Iraq’s September 30 militia disarmament deadline is exposing a deeper struggle over sovereignty as Iran-backed factions resist Baghdad’s authority and seek to preserve their weapons and political power.

By Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj

Iraq is approaching a deadline that could determine whether the state is finally prepared to confront one of the country’s most persistent structural contradictions: the existence of armed organizations that operate simultaneously inside and outside the state. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has set September 30 as the deadline for independent armed groups to surrender their weapons to the Iraqi state, but the behavior of Iran-backed factions suggests that the real contest is no longer simply about disarmament. It is about who gets to define the meaning of state authority in Iraq—and whether Tehran’s armed partners will accept a political order in which the government, rather than the militia, possesses the final monopoly over force.

The recent detention and rapid release of Abbas Hussein al-Yaqoubi illustrates the problem. Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service detained Yaqoubi, an official associated with both Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and the Popular Mobilization Forces, before releasing him less than 24 hours later. The New Arab’s report on the arrest The episode may appear minor compared with Iraq’s larger security challenges, but politically it is highly revealing: when an individual connected to a U.S.-designated organization can be arrested by an Iraqi counterterrorism institution and then quickly released, it raises questions about whether Baghdad possesses the political capacity to enforce its own decisions against powerful militia networks.

The contradiction is embedded in the structure of the Popular Mobilization Forces itself. The PMF was incorporated into Iraq’s formal security architecture, but several of its most powerful components remain deeply connected to Iran and maintain political, military and economic influence beyond conventional state institutions. The result is a hybrid security system in which the distinction between state actor and non-state actor becomes blurred. Iraq can therefore declare that all weapons must ultimately come under government control while simultaneously maintaining institutions through which militia power remains embedded inside the state.

This is precisely why Tehran appears to be treating the September deadline as a negotiation rather than an ultimatum. The issue is not simply whether militias will physically surrender rifles, rockets, drones or heavier weapons. The deeper question is whether Iran-backed factions will surrender the strategic autonomy that allows them to influence Iraqi politics, pressure foreign forces, control economic networks and preserve an independent deterrent against both domestic and external rivals. If weapons are merely hidden, relocated or transferred into nominally state-controlled structures while the same commanders retain political and economic authority, Baghdad could declare victory while the underlying militia system survives intact.

Tehran’s Message to Baghdad: Preserve the Weapons, Avoid the Clash

The most significant development may have occurred not in Baghdad but within Tehran's strategic calculations. IRGC-Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani reportedly traveled to Baghdad on August 10 to meet militia leaders and Shiite political figures over the disarmament question. Shafaq News report on Qaani’s Baghdad meetings According to reports, Qaani encouraged factions to retain their weapons as leverage against Washington while avoiding direct confrontation with Iraqi security forces. Alhurra’s report on Qaani’s instructions

That distinction is crucial. Tehran does not necessarily need its proxies to fight Baghdad to defeat the disarmament initiative. It may be enough for the militias to delay, negotiate, compartmentalize and preserve their arsenals until the political environment changes. This is a familiar model of strategic endurance: avoid an unnecessary confrontation when time itself can become an ally.

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba has already rejected calls for disarmament, reinforcing the argument that the September deadline will not automatically translate into compliance. Previous analysis of Iraq's voluntary disarmament initiative has highlighted the structural difficulty of expecting powerful Iran-backed factions to surrender their military autonomy simply through political negotiation. FDD analysis on voluntary militia disarmament in Iraq

At the same time, the fact that several factions have agreed to disarm should not be dismissed. It suggests that Iran's militia ecosystem is not completely unified and that some groups may calculate that integration into the Iraqi state offers greater long-term political and economic benefits than maintaining an independent armed structure. But partial compliance could become politically useful to Tehran if it creates the appearance of progress while allowing the most strategically important factions to retain their capabilities.

The distinction between symbolic and substantive disarmament will therefore become increasingly important. Baghdad should not measure success by the number of weapons publicly handed over. It should measure whether militia organizations have surrendered independent command structures, weapons stockpiles, intelligence networks, financing mechanisms and the ability to mobilize forces without authorization from the Iraqi state.

