By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj
How did Zaydi shape the power of his ministers?
As coalition parties battle over cabinet posts, Iraq's new prime minister may already have won the real contest by transferring security authority away from ministries and into his own office.
After 74 days, the political parties realized that the struggle over the unfilled ministries is not only about the names of the ministers, but also about their powers.
Suddenly, the parties are faced with a new reality: two civilian ministries (interior and defence) are still at the negotiating table, but their powers are being transferred elsewhere; Especially into the "Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces," which has been reactivated and expanded by Prime Minister Ali Zayed.
After Zaidi took over a large part of the security decisions, one party reportedly proposed a “swap of positions”, that is, giving a position in exchange for a security ministry.
So far, the government is run with only 14 ministries. Meanwhile, Washington refuses to approve the handover of ministries to armed groups and has vetoed some ministers.
Office of the Commander-in-Chief; “A Cold Coup”
A former parliamentarian who declined to be named said Ali Zaidi shocked them by reorganizing the Commander-in-Chief’s office, a place that had been rebuilt after 12 years of dismantling.
He added that the political parties see the move as a kind of “cold coup” over the post-2003 political system, as it is the first time that the prime minister has taken over security positions at this level.
This unprecedented expansion of the powers of this bureau, according to some parties, means that the ministries of interior and defense have been emptied of content and even if they are appointed ministers, they will have little power.
According to a source in the negotiations, the rule of law coalition, which considers the Interior Ministry its share, has proposed the transfer of posts; Bassem al-Badri (who became head of the National Security Agency a month ago) should be transferred to the Interior Ministry, and Qassim Ata should replace him.
Lawmaker Nuri al-Maliki has insisted on nominating Qassim Ata for the Interior Ministry or any other security post, creating a new deadlock for the completion of the cabinet.
Parliament had previously rejected Ata's vote in May, but there are attempts to bring his name back into parliament.
Sectarian divisions and Zaidi powers
According to political tradition, the interior ministry is for the Shiite community and the defense ministry for the Sunnis. But Zaydi has merged both ministries under the umbrella of the commander-in-chief's office and extended his authority to the Hashd al-Shabab.
Security spokesman Saad Ma'an explained that the new task of the bureau is to follow up and implement Zaidi's orders.
According to a leaked document, the bureau has grouped several institutions such as the Joint Operations Command, Special Secretariat, National Operations Center, security agencies, border crossings and military industry under one name, all under the direct control of the prime minister.
The prolongation of the crisis and the strengthening of the prime minister
"Zaidi's openness in distributing posts and the delay in deciding the ministries has created a threat to the political parties," said Mohammed Naana, a researcher and academic. This vacuum has given the prime minister more opportunities to manage all parts of the state.
According to Minna, due to the changes made by Zaidi and the appointment of advisors in ministries, the crisis of completing the cabinet is likely to continue. He also noted that after the recent anti-corruption campaigns, the balance of shares within the “coordination framework” was upset.
The "American veto" and its effects
The former Iraqi parliamentarian explains that US obstacles have become the main obstacle to completing the cabinet. The challenges have moved beyond rejecting a few names to more complex political and security equations.
"Zaidi's visit to Washington showed that there are some ministers and personalities in the government team who are undermining the partnership and relations between Iraq and the United States," he said.
Following talks between Trump and Zaidi, September 30 has been set as a deadline for ending militia fighters and collecting weapons from the state, which will have a direct impact on the rejection of candidates belonging to the militias.
Asaib at the heart of the pressures
Sources point out that parties such as "Asaib Ahl al-Haq" are not satisfied with these decisions and stress that preventing them must be in return for preventing other parties such as the rule of law, thus suspending the dialogue.
A leader in the framework of coordination has said that none of those who participated in the US-Iran war will receive executive positions, even at the director-general level.
There is strong US objection to giving the ministry to Asaib (who will get the labor ministry according to the division), especially when it comes to nominating Laith Khazzali (Qais Khazzali's brother) for the post of deputy prime minister. There is also talk of a broad campaign to remove militants from state administrative positions.
Vacant ministries as pressure cards
Ihsan Shamari, a professor of political science at Baghdad University, believes the issue of vacant ministries has become a pressure card by political parties against Zaidi.
They are afraid that the completion of the cabinet will free Zayed from his promises to them, so they deliberately delay the process until they promise him that they will not confront the traditional parties.
According to Shmari, if Zaidi decides to confront, some parties may withdraw their ministers and bring the government to the brink of resignation.
Khalid Walid of the Reconstruction Coalition, meanwhile, says the ministry problem is linked to the events of the first confidence vote. One side believes what happened was a conspiracy, and the other side sees it as a democratic process in which MPs made up their minds.
Regarding the Interior Ministry, Walid said that the prime minister (Zaidi) is asking for several candidates to choose the best based on the expertise and needs of the stage, while one party has retained one candidate.
Regarding the conduct of state affairs, Walid stressed that Zaidi has not allowed a vacuum in the security agencies by giving acting authority and reactivating the office of the commander-in-chief. He concluded that it was not in anyone's interest to disrupt the government completely because of the risk of challenges (such as arms seizure, corruption and oil exports).
Seventy-four days after Iraq's new government entered office, the fiercest political battle in Baghdad is no longer about who becomes minister. It is about whether those ministers will possess any meaningful authority at all.
Behind closed doors, Iraq's coalition negotiations have shifted dramatically. Political parties that spent weeks bargaining over cabinet portfolios are now confronting an unexpected reality: some of the state's most powerful ministries are gradually being stripped of their traditional authority while executive power is increasingly concentrated inside the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces under Prime Minister Ali Zaidi.
