and military influence. For years, this balancing act appeared manageable. Baghdad welcomed American investment, intelligence, military training, and diplomatic support while tolerating powerful armed factions aligned with Tehran. The policy was often described as "balance," "neutrality," or "positive diplomacy."
Today, it increasingly resembles strategic paralysis.
The geopolitical environment that once allowed Iraq to hedge between Washington and Tehran has fundamentally changed. The Middle East is entering a period of sharper polarization, where governments are expected to demonstrate not merely diplomatic flexibility but credible control over their own territory and security institutions.
If reports continue to emerge that Iraqi territory could be used as a launchpad for attacks against neighboring countries, Iraq's claim to neutrality becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. Whether such reports prove true or not, the perception alone damages Iraq's credibility as a sovereign state.
Neutrality is not simply a declaration. It requires the state to exercise effective authority over its borders, airspace, and armed actors.
This is where Iraq faces its greatest challenge.
No sovereign government can simultaneously claim exclusive authority over national security while allowing independent armed groups to shape regional conflict from its territory. That contradiction has become one of Iraq's most serious strategic liabilities.
Prime Minister Ali Falah Al-Zaidi now confronts a reality that many of his predecessors sought to postpone.
The honeymoon is over.
The luxury of indefinitely balancing between Washington and Tehran is disappearing as regional tensions intensify. Iraq cannot indefinitely reassure the United States that it remains a reliable security partner while also allowing Iranian-aligned armed factions to pursue independent military agendas that risk dragging the country into wider conflict.
This is not simply an American demand.
It is fundamentally an Iraqi national interest.
Every missile launched from Iraqi territory, every drone intercepted over neighboring states, and every threat issued by armed groups operating outside full state command raises the risk that Iraq itself becomes the target of retaliation. The costs would not be borne solely by the factions involved; they would be paid by Iraqi civilians, the economy, foreign investors, and a government trying to rebuild after decades of conflict.
Prime Minister Al-Zaidi therefore faces a defining strategic test.
His government must demonstrate that Iraqi foreign policy is made in Baghdad—not by external capitals or armed organizations operating independently of the state. That does not necessarily require choosing confrontation with Iran, nor does it require abandoning relations with Tehran. Iraq shares deep economic, religious, and geographic ties with Iran that will remain important regardless of regional politics.
Likewise, Iraq's relationship with the United States extends beyond military cooperation. Washington continues to play an important role in security assistance, counterterrorism, international finance, investment, and diplomatic engagement.
The real choice is therefore not simply between Iran and the United States.
It is between a sovereign Iraqi state capable of enforcing its own decisions and an Iraq whose security policy is shaped by competing external actors.
Strategic ambiguity can sometimes be an effective diplomatic tool. But ambiguity only works when all sides believe the government ultimately controls events. Once that perception weakens, ambiguity becomes vulnerability.
Baghdad should therefore pursue several priorities.
First, it must reaffirm that no armed group has the authority to initiate cross-border military operations independently of the Iraqi state.
Second, it should strengthen coordination among the security services to ensure that Iraqi territory is not used to launch attacks that could trigger regional escalation.
Third, Iraq should continue diplomatic engagement with both Washington and Tehran while making clear that Iraqi sovereignty—not proxy competition—defines its foreign policy.
Finally, Prime Minister Al-Zaidi must communicate consistently that Iraq's future lies in stability, investment, reconstruction, and regional economic integration rather than serving as an arena for proxy confrontation.
None of these steps are politically easy.
Every decision carries domestic costs. Every move risks criticism from competing political factions. Yet leadership is measured precisely during periods when difficult choices cannot be avoided.
The question is no longer whether Iraq can maintain relationships with both the United States and Iran. It almost certainly can—and should.
The question is whether Iraq can maintain those relationships while permitting armed actors outside full state control to determine when the country enters regional crises.
That model has reached its limits.
For too long, Iraq has attempted to balance between competing regional powers without fully resolving the question of who ultimately speaks for the Iraqi state. The result has been recurring crises that undermine investor confidence, weaken state institutions, and expose Iraqi civilians to risks generated by conflicts not of their own making.
Prime Minister Al-Zaidi has an opportunity to redefine Iraq's trajectory. Success will not be measured by choosing Washington over Tehran or Tehran over Washington. It will be measured by establishing that the Republic of Iraq—not any foreign capital or armed faction—is the sole authority responsible for decisions of war, peace, and national security.
The era of strategic ambiguity is fading. What comes next should be a strategy rooted in sovereignty, institutional authority, and the long-term interests of the Iraqi people.
Related Analysis
➜ Related: "Silent Coup in Baghdad: How Did Zaidi Shape the Power of His Ministers?"
This analysis complements the current debate by examining how Prime Minister Ali Falah Al-Zaidi has centralized authority within the executive branch. While consolidating ministerial powers may strengthen decision-making, the next—and far more difficult—test is whether that authority can be translated into effective control over Iraq's broader security architecture. If Baghdad is to convince both its allies and its neighbors that Iraqi sovereignty is genuine, executive power must extend beyond ministries to include all armed actors operating on Iraqi territory.
Iraq's economic transformation cannot be separated from its security environment. In this earlier analysis, I argued that Prime Minister Ali Falah Al-Zaidi's ambitious investment agenda will only succeed if the state establishes a monopoly over the use of force. Foreign investors do not simply evaluate tax incentives or infrastructure—they assess political risk, security, and predictability. If armed groups retain the ability to independently launch regional attacks from Iraqi territory, every economic reform risks being overshadowed by geopolitical instability. Recent reports of potential cross-border escalation reinforce a central conclusion of that analysis: without sovereignty, there can be no sustainable investment strategy.
➜ Related: "Political and Religious Geography of East Kurdistan: Where Are the Kurdish Forces in the Equation?"
Understanding the geography of Kurdish political and armed movements helps explain why Iraq remains vulnerable to regional competition. The country's northern frontier has long been intertwined with the strategic calculations of Iran, Turkey, and the United States. As regional rivalries intensify, Iraq's challenge is no longer simply managing internal diversity—it is preventing its territory from becoming the arena where competing regional powers settle their disputes. That broader geopolitical context reinforces why Baghdad can no longer rely solely on balancing strategies and must instead prioritize state sovereignty and strategic clarity.
#Iraq #Iran #UnitedStates #MiddleEast #NationalSecurity
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