Ghalibaf’s Visit Reveals the Iranian Stakes

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s arrival in Baghdad on August 19 added another layer to the pressure campaign. Shafaq News report on Ghalibaf’s Baghdad visit His meetings with senior Iraqi political leaders, including members of the Coordination Framework, demonstrate that Tehran is approaching the militia question simultaneously through military and political channels.

Reports that Tehran has proposed ways to hide, relocate or protect militia weapons until a political agreement acceptable to Iran and the factions emerges are particularly significant. Asharq Al-Awsat’s report on Iran’s proposals in Baghdad If accurate, the strategy would effectively transform the September 30 deadline from a disarmament deadline into a deadline for finding a mechanism to preserve militia capabilities under altered political and institutional arrangements.

This is where the confrontation between Baghdad and Tehran becomes strategically complicated. Iran does not need to openly challenge Iraqi sovereignty to undermine the disarmament process. It can work through Iraqi political parties, militia commanders and institutional structures to ensure that the weapons issue remains permanently negotiable.

The Coordination Framework Is Negotiating With Its Own Security Constituency

The formation of a committee by Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework to negotiate with armed factions highlights another structural problem. 964media’s report on the Coordination Framework committee The Iraqi political system is effectively asking political actors with longstanding relationships to armed groups to persuade those same groups to surrender the military capabilities that helped create their political influence in the first place.

Hadi al-Ameri is particularly important in this context. As leader of the Badr Organization and a prominent figure within the Coordination Framework, Ameri has credibility with Iran-backed factions and has historically occupied the space between Iraqi political institutions and Tehran's security network. Kurdistan24’s report on Ameri’s role Badr's historical relationship with Iran is especially important because it represents one of Tehran's oldest political and military partnerships in Iraq. Hudson Institute analysis of the Badr Organization

Ameri may therefore be capable of facilitating a negotiated settlement, but his involvement also illustrates the limits of the process. A negotiator who belongs to the political ecosystem that benefits from militia influence may seek a compromise that preserves the political architecture surrounding armed groups rather than dismantling it.

The demands being placed on Baghdad reinforce this problem. Badr has reportedly called for the completion of the planned U.S. troop withdrawal, the elimination of strategic threats against Iraq and the complete rebuilding of the Iraqi armed forces. These demands are presented as conditions for the broader disarmament process, but they effectively transform the question from "Will the militias surrender their weapons?" into "What must the Iraqi state and its foreign partners concede before the militias agree to surrender them?"

That is a fundamentally different negotiation.

The Peshmerga Is Being Pulled Into the Bargaining Process

Perhaps the most revealing demand comes from Kataib Hezbollah, which has reportedly called for the departure of U.S. and Turkish forces as well as the disarmament of the Kurdish Peshmerga. Kataib Hezbollah-linked demands reported on X

This demand deserves particular scrutiny because the Peshmerga is not equivalent to an Iran-backed militia. The Kurdistan Region's forces operate within Iraq's constitutional and institutional framework and have fought alongside the United States and other international partners against ISIS. Treating the Peshmerga as simply another independent armed faction would therefore create a false equivalence between constitutionally recognized regional security forces and organizations whose leadership and military structures have been closely tied to Iran.

This distinction is strategically important for Baghdad and Washington. Any disarmament framework that weakens the Peshmerga while allowing Iran-backed groups to retain political, financial or military leverage would not create a stronger Iraqi state. It would instead alter the internal balance of power in favor of the factions most closely aligned with Tehran.

That would be particularly dangerous for the Kurdistan Region. The Peshmerga remains an important component of Iraq's security architecture, particularly in areas where ISIS remnants can exploit gaps between federal and Kurdish forces. A weakened Peshmerga could create security vacuums that neither Baghdad nor Erbil would be immediately capable of filling.

The Real Test Is Whether Baghdad Can Enforce Sovereignty

The central issue facing Prime Minister Zaidi is therefore not whether he can announce a disarmament policy. Iraqi governments have repeatedly declared their commitment to the state's monopoly over weapons. The harder question is whether Baghdad can enforce that principle when enforcement threatens the interests of politically powerful factions.