For Iraq's post-2003 political elite, this represents more than administrative reform. Critics within the political establishment describe it as a "silent" or "cold coup"—not one carried out with tanks in the streets, but through institutional restructuring that could fundamentally alter how Iraq's security sector is governed.
A Cabinet Still Incomplete
Despite weeks of negotiations, Iraq's government continues to function with only fourteen ministries fully operating.
The two most politically sensitive ministries—the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defence—remain vacant as coalition partners continue to dispute who should control them.
Ordinarily, such delays would simply reflect Iraq's complex power-sharing system, where ministries are distributed among competing Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish political blocs.
This time, however, the delay has created an entirely different political consequence.
While parties continue negotiating over ministerial appointments, Prime Minister Ali Zaidi has reportedly transferred many operational security responsibilities directly into the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, effectively allowing the government to function without permanent ministers.
As a result, political factions increasingly fear they may eventually receive ministries that possess little actual authority.
The Revival of the Commander-in-Chief's Office
One of the most significant institutional developments since Ali Zaidi entered office has been the revival of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
According to a former Iraqi parliamentarian familiar with the negotiations, the office has been reconstructed after more than twelve years of diminished influence.
Rather than serving merely as an administrative office coordinating security institutions, it has reportedly evolved into the principal centre for strategic security decision-making.
This restructuring has surprised many political actors.
According to sources involved in government negotiations, security appointments, intelligence coordination, and key operational decisions increasingly pass through the prime minister's office rather than the ministries traditionally responsible for those functions.
If accurate, this would represent one of the largest redistributions of executive authority within Iraq's security institutions since 2003.
Why Political Parties Are Alarmed
Several political factions reportedly believe the prime minister's institutional reforms amount to a fundamental change in Iraq's post-2003 governance model.
The country's political system has traditionally relied on distributing powerful ministries among coalition partners, allowing each major bloc influence over parts of the state apparatus.
Interior, Defence, Finance, and Oil have historically been among the most valuable ministries because they provide both political influence and institutional control.
If the Interior and Defence ministries lose much of their operational authority, their political value diminishes considerably.
One former parliamentarian described the reforms as a "cold coup" against Iraq's post-2003 political architecture.
The phrase reflects concern that institutional authority is being transferred not through constitutional amendment but through administrative restructuring and executive decision-making.
Unlike traditional coups, no government has been overthrown.
Instead, critics argue that authority itself is being quietly relocated.
Ministries Without Power?
According to sources involved in coalition negotiations, several parties now believe that even once ministers are appointed, they may exercise only limited authority over security affairs.
The practical effect would be profound.
Interior and Defence ministers could retain administrative responsibilities while major operational decisions remain concentrated inside the prime minister's office.
Such an arrangement would significantly strengthen the executive branch.
It would also reduce the ability of coalition partners to influence Iraq's security policy through ministerial appointments.
For parties that invested months negotiating these portfolios, this changes the entire political calculation.
The Position Swap Proposal
The reported institutional changes have already begun reshaping negotiations.
According to sources familiar with the talks, one coalition proposed a "swap of positions" rather than insisting on traditional ministerial appointments.
The proposal reportedly involves transferring senior security officials between institutions.
Under one reported scenario:
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Bassem al-Badri, recently appointed head of Iraq's National Security Agency, would become Interior Minister.
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Veteran security official Qassim Ata would then assume leadership of the National Security Agency.
Although the proposal has not been finalised, it illustrates how negotiations have shifted away from ministries themselves toward the individuals controlling Iraq's expanding security institutions.
Washington's Quiet Influence
The negotiations are also influenced by international considerations.
According to political sources, the United States continues to oppose handing key security ministries to factions associated with armed groups.
Several proposed ministerial candidates have reportedly faced informal American objections.
This external factor has complicated cabinet formation even further.
For Prime Minister Ali Zaidi, maintaining direct control over security institutions may also reassure international partners concerned about militia influence inside the Iraqi state.
Whether intentional or not, delays in appointing ministers have allowed executive authority to become increasingly centralised.
A Fundamental Shift in Iraq's Political System?
If these institutional changes become permanent, Iraq may witness one of the most significant transformations of executive power since the establishment of its post-2003 political order.
For two decades, Iraqi governments have operated through consensus politics and ministerial power-sharing, often limiting the prime minister's ability to govern independently.
By expanding the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, Ali Zaidi appears to be testing a different model—one in which the premiership becomes the primary centre of national security authority.
Supporters may argue this creates greater efficiency, improves coordination, and reduces fragmentation across Iraq's security apparatus.
Critics, however, warn that concentrating authority within a single executive office weakens institutional checks and reduces the balance that Iraq's political system was designed to maintain after the fall of Saddam Hussein.
The debate therefore extends beyond cabinet appointments.
It touches on a larger constitutional question: who truly governs Iraq's security institutions—the ministries allocated through political compromise or the prime minister himself?
Future Implications
The outcome of this struggle will shape Iraq's political trajectory well beyond the current cabinet negotiations. If the Office of the Commander-in-Chief continues to absorb operational authority, future governments may inherit a far stronger premiership than envisioned under Iraq's post-2003 power-sharing model. Such a shift could improve decision-making during security crises and reduce bureaucratic fragmentation, but it also risks upsetting the delicate balance among Iraq's competing political factions. As parties realise that control over ministries no longer guarantees control over policy, coalition bargaining itself may fundamentally change. Whether viewed as necessary state-building or an incremental concentration of executive power, Ali Zaidi's reforms could mark the beginning of a new phase in Iraqi governance—one in which the real centre of power lies not inside the ministries, but within the prime minister's office.
Related Analysis: Can Zaidi succeed where others failed?
Also Read: The trap of muhasasa: why Iraq's political system survives every generation?
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