As a multibillion-dollar South Korean missile deal stalls and the U.S.-led Coalition prepares to draw down, Baghdad faces a widening gap between its ambitions to control Iraqi airspace and its actual ability to defend it. Iraq's stalled $2.8 billion South Korean air-defense deal exposes a deeper crisis of sovereignty as the Coalition drawdown leaves Kurdistan increasingly vulnerable.
By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj | Kurdish Policy Analysis
Iraq is approaching a dangerous strategic transition. For years, the country has proclaimed the restoration of full sovereignty over its territory and airspace as a central national objective. Yet sovereignty is not simply a legal principle or political slogan. It requires the military capacity to detect, track and, when necessary, destroy threats entering a country's skies. Iraq does not currently possess that capacity at the scale required by the threats it faces. The problem is becoming particularly acute as the U.S.-led Coalition prepares to withdraw key capabilities and Baghdad's flagship effort to modernize its air defenses appears increasingly uncertain.
The recent drone attack targeting the private office of Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani in Erbil brought this vulnerability into sharp focus. Kurdish officials said the attack also targeted the nearby residence of the Kurdistan Region's intelligence chief, while authorities alleged that the Hadid-110 drones involved had been launched from across the Iranian border. The National's report on the Erbil drone attack Al Jazeera's coverage
No group claimed responsibility. But the strategic significance of the attack extends beyond identifying the perpetrators.
The strike exposed a fundamental weakness at the heart of Iraq's security architecture: the country faces increasingly sophisticated aerial threats while its most ambitious effort to construct a credible national air-defense system has become entangled in financial and political uncertainty.
The question is no longer whether Iraq needs better air defenses. That is obvious.
The question is whether Baghdad can build them before the security environment deteriorates further.
The Sovereignty Gap
Iraq's airspace has been repeatedly penetrated during years of regional confrontation. American, Iranian and Israeli aircraft, missiles and drones have crossed or operated in and around Iraqi territory, while Iran-aligned armed groups have used Iraqi territory as a launch platform for their own drone and missile operations. The result is an uncomfortable contradiction.
Iraq formally possesses sovereignty over one of the Middle East's most strategically important territories. In practice, it has often lacked the military means to enforce that sovereignty.
This problem has become more urgent as regional warfare has evolved. Iraq is no longer confronting only conventional aircraft or ballistic missiles. It must now contend with cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, one-way attack drones, small commercial drones and increasingly sophisticated unmanned systems.
The Hadid-110 illustrates the changing nature of the threat. Unlike the slower propeller-driven Shahed-type drones that have become ubiquitous across the Middle East and the war in Ukraine, the Hadid-110 is described as jet-powered and more difficult to intercept.
An air-defense system optimized to counter conventional aircraft or large missiles may not be equally effective against small, low-flying or fast-moving drones. Iraq therefore faces not one air-defense problem, but several.
It needs strategic systems capable of defending large areas against missiles and aircraft. It also needs short-range systems capable of protecting critical infrastructure against drones. And above all, it needs an integrated command-and-control architecture capable of connecting radars, sensors and weapons into a single defensive network. At present, Iraq has pieces of that puzzle. It does not yet possess the complete system.
Kurdistan Is the Most Exposed Front
The Kurdistan Region has become the clearest example of the gap between Iraq's formal sovereignty and its actual defensive capacity.
For years, the Region has faced drone and missile attacks linked to the broader confrontation between Iran, the United States, Israel and Tehran-aligned armed groups. Oil and gas infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted, while the latest attacks have demonstrated that even senior Kurdish political and security leadership can be placed within range. The danger is compounded by timing.
The U.S.-led Coalition's planned drawdown threatens to remove or reduce capabilities that have served as an important part of the Region's existing protective umbrella. As Kurdish Policy Analysis has previously examined, the changing U.S. military posture is creating new uncertainty over what the end of the Coalition mission could mean for the Kurdistan Region's security.
Masrour Barzani made the problem explicit in July when he warned that the Kurdistan Region lacked adequate defenses against incoming drones and missiles. His broader point was difficult to ignore: much of the Region's protection had depended not on Iraqi federal capabilities but on American military hardware.