The Yaqoubi episode is instructive precisely because it demonstrates the gap between formal authority and practical authority. An Iraqi security institution can arrest a militia-linked figure, but if political pressure results in his rapid release, the message received by other armed groups is that state authority has boundaries—and those boundaries are negotiated by political power.

That is how parallel sovereignty develops. It does not require militias to formally declare independence from the state. It emerges when armed organizations understand that the government cannot impose costs on them without triggering political consequences severe enough to force retreat.

The danger is that Iraq could end up with a disarmament process that changes the appearance of the security landscape without changing its underlying power structure. Weapons could disappear from public view while remaining available to commanders. Militia offices could become political organizations while retaining clandestine military networks. And the PMF could become even more deeply institutionalized without undergoing the command, accountability and organizational reforms necessary to separate the Iraqi state from foreign-backed armed groups.

That would be the worst possible outcome: not disarmament, but institutionalized ambiguity.

Washington Should Focus on Capability, Not Ceremony

The United States also faces a difficult policy choice. Washington should support genuine Iraqi efforts to consolidate state authority, but it should avoid treating the physical transfer of weapons as sufficient evidence of militia demobilization. Previous reporting has highlighted concerns about the continued political role of leaders affiliated with U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. The New Arab’s reporting on U.S. conditions for armed groups

The United States should therefore distinguish between disarmament, demobilization and political normalization. A faction should not be able to surrender a portion of its arsenal while preserving the networks through which it can intimidate opponents, influence ministries, dominate economic sectors or mobilize armed supporters.

Washington should also make clear that additional sanctions remain available for commanders and financial networks that obstruct genuine disarmament. But sanctions should be part of a broader strategy rather than the strategy itself. The objective should be to create incentives for Iraq's political system to absorb legitimate political actors while making it increasingly costly to maintain independent armed structures.

The same principle applies to the PMF. The institution cannot simply be strengthened indefinitely without addressing the question of who commands its constituent factions, who controls their weapons and who determines their operational priorities. Strengthening the PMF without meaningful reform risks strengthening the very networks that Baghdad claims it is attempting to bring under state control.

September 30 Is a Political Deadline, Not Yet a Security Solution

The September 30 deadline should therefore be understood as the beginning of a larger struggle rather than its conclusion. Tehran's strategy appears designed to prevent the deadline from becoming a clean break: retain weapons, avoid confrontation with Iraqi forces, negotiate through political allies and wait for circumstances to make disarmament less urgent.

Baghdad has a different strategic opportunity. If Zaidi can establish that the state possesses the authority to investigate, arrest, prosecute and disarm armed actors regardless of their political connections, he could begin rebuilding the credibility of Iraqi sovereignty. But if the deadline produces another round of exemptions, political bargains and hidden weapons, the episode will reinforce the opposite lesson.

For the Kurdistan Region, the stakes are equally significant. Any national security settlement that places the Peshmerga on the same footing as Iran-backed militias would distort Iraq's constitutional security architecture and could weaken one of the country's most important counter-ISIS partners. The Kurdish leadership should therefore insist that any national disarmament framework clearly distinguish between constitutionally recognized regional forces and unauthorized armed organizations.

Ultimately, Iraq's militia problem is not fundamentally a weapons problem. It is a sovereignty problem. The country can collect thousands of weapons and still fail to establish a monopoly over force if the organizations that once controlled those weapons retain their political networks, financial power and ability to mobilize violence.

The approaching deadline will therefore answer a much larger question than whether Iraq's militias surrender their guns. It will reveal whether Baghdad is finally capable of making its laws binding on the most powerful armed actors in the country—or whether Tehran's proxies have become sufficiently embedded in Iraq's political system to remain above the law.

Further Reading

For further context on the struggle between Baghdad, Iran-backed militias, and the Iraqi state, read “Baghdad’s Militia Test: Can Iraq Confront Iran’s Armed Proxies?” by Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj, which examines whether the Iraqi government has the political and security capacity to challenge Tehran’s armed networks. 

About the Author

Dr. Pshtiwan Faraj is a political and geopolitical analyst and founder of Kurdish Policy Analysis, focusing on Kurdistan, Iraq, Iran, regional security, geopolitics and strategic affairs.

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