That is an extraordinary admission for a country seeking to consolidate its sovereignty. It means that one part of Iraq has depended on a foreign military presence for protection because the national state lacks sufficient capacity to provide an alternative.
The approaching transition therefore creates a strategic dilemma. If the Coalition withdraws critical systems before Iraqi alternatives are operational, the security vacuum could become immediate. And Erbil may be the first place where its consequences are felt.
Baghdad Knows It Has a Problem
Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi's government has responded to growing concern by signaling that air defense has become a national priority.
On Aug. 12, Zaidi made an overnight visit to the Iraqi Air Defense Command's main operations center in Baghdad. His office subsequently emphasized the importance of strengthening Iraq's air-defense capabilities so that Iraqi forces could assume full responsibility for protecting the country's airspace and sovereignty.
Two days later, Zaidi's spokesperson, Sabah Al-Numan, announced that the government intended to accelerate its air-defense modernization program. The ambition was considerable.
According to Numan, Baghdad was considering compressing a development plan originally intended to run from 2026 to 2031 into a three-year period. The program would involve medium- and long-range radar systems, enhanced missile capabilities and more advanced command-and-control infrastructure. Rudaw's report on Baghdad's air-defense plans
Zaidi then chaired a formal meeting of the Air Defense Command to discuss contracts with foreign companies for advanced systems. On paper, this is the right direction. Iraq does not need another isolated weapons purchase. It needs an integrated national architecture. But announcing an accelerated plan and financing one are entirely different matters.
The $2.8 Billion South Korean Problem
Baghdad's most important air-defense acquisition was supposed to provide a major step toward solving the problem. In 2024, Iraq signed a roughly $2.8 billion agreement with South Korea for eight Cheongung-II, or KM-SAM II, medium-range surface-to-air missile batteries. The acquisition was significant because Iraq's existing arsenal lacks a comprehensive long-range strategic air-defense capability.
The South Korean system is particularly important because of its reported anti-ballistic missile capabilities. For Iraq, that represents a qualitative improvement rather than simply an expansion of existing capacity.
Iraqi officials had hoped that the first systems could begin arriving as early as 2026. South Korea's Cheongung-II has also attracted increasing international attention following reports that the United Arab Emirates employed its own system against Iranian attacks during the regional conflict. But Iraq's procurement timetable is now in doubt.
Reports in July suggested that Baghdad had made an initial payment of approximately $500 million but failed to continue payments under the contract, creating the possibility that the systems could be offered elsewhere. Shafaq News report on the stalled South Korean air-defense deal
The implications go beyond one contract. The stalled deal exposes the central weakness of Iraq's defense modernization strategy: Baghdad may understand what it needs but lack the fiscal capacity to acquire it at the speed demanded by the security environment.
Iraq’s Fiscal Crisis Is Now a Security Crisis
Joel Wing, author of the Musings on Iraq blog, offered a blunt assessment of the problem. He argued that the disruption to Iraq's oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz following the regional conflict had placed major government procurement programs under severe pressure. “Paying government workers is the priority, and that has been sporadic,” Wing said.
His conclusion was equally direct: Baghdad “probably does not have the money to pay for the South Korean system.” That assessment should not be dismissed as a narrow procurement dispute. Iraq's ability to defend itself is directly connected to its ability to finance the state.
The country remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenue. When exports are disrupted, prices collapse or fiscal pressures intensify, defense procurement competes directly with salaries, pensions, subsidies and other politically essential expenditures.
Kurdish Policy Analysis has repeatedly examined this structural vulnerability, including in its analysis of Iraq's fiscal crisis and the strategic consequences of dependence on oil revenues. This creates a dangerous cycle.
Iraq faces a worsening security environment and therefore requires more investment in defense. Yet the same regional instability threatening Iraq's security can disrupt the economic resources needed to finance that investment.
In other words, Iraq's air-defense weakness is inseparable from its political economy. A $2.8 billion missile contract is not simply a military decision. It is a test of whether the Iraqi state can convert its national wealth into sustained strategic capability.
The Wrong System for the Most Immediate Threat?
Even if Baghdad resolves its financial dispute with Seoul, however, the Cheongung-II deal will not solve every problem.
Alex Almeida, director of security at the political-risk consultancy Horizon Engage, has argued that the South Korean systems are not specifically designed to counter the drone threat that has become increasingly central to Iraq's security environment.
A state can spend billions of dollars on high-end air-defense systems and still remain vulnerable to relatively inexpensive drones. Almeida also criticized Iraq's existing Russian-made Pantsir-S1 systems, describing them as “notoriously ineffective against drones.”
His assessment points toward a more realistic near-term priority: limited counter-drone point defense for critical sites, particularly energy infrastructure. That may not sound as strategically impressive as a multibillion-dollar national missile shield. But it may be more immediately useful.
Iraq's most vulnerable targets are not necessarily entire cities. They include oil fields, gas installations, airports, military bases and political infrastructure. Defending every kilometer of Iraqi airspace is an enormously expensive undertaking. Defending the country's most important strategic assets is more achievable.
This is where Baghdad needs to distinguish between its long-term ambition and its immediate operational requirements. It needs both. But it cannot afford to confuse them.
The Case for Layered Defense
Freddy Khoueiry, a global security analyst for the region at the risk intelligence firm RANE, offered a similarly cautious assessment.
Iraq, he argued, can provide only “interim drone defenses” rather than an immediate replacement for the broader “defensive umbrella” that the U.S.-led Coalition has provided. Iraq does possess several short-range capabilities, including Avenger and Pantsir missile batteries as well as man-portable air-defense systems.
Baghdad has also reportedly moved to acquire Turkish short-range systems, potentially including Korkut anti-aircraft guns upgraded by Turkish defense manufacturer ASELSAN to counter small drones at close range. These systems could help address an immediate vulnerability. But they also illustrate the fragmentation of Iraq's procurement strategy.
Iraq is acquiring or considering systems from Russia, South Korea, Turkey and potentially other suppliers. Each system may have its own strengths, but without a unified command-and-control structure, a collection of weapons does not automatically become a national air-defense network.
This is Iraq's real strategic challenge. The country does not merely need missiles. It needs integration. A modern air-defense architecture depends on a layered system: Long-range sensors detect threats.
Command centers identify and prioritize them. Medium- and long-range systems defend large areas. Short-range weapons protect critical points. Counter-drone systems intercept low-cost threats. Electronic warfare disrupts hostile unmanned systems. Without this architecture, Iraq risks spending billions of dollars on equipment while retaining gaps that adversaries can exploit.
An Awkward Position for Kurdistan
The Kurdistan Region occupies an especially difficult position within this emerging security environment.
Nicholas Heras, Interim Executive Director at the Middle East Policy Council, described the Region's position relative to Baghdad as “awkward.” His assessment reflects a fundamental constitutional and strategic reality. The Kurdistan Region is part of federal Iraq and ultimately depends on Baghdad for a coordinated national air-defense system. Yet Erbil faces specific threats that may require faster and more localized responses than the federal government can provide.
Heras argued that Iran has encouraged allied Iraqi armed groups to target oil and gas extraction sites in the Kurdistan Region as a means of exerting pressure on Washington. The strategic logic behind such attacks may extend beyond physical destruction.
Persistent attacks can create uncertainty among foreign investors and energy companies. They can raise the cost of doing business in the Kurdistan Region. And they can reinforce the perception that the United States cannot—or will not—provide lasting protection to its regional partners.
Kurdish Policy Analysis has previously explored this wider strategic environment in its coverage of drone warfare and the growing vulnerability of the Kurdistan Region and the changing regional competition surrounding Iraq and Kurdistan. The danger is therefore not simply military. It is economic and political. An undefended energy facility can become a strategic weapon against an entire region.
Can Kurdistan Defend Itself?
Joel Wing remains skeptical that Baghdad can rapidly close the gap. He noted that Iraqi officials themselves have effectively acknowledged the limitations of federal resources. According to Wing's assessment, foreign energy companies operating in the Kurdistan Region have been told that they may need to bring their own air-defense capabilities to protect oil and gas facilities.
If accurate, this represents a remarkable development. The responsibility for defending strategic infrastructure is being partially transferred from the state to private companies because the state lacks sufficient resources. There may be a practical logic to this arrangement.
Energy companies can procure specialized counter-drone systems more rapidly than national governments. Private point-defense systems can protect a specific oil field or gas facility without requiring Baghdad to construct an immediate nationwide missile shield. But there are also obvious dangers.
A country cannot build a coherent national security architecture by allowing every major company to create its own private defensive bubble. That approach produces unequal protection.
Strategically important facilities may be defended while surrounding communities remain exposed. Wealthy companies may acquire advanced systems while public infrastructure cannot. And multiple independent systems may operate without full integration into a national command structure. The solution may be necessary in the short term. It cannot become Iraq's long-term substitute for national air defense.
The September Deadline and the Strategic Clock
The approaching Sept. 30 Coalition deadline has transformed a long-term modernization problem into an immediate strategic emergency. Baghdad has three broad options.
The first is to unlock financing and resume payments for the South Korean systems. This would preserve Iraq's most ambitious medium-range air-defense acquisition, although the systems would still require time to manufacture, deliver and integrate.
The second is to negotiate an extended or modified form of U.S. military and technical presence capable of preserving critical air-defense and intelligence capabilities during the transition.
The third is to accept a period of vulnerability and rely on limited Iraqi systems, private counter-drone defenses and improvised arrangements until a more comprehensive national architecture becomes operational. None of these options is ideal.
The first requires money Baghdad may not currently possess. The second could conflict with political demands for greater Iraqi sovereignty and the end of the Coalition mission. The third creates precisely the kind of security vacuum that Iran-aligned armed groups and other regional actors may seek to exploit.
This is why Iraq's air-defense crisis is ultimately a crisis of strategic timing. The threat is present now. The systems Iraq needs may arrive years later.
Iraq Cannot Buy Its Way Out of This Crisis Overnight
Baghdad's instinct to accelerate procurement is understandable. But there is a danger in believing that air sovereignty can be purchased through a single major contract. The Cheongung-II deal is important. But it is not a complete answer. Iraq needs a layered national strategy that prioritizes threats according to urgency.
First, Baghdad must protect critical infrastructure immediately through counter-drone systems and point defenses. Second, it must establish an integrated command-and-control architecture capable of linking different radars and weapons systems. Third, it must resolve the financing and delivery of medium- and long-range systems. Fourth, Iraq needs a sustainable defense budget that does not collapse whenever oil revenues come under pressure. And fifth, Baghdad and Erbil must establish a clearer framework for protecting the Kurdistan Region within a national defense architecture.
That final issue is particularly important. Iraq cannot credibly claim complete sovereignty over its skies while one of its most strategically exposed regions depends on foreign systems or private contractors for protection.
The Real Test of Iraqi Sovereignty
The drone strike against the Kurdistan Region's leadership was not simply another security incident. It was a warning. Iraq's skies are becoming a battlefield in which state and non-state actors can test Baghdad's weaknesses at relatively low cost. A sophisticated drone may cost a fraction of the missile system required to intercept it. That asymmetry will define the future of warfare.
For Iraq, the problem is particularly severe because its institutional transition is occurring at the same moment as the regional threat environment is becoming more complex. Baghdad wants to assume full responsibility for national security. But responsibility without capability is not sovereignty.
The stalled South Korean deal has therefore become symbolic of a much larger national problem. Iraq knows what it needs to defend its territory. It has identified potential suppliers and announced ambitious modernization plans.
What remains uncertain is whether it can finance, integrate and deploy those capabilities before its existing security umbrella disappears. For the Kurdistan Region, the consequences could be immediate. For Baghdad, the consequences could be historic.
The future of Iraq's air defense will determine more than whether the country can intercept the next drone or missile. It will determine whether Iraq can finally transform formal sovereignty into real control over its own skies.
Further Reading on Kurdish Policy Analysis
About the Author
Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a geopolitical analyst and founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis. His work focuses on Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, Middle Eastern security, energy, geopolitics and the changing regional order.
#Iraq #Kurdistan #AirDefense #Security #MiddleEast #Iran #SouthKorea #Drones #Geopolitics #IraqiAirspace
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